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CHARACTERISTICS

OF

MANNERS, OBSERVED BY

WITH

A COLLECTION OF LETTERS

BY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

TOMY EARL OF CHASTELAIN

VOL. III.

BASIL:

Printed by J. J. TOURNEISEN; and J. S. WILSON

MDCCXC.

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CHARACTERISTICS
OF
MEN, MANNERS, OPINIONS, TIMES,
WITH
A COLLECTION OF LETTERS.
BY THE RIGHT HONORABLE
ANTONY EARL OF SHAFTESBURY.

V O L. III.

B A S I L :

Printed for J. J. TOURNEISEN; and J. L. LEGRAND.

M D C C X C.

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OF

THE MANNERS, OPINIONS, TIMES,

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C O N T E N T S.

O F T H E

T H I R D V O L U M E.

Miscellaneous Reflections on the preceding
treatises, and other critical subjects. Page 1

A notion of the Tablature, or Judgment of
Hercules. 289

W I T H

A Letter concerning Design. 329

CONTENTS

OF THE

THIRD VOLUME.

Miscellaneous Reflections on the preceding
articles, and other critical subjects. Page 1

A notice of the Tablature, or Judgment of
Hercules. 289

WITH

A Letter concerning Design. 329

MISCELLANEOUS REFLECTIONS.

T R E A T I S E VI.

C H A P T E R I.

V I Z.

MISCELLANEOUS REFLECTIONS.

It is well known to the world, that that charitable and
considerate author, who, for the common benefit
of his fellow-authors, introduced the ingenious
way of Miscellaneous writing!—It must be
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T R E A T I S E V I

V I Z

MISCELLANEOUS REFLECTIONS

Hor. fac. r. lib. 2.
Zeitlich was ephor dinstall, nache ein nuch.

MISCELLANEOUS REFLECTIONS.

MISCELLANY I.

CHAP. I.

Of the nature, rise, and establishment of MISCELLANIES.

———*The subject of these which follow.*———*Intention of the writer.*

PEACE be with the soul of that charitable and courteous author, who, for the common benefit of his fellow-authors, introduced the ingenious way of Miscellaneous writing!——It must be owned, that since this happy method was established, the harvest of wit has been more plentiful, and the laborers more in number than heretofore. It is well known to the able practitioners in the writing art, “That as easy as it is to conceive
“ wit, it is the hardest thing imaginable to be
“ delivered of it, upon certain terms.” Nothing could be more severe or rigid than the conditions formerly prescribed to writers, when Criticism took place, and regularity and order were thought essential in a treatise. The notion of a genuine work, a legitimate and just piece, has certainly

been the occasion of great timidity and backwardness among the adventurers in wit: and the imposition of such strict laws and rules of composition, has sat heavy on the free spirits and forward geniuses of mankind. It was a yoke, it seems, which our forefathers bore; but which, for our parts, we have generously thrown off. In effect, the invidious distinctions of bastardy and legitimacy being at length removed, the natural and lawful issue of the brain comes with like advantage into the world: and wit (mere Wit) is well received, without examination of the kind, or censure of the form.

This the Miscellaneous manner of writing, it must be owned, has happily effected. It has rendered almost every soil productive. It has disclosed those various seeds of wit, which lay suppressed in many a bosom; and has reared numberless conceits and curious fancies, which the natural rudeness and asperity of their native soil would have withheld, or at least not have permitted to rise above the ground. From every field, from every hedge or hillock, we now gather as delicious fruits and fragrant flowers, as of old from the richest and best cultivated gardens. Miserable were those ancient planters, who, understanding not how to conform themselves to the rude taste of unpolished mankind, made it so difficult a task to serve the world with intellectual entertainments, and furnish out the repasts of literature and science.

There was certainly a time when the name

of Author stood for something considerable in the world. To succeed happily in such a labor as that of writing a treatise or a poem, was taken as a sure mark of understanding and good sense. The task was painful: but, it seems, it was honorable. How the case happened, in process of time to be so much reversed, is hard to say. The primitive authors perhaps being few in number, and highly respected for their art, fell under the weight of envy. Being sensible of their misfortune in this respect, and being excited, as it is probable, by the example of some popular genius, they quitted their regular schemes and accurate forms of workmanship, in favor of those wits who could not possibly be received as Authors upon such difficult terms. It was necessary, it seems, that the bottom of wit should be enlarged. It was advisable that more hands should be taken into the work. And nothing could better serve this popular purpose, than the way of Miscellany, or common Essay; in which the most confused head, if fraught with a little invention, and provided with common-place-book-learning, might exert itself to as much advantage as the most orderly and well-settled judgment.

To explain the better how this revolution in letters has been effected, it may not perhaps be indecent, should we offer to compare our writing-artists to the manufacturers in stuff or silk. For among these it is esteemed a principal piece of skill to frame a pattern, or plan of workmanship, in which the several colors are agreeably disposed;

with such proportionable adjustment of the various figures and devices, as may, in the whole, create a kind of harmony to the eye. According to this method, each piece must be, in reality, an original. For to copy what has gone before, can be of no use. The fraud would easily be perceived. On the other side, to work originally, and in a manner create each time anew, must be a matter of pressing weight, and fitted to the strength and capacity of none besides the choicest workmen.

A manner therefore is invented to confound this simplicity and conformity of design. Patchwork is substituted. Cuttings and shreds of learning, with various fragments, and points of wit, are drawn together, and tacked in any fantastic form. If they chance to cast a lustre, and spread a sort of sprightly glare, the Miscellany is approved, and the complex form and texture of the work admired. The eye, which before was to be won by regularity, and had kept true to measure and strict proportion, is by this means pleasingly drawn aside, to commit a kind of debauch, and amuse itself in gaudy colors, and disfigured shapes of things. Custom, in the mean while, has not only tolerated this licentiousness, but rendered it even commendable, and brought it into the highest repute. The wild and whimsical, under the name of the odd and pretty, succeed in the room of the graceful and the beautiful. Justness and accuracy of thought are set aside, as too constraining, and of too painful an aspect to be endured

in the agreeable and more easy commerce of gallantry, and modern wit.

Now, since it has been thought convenient, in these latter ages, to distinguish the provinces of Wit and Wisdom, and set apart the agreeable from the useful, it is evident there could be nothing devised more suitable to the distinct and separate interest of the former of these provinces, than this complex manner of performance which we call Miscellany. For whatever is capricious and odd, is sure to create diversion, to those who look no further. And where there is nothing like nature, there is no room for the troublesome part of thought or contemplation. It is the perfection of certain grotesque-painters, to keep as far from nature as possible. To find a likeness in their works, is to find the greatest fault imaginable. A natural connexion is a slur. A coherence, a design, a meaning, is against their purpose, and destroys the very spirit and genius of their workmanship.

I remember formerly when I was a spectator in the French theatre, I found it the custom, at the end of every grave and solemn tragedy, to introduce a comic farce, or Miscellany, which they called the little piece. We have indeed a method still more extraordinary upon our own stage. For we think it agreeable and just, to mix the little piece or farce with the main plot or fable through every act. This perhaps may be the rather chosen, because our tragedy is so much deeper and bloodier than that of the French, and therefore needs

more immediate refreshment from the elegant way of drollery, and burlesque wit; which being thus closely interwoven with its opposite, makes that most accomplished kind of theatrical Miscellany, called by our poets tragi-comedy.

I could go further perhaps, and demonstrate, from the writings of many of our grave divines, the speeches of our senators, and other principal models of our national erudition, "That the Miscellaneous manner is at present in the highest esteem." But since my chief intention in the following sheets is to descant cursorily upon some late pieces of a British author, I will presume, that what I have said already on this head is sufficient; and that it will not be judged improper or absurd in me, as I proceed, to take advantage of this miscellaneous taste which now evidently prevails. According to this method, whilst I serve as critic or interpreter to this new writer, I may the better correct his phlegm, and give him more of the fashionable air and manner of the world; especially in what relates to the subject and manner of his two last pieces, which are contained in his second volume. For these being of the more regular and formal kind, may easily be oppressive to the airy reader; and may therefore, with the same assurance as tragedy, claim the necessary relief of the little piece or farce above-mentioned.

Nor ought the title of a Miscellaneous writer to be denied me, on the account that I have grounded my miscellanies upon a certain set of treatises already published. Grounds and foundations

are of no moment in a kind of work, which, according to modern establishment, has properly neither top nor bottom, beginning nor end. Besides, that I shall no way confine myself to the precise contents of these treatises; but, like my fellow-miscellanarians, shall take occasion to vary often from my proposed subject, and make what deviations or excursions I shall think fit, as I proceed in my random Essays.

C H A P. II.

Of controversial writings: answers: replies. — — —
 Polemic divinity; or the writing church-militant.
 — — — Philosophers, and bear-garden. — — —
 Authors paired and matched. — — — The match-
 makers. — — — Foot-ball. — — — A dialogue be-
 tween our author and his bookseller.

AMONG the many improvements daily made in the art of writing, there is none perhaps which can be said to have attained a greater height than that of controversy, or the method of answer and refutation. It is true indeed, that anciently the wits of men were for the most part taken up in other employment. If authors writ ill, they were despised; if well, they were by some party or other espoused. For parties there would necessarily be, and sects of every kind, in learning and philosophy. Every one sided with whom he liked; and having the liberty of hearing each side speak

for itself, stood in no need of express warning-pieces against pretended sophistry or dangerous reasoning. Particular answers to single treatises, were thought to be of little use. And it was esteemed no compliment to a reader, to help him so carefully in the judgment of every piece which came abroad. Whatever sects there were in those days, the zeal of party-causes ran not so high as to give the reader a taste of those personal reproaches, which might pass in a debate between the different party-men.

Thus matters stood of old; when as yet the method of writing controversy was not raised into an art, nor the feuds of contending authors become the chief amusement of the learned world. But we have at present so high a relish of this kind, that the writings of the learned are never truly gustful, till they are come to what we may properly enough call their due ripeness, and have begot a fray. When the answer and reply is once formed, our curiosity is excited; we begin then, for the first time to whet our attention, and apply our ear.

For example: Let a zealous divine, and flaming champion of our faith, when inclined to show himself in print, make choice of some tremendous mystery of religion, opposed heretofore by some damnable heresiarch; whom having vehemently refuted, he turns himself towards the orthodox opinion, and supports the true belief, with the highest eloquence and profoundest erudition; he shall, notwithstanding this, remain perhaps in deep

obscurity, to the great affliction of his bookseller, and the regret of all who bear a just veneration for church-history, and the ancient purity of the Christian faith. But let it so happen, that, in this prosecution of his deceased adversary, our doctor raises up some living antagonist; who, on the same foot of orthodoxy with himself, pretends to arraign his expositions, and refute the refuter upon every article he has advanced; from this moment the writing gathers life, the public listens, the bookseller takes heart, and when issue is well joined, the repartees grown smart, and the contention vigorous between the learned parties, a ring is made, and readers gather in abundance. Every one takes party, and encourages his own side. “This shall be my champion! ——— This
“man for my money! ——— Well hit, on our side!
“—— Again, a good stroke! ——— There he was
“even with him! ——— Have at him the next
“bout!” ——— Excellent sport! and when the combatants are for a while drawn off, and each retired with his companions; what praises and congratulations! what applauses of the supposed victor! and how honorably is he saluted by his favorers, and complimented even to the disturbance of his modesty! “Nay, but gentlemen! —
“Good Gentlemen do you really think thus? —
“Are you sincere with me? ——— Have I treated
“my adversary as he deserves? Never
“was man so mauled. Why, you have
“killed him downright. O, Sirs! you
“flatter me. He can never rise more.

“ Think ye so indeed ? Or if he should,
“ it would be a pleasure to see how you would
“ handle him.”

These are the triumphs. This is what sets sharp; this gives the author his edge, and excites the reader's attention; when the trumpets are thus sounded to the crowd, and a kind of amphitheatrical entertainment exhibited to the multitude, by these gladiatorian penmen.

The author of the preceding treatises being by profession a nice inspector into the ridicule of things, must in all probability have raised to himself some such views as these, which hindered him from engaging in the way of controversy. For, when by accident, the first of these treatises¹ (a private letter, and, in the writer's esteem, little worthy of the public's notice) came to be read abroad in copies, and afterwards in print, the smartest answers which came out against it, could not, it seems, move our author to form any reply. All he was heard to say in return was, “ That he thought whoever had taken upon him
“ to publish a book in answer to that casual piece,
“ had certainly made either a very high compli-
“ ment to the author, or a very ill one to the
“ public.”

It must be owned, that when a writer of any kind is so considerable as to deserve the labor and pains of some shrewd heads to refute him in public, he may, in the quality of an author, be justly

¹ *Viz.* The letter concerning enthusiasm.

congratulated on that occasion. It is supposed necessarily, that he must have writ with some kind of ability or wit. But if his original performance be in truth no better than ordinary, his answerer's task must certainly be very mean. He must be very indifferently employed, who would take upon him to answer nonsense in form, ridicule what is of itself a jest, and put it upon the world to read a second book, for the sake of the impertinencies of a former.

Taking it, however, for granted, "That a sorry
" treatise may be the foundation of a considerable
" answer;" a reply still must certainly be ridiculous, whichever way we take it. For either the author, in his original piece, has been truly refuted, or not. If refuted, why does he defend? if not refuted, why trouble himself? What has the public to do with his private quarrels, or his adversary's impertinence? Or supposing the world, out of curiosity, may delight to see a pedant exposed by a man of better wit, and a controversy thus unequally carried on between two such opposite parties; how long is this diversion likely to hold good? and what will become of these polemic writings a few years hence? What is already become of those mighty controversies, with which some of the most eminent authors amused the world within the memory of the youngest scholar? An original work or two may perhaps remain; but for the subsequent defences, the answers, rejoinders, and replications; they have been long since paying their attendance to

the pastry-cooks. Mankind perhaps were heated at that time, when first those matters were debated: but they are now cool again. They laughed; they carried on the humor; they blew the coals; they teased, and set on, maliciously, and to create themselves diversion. But the jest is now over. No one so much as inquires where the wit was; or where possibly the sting should lie of those notable reflections and satirical hints, which were once found so pungent, and gave the readers such high delight. — Notable philosophers and divines, who can be contented to make sport, and write in learned Billingsgate, to divert the coffeehouse, and entertain the assemblies at book-sellers shops, or the more airy stalls of inferior book-retailers!

It must be allowed, that in this respect controversial writing is not so wholly unprofitable; and that for book-merchants of whatever kind or degree, they undoubtedly receive no small advantage from a right improvement of a learned scuffle. Nothing revives them more or makes a quicker trade, than a pair of substantial divines, or grave philosophers, well matched, and soundly backed; till, by long worrying one another, they are grown out of breath, and have almost lost their force of biting. — “So have I known a crafty
“glazier, in time of frost, procure a foot-ball,
“to draw into the street the emulous chiefs of
“the robust youth. The timid bladder bounds
“at every kick, bursts the withstanding casements,
“the chaffies, lanterns, and all the brittle vitre-

“ous ware. The noise of blows and outcries fills
“the whole neighbourhood; the ruins of glass
“cover the stony pavements, till the bloated
“battering engine, subdued by force of foot and
“fist, and yielding up its breath at many a fatal
“cranny, becomes lank and harmless, sinks in its
“flight, and can no longer uphold the spirit of
“the contending parties.”

This our author supposes to have been the occasion of his being so often and zealously complimented by his amanuensis, (for so he calls his bookseller or printer²), on the fame of his first piece. The obliging craftsman has at times presented him with many a handsome book, set off with titles of remarks, reflections, and the like, which, as he assured him, were Answers to his small treatise. “Here, Sir!” says he, “you have
“a considerable hand has undertaken you!——
“This Sir, is a reverend——This a right reverend——This a noted author——Will
“you not reply, Sir?——On my word, Sir,
“the world is in expectation.——Pity they
“should be disappointed! A dozen sheets, Sir,
“would be sufficient.——You might dispatch
“it presently. Think you so?
“I have my paper ready.——And a good
“letter.——Take my word for it.——
“You shall see, Sir! Enough. But hark
“ye (Mr A, a, a, a), my worthy engineer and
“manager of the war of letters! Ere you prepare

² Vol. I. p. 262.

“ your artillery, or engage me in acts of hostility,
 “ let me hear, I intreat you, whether or no my
 “ adversary be taken notice of. — Wait for his
 “ second edition. And if by next year, or year
 “ or two after, it be known in good company,
 “ that there is such a book in being, I shall then
 “ perhaps think it time to consider of a reply.”

C H A P. III.

Of the letter concerning enthusiasm. — Foreign critics. — Of letters in general; and of the epistolary style. — Addresses to great men — Authors and horsemanship. — The modern amble. — Further explanation of the Miscellaneous manner.

AS resolute as our author may have shown himself in refusing to take notice of the smart writings published against him by certain zealots of his own country, he could not, it seems, but out of curiosity observe what the foreign and more impartial critics might object to his small treatise, which he was surpris'd to hear had been translated into foreign languages, soon after it had been published here at home. The first censure of this kind which came to our author's sight, was that of the *Paris Journal des sçavans*¹. Considering how little favorable the author of the letter had shown himself towards the Romish

¹ Du 25 Mars 1709.

church, and policy of France, it must be owned those journalists have treated him with sufficient candor; though they failed not to take what advantages they well could against the writing, and particularly arraigned it for the want of order and method².

The Protestant writers, such as live in a free country, and can deliver their sentiments without constraint, have certainly done our author more honor than he ever presumed to think he could deserve³. His translator indeed, who had done him the previous honor of introducing him to the acquaintance of the foreign world, represents particularly, by the turn given to the latter end of the letter, that the writer of it was, as to his condition and rank, little better than an inferior dependent on the Noble Lord to whom he had addressed himself. And in reality, the original has so much of that air, that I wonder not, if what the author left ambiguous, the translator has determined to the side of clientship and dependency.

But whatever may have been the circumstance or character of our author himself, that of his great friend ought in justice to have been considered by those former critics above-mentioned.

² Ses pensées ne semblent occuper dans son ouvrage, que la place que le hazard leur a donnée. *Ibid.* p. 181.

³ (1.) Bibliothèque choisie, année 1709. tome 19. p. 427.

(2.) Histoire des ouvrages des savans, mois d'Octobre, Novembre, et Decembre 1708. p. 514. (3.) Nouvelles de la republique des lettres, mois de Mars 1710.

So much at least should have been taken notice of, that there was a real Great Man characterized, and suitable measures of address and style preserved. But they who would neither observe this, nor apprehend the letter itself to be real, were insufficient critics, and unqualified to judge of the turn or humor of a piece, which they had never considered in a proper light.

It is become indeed so common a practice among authors, to feign a correspondence, and give the title of a private letter, to a piece addressed solely to the public, that it would not be strange to see other journalists and critics, as well as the gentlemen of Paris, pass over such particularities, as things of form. This prejudice, however, could not misguide a chief critic of the protestant side; when mentioning this letter concerning enthusiasm⁴, he speaks of it as a real letter, (such as in truth it was), not a precise and formal Treatise⁵, designed for public view.

It will be owned surely, by those who have learned to judge of elegance and wit by the help merely of modern languages, that we could have little relish of the best letters of a Balsac or

⁴ Ceux qui l'ont lue ont pu voir en général, que l'auteur ne s'y est pas proposé un certain plan, pour traiter sa matiere methodiquement; parceque c'est une lettre, et non un traité. *Bibliothèque Choisie. Ibid. p. 428.*

⁵ If in this joint edition, with other works, the letter be made to pass under that general name of *treatise*; it is the bookseller must account for it. For the author's part, he considers it as no other than what it originally was.

Voiture,

Voiture, were we wholly ignorant of the characters of the principal persons to whom those letters were actually written. But much less could we find pleasure in this reading, should we take it into our heads, that both the personages and correspondence itself were merely fictitious. Let the best of Tully's epistles be read in such a narrow view as this, and they will certainly prove very insipid. If a real Brutus, a real Atticus be not supposed, there will be no real Cicero. The elegant writer will disappear: as will the vast labor and art with which this eloquent Roman writ those letters to his illustrious friends. There was no kind of composition in which this great author prided or pleased himself more than in this; where he endeavoured to throw off the mien of the philosopher and orator, whilst in effect he employed both his rhetoric and philosophy with the greatest force. They who can read an epistle or satire of Horace in somewhat better than a mere scholastic relish, will comprehend, that the concealment of order and method, in this manner of writing, makes the chief beauty of the work. They will own, that unless a reader be in some measure apprized of the characters of an Augustus, a Mæcenas, a Florus, or a Trebatius, there will be little relish in those satires or epistles addressed in particular to the courtiers, ministers, and great men of the times. Even the Satiric, or Miscellaneous manner of the polite ancients, required as much order as the most regular pieces. But the art was to destroy every such token or appearance, give

an extemporary air to what was writ, and make the effect of art be felt, without discovering the artifice. There needs no further explanation on this head. Our author himself has said enough in his advice to an Author⁶, particularly where he treats of the simple style, in contradiction to the learned, the formal, or methodic.

It is a different case indeed, when the title of epistle is improperly given to such works as were never writ in any other view than that of being made public, or to serve as exercises or specimens of the wit of their composer. Such were those infinite numbers of Greek and Latin epistles, writ by the ancient sophists, grammarians, or rhetoricians; where we find the real character of the epistle, the genuine style and manners of the corresponding parties sometimes imitated; but at other times not so much as aimed at, nor any measures of historical truth preserved. Such perhaps we may esteem even the letters of a Seneca⁷

⁶ Vol. I. p. 201. 221, 222.

⁷ It is not the *person*, *character*, or *genius*, but the *style* and manner of this great man, which we presume to censure. We acknowledge his noble sentiments and worthy actions. We own the *patriot* and *good minister*: but we reject the *writer*. He was the first of any note or worth, who gave credit to that *false style* and manner here spoken of. He might, on this account, be called in reality the *corrupter of Roman eloquence*. This indeed could not but naturally, and of itself, become relax and dissolute, after such a relaxation and dissolution of manners, consequent to the change of government, and to the horrid luxury and effeminacy of the *Roman court*, even before the time of a *Claudius*, or a *Nero*. There

to his friend Lucilius. Or supposing that philosophical courtier had really such a correspondency; and, at several times, had sent so many fair epistles, honestly signed and sealed, to his country-friend at a distance; it appears, however, by the

was no more possibility of making a stand for language, than for liberty. As the world now stood, the highest glory which could be attained by mortal man, was to be mitigator or moderator of that universal tyranny already established. To this I must add, that in every city, principality, or smaller nation, where *single* Will prevails, and court-power, instead of laws and constitutions, guides the state; it is of the highest difficulty for the best minister to procure a just, or even a tolerable administration. Where such a minister is found, who can but moderately influence the petty tyranny, he deserves considerable applause and honor. But in the case we have mentioned, where a universal monarchy was actually established, and the interest of a whole world concerned; he surely must have been esteemed a guardian-angel, who, as a *prime minister*, could, for several years, turn the very worst of courts, and worst-conditioned of all princes, to the fatherly care and just government of mankind. Such a *minister* was *Seneca* under an *Agrippina* and a *Nero*. And such he was acknowledged by the ancient and never sparing *satirists*, who could not forbear to celebrate, withal, his *generosity* and *friendship* in a private life:

*Nemo petit modicis quæ mittebantur amicis
A Seneca: quæ Piso bonus, quæ Cotta solebat
Largiri: namque et titulis, et facibus olim
Major habebatur donandi gloria.*

Juvenal. sat. 5.

— — — — — *Quis tam
Perditus, ut dubitet Senecam præferre Neroni?*

Id. sat. 8.

epistles themselves, in their proper order, (if they may be said to have any), that, after a few attempts at the beginning, the author by degrees loses sight of his correspondent, and takes the world in general for his reader or disciple. He falls into the random way of miscellaneous writing; says every where great and noble things, in and out of the way, accidentally as words led him, (for with these he plays perpetually); with infinite wit, but with little or no coherence; without a shape or body to his work; without a real beginning, a middle, or an end^{*}. Of a hundred

This remark is what I have been tempted to make by the way, on the *character* of this *Roman* author, more mistaken (if I am not very much so myself) than any other so generally studied. As for the *philosophic* character or function imputed to him, it was foreign, and no way proper or peculiar to one who never assumed so much as that of *sophist*, or *pensionary teacher of philosophy*. He was far wide of any such order or profession. There is great difference between a courtier who takes a fancy for philosophy, and a philosopher who should take a fancy for a court. Now, *Seneca* was born a *courtier*; being son of a court-rhetor; himself bred in the same manner, and taken into favor for his wit and genius, his admired style and eloquence; not for his learning in the books of philosophy and the ancients. For this indeed was not very profound in him. In short, he was a man of wonderful wit, fluency of thoughts and language, an *able minister*, and *honest courtier*. And what has been delivered down to his prejudice, is by the common enemy of all the free and generous *Romans*, that apish shallow historian, and court-flatterer, *Dion Cassius*, of a low age, when barbarism (as may be easily seen in his own work) came on apace, and the very traces and features of virtue, science, and knowledge, were wearing out of the world.

^{*} *Infra*, Misc. 5. chap. 1. parag. 6. from the end, in the notes; and vol. 1. p. 126.

and twenty-four epistles, you may, if you please, make five hundred or half a score. A great one, for instance, you may divide into five or six. A little one you may tack to another; and that to another; and so on. The unity of the writing will be the same; the life and spirit full as well preserved. It is not only whole letters or pages you may change and manage thus at pleasure: every period, every sentence almost is independent; and may be taken asunder, transposed, postponed, anticipated, or set in any new order, as you fancy.

This is the manner of writing so much admired and imitated in our age, that we have scarce the idea of any other model. We know little, indeed, of the difference between one model or character of writing and another. All runs to the same tune, and beats exactly one and the same measure. Nothing, one would think, could be more tedious than this uniform pace. The common Amble or Canterbury is not, I am persuaded, more tiresome to a good rider, than this see-saw of Essay-writers is to an able reader. The just composer of a legitimate piece is like an able traveller, who exactly measures his journey, considers his ground, premeditates his stages, and intervals of relaxation and intention, to the very conclusion of his undertaking, that he happily arrives where he first proposed when he set out. He is not presently upon the spur, or in his full career; but walks his steed leisurely out of his stable, fettles himself in his stirrups, and when fair road and season offer, puts on

perhaps to a round trot; thence into a gallop, and after a while takes up. As down or meadow, or shady lane present themselves, he accordingly suits his pace, favors his palfry; and is sure not to bring him puffing, and in heat, into his last inn. But the post-way is become highly fashionable with modern authors. The very same stroke sets you out, and brings you in. Nothing stays, or interrupts. Hill or valley; rough or smooth; thick or thin: no difference; no variation. When an author sits down to write, he knows no other business he has, than to be witty, and take care that his periods be well turned, or, as they commonly say, run smooth. In this manner, he doubts not to gain the character of bright. When he has writ as many pages as he likes, or as his run of fancy would permit, he then perhaps considers what name he had best give to his new writing; whether he should call it letter, essay, miscellany, or ought else. The bookseller perhaps is to determine this at last, when all, besides the preface, epistle dedicatory, and title-page, is dispatched.

— *Incertus Scamnum, faceretne Priapum.*

— *Deus inde ego!*

Hor. sat. 8. lib. 1,

MISCELLANY II.

C H A P. I.

Review of Enthusiasm. Its defence, praise: —

Use in business, as well as pleasure: — Operation by fear, love. — Modifications of enthusiasm: magnanimity; heroic virtue; honor; public zeal; religion; superstition; persecution; martyrdom. —

Energy of the ecstatic devotion in the tender sex.

— Account of ancient priesthood. — Religious war. — Reference to a succeeding chapter.

WHETHER in fact there be any real enchantment, any influence of stars, any power of dæmons or foreign natures over our own minds, is thought questionable by many. Some there are who assert the negative, and endeavour to solve the appearances of this kind by the natural operation of our passions, and the common course of outward things. For my own part, I cannot but at this present apprehend a kind of enchantment or magic in that which we call Enthusiasm; since I find, that having touched slightly on this subject, I cannot so easily part with it at pleasure.

After having made some cursory reflections on our author's letter¹, I thought I might have sufficiently acquitted myself on this head, till passing to his next treatise, I found myself still further engaged. I perceived plainly, that I had as yet scarce entered into our author's humor, or felt any thing of that passion, which, as he informs us, is so easily communicable and naturally engaging. But what I had passed over in my first reflections, I found naturally rising in me, upon second thoughts. So that by experience I proved it true what our author says², "That we all of us know something of this principle." And now that I find I have in reality so much of it imparted to me, I may with better reason be pardoned, if, after our author's example, I am led to write on such subjects as these, with caution, at different reprises; and not singly, in one breath.

I have heard indeed, that the very reading of treatises and accounts of melancholy, has been apt to generate that passion in the over-diligent and attentive reader. And this perhaps may have been the reason why our author himself (as he seems to intimate towards the conclusion of his first letter³) cared not in reality to grapple closely with his subject, or give us, at once, the precise definition of Enthusiasm. This, however, we may, with our author, presume to infer, from the coolest of

¹ *Viz.* Letter concerning Enthusiasm, above, vol. I. treatise I.

² Vol. I. p. 45, 46.

³ *Viz.* treatise I. (Letter of Enthusiasm), vol. I. p. 46.

all studies, even from criticism itself, (of which we have been lately treating⁴), "That there is
" a power in numbers, harmony, proportion,
" and beauty of every kind, which naturally cap-
" tivates the heart, and raises the imagination to
" an opinion or conceit of something majestic and
" divine."

Whatever this subject may be in itself, we cannot help being transported with the thought of it. It inspires us with something more than ordinary, and raises us above ourselves. Without this imagination or conceit, the world would be but a dull circumstance, and life a sorry pastime. Scarce could we be said to live. The animal functions might in their course be carried on; but nothing further sought for, or regarded. The gallant sentiments, the elegant fancies, the belle passions, which have, all of them, this Beauty in view, would be set aside, and leave us probably no other employment than that of satisfying our coarsest appetites at the cheapest rate, in order to the attainment of a supine state of indolence and inactivity.

Slender would be the enjoyments of the lover, the ambitious man, the warrior, or the virtuoso, (as our author has elsewhere⁵ intimated), if in the beauties which they admire, and passionately pursue, there were no reference or regard to any higher majesty or grandeur, than what simply

⁴ Inquiry conc. Virtue, Book 1. p. 3. § 3. Book 4. p. 2. § 3. and The Moralists, p. 3. § 2. in vol. 2.

⁵ The Moralists, p. 3. Sect. 2. in vol. 2.

results from the particular objects of their pursuit. I know not, in reality, what we should do to find a seasoning to most of our pleasures in life, were it not for the taste or relish which is owing to this particular passion, and the conceit or imagination which supports it. Without this, we could not so much as admire a poem, or a picture; a garden, or a palace; a charming shape, or a fair face. Love itself would appear the lowest thing in nature, when thus anticipated, and treated according to the anti-enthusiastic poet's method:

Et jacere humorem collectum in corpora quaque.*

How heroism or magnanimity must stand in this hypothesis, is easy to imagine. The Muses themselves must make a very indifferent figure in this philosophical draught. Even the prince of poets[†] would prove a most insipid writer, if he were thus reduced. Nor could there, according to this scheme, be yet a place of honor left even for our Latin poet[‡], the great disciple of this unpolite philosophy, who dares with so little equity employ the Muses' art in favor of such a system. But in spite of his philosophy, he every where gives way to admiration, and rapturous views of Nature. He is transported with the several beauties of the

* Lucret. lib. 4.

† Οὐδὲν μέρος Ὀμήρῳ ἄλλεον, ἔδδ' ἐδυνάσθ' ἄπορον, ἔδδ' ἀρχῆς ἔρημον, ἀλλὰ πάντα μεσὰ θεῶν ὀνομάτων ἢ θεῶν λόγων, ἢ θεῆας τέχνης.

Maximus Tyr. dissert. 16.

‡ Viz. Lucretius; as above, vol. 1. p. 43.

World, even whilst he arraigns the order of it, and destroys the principle of beauty, from whence in ancient languages the World' itself was named.

This is what our author advances, when in behalf of Enthusiasm he quotes its formal enemies, and shows that they are as capable of it as its greatest confessors and assertors. So far is he from degrading enthusiasm, or disclaiming it in himself, that he looks on this passion, simply considered, as the most natural, and its object as the justest in the world. Even Virtue itself he takes to be no other than a noble enthusiasm justly directed, and regulated by that high standard which he supposes in the nature of things.

He seems to assert¹⁰, "That there are certain
" moral species or appearances so striking, and
" of such force over our natures, that when they
" present themselves, they bear down all contrary
" opinion or conceit, all opposite passion, sensa-
" tion, or mere bodily affection." Of this kind he makes Virtue itself to be the chief; since of all views or contemplations, this, in his account, is the most naturally and strongly affecting. The exalted part of love is only borrowed hence. That of pure friendship is its immediate self. He who yields his life a sacrifice to his prince or country;

⁹ Κόσμος, *mundus*. From whence that expostulation, Εν σοὶ μὲν τις κόσμος ὑφίστασθαι δύναται, ἐν δὲ τῷ παντὶ ἀκοσμία; M. Avl. βιβ. δ'. And that other allusion to the same word, Κόσμον δ' ἐτύμως τὸ σύμπαν, ἀλλ' ἔκ ἀκοσμίαν ὀνομάταις ἄν. Below, Misc. 5. chap. I. parag. 5. from the end, in the notes.

¹⁰ Vol. I. p. 118. 119. &c.; and Inquiry con. Virtue Book 2. p. 2. § 1. in vol. 2.

the lover who for his paramour performs as much; the heroic, the amorous, the religious martyrs, who draw their views, whether visionary or real, from this pattern and exemplar of Divinity; all these, according to our author's sentiment, are alike actuated by this passion, and prove themselves in effect so many different enthusiasts.

Nor is thorough honesty, in its hypothesis, any other than this zeal, or passion, moving strongly upon the species or view of the Decorum, and Sublime of actions. Others may pursue different forms¹¹, and fix their eye on different species, (as all men do on one or other): the real honest man, however plain or simple he appears, has that highest species, honesty¹² itself, in view; and instead of outward forms or symmetries, is struck with that of inward character, the harmony and numbers of the heart, and beauty of the affections, which form the manners and conduct of a truly social life.

It is indeed peculiar to the genius of that cool philosophy above-described¹³, that as it denies the order or harmony of things in general, so, by a just consequence and truth of reasoning, it rejects the habit of admiring or being charmed with whatever is called beautiful in particular. According to the regimen prescribed by this philosophy, it must be acknowledged, that the evils

¹¹ The Moralists, p. 3. § 3. in vol. 2.

¹² The *honestum*, *pulchrum*, τὸ καλὸν, πρέπον. *Infra*, Misc. 3. chap. 2. parag. 6. from the end.

¹³ *Supra*, p. 26.; and vol. 1. p. 40, 41. 99. &c.

of love, ambition, vanity, luxury, with other disturbances derived from the florid, high, and elegant ideas of things, must in appearance be set in a fair way of being radically cured.

It need not be thought surprising, that religion itself should, in the account of these philosophers, be reckoned among those vices and disturbances, which it concerns us after this manner to extirpate. If the idea of majesty and beauty in other inferior subjects be in reality distracting, it must chiefly prove so, in that principal subject, the basis and foundation of this conceit. Now, if the subject itself be not in nature, neither the idea, nor the passion grounded on it, can be properly esteemed natural: and thus all admiration ceases, and Enthusiasm is at an end. But if there be naturally such a passion, it is evident that Religion itself is of the kind, and must be therefore natural to man.

We can admire nothing profoundly, without a certain religious veneration. And because this borders so much on fear, and raises a certain tremor or horror of like appearance, it is easy to give that turn to the affection, and represent all Enthusiasm and religious ecstasy as the product or effect of Fear:

Primus in orbe Deos fecit timor.

But the original passion, as appears plainly, is of another kind, and in effect is so confessed by those who are the greatest opposers of religion, and

who, as our author observes, have shown themselves sufficiently convinced, " That although
 " these ideas of divinity and beauty were vain,
 " they were yet in a manner innate, or such as
 " men were really born to, and could hardly by
 " any means avoid¹⁴."

Now, as all affections have their excess, and require judgment and discretion to moderate and govern them; so this high and noble affection, which raises men to action, and is his guide in business, as well as pleasure, requires a steady rein and strict hand over it. All moralists worthy of any name have recognised the passion; though among these the wisest have prescribed restraint, pressed moderation, and to all Tyros in philosophy forbid the forward use of admiration, rapture, or ecstasy, even in the subjects they esteemed the highest, and most divine. They knew very well that the first motion, appetite, and ardor of the youth in general towards philosophy and knowledge¹⁵, depended chiefly on this turn of temper: yet were they well apprized, withal, that in the progress of this study, as well as in the affairs of life, the florid ideas and exalted fancy of this kind became the fuel of many incendiary passions; and that, in religious concerns particularly, the habit of admiration and contemplative delight would, by over-indulgence, too

¹⁴ Letter of Enthusiasm, vol. 1. p. 41.

¹⁵ So the Stagirite: Διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν. Metaph. lib. 1. cap. 2. See below, Misc. 4. chap. 1. parag. 28. in the notes.

easily mount into high fanaticism, or degenerate into abject superstition.

Upon the whole, therefore, according to our author, Enthusiasm is, in itself, a very natural honest passion; and has properly nothing for its object but what is good and honest¹⁶. It is apt indeed, he confesses, to run astray. And by modern example we know, perhaps yet better than by any ancient, that, in religion, the Enthusiasm which works by love is subject to many strange irregularities; and that which works by fear, to many monstrous and horrible superstitions. Mystics and fanatics are known to abound, as well in uor reformed, as in the Romish churches. The pretended floods of grace poured into the bosoms of the quietists, pietists, and those who favor the ecstatic way of devotion, raise such transports as by their own profelytes are confessed to have something strangely agreeable, and in common with what ordinary lovers are used to feel. And it has been remarked by many, that the female saints have been the greatest improvers of this soft part of religion. What truth there may be in the related operations of this pretended grace and amorous zeal, or in the accounts of what has usually passed between the saints of each sex, in these devout ecstasies, I shall leave the reader to examine; supposing he will find credible accounts, sufficient to convince him of the dangerous progress of Enthusiasm in this amorous lineage.

¹⁶ Τὸ καλὸν ἢ ἀγαθόν.

There are many branches indeed more vulgar, as that of Fear, Melancholy, Consternation, Suspicion, Despair. And when the passion turns more towards the astonishing and frightful, than the amiable and delightful side, it creates rather what we call superstition than Enthusiasm. I must confess withal, that what we commonly style zeal in matters of religion, is seldom without a mixture of both these extravagancies. The ecstatic motions of love and admiration, are seldom unaccompanied with the horrors and consternations of a lower sort of devotion. These paroxysms of zeal are in reality as the hot and cold fits of an ague, and depend on the different and occasional views or aspects of the Divinity, according as the worshipper is guided from without¹⁷, or affected from within, by his particular constitution. Seldom are those aspects so determinate and fixed, as to excite constantly one and the same spirit of devotion. In religions, therefore, which hold most of love, there is generally room left for terrors of the deepest kind. Nor is there any religion so diabolical, as, in its representation of Divinity, to leave no room for admiration and esteem. Whatever personage or spectre of Divinity is worshipped, a certain esteem and love is generally affected by his worshippers. Or if, in the devotion paid him, there be in truth no real or absolute esteem, there is, however, a certain astonishing delight or ravishment excited.

¹⁷ *Infra*, Misc. 2. chap. 3. parag. 3. from the end.

This

This passion is experienced, in common, by every worshipper of the zealot-kind. The motion, when unguided, and left wholly to itself, is in its nature turbulent and incentive. It disjoins the natural frame, and relaxes the ordinary tone or tenor of the mind. In this disposition the reins are let loose to all passion which arises: and the mind, as far as it is able to act or think in such a state, approves the riot, and justifies the wild effects, by the supposed sacredness of the cause. Every dream and frenzy is made Inspiration; every affection, zeal. And in this persuasion the zealots, no longer self-governed, but set adrift to the wide sea of passion, can in one and the same spirit of devotion exert the opposite passions of love and hatred; unite affectionately, and abhor furiously; curse, bless, sing, mourn, exult, tremble, caress, assassinate, inflict and suffer Martyrdom¹⁸, with a thousand other the most vehement efforts of variable and contrary affection.

¹⁸ A passage of history comes to my mind, as it is cited by an eminent divine of our own church, with regard to that *spirit* of Martyrdom which furnishes, it seems, such solid matter for the opinion and faith of many zealots. The *story*, in the words of our *divine*, and his own reflections upon it, is as follows. "Two
" *Franciscans* offered themselves to the fire to prove *Savanorola* to
" be a heretic. But a certain *Jacobine* offered himself to the fire to
" prove that *Savanorola* had true revelations, and was no heretic.
" In the mean time *Savanorola* preached; but made no such con-
" fident offer, nor durst he venture at that new kind of fire-ordeal.
" And put case, all *four* had passed through the fire, and died in
" the flames; what would that have proved? Had he been a he-
" retic, or no heretic, the more, or the less, for the confidence of

The common Heathen religion, especially in its latter age, when adorned with the most beautiful temples, and rendered more illustrious by the munificence of the Roman senate and succeeding emperors, ran wholly into pomp, and was supported chiefly by that sort of Enthusiasm, which is raised from the external objects of grandeur, majesty, and what we call august¹⁹. On the other side, the Egyptian or Syrian religions, which lay more in mystery and concealed rites; having less dependence on the magistrate, and less of that decorum of art, politeness, and magnificence, ran into a more pusillanimous, frivolous, and mean kind of Superstition, “the observation of days, the forbearance of meats, and the contention about traditions, seniority of laws, and priority of godships²⁰.”

— — — — — *Summus utrinque*
Inde furor vulgo, quod Numina vicinorum
Odit uterque locus, quum solos credat habendos
Esse Deos, quos ipse colit. — —

History, withal, informs us of a certain establishment in Egypt, which was very extraordinary, and must needs have had a very uncommon effect;

“these zealous idiots? If we mark it, a great many arguments whereon many sects rely, are no better probation than this comes to.” Bishop Taylor, in his dedicatory discourse before his liberty of prophesying. See *letter of enthusiasm*, vol. 1. p. 21, 22.

¹⁹ Infra, Misc. 2. chap. 2. parag. 6. from the end.

²⁰ Juvenal. sat. 15. vers. 35. See the Moralists, part 3. § 1. in vol. 2.

no way advantageous to that nation in particular, or to the general society of mankind. We know very well, that nothing is more injurious to the police, or municipal constitution of any city or colony, than the forcing of a particular trade. Nothing more dangerous than the overpeopling any manufacture, or multiplying the traders or dealers of whatever vocation, beyond their natural proportion, and the public demand. Now, it happened of old, in this mother-land of superstition, that the sons of certain artists were by law obliged always to follow the same calling with their fathers²¹. Thus, the son of a priest was always a priest by birth, as was the whole lineage after him, without interruption. Nor was it a custom with this nation, as with others, to have only one single priest or priestess to a temple²²: but as the number of gods and temples

²¹ Ἐστὶ δὲ Ἀιγυπτίων ἐπὶ τοῖς γένεσι. Καὶ τῶν, οἱ μὲν, Ἱερεῖς, οἱ δὲ, Μάχιμοι κεκλέσθαι. — Οὐδὲ τούτοις ἕξεται τέχνην ἐπασκῆσαι ἑδεμίνην, ἀλλὰ τὰ εἰς πόλεμον ἐπασκῆσαι μῦθον, παῖς παρὰ πλήθος ἐκδεκόμενοι. Herodot. l. 2. § 164.

Ἱεράται δὲ ἔνι εἰς ἑκάστη τῶν Θεῶν, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ — ἑπεὶ δὲ τις ἀποθάνῃ, τὸν οὗ παῖς ἀντικαθίσταται. Ibid. § 37.

²² Τῆς δὲ χώρας ἀπάσης εἰς τρία μέρη διηρημένης, &c. Cum tota regio in tres partes divisa sit, primam sibi portionem vindicat ordo sacerdotum, magna apud indigenas auctoritate pollens, tum ob pietatem in Deos, tum quod multam ex eruditione scientiam ejusmodi homines afferunt. Ex redditibus autem suis cuncta per Ægyptum sacrificia procurant, ministros alunt; et propriis commoditatibus ancillantur, ταῖς ἰδίαις χρείαις χορηγεῖσιν. Non enim (Ægyptii) existimant fas esse Deorum honores mutari, sed semper ab eisdem eodem ritu peragi, neque eos necessariorum copia destitui

was infinite, so was that of the priests. The religious foundations were without restriction; and to one single worship or temple, as many of the holy order might be retainers, as could raise a maintenance from the office.

Whatever happened to other races or professions, that of the priest, in all likelihood, must, by this regulation, have propagated the most of any. It is a tempting circumstance, to have so easy a mastery over the world; to subdue by wit instead of force; to practice on the passions, and triumph over the judgment of mankind; to influence private families, and public counsels; conquer conquerors; control the magistrate himself, and govern without the envy which attends all other government or superiority. No wonder if such a profession was apt to multiply; especially when we consider the easy living and security of the professors, their exemption from all labor and hazard; the supposed sacredness of their character; and their free possession of wealth, grandeur, estates, and women.

qui in commune omnibus consulunt. In universum namque de maximis rebus consulentes, indefinenter regi præsto sunt, in nonnullis tanquam participes imperii, in aliis reges, duces, et magistri (συνεργοί, ἐισηγηταί, διδάσκαλοι) existentes. Ex astrologia quoque et sacrorum inspectione, futura prædicunt, atque e sacrorum librorum scriptis res gestas cum utilitate conjunctas prælegunt. Non enim, ut apud Græcos, unus tantummodo vir, aut fœmina una, sacerdotio fungitur; sed complures sacrificia et honores Deum obeuntes, liberis suis eandem vitæ rationem quasi per manus tradunt. Hi autem cunctis oneribus sunt immunes, et primos post regem honoris et potestatis gradus obtinent. *Diod. Sic. lib. 1. p. 66.*

There was no need to invest such a body as this, with rich lands and ample territories, as it happened in Egypt. The generation or tribe being once set apart as sacred, would, without further encouragement, be able, no doubt, in process of time, to establish themselves a plentiful and growing fund, or religious land-bank. It was a sufficient donative, to have had only that single privilege from the law²³, "That they might retain what they could get; and that it might be lawful for their order, to receive such estates by voluntary contribution, as could never afterwards be converted to other uses.

Now, if, besides the method of propagation by descent, other methods of increase were allowed in this order of men; if volunteers were also admitted at pleasure, without any stint or confinement to a certain number, it is not difficult to imagine, how enormous the growth would be of such a science or profession, thus recognised by magistrate, thus invested with lands and power, and thus entitled to whatever extent of riches or possession could be acquired by practice and influence over the superstitious part of mankind.

There were, besides, in Egypt some natural causes of superstition, beyond those which were common to other regions. This nation might well abound in prodigies, when even their country and soil itself was a kind of prodigy in nature. Their solitary, idle life, whilst shut up in their

²³ Infra, Misc. 2. chap. 2. parag. 23.

houses by the regular inundations of the Nile, the unwholesome vapors arising from the new mud, and slimy relics of their river, exposed to the hot suns; their various meteors and phenomena; with the long vacancy they had to observe and comment on them; the necessity, withal, which, on the account of their navigation, and the measure of their yearly drowned lands, compelled them to promote the studies of astronomy and other sciences, of which their priesthood could make good advantages: all these may be reckoned perhaps as additional causes of the immense growth of superstition, and the enormous increase of the priesthood in this fertile land.

It will, however, as I conceive, be found unquestionably true, according to political arithmetic, in every nation whatsoever, "That the quantity
" of Superstition, if I may so speak, will, in
" proportion, nearly answer the number of priests,
" diviners, soothsayers, prophets, or such who
" gain their livelihood, or receive advantages by
" officiating in religious affairs." For if these dealers are numerous, they will force a trade. And as the liberal hand of the magistrate can easily raise swarms of this kind, where they are already but in a moderate proportion; so where, through any other cause, the number of these increasing still by degrees, is suffered to grow beyond a certain measure, they will soon raise such a ferment in men's minds, as will at least compel the magistrate, however sensible of the grievance, to be cautious in proceeding to a reform.

We may observe in other necessary professions, raised on the infirmities and defects of mankind, as, for instance, in law and physic, "That, with
 " the least help from the bounty or beneficence of
 " the magistrate, the number of the professors,
 " and the subject-matter of the profession, is
 " found over and above increasing." New difficulties are started; new subjects of contention; deeds and instruments of law grow more numerous and prolix; hypotheses, methods, regimens, more various, and the materia medica more extensive and abundant. What, in process of time, must therefore naturally have happened in the case of religion, among the Egyptians, may easily be gathered.

Nor is it strange that we should find the property²⁴ and power of the Egyptian priesthood, in ancient days, arrived to such a height, as in a manner to have swallowed up the state and monarchy. A worse accident befel the Persian crown, of which the hierarchy having once got absolute possession, had once a fair chance for the universal empire. Now, that the Persian or Babylonian hierarchy was much after the model of the Egyptian, though different perhaps in rites and ceremonies, we may well judge; not only from the

²⁴ Which was one third. Βελομένην δὲ τὴν ἸΣΙΝ, &c. *Sed cum Isis lucro etiam sacerdotes invitare vellet ad cultus istos, (nempe Osiridis, mariti fato functi), tertiam eis terræ partem eis προσόδους, ad eorum ministeria et sacra munia, fruendam donavit.* Diod. Sic. lib. 1. A remarkable effect of female superstition! See also the passage of the same historian, cited above, p. 35. in the notes.

history of the Magi²⁵, but from what is recorded of ancient colonies sent long before by the Egyptians into Chaldea²⁶, and the adjacent countries. And whether the Ethiopian model was from that of Egypt, or the Egyptian from that of Ethiopia, for each nation had its pretence²⁷, we know by remarkable effects²⁸, that the Ethiopian empire was once in the same condition; the state having been wholly swallowed in the exorbitant power of their landed hierarchy. So true it is, "That

²⁵ See treatise 2. viz. *Sensus Communis*, vol. 1. p. 71. &c. *Herodotus* gives us the history at length in his third book.

²⁶ *Diod. Sic. lib. 1. p. 17. & 73.*

²⁷ *Herodot. Euterpe; et Diod. Sic. lib. 3.*

²⁸ Κατὰ τὴν Μερὸν οἱ περὶ τὰς τῶν Θεῶν Σεραπείας τε καὶ τιμὰς διατίθεντες ἱερεῖς, &c. *Qui in Meroe (urbe, et insula primaria Æthiopum) Deorum cultus et honores administrant sacerdotes, (ordo autem hic maxima pollet auctoritate), quodcumque ipsis in mentem venerit, misso ad regem nuncio, vita se illum abdicare jument. Oraculis enim deorum hoc edici; nec fas esse ab ullo mortalium, quod Dii immortales jusserint, contemni. — So much for their kings. For as to subjects, the manner was related a little before. Unus ex lictoribus ad reum mittitur, signum mortis præferens; quo ille viso, domum abiens sibi mortem consciscit. This the people of our days would call passive obedience and priest-craft, with a witness. But our historian proceeds — Et per superiores quidem ætates, non armis aut vi coacti, sed meræ superstitionis ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς δεισιδαιμονίας fascino, mente capti reges, sacerdotibus morem gesserunt: donec Ergamenes, Æthiopum rex, (Ptolomæo Secundo rerum potiente), Græcorum disciplinæ et philosophiæ particeps, mandata illa primus adspernari ausus fuit. Nam hic animo, qui regem deceret, sumto, cum militum manu in locum inaccessum, ubi aureum fuit templum Æthiopum, profectus; omnes illos sacrificos jugulavit, et abolito more pristino, sacra pro arbitrio suo instauravit. *Diod. Sic. lib. 3.**

“dominion must naturally follow property.” Nor is it possible, as I conceive, for any state or monarchy to withstand the incroachments of a growing hierarchy, founded on the model of these Egyptian and Asiatic priesthoods. No Superstition will ever be wanting among the ignorant and vulgar, whilst the able and crafty have a power to gain inheritances and possessions, by working on this human weakness. This is a fund, which, by these allowances, will prove inexhaustible. New modes of worship, new miracles, new heroes, saints, divinities, which serve as new occasions for sacred Donatives, will be easily supplied on the part of the religious orders; whilst the civil magistrate authorizes the accumulative Donation, and neither restrains the number or possessions of the sacred body.

We find, withal, that in the early days of this ancient priestly nation, of whom we have been speaking, it was thought expedient also, for the increase of devotion, to enlarge their system of Deity; and, either by mystical genealogy, consecration, or canonization, to multiply their revealed objects of worship, and raise new personages of Divinity in their religion. They proceeded it seems, in process of time, to increase the number of their Gods²⁹, so far that, at last, they became in a manner numberless. What odd shapes, species,

²⁹ Ὡς δὲ αὐτοὶ λέγουσι, ἕτεα ἐστὶ ἐπὶ ἑξακισχίλια ἢ μύρια ἐς Ἀμασιν βασιλεύσαντα, ἐπεὶ τε ἐκ τῶν ὀκτὼ Θεῶν οἱ δωδέκα Θεοὶ ἐγένοντο.
Herodot. lib. 2. § 43.

and forms of Deity were in latter times exhibited, is well known. Scarce an animal or plant but was adopted into some share of Divinity.

*O sanctas gentes, quibus hæc nascuntur in hortis
Numina* ³⁰! —————

No wonder, if by a nation so abounding in religious orders, spiritual conquests were sought in foreign countries, colonies led abroad ³¹, and missionaries detached on expeditions, in this prosperous service. It was thus a zealot-people, influenced of old by their very region and climate, and who, through a long tract of time, under a peculiar policy, had been raised both by art and nature to an immense growth in religious science and mystery, came by degrees to spread their variety of rites and ceremonies, their distinguishing marks of separate worships and secret communities, through the distant world, but chiefly through their neighbouring and dependent countries.

We understand from history, that even when the Egyptian state was least powerful in arms, it was still respected for its religion and mysteries.

³⁰ Juvenal. sat. 15. v. 10.

³¹ Οἱ δὲ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ, Ægyptii plurimas colonias ex Ægypto in orbem terrarum disseminatas fuisse dicunt. In Babylonem colonos deduxit Belus, qui Neptuni et Libyæ filius habetur: et posita ad Euphratem sede, instituit sacerdotes ad morem Ægyptiorum exemptos impensis et oneribus publicis, quos Babylonii vocant Chaldaeos, qui, exemplo sacerdotum et physicorum, astrologorumque in Ægypto, observant stellas. Diod. Sic. lib. 1. p. 17. Ibid. p. 73.

It drew strangers from all parts to behold its wonders. And the fertility of its soil forced the adjacent people, and wandering nations who lived dispersed in single tribes, to visit them, court their alliance, and solicit a trade and commerce with them, on whatsoever terms. The strangers, no doubt, might well receive religious rites and doctrines from those to whom they owed their maintenance and bread.

Before the time that Israel was constrained to go down to Egypt, and sue for maintenance to these powerful dynasties or lowland states, the holy patriarch Abraham himself had been necessitated to this compliance on the same account³². He applied in the same manner to the Egyptian court. He was at first well received, and handsomely presented; but afterwards ill used, and out of favor with the prince; yet suffered to depart the kingdom, and retire with his effects; without any attempt of recalling him again by force, as it happened in the case of his posterity. It is certain, that if this holy patriarch, who first instituted the sacred rite of circumcision within his own family or tribe, had no regard to any policy or religion of the Egyptians; yet he had formerly been a guest and inhabitant in Egypt, where historians³³ mention this to have been a

³² Gen. xii. 10. &c.

³³ Abramus, quando Ægyptum ingressus est, nondum circumcissus erat, neque per annos amplius viginti post reditum. — Illius posterii circumcisi sunt, et ante introitum, et dum in Ægypto commorati sunt: post exitum vero non sunt circumcisi, quamdiu vixit

national rite, long ere he had received any divine notice or revelation concerning this affair³⁴. Nor was it in religion merely that this reverend guest was said to have derived knowledge and learning from the Egyptians. It was from this parent-country of occult sciences that he was presumed, together with other wisdom, to have learned that of judicial astrology³⁵, as his successors did afterwards other prophetic and miraculous arts, proper to the Magi, or priesthood of this land.

One cannot indeed but observe, in after-times, the strange adherence and servile dependency of the whole Hebrew race on the Egyptian nation. It appears, that though they were of old abused in the person of their grand patriarch; though afterwards held in bondage, and treated as the most abject slaves; though twice expelled, or necessitated to save themselves by flight, out of this oppressive region; yet in the very instant of their last retreat, whilst they were yet on their march, conducted by visible divinity, supplied and fed from heaven,

Moses. — *Fecit itaque Josue cultros lapideos, et circumcidit filios Israel in colle præputiorum. Factum Deus ratum habuit, dixitque, Hodie ἀφείλον τὸν ὀνειδισμὸν Αἰγύπτου ἀπὸ υἱῶν, abstulisti opprobrium Ægypti a vobis*, Josue, cap. 5. ver. 3. Tam Ægyptiis quam Judæis opprobrio erant incircumcisi. — Apud Ægyptios circumcidendi ritus vetustissimus fuit, et ἀπὸ ἀρχῆς, ab ipso initio institutus. Illi nullorum aliorum hominum institutis uti volunt. Herodot. lib. 2. cap. 91. Τὰ αἰδοῖα οἱ ἄλλοι μὲν ἐῷσι ὡς ἐγένοντο, πλὴν ἔσοι ἀπὸ τέτων ἔμαθον· Αἰγύπτιοι δὲ περιτεμνονται. Herodot. lib. 2. cap. 36. Marsham chronicon canon, p. 72.

³⁴ Gen. xvii.

³⁵ Julius Firmicus, apud Marshamum, p. 452, 453.

and supported by continual miracles; they notwithstanding inclined so strongly to the manners, the religion, rites, diet, customs, laws, and constitutions of their tyrannical masters, that it was with the utmost difficulty they could be withheld from returning again into the same subjection³⁶. Nor could their great captains and legislators prevent their relapsing perpetually into the same worship to which they had been so long accustomed³⁷.

³⁶ It can scarce be said in reality, from what appears in holy writ, that their retreat was *voluntary*. And for the historians of other nations, they have presumed to assert, that this people was actually expelled *Egypt* on account of their *leprosy*; to which the *Jewish* laws appear to have so great a reference. Thus *Tacitus*: *Plurimi auctores consentiunt, orta per Ægyptum tabe, quæ corpora fœdaret, regem Occhorim, adito Hammonis oraculo, remedium petentem, purgare regnum, et id genus hominum ut invisum Deis, alias in terras avehere jussim. Sic conquistum collectumque vulgus, — Mosem unum monuisse, &c. Hist. lib. 5. cap. 3. Ægyptii, quum scabiem et vitiliginem paterentur, responso moniti, eum (Mosem) cum ægris, ne pestis ad plures serperet, terminis Ægypti pellunt. Dux igitur exulum factus, sacra Ægyptiorum furto abstulit: quæ repetentes armis Ægyptii, domum redire tempestatibus compulsi sunt. Justin. lib. 36. cap. 2.* And in *Marsham* we find this remarkable citation from *Manetho*: *Amenophin regem affectasse Θεῶν γενέσθαι θεατὴν, ὥσπερ Ὀρ εἰς τῶν πρὸ αὐτῆς βασιλευκότων, Deorum esse contemplatorem, sicut Orum quendam regum priorum. Cui responsum est, ὅτι δυνήσασθε θεὸς ἰδεῖν, quod posset videre Deos, si regionem a leprosis et immundis hominibus purgaret. Chronicus Canon, p. 52.*

³⁷ See what is cited above (p. 43. in the notes from *Marsham*) of the *Jews* returning to circumcision under *Joshua*, after a generation's intermission; this being approved by God, for the reason given. “*That it was taking from them the reproach of the*

How far the divine Providence might have indulged the stubborn habit and stupid humor of this people, by giving them laws, as the prophet says³⁸, which he himself approved not, I have

“ Egyptians, or what rendered them odious and impious in the eyes of that people.” Compare with this the passage concerning Moses himself, *Exod. iv. 18. 25, 26.* (together with *Acts, vii. 30. 34.*; where, in regard to the *Egyptians*, to whom he was now returning when fourscore years of age, he appears to have circumcised his children, and taken off this national reproach: *Zipporah* his wife, nevertheless, reproaching him with the bloodiness of the deed; to which she appears to have been a party only through necessity, and in fear rather of her husband, than of God.

³⁸ *Ezek. xx. 25. Acts, xv. 10.* Of these *Egyptian* institutions received amongst the *Jews*, see our *Spencer*. *Cum morum quorundam antiquorum toleratio vi magna polleret, ad Hebræorum animos Dei legi et cultui conciliandos, et a reformatione Mosaica invidiam omnem amoliretur; maxime conveniebat, ut Deus ritus aliquos antiquitus usitatos in sacrorum suorum numerum assumeret, et lex a Mose data speciem aliquam cultus olim recepti ferret. — Ita nempe nati factique erant Israelitæ, ex Ægypto recens egressi, quod Deo pene necesse esset (humanitus loqui fas sit) rituum aliquorum veterum usum iis indulgere, et illius instituta ad eorum morem et modulum accommodare. Nam populus erat a teneris Ægyptii moribus assuetus, et in iis multorum annorum usu confirmatus. — Hebræi, non tantum Ægypti moribus assueti, sed etiam refractarii fuerunt. — Quemadmodum cujusque regionis et terræ populo sua sunt ingenia, moresque proprii, ita natura gentem Hebræorum, præter cæteros orbis ineolas, ingenio moroso, difficili, et ad infamiam usque pertinaci, finxit. — Cum itaque veteres Hebræi moribus essent asperis et efferatis adeo, populi conditio postulavit, ut Deos ritus aliquos usu veteri firmatos iis concederet, et νομικὴν λαλρείαν τῇ ἐαυτῶν ἀσθενείᾳ συμβάλινσθαι (uti loquitur Theodoretus) cultum legalem eorum infirmitati accommodatum instituerit. — Hebræi superstitiosa gens erant, et omni pene literatura destituti:*

no intention to examine. This only I pretend to infer from what has been advanced, "That the
 "manners, opinions, rites, and customs of the
 "Egyptians, had, in the earliest times, and from
 "generation to generation, strongly influenced
 "the Hebrew people, their guests and subjects,
 "and had undoubtedly gained a powerful ascend-
 "ency over their natures."

How extravagant soever the multitude of the Egyptian superstitions may appear, it is certain that their doctrine and wisdom were in high repute, since it is taken notice of in holy scripture, as no small advantage even to Moses himself, "That he
 "had imbibed the wisdom of this nation";" which as is well known, lay chiefly among their priests and Magi.

Before the time that the great Hebrew legislator

Quam alte gentium superstitionibus immergebantur, e legibus intelligere licet, quæ populo tanquam remedia superstitionis imponebantur. Contumax autem bellæ superstitionis, si præsertim ab ignorantie tenebris novam ferociam et contumaciam hauserit. Facile vero credi potest, Israelitas, nuper e servorum domo liberatos, artium humaniorum rudes fuisse, et vix quicquam supra lateres atque allium Ægypti sapuisse. Quando itaque Deo jam negotium esset, cum populo tam barbaro, et superstitioni tam impense dedito; pene necesse fuit, ut aliquid eorum infirmitati daret, eosque dolo quodam (non argumentis) ad seipsum alliceret. Nullum animal superstizioso, rudi præcipue, morosius est, aut majori arte tractandum. Spencerus de leg. Hebr. p. 627, 628, 629.

¹⁹ (1.) Καὶ ἐπαίδευσεν Μωϋσῆς ΠΑΣΗ ΣΟΦΙΑ Αἰγυπτίῳ ᾧ δὲ δυνατός ἐν λόγοις καὶ ἐν ἔργοις. Act. Apost. vii. 22.

(2.) Exod. vii. 11. & 22.

(3.) Ibid. viii. 7.

(4.) Justin. lib. 36. cap. 2.

received his education among these sages, a Hebrew slave⁴⁰, who came a youth into the Egyptian court, had already grown so powerful in this kind of wisdom, as to outdo the chief diviners, prognosticators, and interpreters of Egypt. He raised himself to be chief minister to a prince, who, following his advice, obtained in a manner the whole property, and consequently the absolute dominion of that land. But to what height of power the established priesthood was arrived even at that time, may be conjectured hence, "That the crown, to speak in a modern style, offered not to meddle with the church-lands;" and that in this great revolution nothing was attempted, so much as by way of purchase or exchange⁴¹, in prejudice of this landed clergy; the prime minister himself having joined his interest with theirs, and entered by marriage into their alliance⁴². And in this he was followed by the great founder of the Hebrew state. For he also⁴³ matched himself with the priesthood of some of the neighbouring nations, and traders into Egypt⁴⁴, long ere his establishment of the Hebrew religion and

⁴⁰ Gen. xxxix, &c. *Minimus ætate inter fratres Joseph fuit, cujus excellens ingenium veriti fratres clam interceptum peregrinis mercatoribus vendiderunt. A quibus deportatus in Ægyptum, cum magicas ibi artes solerti ingenio percepisset, brevi ipsi regi percarus fuit. Justin. lib. 36. cap. 2.*

⁴¹ Gen. xlvii. 22. 26.

⁴² Gen. xli. 45.

⁴³ Exod. iii. 1. and xviii. 1, &c.

⁴⁴ Such were the Midianites, Gen. xxxvii. 28. 36.

commonwealth.

commonwealth. Nor had he perfected his model, till he consulted the foreign priest his father-in-law⁴⁵, to whose advice he paid such remarkable deference.

But to resume the subject of our speculation, concerning the wide diffusion of the priestly science or function: It appears from what has been said, that notwithstanding the Egyptian priesthood was, by ancient establishment, hereditary, the skill of divining, soothsaying, and magic, was communicated to others besides their national sacred body; and that the wisdom of the Magicians, their power of miracles, their interpretation of dreams and visions, and their art of administering in divine affairs, were intrusted even to foreigners who resided amongst them.

It appears, withal, from these considerations, how apt the religious profession was to spread itself widely in this region of the world; and what efforts would naturally be made by the more necessitous of these unlimited professors, towards a fortune, or maintenance, for themselves and their successors.

Common arithmetic will, in this case, demonstrate to us, "that as the proportion of so many
" laymen to each priest grew every day less and
" less, so the wants and necessities of each priest
" must grow more and more." The magistrate too, who, according to this Egyptian regulation, had resigned his title or share of right in sacred

⁴⁵ Exod. xviii. 17—24.

things, could no longer govern, as he pleased, in these affairs, or check the growing number of these professors. The spiritual generations were left to prey on others, and, like fish of prey, even on themselves, when destitute of other capture, and confined within too narrow limits. What method, therefore, was there left to heighten the Zeal of worshippers, and augment their liberality, but “to foment their emulation, prefer worship
“to worship, faith to faith; and turn the spirit
“of Enthusiasm to the side of sacred horror, religious antipathy, and mutual discord between
“worshippers.”

Thus provinces and nations were divided by the most contrary rites and customs which could be devised, in order to create the strongest aversion possible between creatures of a like species. For when all other animosities are allayed, and anger of the fiercest kind appeased, the religious hatred, we find, continues still, as it began, without provocation or voluntary offence. The presumed misbeliever and blasphemer, as one rejected and abhorred of God, is through a pious imitation abhorred by the adverse worshippers, whose enmity must naturally increase as his religious zeal increases.

From hence the opposition rose of temple against temple, proselyte against proselyte. The most zealous worship of one God, was best expressed, as they conceived, by the open defiance of another. Sir-names and titles of Divinity passed as watch-

words. He who had not the Symbol, nor could give the word, received the knock.

*Down with him ! Kill him ! Merit heaven
thereby ;*

as our poet has it, in his American tragedy⁴⁶.

Nor did Philosophy⁴⁷, when introduced into religion, extinguish, but rather inflame this zeal : as we may show perhaps in our following chapter more particularly ; if we return again, as is likely, to this subject. For this, we perceive, is of a kind apt enough to grow upon our hands. We shall here, therefore, observe only what is obvious to every student in sacred antiquities, that from the contentious learning and sophistry of the ancient schools, when true science, philosophy, and arts were already deep in their decline⁴⁸, religious problems of a like contentious form sprang up ; and certain doctrinal Tests were framed, by which religious parties were engaged and listed against one another, with more animosity than in any other cause or quarrel had been ever known. Thus religious massacres began, and were carried on ; temples were demolished ; holy utensils destroyed ; the sacred pomp trodden under foot, insulted, and the insulters in their turn exposed to the same treatment, in their persons as well as in their

⁴⁶ Dryden, *Indian Emperor*, act 5. scene 2.

⁴⁷ *Infra*, Misc. 2. chap. 2. parag. 27.

⁴⁸ Vol. 1. p. 191. 301. in the notes ; and *infra*, Misc. 2. chap. 2. parag. 23. &c.

worship. Thus madness and confusion were brought upon the world, like that Chaos, which the poet miraculously describes in the mouth of his mad hero: when even in celestial places, disorder and blindness reigned: —— “No dawn of
“light;”

—— “No glimpse or starry spark;

“But gods met gods, and jostled in the dark”.”

C H A P. II.

Judgment of divines and grave authors concerning enthusiasm. —— Reflections upon scepticism. —— A sceptic Christian. —— Judgment of the inspired concerning their own inspirations. —— Knowledge and belief. —— History of religion resumed. —— Zeal offensive and defensive. —— A church in danger. —— Persecution. —— Policy of the church of Rome.

WHAT I had to remark of my own concerning Enthusiasm, I have thus dispatched: what others have remarked on the same subject, I may, as an apologist to another author, be allowed to cite; especially if I take notice only of what has

“Oedipus of Dryden and Lee.

been dropped very naturally by some of our most approved authors, and ablest divines.

It has been thought an odd kind of temerity, in our author, to assert, "That even Atheism itself
" was not wholly exempt from enthusiasm; that
" there have been in reality enthusiastical Atheists;
" and that even the spirit of martyrdom could,
" upon occasion, exert itself as well in this cause,
" as in any other¹." Now, besides what has been intimated in the preceding chapter, and what in fact may be demonstrated from the examples of Vaninus and other martyrs of a like principle, we may hear an excellent and learned divine², of highest authority at home, and fame abroad; who, after having described an enthusiastical Atheist, and one atheistically inspired, says of this very sort of men, "That they are fanatics too; how-
" ever that word seem to have a more peculiar
" respect to something of a Deity: all Atheists
" being that blind goddess Nature's fanatics."

And again: "All Atheists" says he "are possessed with a certain kind of madness, that may
" be called pneumatophobia³, that makes them

¹ *Viz.* in his letter concerning enthusiasm, in vol. 1.

² Dr Cudworth's intellectual system, p. 134.

³ The good Doctor makes use here of a stroke of raillery against the over-frighted *anti-superstitious* gentlemen, with whom our author reasons at large in his second treatise, (*viz.* vol. 1. p. 71, 72, &c. and 75, 76, &c.). It is indeed the nature of *fear*, as of all other passions, when excessive, to defeat its own end, and prevent us in the execution of what we naturally propose to ourselves as our advantage. Superstition itself is but a certain

“ have an irrational but desperate abhorrence from
“ spirits or incorporeal substances; they being acted
“ also, at the same time, with an hylomania,
“ whereby they madly doat upon matter, and
“ devoutly worship it, as the only Numen.”

What the power of Ecstasy is, whether through melancholy, wine, love, or other natural causes another learned divine of our church*, in a discourse upon enthusiasm, sets forth; bringing an example from Aristotle, “Of a Syracusean poet, who never versified so well, as when he was in his distracted fits.” But as to poets in general, compared with the religious enthusiasts, he says: There is this difference, “That a poet is

kind of *fear*, which possessing us strongly with the apprehended wrath or displeasure of *divine powers*, hinders us from judging what those *powers* are in themselves, or what conduct of ours may, with best reason, be thought suitable to such highly rational and superior natures. Now, if from the experience of many gross delusions of a superstitious kind, the course of this fear begins to turn; it is natural for it to run, with equal violence, a contrary way. The extreme passion for religious objects passes into an aversion, and a certain *horror* and *dread of imposture* causes as great a disturbance as even *imposture itself* had done before. In such a situation as this, the mind may easily be blinded; as well in one respect as in the other. It is plain, *both* these disorders carry something with them which discovers us to be in some manner beside our reason, and out of the right use of judgment and understanding. For how can we be said to *intrust* or *use* our reason, if in any case we fear to be convinced? How are we masters of ourselves, when we have acquired the habit of bringing horror, aversion, favor, fondness, or any other temper than that of mere *indifference* and *impartiality*, into the judgment of opinions, and search of truth?

* Dr More, § 11. 19, 20. and so on.

“ an enthusiast in jest; and an enthusiast is a poet
“ in good earnest.”

“ It is a strong temptation, says the Doctor,
“ with a melancholist⁵, when he feels a storm of
“ devotion and zeal come upon him like a mighty
“ wind; his heart being full of affection, his head
“ pregnant with clear and sensible representations,
“ and his mouth flowing and streaming with fit
“ and powerful expressions, such as would astonish
“ an ordinary auditory⁶; it is, I say, a shrewd
“ temptation to him, to think it the very spirit of
“ God that then moves supernaturally in him;
“ whereas all that excess of zeal and affection, and
“ fluency of words, is most palpably to be resolv-
“ ed into the power of melancholy, which is a
“ kind of natural inebriation.”

The learned Doctor, with much pains afterwards,
and by the help of the Peripatetic philosophy,
explains this enthusiastic inebriation, and shows in
particular⁷, “ How the vapors and fumes of me-
“ lancholy partake of the nature of wine.”

One might conjecture from hence, that the
malicious opposers of early Christianity were not

⁵ Dr More, § 16.

⁶ It appears from hence, that in the notion which this learned
divine gives us of Enthusiasm, he comprehends the *social* or *po-*
pular genius of the passion; agreeably with what our author in
his letter concerning *Enthusiasm* (p. 12, 13. 37, 38.) has said of
the influence and power of the *assembly* and *auditory* itself, and
of the communicative force and rapid progress of this ecstatic
fervor, once kindled, and set in action.

⁷ Dr More, § 20. 22, 23. 26.

unversed in this philosophy; when they sophistically objected against the apparent force of the divine Spirit speaking in diverse languages, and attributed it "To the power of new wine".

But our devout and zealous Doctor seems to go yet further. For, besides what he says of the enthusiastic power of fancy in Atheists⁹, he calls melancholy a pertinacious and religious complexion¹⁰; and asserts, "That there is not any true
" spiritual grace from God, but this mere natural
" constitution, according to the several tempers
" and workings of it, will not only resemble, but
" sometimes seem to outstrip." And after speaking of prophetic Enthusiasm¹¹, and establishing, as our author does¹², a legitimate and a bastard sort, he asserts and justifies the devotional Enthusiasm, as he calls it, of holy and sincere souls¹³, and ascribes this also to Melancholy.

He allows, "That the soul may sink so far into
" phantasms, as not to recover the use of her free
" faculties; and that this enormous strength of
" imagination, does not only beget the belief of
" mad internal apprehensions, but is able to assure
" us of the presence of external objects which are
" not." He adds, "That what custom and
" education do by degrees, distempered Fancy
" may do in a shorter time." And speaking of Ecstasy and the power of Melancholy in ecstatic fancies¹⁴, he says, "That what the imagination

⁸ Acts ii. 13.

⁹ Dr More, § 1.

¹⁰ § 15.

¹¹ § 30. and 57.

¹² Vol. I. p. 44 45.

¹³ § 63.

¹⁴ § 28.

“ then puts forth of herself, is as clear as broad
 “ day; and the perception of the soul at least as
 “ strong and vigorous, as at any time in beholding
 “ things awake.

From whence the Doctor infers, “That the
 “ strength of perception is no sure ground of truth.”

Had any other than a reverend father of our church expressed himself in this manner, he must have been contented perhaps to bear a sufficient charge of scepticism.

It was good fortune in my Lord Bacon's case, that he should have escaped being called an Atheist, or a Sceptic, when speaking in a solemn manner of the religious passion, the ground of Superstition, or Enthusiasm, which he also terms a panic¹⁵, he derives it from an imperfection in the creation, make, or natural constitution of man.

¹⁵ *Natura rerum omnibus viventibus indidit metum et formidinem, vitæ atque essentiae suæ conservatricem, ac mala ingruentia vitantem et depellentem. Veruntamen eadem natura modum tenere nescia est, sed timoribus salutaribus semper vanos et inanes admiscet: adeo ut omnia (si intus conspici darentur) panicis terroribus plenissima sint, præsertim humana; et maxime omnium apud vulgum, qui superstitione (quæ vere nihil aliud quam panicus terror est), in immensum laborat et agitur; præcipue temporibus duris, et trepidis, et adversis. Franciscus Bacon de augment. scient. lib. 2. c. 13.*

The author of the letter, I dare say, would have expected no quarter from his critics, had he expressed himself as this celebrated author here quoted; who, by his *natura rerum*, can mean nothing less than the *universal dispensing nature*, erring blindly in the very first design, contrivance, or original frame of things; according to the opinion of *Epicurus* himself, whom this author, immediately after, cites with praise.

How far the author of the letter¹⁶ differs from this author in his opinion both of the end and foundation of this passion, may appear from what has been said above. And, in general, from what we read in the other succeeding treatises of our author, we may venture to say of him with assurance, "That he is as little a Sceptic, according to the vulgar sense of that word, as he is Epicurean or Atheist." This may be proved sufficiently from his philosophy: and for any thing higher, it is what he no where presumes to treat; having forborn in particular to mention any holy mysteries of our religion, or sacred article of our belief.

As for what relates to revelation in general¹⁷, if I mistake not our author's meaning, he professes to believe, as far as is possible for any one who himself had never experienced any divine communication, whether by dream, vision, apparition, or other supernatural operation; nor was ever present as eye-witness of any sign, prodigy, or miracle whatsoever. Many of these, he observes¹⁸, are at this day pretendedly exhibited in the world, with an endeavour of giving them the perfect air and exact resemblance of those recorded in holy writ. He speaks indeed with contempt of the mockery of modern miracles and inspiration. And as to all pretences to things of this kind in our present age, he seems inclined to look upon them

¹⁶ *Viz.* the letter concerning Enthusiasm, above, in vol. 1.

¹⁷ *Infra*, Misc. 5. chap. 3. parag. 31.

¹⁸ Vol. 1. p. 37, 38, &c.; and, *The Moralists*, p. 2. § 3. in vol. 2.

as no better than mere imposture or delusion. But for what is recorded of ages heretofore, he seems to resign his judgment, with entire condescension, to his superiors. He pretends not to frame any certain or positive opinion of his own, notwithstanding his best searches into antiquity, and the nature of religious record and tradition: but on all occasions submits most willingly, and with full confidence and trust, to the opinions by law established¹⁹. And if this be not sufficient to free him from the reproach of Scepticism, he must, for ought I see, be content to undergo it.

To say truth, I have often wondered to find such a disturbance raised about the simple name of Sceptic²⁰. It is certain, that, in its original and plain signification, the word imports no more than barely, "That state or frame of mind in which every one remains, on every subject of which he is not certain." He who is certain, or presumes to say he knows, is in that particular, whether he be mistaken or in the right, a Dogmatist. Between these two states or situations of mind, there can be no medium. For he who says, "That he believes for certain, or is assured of what he believes;" either speaks ridiculously, or says in effect, "That he believes strongly, but is not sure." So that whoever is not conscious of revelation, nor has certain knowledge of

¹⁹ Vol. 1. p. 309, &c.; and *infra*, Misc. 2. chap. 3. parag. 19. Misc. 5. chap. 1. parag. 6. and chap. 3. parag. 31.

²⁰ The Moralists, p. 1. § 2. & p. 2. § 3. in vol. 2, and *infra*, Misc. 5. chap. 3. parag. 31, 32, &c.

any miracle or sign, can be no more than Sceptic in the case: and the best Christian in the world, who being destitute of the means of certainty, depends only on history and tradition for his belief in these particulars, is at best but a sceptic Christian. He has no more than a nicely critical, historical faith²¹, subject to various speculations, and a thousand different criticisms of language and literature.

This he will naturally find to be the case, if he attempts to search into originals, in order to be his own judge, and proceed on the bottom of his own discernment and understanding. If, on the other hand, he is no critic, nor competently learned in these Originals; it is plain he can have no original judgment of his own; but must rely still on the opinion of those who have opportunity to examine such matters, and whom he takes to be the unbiassed and disinterested judges of these religious narratives. His faith is not in ancient facts or persons, nor in the ancient writ, or primitive recorders; nor in the successive collators or conservators of these records, for of these he is unable to take cognisance: but his confidence and trust must be in those modern men, or societies of men, to whom the public, or he himself, ascribes the judgment of these records, and commits the determination of sacred writ, and genuine story.

²¹ Vol. I. p. 126, 127.; and *infra*, Misc. 5. chap. 3. parag. 31, &c.

Let the person seem ever so positive or dogmatical in these high points of learning; he is yet in reality no dogmatist, nor can any way free himself from a certain kind of Scepticism. He must know himself still capable of doubting: or if for fear of it, he strives to banish every opposite thought and resolves not so much as to deliberate on the case; this still will not acquit him. So far are we from being able to be sure when we have a mind, that indeed we can never be thoroughly sure, but then only when we cannot help it, and find of necessity we must be so, whether we will or not. Even the highest implicit faith is in reality no more than a kind of passive Scepticism; "A resolution to
" examine, recollect, consider, or hear as little
" as possible to the prejudice of that belief, which
" having once espoused, we are ever afterwards
" afraid to lose."

If I might be allowed to imitate our author, in daring to touch now and then upon the characters of our divine worthies, I should, upon this subject of Belief, observe how fair and generous the great Christian convert and learned Apostle has shown himself in his sacred writings. Notwithstanding he had himself an original testimony and revelation from heaven, on which he grounded his conversion; notwithstanding he had in his own person the experience of outward miracles and inward communications; he condescended still, on many occasions, to speak sceptically, and with some hesitation and reserve, as to the certainty of these divine exhibitions. In his account of

some transactions of this kind, himself being the witness, and speaking, as we may presume, of his own person, and proper vision, he says only, that "He knew a man: whether in the body or " out of it, he cannot tell. But such a one caught " up to the third heaven he knew formerly," he says, " above fourteen years before his then " writing²²." And when in another capacity the same inspired writer, giving precepts to his disciples, distinguishes what he writes by divine commission, from what he delivers as his own judgment and private opinion²³, he condescends nevertheless to speak as one no way positive, or master of any absolute criterion in the case. And in several subsequent passages he expresses himself as under some kind of doubt how to judge or determine certainly²⁴, " Whether he writes by in- " spiration or otherwise. He only thinks he has " the Spirit. He is not sure," nor would have us to depend on him as positive or certain in a matter of so nice discernment.

The holy founders and inspired authors of our religion, required not, it seems, so strict an assent, or such implicit faith, in behalf of their original writings and revelations, as later uninspired doctors, without the help of divine testimony, or any miracle on their side, have required in behalf of their own comments and interpretations. The earliest and worst of heretics, it is said, were those called

²² 2 Cor. xii. 2, 3.

²³ 1 Cor. vii. 10. 12.

²⁴ 1 Cor. vii. 40.

Gnostics, who took their name from an audacious pretence to certain knowledge and comprehension of the greatest mysteries of faith. If the most dangerous state of opinion was this dogmatical and presumptuous sort, the safest, in all likelihood, must be the sceptical and modest.

There is nothing more evident than that our holy Religion, in its original constitution, was set so far apart from all philosophy, or refined speculation, that it seemed in a manner diametrically opposed to it. A man might have been not only a sceptic in all the controverted points of the academies, or schools of learning, but even a perfect stranger to all of this kind, and yet complete in his religion, faith, and worship.

Among the polite Heathens of the ancient world, these different provinces of religion and philosophy were upheld, we know, without the least interfering with each other. If in some barbarous nations the philosopher and priest were joined in one, it is observable that the mysteries, whatever they were, which sprang from this extraordinary conjunction, were kept secret and undivulged. It was satisfaction enough to the priest-philosopher, if the initiated party preserved his respect and veneration for the tradition and worship of the temple, by complying in every respect with the requisite performances and rites of worship. No account was afterwards taken of the philosophic faith of the profelyte or worshipper. His opinions were left to himself, and he might philosophize according to what foreign school or sect he fancied.

Even among the Jews themselves, the Sadducee, a materialist, and denier of the soul's immortality, was as well admitted as the Pharisee; who, from the schools of Pythagoras, Plato, or other later philosophers of Greece, had learned to reason upon immaterial substances, and the natural immortality of souls.

It is no astonishing reflection to observe, how fast the world declined in wit and sense²⁵, in manhood, reason, science, and in every art, when once the Roman empire had prevailed, and spread an universal tyranny and oppression over mankind. Even the Romans themselves, after the early sweets of one peaceful and long reign, began to groan under that yoke of which they had been themselves the imposers. How much more must other nations, and mighty cities, at a far distance, have abhorred this tyranny, and detested their common servitude, under a people who were themselves no better than mere slaves?

It may be looked upon, no doubt, as providential, that at this time, and in these circumstances of the world, there should arise so high an expectation of a divine deliverer; and that from the eastern parts and confines of Judea, the opinion should spread itself of such a deliverer to come, with strength from heaven sufficient to break that empire, which no earthly power remaining could be thought sufficient to encounter. Nothing could have better disposed the generality of mankind, to

²⁵ Vol. I. p. 190, &c.; and in the preceding chapter, p. 52, receive

receive the evangelical advice; whilst they mistook the news, as many of the first Christians plainly did, and understood the promises of a Messias in this temporal sense, with respect to his second coming, and sudden reign here upon earth.

Superstition, in the mean while, could not but naturally prevail, as misery and ignorance increased²⁶. The Roman emperors, as they grew more barbarous, grew so much the more superstitious. The lands and revenues, as well as the numbers of the Heathen priests, grew daily. And when the season came, that, by means of a convert emperor, the Heathen church-lands²⁷, with an

²⁶ Vol. I. p. 114.; and below, parag. 6. from the end.

²⁷ How rich and vast these were, especially in the latter times of that empire, may be judged from what belonged to the single order of the *Vestals*, and what we read of the revenues belonging to the temples of the *Sun*, as in the time of the monster *Helio-gabalus*, and of other donations by other emperors. But what may give us yet a greater idea of these riches, is, that in the latter Heathen times, which grew more and more superstitious, the restraining laws, or statutes of *mort-main*, by which men had formerly been with-held from giving away estates by will, or otherwise, to religious uses, were repealed; and the Heathen church left, in this manner, as a bottomless gulf, and devouring receptacle of land and treasure. *Senatus-consulto, et constitutionibus principum, heredes instituere concessum est Apollinem Didymæum, Dianam Ephesiam, matrem deorum, &c.* Ulpianus post Cod. Theodof. p. 92. apud Marsh.

This answers not amiss to the modern practice and expression of making our soul our heir; giving to God what has been taken sometimes with freedom enough from man; and conveying estates in such a manner in this world, as to make good interest of them in another. The reproach of the ancient satirist is at present out

increase of power, became transferred to the Christian clergy, it was no wonder, if, by such riches and authority, they were in no small measure influenced and corrupted; as may be gathered even from the accounts given us of these matters by themselves.

When, together with this, the schools of the ancient philosophers²⁸, which had been long in their decline, came now to be dissolved, and their sophistic teachers became ecclesiastical instructors; the unnatural union of religion and philosophy was completed, and the monstrous product of this match appeared soon in the world. The odd, exterior shapes of Deities, temples, and holy utensils, which by the Ægyptian sects²⁹ had been formerly set in battle against each other, were now metamorphosed into philosophical forms and phantoms; and, like flags and banners, displayed in hostile manner, and borne offensively, by one party against another. In former times, those barbarous nations above-mentioned were the sole warriors in these religious causes; but now the whole world became engaged; when, instead of storks and crocodiles, other ensigns were erected;

of doors. It is no affront to religion now-a-days to compute its profits. And a man might well be accounted dull, who, in our present age, should ask the question, *Dicite, pontifices, in sacro quid facit aurum?* Pers. sat. 2. See below, Misc. 2. chap. 2. parag. 6. from the end, and *ib.* par. 8. from the end, in the notes; and chap. 2. parag. 8. from the end.

²⁸ As above, p. 51.

²⁹ Supra, p. 34. 39. 40. 51. and vol. 1. p. 301. in the notes.

when sophistical chimeras, crabbed notions, bombastic phrases, solecisms, absurdities, and a thousand monsters of a scholastic brood, were set on foot, and made the subject of vulgar animosity and dispute.

Here first began that spirit of bigotry which broke out in a more raging manner than had been ever known before, and was less capable of temper or moderation than any species, form, or mixture of religion in the ancient world. Mysteries, which were heretofore treated with profound respect, and lay unexposed to vulgar eyes, became public and prostitute; being enforced with terrors, and urged with compulsion and violence, on the unfitted capacities and apprehensions of mankind. The very Jewish traditions, and Cabalistic learning underwent this fate. That which was naturally the subject of profound speculation and inquiry, was made the necessary subject of a strict and absolute assent. The allegorical, mythological account of sacred things, was wholly inverted; liberty of judgment and exposition taken away; no ground left for inquiry, search, or meditation; no refuge from the dogmatical spirit let loose. Every quarter was taken up; every portion prepossessed. All was reduced to article and proposition ³⁰.

Thus a sort of philosophical Enthusiasm overspread the world. And Bigotry, a species of super-

³⁰ *Infra*, Misc. 5. chap. 3. par. 13. from the end, in the notes; *et supra*, p. 54.

stition³¹ hardly known before, took place in men's affections, and armed them with a new jealousy against each other. Barbarous terms and idioms were every day introduced, monstrous definitions invented and imposed; new schemes of faith erected from time to time; and hostilities, the fiercest imaginable, exercised on these occasions. So that the Enthusiasm or Zeal which was usually shown by mankind in behalf of their particular worships, and which for the most part had been hitherto defensive only, grew now to be universally of the offensive kind.

It may be expected of me perhaps, that being fallen thus from remote antiquity to later periods, I should speak on this occasion with more than ordinary exactness and regularity. It may be urged against me, that I talk here as at random, and without book; neglecting to produce my authorities, or continue my quotations, according to the professed style and manner in which I began this present chapter. But as there are many greater privileges, by way of variation, interruption, and digression, allowed to us writers of Miscellany; and especially to such as are commentators upon other authors; I shall be content to remain mysterious in this respect, and explain myself no further than by a noted story, which seems to suit our author's purpose, and the present argument.

³¹ Let any one who considers distinctly the meaning and force of the word Bigotry, endeavour to render it in either of the ancient languages, and he will find how peculiar a passion it implies; and how different from the mere affection of *enthusiasm* or *superstition*.

It is observable from holy writ, that the ancient Ephesian worshippers, however zealous or enthusiastic they appeared, had only a defensive kind of zeal in behalf of their temple³², whenever they thought in earnest it was brought in danger. In the tumult which happened in that city near the time of the holy apostle's retreat, we have a remarkable instance of what our author calls a religious panic³³. As little bigots as the people were, and as far from any offensive zeal, yet when their established church came to be called in question, we see in what a manner their zeal began to operate. "All with one voice, about the space of two hours, cried out, saying, Great is Diana of the Ephesians"³⁴. "At the same time this assembly was so confused, that the greater part knew not wherefore they were come toge-

³² The magnificence and beauty of that temple is well known to all who have formed any idea of the ancient Grecian arts and workmanship. It seems to me to be remarkable, in our learned and elegant apostle, that though an enemy to this mechanical spirit of religion in the Ephesians, yet, according to his known character, he accommodates himself to their humor, and the natural turn of their Enthusiasm; by writing to his converts in a kind of *architect* style, and almost with a perpetual allusion to *building*, and to that *majesty*, *order*, and *beauty*, of which their temple was a master-piece. Ἐποικοδομηθέντες ἐπὶ τῷ θεμελίῳ τῶν ἀποστόλων καὶ προφητῶν, ὧς ἡ ἀκρογωνίαί ἐστι λίθος αὐτῶν Ἰησοῦς Χριστός. Ἐν ᾧ πάντα ἡ οἰκοδομὴ συναρμολογημένη αὐξάνει εἰς ναὸν ἅγιον ἐν Κυρίῳ. Ἐν ᾧ καὶ ὑμεῖς συνοικοδομεῖσθε εἰς κατοικητήριον τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐν πνεύματι. — Eph. ii. 20, 21, 22. And so chap. iii. 17, 18, &c. and chap. iv. 16. 29.

³³ Acts of the Apostles, chap. xix. v. 23.

³⁴ Ibid. v. 28 and 34.

ther³⁵ ; and consequently could not understand why their church was in any danger. But the Enthusiasm was got up, and a panic fear for the church had struck the multitude. It ran into a popular rage, or epidemical phrensy, and was communicated, as our author expresses it³⁶, “ by
“ aspect, or, as it were, by contact or sympathy.”

It must be confessed, that there was, besides these motives, a secret spring which forwarded this Enthusiasm. For certain parties concerned, men of craft, and strictly united in interest, had been secretly called together, and told, “ Gentle-
“ men! or Sirs, ye know that by this mystery or
“ craft we have our wealth. Ye see, withal, and
“ have heard, that not only here at Ephesus, but
“ almost throughout all Asia, this Paul has per-
“ suaded and turned away many people, by
“ telling them, they are no real gods who are
“ figured or wrought with hands; so that not
“ only this our craft is in danger; but also the
“ temple itself³⁷. ”

Nothing could be more moderate and wise, nothing more agreeable to that magisterial science or policy which our author recommends³⁸, than the behaviour of the town-clerk or recorder of the city, as he is represented on this occasion in holy writ. I must confess indeed, he went pretty

³⁵ Ibid. § 32.

³⁶ Letter of enthusiasm, vol. 1. p. 12.

³⁷ Act. Apost. xix. 25, &c.

³⁸ Letter of enthusiasm, vol. 1. p. 13. &c.

far in the use of this moderating art. He ventured to assure the people, “that every one acquiesced
“in their ancient worship of the great goddess,
“and in their tradition of the image, which fell
“down from Jupiter! that these were facts unde-
“niable: and that the new sect neither meant the
“pulling down of their church, nor so much as
“offered to blaspheme or speak amiss of their
“goddess.”

This, no doubt, was stretching the point sufficiently; as may be understood by the event, in after time. One might perhaps have suspected this recorder to have been himself a dissenter, or at least an occasional conformist, who could answer so roundly for the new sect, and warrant the church in being secure of damage, and out of all danger for the future. Mean while the tumult was appeased: no harm befel the temple for that time. The new sect acquiesced in what had been spoken on their behalf. They allowed the apology of the recorder. Accordingly the zeal of the Heathen church, which was only defensive, gave way; and the new religionists were prosecuted no further.

Hitherto, it seems, the face of persecution had not openly shown itself in the wide world. It was sufficient security for every man, that he gave no disturbance to what was publicly established. But when offensive zeal came to be discovered in one party, the rest became in a manner necessitated to be aggressors in their turn. They who observed, or had once experienced this intolerating

spirit, could no longer tolerate on their part³⁹. And they who had once exerted it over others,

³⁹ Thus the controversy stood before the time of the Emperor *Julian*, when blood had been so freely drawn, and cruelties so frequently exchanged, not only between Christian and Heathen, but between Christian and Christian, after the most barbarous manner. What the zeal was of many early Christians against the idolatry of the old Heathen church, at that time the established one, may be comprehended by any person who is ever so slenderly versed in the history of those times. Nor can it be said indeed of us moderns, that in the quality of good *Christians*, as that character is generally understood, we are found either backward or scrupulous in assigning to perdition such wretches as we pronounce *guilty of idolatry*. The name *idolater* is sufficient excuse for almost any kind of insult against the person, and much more against the worship of such a misbeliever. The very word *Christian* is in common language used for *man*, in opposition to *brute-beast*, without leaving so much as a middle place for the poor *Heathen* or *Pagan*; who, as the greater beast of the two, is naturally doomed to massacre, and his gods and temples to fracture and demolition. Nor are we masters of this passion, even in our best humor. The *French* poet, we see, can with great success, and general applause, exhibit this primitive zeal, even on the public stage: *Polyeucte*, act 2. scene. 6.

*Ne perdons plus de temps, le sacrifice est prêt.
Allons y du vray Dieu soutenir l'intérêt,
Allons fouler aux piés ce foudre ridicule
Dont arme un bois pourri ce peuple trop credule;
Allons en éclairer l'aveuglement fatal,
Allons briser ces Dieux de pierre et de metal:
Abandonnons nos jours à cette ardeur celeste,
Faisons triompher Dieu; qu'il dispose du reste.*

I should scarce have mentioned this, but that it came into my mind how ill a construction some people have endeavoured to

could expect no better quarter for themselves. So that nothing less than mutual extirpation became

make of what our author, stating the case of Heathen and Christian persecution, in his *letter of enthusiasm*, has said concerning the Emperor *Julian*. It was no more indeed than had been said of that virtuous and gallant Emperor by his greatest enemies; even by those who, to the shame of Christianity, boasted of his having been most insolently affronted on all occasions, and even treacherously assassinated by one of his Christian soldiers. As for such authors as these, should I cite them in their proper invective style and faint-like phrase, they would make no very agreeable appearance, especially in *miscellanies* of the kind we have here undertaken. But a letter of that elegant and witty Emperor may not be improperly placed amongst our citations, as a pattern of his humor and genius, as well as of his principle and sentiments, on this occasion. *Julian's epistles*, numb. 52.

JULIAN to the BOSTRENS.

“ I should have thought, indeed, that the *Galilæan* leaders
“ would have esteemed themselves more indebted to me, than to
“ him who preceded me in the administration of the empire. For
“ in his time many of them suffered exile, persecution, and im-
“ prisonment. Multitudes of those whom in their religion they
“ term *heretics*, were put to the sword: insomuch that in *Samo-*
“ *sata*, *Cyzicum*, *Paphlagonia*, *Bithynia*, *Galatia*, and many
“ other countries, whole towns were levelled with the earth.
“ The just reverse of this has been observed in my time. The
“ exiles have been recalled, and the proscribed restored to the
“ lawful possession of their estates. But to that height of fury
“ and distraction are this people arrived, that being no longer
“ allowed the privilege to tyrannize over one another, or perse-
“ cute either their own sectaries, or the religious of the lawful
“ church, they swell with rage, and leave no stone unturned,
“ no opportunity unemployed, of raising tumult and sedition. So

the aim, and almost open profession of each religious society.

“ little regard have they to true piety; so little obedience to our
“ laws and constitutions, however humane and tolerating. For
“ still do we determine and steadily resolve, never to suffer one
“ of them to be drawn involuntarily to our altars. * * * As for
“ the mere people, indeed, they appear driven to these riots and
“ seditions by those amongst them whom they call Clerics; who
“ are now enraged to find themselves restrained in the use of
“ their former power and intemperate rule. * * * They can no
“ longer act the magistrate or civil judge, nor assume authority
“ to make people's *wills*, supplant relations, possess themselves
“ of other men's patrimonies, and by specious pretences transfer
“ *all* into their own possession. * * * For this reason I have
“ thought fit, by this *public Edict*, to forewarn the people of
“ this sort, that they raise no more commotions, nor gather in a
“ riotous manner about their seditious Clerics, in defiance of
“ the magistrate, who has been insulted, and in danger of being
“ stoned, by these incited rabbles. In their congregations, they
“ may, notwithstanding, assemble as they please, and crowd
“ about their leaders, performing worship, receiving doctrine, and
“ praying, according as they are by them taught and conducted:
“ but if with any tendency to sedition, let them beware how
“ they hearken, or give assent; and remember, it is at their peril,
“ if by these means they are secretly wrought up to mutiny and
“ insurrection. * * * Live, therefore, in peace and quietness!
“ neither spitefully opposing, or injuriously treating one another.
“ You misguided people of the new way, beware on your side!
“ And you of the ancient and established church, injure not your
“ neighbours and fellow-citizens, who are enthusiastically led
“ away in ignorance and mistake, rather than with design or
“ malice! It is by Discourse and Reason, not by *blows, insults,*
“ or *violence*, that men are to be informed of truth, and con-
“ vinced of error. Again, therefore, and again, I enjoin and
“ charge the zealous followers of the true religion, no way to
“ injure, molest, or affront the *Galilean* people.”

In this extremity, it might well perhaps have been esteemed the happiest wish for mankind, that one of these contending parties of incompatible religionists should at last prevail over the rest; so as, by an universal and absolute power, to determine orthodoxy⁴⁰, and make that opinion effectually catholic, which in their particular judgment had the best right to that denomination. And thus, by force of massacre and desolation, peace in worship, and civil unity by help of the spiritual, might be presumed in a fair way of being restored to mankind.

I shall conclude with observing, how ably the Roman-Christian, and once catholic church, by the assistance of their converted emperors⁴¹, proceeded in the establishment of their growing hierarchy. They considered wisely the various superstitions and enthusiasms of mankind, and proved the different kinds and force of each. All these seeming contrarieties of human passion they knew how to comprehend in their political model

Thus the generous and mild Emperor; whom we may indeed call *Heathen*, but not so justly *apostate*: since being, at different times of his youth, transferred to different schools or universities, and bred under tutors of each religion, as well *Heathen* as *Christian*; he happened, when of full age, to make his choice, though very unfortunately, in the former kind, and adhered to the ancient religion of his country and forefathers. See the same Emperor's letters to *Artabius*, numb. 7. and to *Hecebolus*, numb. 43. and to the people of *Alexandria*, numb. 10. See vol. 1. p. 21.

⁴⁰ Infra, Misc. 5. chap. 3. parag. penult.

⁴¹ Vol. 1. p. 114. Supra, p. 65, 66.

and subservient system of divinity. They knew how to make advantage both from the high speculations of philosophy, and the grossest ideas of vulgar ignorance. They saw there was nothing more different than that enthusiasm which ran upon spirituals, according to the simpler views of the divine existence ⁴², and that which ran upon external proportions, magnificence of structures, ceremonies, processions, quires, and those other harmonies which captivate the eye and ear ⁴³. On this account they even added to this latter kind, and displayed religion in a yet more gorgeous habit of temples, statues, paintings, vestments, copes, mitres, purple, and the cathedral pomp. With these arms they could subdue the victorious Goths, and secure themselves an Attila ⁴⁴, when their Cæsars failed them.

The truth is, it is but a vulgar species of enthusiasm, which is moved chiefly by show and ceremony, and wrought upon chalices and candles, robes, and figured dances. Yet this, we may

⁴² Vol. 2. p. 223.

⁴³ Supra, p. 34.

⁴⁴ When this victorious ravager was in full march to Rome, St Leon, the then Pope, went out to meet him in solemn pomp. The Goth was struck with the appearance, obeyed the priest, and retired instantly with his whole army in a panic-fear; alledging, that among the rest of the pontifical train, he had seen one of an extraordinary form, who threatened him with death, if he did not instantly retire. Of this important encounter there are in St Peter's church, in the Vatican, and elsewhere, at Rome, many fine sculptures, paintings, and representations, deservingly made, in honor of the miracle.

believe, was looked upon as no slight ingredient of devotion in those days ; since , at this hour, the manner is found to be of considerable efficacy with some of the devout amongst ourselves , who pass the least for superstitious , and are reckoned in the number of the polite world. This the wise hierarchy duly preponderating ; but being satisfied withal , that there were other tempers and hearts which could not so easily be captivated by this exterior allurements , they assigned another part of religion to profelytes of another character and complexion , who were allowed to proceed on a quite different bottom , by the inward way of contemplation , and divine love.

They are indeed so far from being jealous of mere enthusiasm , or the ecstatic manner of devotion , that they allow their mystics to write and preach in the most rapturous and seraphic strains. They suffer them , in a manner , to supersede all external worship , and triumph over outward forms ; till the refined religionists proceed so far , as either expressly or seemingly to dissuade the practice of the vulgar and established ceremonial duties. And then , indeed , they check the supposed exorbitant enthusiasm , which would prove dangerous to their hierarchal state ⁴⁵.

If modern visions , prophecies , and dreams , charms , miracles , exorcisms , and the rest of this kind , be comprehended in that which we call

⁴⁵ Witness the case of *Molinos* , and of the pious , worthy , and ingenious Abbé *Fenelon* , now Archbishop of *Cambray*.

fanaticism or superstition, to this spirit they allow a full career; whilst to ingenious writers they afford the liberty, on the other side, in a civil manner, to call in question these spiritual feats performed in monasteries, or up and down by their mendicant or itinerant priests, and ghostly missionaries.

This is that ancient hierarchy, which, in respect of its first foundation, its policy, and the consistency of its whole frame and constitution, cannot but appear in some respect august and venerable, even in such as we do not usually esteem weak eyes. These are the spiritual conquerors, who, like the first Cæsars, from small beginnings, established the foundations of an almost universal monarchy. No wonder if at this day the immediate view of this hierarchal residence, the city and court of Rome, be found to have an extraordinary effect on foreigners of other latter churches. No wonder if the amazed surveyors are for the future so apt either to conceive the horriddest aversion to all priestly government, or, on the contrary, to admire it, so far as even to wish a coalescence or reunion with this ancient mother-church.

In reality, the exercise of power, however arbitrary or despotic, seems less intolerable under such a spiritual sovereignty, so extensive, ancient, and of such a long succession, than under the petty tyrannies and mimical polities of some new pretenders. The former may even persecute⁴⁶ with a tolerable grace: the latter, who would willingly

⁴⁶ *Infra*, Misc. 2. chap. 3. parag. 30.

derive their authority from the former , and graft on their successive right , must necessarily make a very awkward figure. And whilst they strive to give themselves the same air of independency on the civil magistrate ; whilst they affect the same authority in government , the same grandeur , magnificence , and pomp in worship , they raise the highest ridicule , in the eyes of those who have real discernment , and can distinguish originals from copies :

O imitatores , servum pecus ⁴⁷ !

C H A P. III.

Of the force of humor in religion. — Support of our author's argument in his essay on the freedom of wit and raillery. — Zeal discussed. Spiritual surgeons : executioners : carvers. — Original of human sacrifice. — Exhilaration of religion. — Various aspects from outward causes.

THE celebrated wits of the miscellanarian race , the essay-writers , casual discourses , reflection-coiners , meditation-founders , and others of the irregular kind of writers , may plead it as their peculiar advantage , “ that they follow the variety “ of Nature. ” And in such a climate as ours , their plea , no doubt , may be very just. We

⁴⁷ Horat. lib. i. epist. 19.

islanders, famed for other mutabilities, are particularly noted for the variableness and inconstancy of our weather. And if our taste in letters be found answerable to this temperature of our climate, it is certain a writer must, in our account, be the more valuable in his kind, as he can agreeably surprise his reader, by sudden changes and transports, from one extreme to another.

Were it not for the known prevalency of this relish, and the apparent deference paid to those geniuses who are said to elevate and surprise, the author of these Miscellanies might, in all probability, be afraid to entertain his reader with this multifarious, complex, and desultory kind of reading. It is certain, that if we consider the beginning and process of our present work, we shall find sufficient variation in it. From a professed levity, we are lapsed into a sort of gravity unsuitable to our manner of setting out. We have steered an adventurous course, and seem newly come out of a stormy and rough sea. It is time indeed we should enjoy a calm, and instead of expanding our sails before the swelling gusts, it befits us to retire under the lee-shore, and ply our oars in a smooth water.

It is the philosopher, the orator, or the poet, whom we may compare to some first-rate vessel, which launches out into the wide sea, and with a proud motion insults the encountering surges. We essay-writers are of the small-craft, or galley-kind. We move chiefly by starts and bounds, according as our motion is by frequent intervals renewed.

renewed. We have no great adventure in view, nor can tell certainly whither we are bound. We undertake no mighty voyage by help of stars or compass; but row from creek to creek, keep up a coasting-trade, and are fitted only for fair weather and the summer-season.

Happy therefore it is for us in particular, that having finished our course of enthusiasm, and pursued our author into his second treatise⁴⁸, we are now, at last, obliged to turn towards pleasanter reflections, and have such subjects in view as must naturally reduce us to a more familiar style. Wit and Humor, the professed subjects of the treatise now before us, will hardly bear to be examined in ponderous sentences and poised discourse. We might now perhaps do best, to lay aside the gravity of strict argument, and resume the way of chat; which, through aversion to a contrary formal manner, is generally relished with more than ordinary satisfaction. For excess of physic, we know, has often made men hate the name of wholesome. And an abundance of forced instruction, and solemn counsel, may have made men full as averse to any thing delivered with an air of high wisdom and science; especially if it be so high as to be set above all human art of reasoning, and even above reason itself, in the account of its sublime dispensers.

However, since it may be objected to us by certain formalists of this sort, "That we can prove

⁴⁸ *Viz.* Essay on the freedom of wit and humor, vol. 1.

“ nothing duly without proving it in form ; ” we may for once condescend to their demand, state our case formally, and divide our subject into parts, after the precise manner, and according to just rule and method.

Our purpose, therefore, being to defend an author who has been charged as too presumptuous for introducing the way of wit and humor into religious searches; we shall endeavour to make appear,

1st, That wit and humor are corroborative of religion, and promotive of true faith.

2dly, That they are used as proper means of this kind by the holy founders of religion.

3dly, That, notwithstanding the dark complexion and sour humor of some religious teachers, we may be justly said to have in the main a witty and good-humored religion.

Among the earliest acquaintance of my youth, I remember, in particular, a club of three or four merry gentlemen, who had long kept company with one another, and were seldom separate in any party of pleasure or diversion. They happened once to be upon a travelling adventure, and came to a country where they were told for certain, they should find the worst entertainment, as well as the worst roads imaginable. One of the gentlemen, who seemed the least concerned for this disaster, said slightly, and without any seeming design, “ That the best expedient for them in this extremity would be, to keep themselves in high humor, and endeavour to commend every thing which

“ the place afforded. ” The other gentlemen immediately took the hint ; but , as it happened , kept silence , passed the subject over , and took no further notice of what had been proposed.

Being entered into the dismal country , in which they proceeded without the least complaint , it was remarkable , that if , by great chance , they came to any tolerable bit of road , or any ordinary prospect , they failed not to say something or other in its praise , and would light often on such pleasant fancies and representations as made the objects in reality agreeable.

When the greatest part of the day was thus spent , and our gentlemen arrived where they intended to take their quarters , the first of them who made trial of the fare , or tasted either glass or dish , recommended it with such an air of assurance , and in such lively expressions of approbation , that the others came instantly over to his opinion , and confirmed his relish with many additional encomiums of their own.

Many ingenious reasons were given for the several odd tastes and looks of things , which were presented to them at table. “ Some meats were “ wholesome ; others of a high taste ; others according to the manner of eating in this or that “ foreign country. ” Every dish had the flavor of some celebrated receipt in cookery ; and the wine and other liquors had , in their turn , the advantage of being treated in the same elegant strain. In short , our gentlemen eat and drank heartily , and took up with their indifferent fare so well ,

that it was apparent they had wrought upon themselves to believe they were tolerably well served.

Their servants, in the mean time, having laid no such plot as this against themselves, kept to their senses, and stood it out, "That their masters
" had certainly lost theirs. For how else could
" they swallow so contentedly, and take all for
" good which was set before them?" —

Had I to deal with a malicious reader, he might perhaps pretend to infer from this story of my travelling friends, that I intended to represent it as an easy matter for people to persuade themselves into what opinion or belief they pleased. But it can never surely be thought, that men of true judgment and understanding should set about such a task as that of perverting their own judgment, and giving a wrong bias to their Reason. They must easily foresee, that an attempt of this kind, should it have the least success, would prove of far worse consequence to them than any perversion of their taste, appetite, or ordinary senses.

I must confess it, however, to be my imagination, that where fit circumstances concur, and many inviting occasions offer from the side of men's interest, their humor, or their passion; it is no extraordinary case to see them enter into such a plot as this against their own understandings, and endeavour, by all possible means, to persuade both themselves and others of what they think convenient and useful to believe.

If, in many particular cases, where favor and

affection prevail, it be found so easy a thing with us to impose upon ourselves, it cannot surely be very hard to do it, where we take for granted our highest interest is concerned. Now, it is certainly no small interest or concern with men, to believe what is by authority established; since, in the case of disbelief, there can be no choice left, but either to live a hypocrite, or be esteemed profane. Even where men are left to themselves, and allowed the freedom of their choice, they are still forward enough in believing; and can officiously endeavour to persuade themselves of the truth of any flattering imposture.

Nor is it unusual to find men successful in this endeavour; as, among other instances, may appear by the many religious faiths or opinions, however preposterous or contradictory, which, age after age, we know to have been raised on the foundation of miracles and pretended commissions from heaven. These have been as generally espoused and passionately cherished, as the greatest truths, and most certain revelations. It is hardly to be supposed, that such combinations should be formed, and forgeries erected with such success and prevalency over the understandings of men, did not they themselves co-operate, of their own accord, towards the imposture, and show, "That, by a good will and hearty desire of believing, they had in reality a considerable hand in the deceit."

It is certain, that in a country where Faith has for a long time gone by inheritance, and opinions are entailed by law, there is little room left for

the vulgar to alter their persuasion, or deliberate on the choice of their religious belief. Whensoever a government thinks fit to concern itself with men's opinions, and, by its absolute authority, impose any particular belief, there is none perhaps ever so ridiculous or monstrous, in which it needs doubt of having good success. This we may see thoroughly effected in certain countries, by a steady policy, and sound application of punishment and reward, with the assistance of particular courts erected to this end; peculiar methods of justice; peculiar magistrates and officers; proper inquests, and certain wholesome severities, not slightly administered, and played with, as certain triflers propose, but duly and properly enforced; as is absolutely requisite to this end of strict conformity and unity in one and the same profession, and manner of worship.

But should it happen to be the Truth itself which was thus effectually propagated by the means we have described, the very nature of such means can, however, allow but little honor to the propagators, and little merit to the disciples and believers. It is certain, that Mahometism, Paganism, Judaism, or any other belief may stand, as well as the truest, upon this foundation. He who is now an orthodox Christian, would, by virtue of such a discipline, have been infallibly as true a Mussulman; or as errant a heretic, had his birth happened in another place.

For this reason, there can be no rational belief but where comparison is allowed, examination

permitted, and a sincere toleration established. And in this case, I will presume to say, "That whatever Belief is once espoused or countenanced by the magistrate, it will have a sufficient advantage, without any help from force or menaces on one hand, or extraordinary favor and partial treatment on the other." If the Belief be in any measure consonant to truth and reason, it will find as much favor in the eyes of mankind as truth and reason need desire. Whatever difficulties there may be in any particular speculations or mysteries belonging to it, the better sort of men will endeavour to pass them over. They will believe, as our author says, "to the full stretch of their Reason, and add spurs to their Faith, in order to be the more sociable, and conform the better with what their interest, in conjunction with their good humor, inclines them to receive as credible, and observe as their religious duty and devotional task.

Here it is that good humor will naturally take place, and the hospitable disposition of our travelling friends above recited will easily transfer itself into religion, and operate in the same manner with respect to the established faith, however miraculous or incomprehensible, under a tolerating, mild, and gentle government.

Every one knows, indeed, that by Heresy is understood a stubbornness in the will, not a defect merely in the understanding. On this account it

⁴⁹ Letter of enthusiasm, vol. 1. p. 29.

is impossible that an honest and good-humored man should be a schismatic and heretic, and affect to separate from his national worship on slight reason, or without severe provocation.

To be pursued by petty Inquisitors; to be threatened with punishment, or penal laws, to be marked out as dangerous and suspected; to be railed at in high places, with all the studied wit and art of calumny; are indeed sufficient provocations to ill humor, and may force people to divide, who at first had never any such intention. But the virtue of good humor in religion is such, that it can even reconcile persons to a belief in which they were never bred, or to which they had conceived a former prejudice.

From these considerations we cannot but of course conclude, "That there is nothing so ridiculous in respect of policy, or so wrong and odious in respect of common humanity, as a moderate and half-way Persecution." It only frets the sore; it raises the ill humor of mankind; excites the keener spirits; moves indignation in beholders; and sows the very seeds of schism in men's bosoms. A resolute and bold-faced Persecution leaves no time or scope for these engendering distempers, or gathering ill-humors. It does the work at once; by extirpation, banishment, or massacre; and, like a bold stroke in surgery, dispatches by one short amputation, what a bungling hand would make worse and worse, to the perpetual sufferance and misery of the patient.

If there be on earth a proper way to render the

most sacred truth suspected, it is by supporting it with threats, and pretending to terrify people into the belief of it. This is a sort of daring mankind in a cause where they know themselves superior, and out of reach. The weakest mortal finds within himself, that though he may be outwitted and deluded, he can never be forced in what relates to his opinion or assent. And there are few men so ignorant of human nature, and of what they hold in common with their kind, as not to comprehend, "That where great vehemence is expressed
" by any one in what relates solely to another,
" it is seldom without some private interest of
" his own."

In common matters of dispute, the angry disputant makes the best cause to appear the worst. A clown once took a fancy to hear the Latin disputes of doctors at a university. He was asked what pleasure he could take in viewing such combatants, when he could never know so much as which of the parties had the better. "For that matter," replied the clown, "I am not such a fool neither,
" but I can see who is the first that puts the other
" into a passion." Nature herself dictated this lesson to the clown, "That he who had the better
" of the argument, would be easy and well-hu-
" mored; but he who was unable to support his
" cause by reason, would naturally lose his temper,
" and grow violent."

Were two travellers agreed to tell their story separate in public; the one being a man of sincerity, but positive and dogmatical; the other less

sincere, but easy and good humored. Though it happened that the accounts of this latter gentleman were of the more miraculous sort, they would yet sooner gain belief, and be more favorably received by mankind, than the strongly-asserted relations and vehement narratives of the other fierce defender of the truth.

That good humor is a chief cause of compliance, or acquiescence in matters of faith, may be proved from the very spirit of those whom we commonly call Critics. It is a known prevention against the gentlemen of this character, "That they are generally ill-humored and splenetic." The world will needs have it, that their spleen disturbs them. And I must confess I think the world in general to be so far right in this conceit, that though all critics perhaps are not necessarily splenetic, all splenetic people, whether naturally such, or made so by ill usage, have a necessary propensity to criticism and satire. When men are easy in themselves, they let others remain so; and can readily comply with what seems plausible, and is thought conducing to the quiet or good correspondence of mankind. They study to raise no difficulties or doubts. And in religious affairs, it is seldom that they are known forward to entertain ill thoughts or surmises, whilst they are unmolested. But if disturbed by groundless arraignments and suspicions, by unnecessary invectives and bitter declamations, and by a contentious quarrelsome aspect of religion, they naturally turn critics, and begin to question every thing. The spirit of satire

rises with the ill mood: and the chief passion of men thus diseased and thrown out of good humor, is, to find fault, censure, unravel, confound, and leave nothing without exception and controversy.

These are the sceptics or scrupulists against whom there is such a clamor raised. It is evident, in the mean while, that the very clamor itself, joined with the usual menaces and show of force, is that which chiefly raises this sceptical spirit, and helps to multiply the number of these inquisitive and ill-humored Critics. Mere threats, without power of execution, are only exasperating and provocative. They who are masters of the carnal as well as spiritual weapon⁵⁰, may apply each at their pleasure, and in what proportion they think necessary. But where the magistrate resolves steadily to reserve his fasces for his own proper province, and keep the edge-tools and deadly instruments out of other hands, it is in vain for spiritual pretenders to take such magisterial airs. It can then only become them to brandish such arms, when they have strength enough to make the magistrate resign his office, and become provost or executioner in their service. —

Should any one who happens to read these lines, perceive in himself a rising animosity against the author, for asserting thus zealously the notion of a religious liberty, and mutual toleration; it is wished that he would maturely deliberate on the cause of his disturbance and ill-humor. Would he deign

⁵⁰ Supra, p. 79.

to look narrowly into himself, he would undoubtedly find that it is not Zeal for religion or the truth which moves him on this occasion. For had he happened to be in a nation where he was no conformist, nor had any hope or expectation of obtaining the precedency for his own manner of worship, he would have found nothing preposterous in this our doctrine of indulgence. It is a fact indisputable, that whatever sect or religion is undermost, though it may have persecuted at any time before; yet as soon as it begins to suffer persecution in its turn, it recurs instantly to the principles of Moderation, and maintains this our plea for complacency, sociableness, and good humor in religion. The mystery therefore of this animosity, or rising indignation of my devout and zealous reader, is only this: "That being devoted to the
" interest of a party already in possession or expect-
" tation of the temporal advantages annexed to a
" particular belief, he fails not, as a zealous party-
" man, to look with jealousy on every unconform-
" able opinion, and is sure to justify those means
" which he thinks proper to prevent its growth." He knows, that if in matters of religion any one believes amiss, it is at his own peril. If opinion damns, vice certainly does as much. Yet will our gentleman easily find, if he inquires the least into himself, that he has no such furious concern for the security of men's morals, nor any such violent resentment of their vices, when they are such as no way incommode him. And from hence it will be easy for him to infer, " That the passion
" he feels on this occasion, is not from pure

“ Zeal , but private Interest , and worldly emulation.”

Come we now, as authentic rhetoricians express themselves, to our second head: which we should again subdivide into firsts and seconds, but that this manner of carving is of late days grown much out of fashion.

It was the custom of our ancestors, perhaps as long since as the days of our hospitable king Arthur, to have nothing served at table but what was entire and substantial. It was a whole boar, or solid ox which made the feast. The figure of the animal was preserved entire, and the dissection made in form by the appointed carver, a man of might as well as profound craft and notable dexterity; who was seen erect, with goodly mien and action, displaying heads and members, dividing according to art, and distributing his subject-matter into proper parts, suitable to the stomachs of those he served. In latter days it is become the fashion to eat with less ceremony and method. Every one chuses to carve for himself. The learned manner of dissection is out of request; and a certain method of cookery has been introduced by which the anatomical science of the table is entirely set aside. Ragouts and fricassees are the reigning dishes, in which every thing is so dismembered and thrown out of all order and form, that no part of the mass can properly be divided, or distinguished from another.

Fashion is indeed a powerful mistress, and by her single authority has so far degraded the carving

method and use of solids, even in discourse and writing, that our religious pastors themselves have many of them changed their manner of distributing to us their spiritual food. They have quitted their substantial service, and uniform division into parts and under parts; and in order to become fashionable, they have run into the more favourable way of learned ragout and medley. It is the unbred rustic orator alone who presents his clownish audience with a divisible discourse. The elegant court-divine exhorts in Miscellany, and is ashamed to bring his two's and three's before a fashionable assembly.

Should I therefore, as a mere miscellanarian or essay-writer, forgetting what I had premised, be found to drop a head, and lose the connecting thread of my present discourse, the case perhaps would not be so preposterous. For fear, however, lest I should be charged for being worse than my word, I shall endeavour to satisfy my reader, by pursuing my method proposed: if peradventure he can call to mind, what that method was; or if he cannot, the matter is not so very important, but he may safely pursue his reading, without further trouble.

To proceed therefore: Whatever means or methods may be employed at any time in maintaining or propagating a religious belief already current and established, it is evident that the first beginnings must have been founded in that natural complacency and good humor, which inclines to trust and confidence in mankind. Terrors alone, though accompanied with miracles and prodigies of whatever kind, are not capable of raising that

sincere faith and absolute reliance which is required in favor of the divinely-authorised instructor, and spiritual chief. The affection and love which procures a true adherence to the new religious foundation, must depend either on a real or counterfeit Goodness in the religious founder⁵¹. Whatever ambitious spirit may inspire him; whatever savage zeal or persecuting principle may lie in reserve ready to disclose itself when authority and power is once obtained; the first scene of doctrine, however, fails not to present us with the agreeable views of joy, love, meekness, gentleness, and moderation.

In this respect Religion, according to the common practice in many sects, may be compared to that sort of courtship of which the fair sex are known often to complain. In the beginning of an amour, when these innocent charmers are first accosted, they hear of nothing but tender vows, submission, service, love. But soon afterwards, when won by this appearance of gentleness and humility, they have resigned themselves, and are no longer their own, they hear a different note, and are taught to understand submission and service in a sense they little expected. Charity and brotherly love are very engaging sounds: but who would dream that out of abundant charity and brotherly love should come steel, fire, gibbets, rods, and such a sound and hearty application of these remedies as should at once advance the worldly great-

⁵¹ Vol. 1. p. 79. and vol. 2. p. 277.

ness of religious pastors, and the particular interest of private souls, for which they are so charitably concerned?

It has been observed by our author ⁵², "That the Jews were naturally a very cloudy people." That they had certainly in religion, as in every thing else, the least good humor of any people in the world, is very apparent. Had it been otherwise, their holy legislator and deliverer, who was declared the meekest man on earth ⁵³, and who for many years together, had, by the most popular and kind acts, endeavoured to gain their love and affection, would, in all probability, have treated them afterwards with more sweetness, and been able, with less blood and massacre ⁵⁴, to retain them in their religious duty. This, however, we may observe, that if the first Jewish princes, and celebrated kings, acted in reality according to the institutions of their great founder, not only Music, but even Play and Dance, were of holy appointment, and divine right. The first monarch of this nation, though of a melancholy complexion, joined music with his spiritual exercises, and even used it as a remedy under that dark Enthusiasm or evil spirit ⁵⁵; which, how far it might resemble that of prophecy, experienced by him even after his apostasy ⁵⁶, our author pretends not to determine ⁵⁷.

⁵² Letter of enthusiasm, vol. i. p. 24.; and above, p. 46, 47.

⁵³ Numb. xii. 3. ⁵⁴ Exod. xxxii. 27. &c.; Numb. xvi. 41.

⁵⁵ 1 Sam. xviii. 10. & xix. 9. ⁵⁶ Ibid. § 23, 24.

⁵⁷ Letter of enthusiasm, vol. i. p. 38.

It is certain, that the successor of this prince was a hearty espouser of the merry devotion, and, by his example, has shown it to have been fundamental in the religious constitution of his people⁵⁸. The famous entry or high dance performed by him, after so conspicuous a manner, in the procession of the sacred coffer, shows that he was not ashamed of expressing any ecstasy of joy, or playfome humor⁵⁹, which was practised by the meanest of the priests or people on such an occasion⁶⁰.

Besides the many songs and hymns dispersed in holy writ, the book of Psalms itself, Job, Proverbs, Canticles, and other entire volumes of the sacred collection, which are plainly poetry, and full of humorous images, and jocular wit, may sufficiently show how readily the inspired authors had

⁵⁸ 2 Sam. vi. 5. 14. 16.

⁵⁹ Ibid. v. 22.

⁶⁰ Though this *dance* was not performed quite naked, the dancers, it seems, were so slightly clothed, that, in respect of modesty, they might as well have wore nothing; their nakedness appearing still by means of their high caperings, leaps, and violent attitudes, which were proper to this dance. The reader, if he be curious, may examine what relation this religious ecstasy and naked dance had to the *naked* and *processional* prophecy, (1 Sam. xix. 23. and 24.), where prince, priest, and people prophesied in conjunction; the prince himself being both of the *itinerant* and *naked* party. It appears, that even before he was yet advanced to the throne, he had been seized with this prophesying spirit-errant, *processional* and *saltant*, attended, as we find, with a sort of martial dance, performed in troops or companies, with pipe and tabret accompanying the march, together with psaltery, harp, cornets, timbrels, and other variety of music. See 1 Sam. x. 5. and xix. 23, 24. &c.; and 2 Sam. vi. 5.; and above, *Letter of Enthusiasm*, vol. i. p. 38.


recourse to Humor and Diverſion, as a proper means to promote religion, and ſtrengthen the eſtabliſhed faith.

When the affairs of the Jewiſh nation grew deſperate, and every thing ſeemed tending to a total conqueſt and captivity, the ſtyle of their holy writers and prophets might well vary from that of earlier days, in the riſe and vigor of their common-wealth, or during the firſt ſplendor of their monarchy, when the princes themſelves propheſied, and potent kings were of the number of the ſacred penmen. This ſtill we may be aſſured of, that, however, melancholy or ill-humored any of the prophets may appear at any time, it was not that kind of ſpirit which God was wont to encourage in them. Witneſs the caſe of the prophet Jonah, whoſe character is ſo naturally deſcribed in holy writ.

Pettish as this prophet was, unlike a man, and reſembling rather ſome refractory boyiſh pupil, it may be ſaid, that God, as a kind tutor, was pleaſed to humor him, bear with his anger, and, in a luſory manner, expoſe his childiſh frowardneſs, and ſhow him to himſelf.

“Arise,” ſaid his gracious Lord, “and go to Nineveh⁶¹.” “No ſuch matter,” ſays our prophet to himſelf; but away over-ſea for Tarſhiſh. He fairly plays the truant, like an arch ſchoolboy; hoping to hide out of the way. But his tutor had good eyes, and a long reach. He

⁶¹ Jonah, chap. i. &c.



overtook him at sea, where a storm was ready prepared for his exercise, and a fish's belly for his lodging. The renegade found himself in harder durance than any at land. He was sufficiently mortified; he grew good, prayed, moralized, and spoke mightily against lying vanities ⁶².

Again, ⁶³ the prophet is taken into favor, and bid go to Nineveh, to foretel destruction. He foretells it. Nineveh repents; God pardons; and the prophet is angry.

“ ⁶⁴ Lord! — Did I not foresee what this would
“ come to? Was not this my saying, when I was
“ safe and quiet at home? — What else should
“ I have run away for? — As if I knew not
“ how little dependence there was on the resolu-
“ tion of those who are always so ready to for-
“ give, and repent of what they have determined.
“ — No — Strike me dead! — Take
“ my life this moment. It is better for me. —
“ If ever I prophesy again.” *****

“ And dost thou well then to be thus angry,
“ Jonah! Consider with thyself! — Come!
“ — Since thou wilt needs retire out of the city,
“ to see at a distance what will come of it; here,
“ take a better fence than thy own booth against
“ the hot sun which incommodes thee. Take this
“ tall plant, as a shady covering for thy head.

⁶² Ibid. ii. 8.

⁶³ Ibid. iii. 1. &c.

⁶⁴ Ibid. iv. 1, 2, 3.

“Cool thyself, and be delivered from thy
“grief”⁶⁵.”

When the Almighty had shown this indulgence to the prophet, he grew better-humored, and passed a tolerable night. But the next morning the worm came, and an east-wind: the arbor was nipped; the sun shone vehemently, and the prophet's head was heated as before. Presently the ill mood returns, and the prophet is at the old pass.

“Better die, than live at this rate. ——— Death,
“death, alone can satisfy me. Let me hear no
“longer of living. ——— No! ——— It is in vain
“to talk of it”⁶⁶. —

Again, God expostulates; but is taken up short, and answered churlishly by the testy prophet.

“Angry he is; angry he ought to be, and angry
“he will be, to his death”⁶⁷.” But the Almighty, with the utmost pity towards him, in this melancholy and froward temper, lays open the folly of it; and exhorts to mildness and good humor, in the most tender manner, and under the most familiar and pleasant images; whilst he shows expressly more regard and tenderness to the very cattle and brute-beast, than the prophet to his own human kind, and to those very disciples whom by his preaching he had converted⁶⁸.

In the ancienter parts of sacred story, where the beginning of things, and origin of human race are

⁶⁵ Jonah, iv. 4, 5, 6.

⁶⁶ Ibid. ~~v~~ 7, 8.

⁶⁷ Ibid. iv. 9.

⁶⁸ See the last verse of this prophet.

represented to us, there are sufficient instances of this familiarity of style, this popular pleasant intercourse, and manner of dialogue between God and man⁶⁹; I might add even between man and beast⁷⁰; and, what is still more extraordinary, between God and Satan⁷¹.

Whatsoever of this kind may be allegorically understood, or in the way of Parable or Fable; this I am sure of, that the accounts, descriptions, narrations, expressions, and phrases, are in themselves many times exceedingly pleasant, entertaining, and facetious. But fearing lest I might be misinterpreted, should I offer to set these passages in their proper light, which, however, has been performed by undoubted good Christians, and most learned and eminent divines of our own church⁷², I forbear to go any further into the examination or criticism of this sort.

As for our Saviour's style, it is not more vehement and majestic in his gravest animadversions or declamatory discourses, than it is sharp, humorous, and witty in his repartees, reflections, fabulous narrations, or parables, similes, comparisons, and other methods of milder censure and reproof. His exhortations to his disciples, his particular designation of their manners; the pleasant images under which he often couches his morals and prudential

⁶⁹ Genesis iii. 9. &c.

⁷⁰ Numb. xxii. 28. &c.

⁷¹ (1.) Job i, ii.

(2.) 2 Chron. xviii. 18, 19. &c.

⁷² See Burnet, *Archæol.* cap. 7. p. 280. &c.

rules; even his miracles themselves, especially the first he ever wrought⁷³, carry with them a certain festivity, alacrity, and good humor, so remarkable, that I should look upon it as impossible not to be moved in a pleasant manner at their recital.

Now, if what I have here asserted in behalf of pleasantry and humor be found just and real in respect of the Jewish and Christian religions, I doubt not it will be yielded to me, in respect of the ancient Heathen establishments, that the highest care was taken by their original founders, and following reformers, to exhilarate religion, and correct that melancholy and gloominess to which it is subject, according to those different modifications of Enthusiasm above specified⁷⁴.

Our author, as I take it, has elsewhere shown⁷⁵, that these founders were real musicians, and improvers of poetry, music, and the entertaining arts; which they in a manner incorporated with religion: not without good reason, as I am apt to imagine. For to me it plainly appears, that in the early times of all religions, when nations were yet barbarous and savage, there was ever an aptness or tendency towards the dark part of superstition, which, among many other horrors, produced that of human sacrifice. Something of this nature might

⁷³ St John ii. 11.

⁷⁴ Above, chap. i. 2.

⁷⁵ Vol. i. p. 205, 206.

possibly be deduced even from holy writ ⁷⁶. And in other histories we are informed of it more at large.

Every one knows how great a part of the old Heathen worship consisted in play, poetry, and dance. And though some of the more melancholy and superstitious votaries might approach the shrines of their Divinities with mean grimaces, crouchings, and other fawning actions, betraying the low thoughts they had of the divine nature; yet it is well known, that in those times the illiberal sycophantic ⁷⁷ manner of devotion was by the wiser sort contemned, and oft suspected, as knavish and indirect ⁷⁸.

⁷⁶ Gen. xxii. 1, 2, &c.; and Judg. xi. 30, 31, &c.

These places relating to *Abraham* and *Jephthah*, are cited only with respect to the notion which these primitive warriors may be said to have entertained concerning this horrid enormity, so common among the inhabitants of *Palestine* and other neighbouring nations. It appears, that even the elder of these *Hebrew* princes was under no extreme surprise on this trying revelation. Nor did he think of expostulating in the least on this occasion; when, at another time, he could be so importunate for the pardon of an inhospitable, murderous, impious and incestuous city, *Gen.* xviii. 23. &c. See *Marsham's* citations, p. 76, 77. *Ex istis satius est colligere hanc Abrahami tentationem non fuisse κεναιεργημένην πρόξιν, actionem innovatam, non recens excogitatam, sed ad pristinos Cananæorum mores designatam.* See the learned *Capel's* dissertation upon *Jephthah*: “*Ex hujus voti lege (Lev. xxvii. 28, 29.) Jephthe filiam omnino videtur immolasse, hoc est, morte affecisse, et ex-*”
“*ecutus est in ea votum quod ipse voverat, Jud. xi. 39.*”

⁷⁷ See vol. i. p. 23.

⁷⁸ — *Non tu prece poscis emaci, &c.*

Haud cuivis promptum est, murmurque humilefque susurros,

How different an air and aspect the good and virtuous were presumed to carry with them to the temple, let Plutarch singly, instead of many others, witness, in his excellent treatise of superstition⁷⁹; and in another against the Epicurean

Tollere de templis. —————

De Jove quid sentis? Estne, ut præponere cures

Hunc cuinam? —————

————— Qua tu mercede Deorum

Emeris auriculas? —————

O curvæ in terris animæ, et cælestium inanes?

Quid juvat hoc, templis nostros immittere mores,

Et bona Diis ex hac scelerata ducere pulpa?

Perf. sat. 2.

Non est meum, si mugiat Africis

Malus procellis, ad miseras preces

Decurrere. —————

Hor. lib. 3. od. 29.

See vol. I. p. 114.; and above, p. 66. in the notes.

⁷⁹ ὦ βάρβαρ' ἐξευρόντες Ἕλληνες κατὰ τῇ δεισιδαιμονίᾳ, πληώσεις, καλαβορβορώσεις, σαδσατισμὸς, ῥίψεις ἐπὶ πρόσωπον αἰσχρὰς, προσκαθήσεις, ἀλλοκότους προσκυνήσεις, &c. "O wretched Greeks!" (say: he, speaking to his then declining countrymen), "who in a way of
"superstition run so easily into the relish of barbarous nations,
"and bring into religion that frightful mien of sordid and vilify-
"ing devotion, ill-favored humiliation and contrition, abject
"looks and countenances, consternations, prostrations, disfigura-
"tions, and, in the act of worship, distortions, constrained and
"painful postures of the body, wry faces, beggarly tones, mum-
"pings, grimaces, cringings, and the rest of this kind.—A shame
"indeed to us Grecians!—For to us, we know, it is prescribed
"from of old by our peculiar laws concerning music, and the
"public choruses, that we should perform in the handsomest
"manner, and with a just and manly countenance, avoiding those
"grimaces and contortions of which some singers contract a habit.

Atheism, where it will plainly enough appear what a share Good Humor had in that which

“ And shall we not in the more immediate worship of the Deity
 “ preserve this *liberal air* and *manly appearance*? Or, on the con-
 “ trary, whilst we are nicely observant of other forms and de-
 “ cencies in the temple, shall we neglect this greater decency
 “ in voice, words, and manners? and with vile cries, fawnings,
 “ and prostitute behaviour, betray the natural dignity and majesty
 “ of that divine religion and national worship delivered down
 “ to us by our forefathers, and purged from every thing of a
 “ barbarous and savage kind? ”

What *Plutarch* mentions here, of the *just countenance* or *liberal air*, the *σώμα δίκαιον*, of the musical performer, is agreeably illustrated in his *Alcibiades*. It was that heroic youth, who, as appears by this historian, first gave occasion to the *Athenians* of the higher rank wholly to abandon the use of *flutes*; which had before been highly in favor with them. The reason given, “ was the *il-
 “ beral air* which attended such performers, and the *unmanly disfigu-
 “ ration* of their looks and countenance, which this piping-work
 “ produced. ” As for the real figure or plight of the *superstitious
 mind*, our author thus describes it. “ Gladly would the poor com-
 “ fortless mind, by whiles, keep festival and rejoice: but such as its
 “ religion is, there can be no free mirth or joy belonging to it.
 “ Public thanksgivings are but private mournings. Sighs and for-
 “ rows accompany its praises. Fears and horrors corrupt its best
 “ affections. When it assumes the outward ornaments of best ap-
 “ parel for the temple, it even then strikes melancholy, and appears
 “ in paleness and ghastly looks. While it worships, it trembles.
 “ It sends up vows in faint and feeble voices, with eager hopes, de-
 “ sires, and passions, discoverable in the whole disorder of the out-
 “ ward frame: and, in the main, it evinces plainly by practice,
 “ that the notion of *Pythagoras* was but vain, who dared assert, *that
 “ we were then in the best state, and carried our most becoming looks
 “ with us, when we approached the gods*. For then, above all other
 “ seasons, are the superstitious found in the most abject miserable
 “ state of mind, and with the meanest presence and behaviour;
 “ approaching the sacred shrines of the divine powers in the same
 “ manner as they would the dens of bears or lions, the caves of ba-

the politer ancients esteemed as piety and true religion⁸⁰.

“ filisks or dragons , or other hideous recesses of wild beasts or ra-
 “ ging monsters. To me therefore it appears wonderful, that we
 “ should arraign Atheism as impious; whilst superstition escapes the
 “ charge. Shall he who holds there are no divine powers, be e-
 “ steemed impious; and shall not he be esteemed far more impious ,
 “ who holds the divine beings such in their nature as the supersti-
 “ tious believe and represent? For my own part, I had rather men
 “ should say of me , ” &c. See Vol. 1. p. 34. in the notes. No-
 thing can be more remarkable than what our author says again, a
 little below. ” The *Atheist* believes there is no Deity; the *reli-*
 “ *gionist*, or superstitious believer, wishes there were none. If he
 “ believes, it is against his will: mistrust he dares not, nor call his
 “ thought in question. But could he with security, at once, throw
 “ off that oppressive fear, which like the rock of *Tantalus* im-
 “ pends, and presses over him; he would with equal joy spurn his
 “ enslaving thought, and embrace the *Atheist's* state and opinion
 “ as his happiest deliverance. Atheists are free of superstition; but
 “ the superstitious are ever *willing Atheists*, though impotent in
 “ their thought, and unable to believe of the Divine Being as they
 “ gladly would. Νυνὶ δὲ τῷ μὲν Αθέῳ δεισιδαιμονίας εἶδέν μίτεσιν
 “ ὁ δὲ δεισιδαίμων τῇ προαιρέσει ἄθεος ὢν, ἄσθενέστερος ἐστὶν ἢ τῷ
 “ δοξάζειν περὶ θεῶν ὁ βύλεται.” See vol. 1. p. 28. 29. 34. 35.

⁸⁰ Where, speaking of *religion*, as it stood in the Heathen church, and in his own time, he confesses, “ that as to the vulgar
 “ *disposition*, there was no remedy. Many even of the better sort
 “ would be found, of course, to intermix with their veneration and
 “ esteem something of *terror* or *fear* in their religious worship, which
 “ might give it perhaps the character of Superstition: but that
 “ this evil was a thousand times overbalanced by the satisfaction,
 “ hope, joy, and delight, which attended religious worship.
 “ This,” says he, “ is plain and evident from the most demonstrable
 “ testimonies. For neither the societies, or public meetings in the
 “ temples, nor the festivals themselves, nor any other diverting
 “ parties, fights, or entertainments, are more delightful or rejoicing
 “ than what we ourselves behold, and act in the divine worship, and
 “ in the holy sacrifices and mysteries which belong to it. Our dis-

But now, methinks, I have been sufficiently grave and serious, in defence of what is directly contrary to seriousness and gravity. I have very solemnly pleaded for gaiety and Good Humor; I have declaimed against pedantry in learned language, and opposed formality in form. I now find myself somewhat impatient to get loose from the constraint of method: and I pretend lawfully to exercise the privilege which I have asserted, of rambling from subject to subject, from style to style, in my Miscellaneous manner, according to my present profession and character.

I may, in the mean while, be censured probably for passing over my third head. But the methodical reader, if he be scrupulous about it, may content himself with looking back: and if possibly he can pick it out of my second, he will forgive this anticipation, in a writing which is governed less by form than humor. I had indeed resolved with myself to make a large collection of passages from our most eminent and learned divines, in order to have set forth this latter head of my chapter; and by better authority than my own to have evinced,

“ position and temper is not, on this occasion, as if we were in the
“ presence of worldly potentates, dread sovereigns, and despotic
“ princes. Nor are we here found meanly humbling ourselves,
“ crouching in fear and awe, and full of anxiety and confusion, as
“ would be natural to us in such a case. But where *the Divinity* is
“ esteemed the *nearest*, and most *immediately present*, there horrors
“ and amazements are the farthest banished; there the heart, we
“ find, gives freest way to pleasure, to entertainment, to play,
“ mirth, humor, and diversion; and this even to an excess.”

“ That we had in the main a good-humored
“ religion.” But after considering a little while,
I came to this short issue with myself, “ That it
“ was better not to cite at all, than to cite
“ partially.” Now, if I cited fairly what was said,
as well on the melancholy as the chearful side of
our religion, the matter, I found, would be pretty
doubtfully balanced: and the result at last would
be this, “ That, generally speaking, as oft as a
“ divine was in good humor, we should find
“ Religion the sweetest and best-humored thing
“ in nature: but at other times, and that pretty
“ often, we should find a very different face of
“ matters.”

Thus are we alternately exalted and humbled,
cheared and dejected, according as our spiritual
director ⁸¹ is himself influenced: and this, perad-
venture, for our edification and advantage; “ That,
“ by these contrarieties and changes, we may be
“ rendered more supple and compliant.” If we
are very low, and down, we are taken up. If we
are up, and high, we are taken down. — This
is discipline; this is authority and command. —
Did religion carry constantly one and the same
face, and were it always represented to us alike
in every respect, we might perhaps be over-bold,
and make acquaintance with it in too familiar a
manner: we might think ourselves fully knowing
in it, and assured of its true character and genius.
From whence perhaps we might become more

⁸¹ Supra, p. 29.

refractory towards the ghostly teachers of it, and be apt to submit ourselves the less to those who, by appointment and authority, represent it to us in such lights as they esteem most proper and convenient.

I shall therefore not only conclude abruptly, but even sceptically, on this my last head; referring my reader to what has been said already, on my preceding heads, for the bare probability “of our having, in the main, a witty and good-humored Religion.”

This, however, I may presume to assert, that there are undoubtedly some countenances or aspects of our religion, which are humorous and pleasant in themselves; and that the sadder representations of it are many times so over sad and dismal, that they are apt to excite a very contrary passion to what is intended by the representers.

MISCELLANY III.

CHAP. I.

Further remarks on the author of the treatises. — His order and design. — His remarks on the Succession of wit, and progress of letters and philosophy. — Of words, relations, affections. — Countrymen and country. — Old-England. — Patriots of the soil. — Virtuosi, and philosophers. — A Taste.

HAVING already asserted my privilege, as a Miscellaneous or Essay - writer of the modern establishment, to write on every subject, and in every method, as I fancy ; to use order, or lay it aside, as I think fit ; and to treat of order and method in other works, though free perhaps and unconfined as to my own ; I shall presume, in this place, to consider the present method and order of my author's treatises, as in this joint edition they are ranged.

Notwithstanding the high airs of Scepticism which our author assumes in his first piece, I cannot, after all, but imagine, that even there he proves himself, at the bottom, a real Dogmatist, and shows plainly that he has his private opinion, belief, or faith, as strong as any devotee or religionist of them all. Though he affects perhaps to strike at other hypotheses and schemes, he has

something of his own still in reserve, and holds a certain plan or system peculiar to himself, or such, at least, in which he has at present but few companions or followers.

On this account I look upon his management to have been much after the rate of some ambitious Architect; who being called perhaps to prop a roof, redress a leaning wall, or add to some particular apartment, is not contented with this small specimen of his mastership: but pretending to demonstrate the unserviceableness and inconvenience of the old fabric, forms the design of a new building, and longs to show his skill in the principal parts of architecture and mechanics.

It is certain, that, in matters of learning and philosophy, the practice of pulling down is far pleasanter, and affords more entertainment, than that of building and setting up. Many have succeeded, to a miracle, in the first, who have miserably failed in the latter of these attempts. We may find a thousand engineers who can sap, undermine, and blow up, with admirable dexterity, for one single one who can build a fort, or lay the platform of a citadel. And though compassion in real war may make the ruinous practice less delightful, it is certain, that in the literate warring-world, the springing of mines, the blowing up of towers, bastions, and ramparts of Philosophy, with systems, hypotheses, opinions, and doctrines into the air, is a spectacle of all other the most naturally rejoicing.

Our author, we suppose, might have done well

to consider this. We have fairly conducted him through his first and second Letter, and have brought him, as we see here, into his third piece. He has hitherto, methinks, kept up his fapping method, and unravelling humor, with tolerable good grace. He has given only some few, and very slender hints¹ of going further, or attempting to erect any scheme or model which may discover his pretence to a real architect-capacity. Even in this his third piece he carries with him the same sceptical mien: and what he offers by way of project or hypothesis, is very faint, hardly spoken aloud; but muttered to himself, in a kind of dubious whisper, or feigned Soliloquy. What he discovers of form and method, is indeed so accompanied with the random miscellaneous air, that it may pass for raillery, rather than good earnest. It is in his following treatise² that he discovers himself openly, as a plain dogmatist, a formalist, a man of method; with his hypothesis tacked to him, and his opinions so close-sticking, as would

¹ *Viz.* in the letter of enthusiasm, which makes treatise 1. See vol. 1. p. 34, 35, 36. 41. at the end; — and p. 45. concerning the previous knowledge. — So again, treatise 2. vol. 1. p. 66. & 97. — And again, treatise 3. vol. 1. p. 253, 254, &c. where the Inquiry is proposed, and the system and genealogy of the *affections* previously treated; with an apology, p. 268. for the *examining practice*, and seeming pedantry of the method. — And afterwards the apology for treatise 4 in treatise 5. vol. 2. p. 215, 216. Concerning this series and dependency of these joint treatises, see more particularly below, Misc. 4. chap. 1. [parag. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Misc. 5. chap. 2. parag. 17, 18. &c.

² *Viz.* Treatise 4. the Inquiry concerning virtue, vol. 2.

force

force one to call to mind the figure of some precise and strait-laced professor in a university.

What may be justly pleaded in his behalf, when we come in company with him, to inquire into such solemn and profound subjects, seems very doubtful. Mean while, as his affairs stand hitherto in this his treatise of advice, I shall be contented to yoke with him, and proceed, in my miscellaneous manner, to give my Advice also to men of note; whether they are authors or politicians, virtuosi or fine gentlemen; comprehending him, the said author, as one of the number of the advised, and myself too, if occasion be, after his own example of self-admonition and private address.

But, first, as to our author's dissertation in this third treatise³, where his reflections upon authors in general, and the rise and progress of arts, make the inlet or introduction to his philosophy; we may observe, that it is not without some appearance of reason that he has advanced this method. It must be acknowledged, that though, in the earliest times, there may have been divine men of a transcending genius, who have given laws both in religion and government, to the great advantage and improvement of mankind; yet Philosophy itself, as a science and known profession worthy of that name, cannot with any probability be supposed to have risen, as our author shows, till other arts had been raised, and, in a

³ Vol. I. p. 204, 205. &c.

certain proportion, advanced before it. And as this was of the greatest dignity and weight, so it came last into form. It was long clearing itself from the affected dress of sophists, or enthusiastic air of poets; and appeared late in its genuine, simple, and just beauty.

The reader perhaps may justly excuse our author for having in this place so overloaded his margin with those weighty authorities and ancient citations *, when he knows that there are many grave professors in humanity and letters among the moderns who are puzzled in this search, and write both repugnantly to one another, and to the plain and natural evidence of the case. The real lineage and Succession of wit, is indeed plainly founded in nature; as our author has endeavoured to make appear both from history and fact. The Greek nation, as it is original to us in respect of these polite arts and sciences, so it was in reality original to itself. For whether the Egyptians, Phenicians, Thracians, or Barbarians of any kind, may have hit fortunately on this or that particular invention, either in agriculture, building, navigation, or letters; which-ever may have introduced this rite of worship, this title of a Deity, this or that instrument of music, this or that festival, game, or dance, for on this matter there are high debates among the learned; it is evident, beyond a doubt, that the arts and sciences were formed in Greece itself. It was there

* *Viz.* vol. I. p. 209, &c.

that music, poetry, and the rest came to receive some kind of shape, and be distinguished into their several orders and degrees. Whatever flourished, or was raised to any degree of correctness, or real perfection in the kind, was by means of Greece alone, and in the hand of that sole polite, most civilized, and accomplished nation.

Nor can this appear strange, when we consider the fortunate constitution of that people. For though composed of different nations, distinct in laws and governments, divided by seas and continents, dispersed in distant islands; yet being originally of the same extract, united by one single language, and animated by that social, public, and free spirit, which, notwithstanding the animosity of their several warring states, induced them to erect such heroic congresses and powers as those which constituted the Amphictyonian councils, the Olympic, Isthmian, and other games; they could not but naturally polish and refine each other. It was thus they brought their beautiful and comprehensive language to a just standard, leaving only such variety in the dialects as rendered their poetry, in particular, so much the more agreeable. The standard was in the same proportion carried into other arts. The secretion was made. The several species found, and set apart. The performers and masters in every kind, honored, and admired. And, last of all, even Critics themselves acknowledged and received as masters over all the rest. From music, poetry, rhetoric, down to the simple prose of history,

through all the plastic arts of sculpture, statuary, painting, architecture, and the rest, every thing muse-like, graceful and exquisite, was rewarded with the highest honors, and carried on with the utmost ardor and emulation. Thus Greece, though she exported arts to other nations, had properly for her own share no import of the kind. The utmost which could be named, would amount to no more than raw materials, of a rude and barbarous form. And thus the nation was evidently original in art; and with them every noble study and science was, as the great master, so often cited by our author, says of certain kinds of poetry, self-formed⁵, wrought out of nature, and drawn from the necessary operation and course of things, working, as it were, of their own accord, and proper inclination. Now, according to this natural growth of arts, peculiar to Greece, it would necessarily happen, that at the beginning, when the force of language came to be first proved; when the admiring world made their first judgment, and essayed their taste in the elegancies of this sort, the lofty, the sublime, the astonishing and amazing would be the most in fashion, and preferred. Metaphorical speech, multiplicity of

⁵ Αυτοσχεδιασική. Vol. 1. p. 210, &c. It is in this sense of the *natural* production, and *self*-formation of the arts, in this *free* state of ancient Greece, that the same great master uses this word a little before, in the same chapter of his poetics, (*viz.* the 4th) speaking in general of the poets: Καὶ μὲν πρῶτον προαγγέλλει, ἐγέννησαν τὴν ποίησιν ἐκ τῶν αὐτοσχεδιασμάτων. And presently after, Λέξεως δὲ γενομένης, αὐτὴ ἡ Φύσις τὸ οἰκῆτον μέτρον ἔσχε.

figures and high-sounding words, would naturally prevail. Though in the commonwealth itself, and in the affairs of government, men were used originally to plain and direct speech; yet when speaking became an art, and was taught by sophists, and other pretended masters, the high-poetic, and the figurative way began to prevail, even at the bar, and in the public assemblies: infomuch that the grand master, in the above-cited part of his rhetorics⁶, where he extols the tragic poet Euripides, upbraids the rhetoricians of his own age, who retained that very bombastic style, which even poets, and those too of the tragic kind, had already thrown off, or at least considerably mitigated. But the taste of Greece was now polishing. A better judgment was soon formed, when a Demosthenes was heard, and had found success. The people themselves, as our author has shown, came now to reform their Comedy and familiar manner, after Tragedy, and the higher style, had been brought to its perfection under the last hand of an Euripides. And now in all the principal works of ingenuity and art, Simplicity and Nature began chiefly to be sought, and this was the Taste which lasted through so many ages, till the ruin of all things, under a universal monarchy.

If the reader should peradventure be led by his curiosity to seek some kind of comparison between this ancient growth of Taste, and that which we

⁶ Vol. I. p. 212, 213, 214. in the notes.

have experienced in modern days, and within our own nation; he may look back to the speeches of our ancestors in parliament. He will find them, generally speaking, to have been very short and plain, but coarse, and what we properly call homespun, till learning came in vogue, and science was known amongst us. When our princes and senators became scholars, they spoke scholastically. And the pedantic style was prevalent, from the first dawn of letters, about the age of the reformation, till long afterwards. Witness the best-written discourses, the admired speeches, orations, or sermons, through several reigns, down to these latter, which we compute within the present age. It will undoubtedly be found, that, till very late days, the fashion of speaking, and the turn of wit, was after the figurative and florid manner. Nothing was so acceptable as the high-sounding phrase, the far-fetched comparison, the capricious point, and play of words; and nothing so despicable as what was merely of the plain or natural kind. So that it must either be confessed, that, in respect of the preceding age, we are fallen very low in Taste; or that, if we are in reality improved, the natural and simple manner which conceals and covers Art, is the most truly artful, and of the genteelest, truest, and best-studied taste; as has above been treated more at large⁷.

Now, therefore, as to our author's Philosophy

⁷ P. 16. and vol. 1. p. 221, 222.

itself, as it lies concealed in this treatise³, but more professed and formal in his next⁹; we shall proceed gradually according to his own method: since it becomes not one who has undertaken the part of his airy assistant and humorous paraphrast, to enter suddenly, without good preparation, into his dry reasonings and moral researches about the social passions and natural affections, of which he is such a punctilious examiner.

Of all human affections, the noblest and most becoming human nature, is that of love to one's country. This, perhaps, will easily be allowed by all men, who have really a Country, and are of the number of those who may be called a People¹⁰, as enjoying the happiness of a real constitution and polity, by which they are free and independent. There are few such countrymen or free-men so degenerate, as directly to discountenance or condemn this passion of love to their community and national brotherhood. The indirect manner of opposing this principle, is the most usual. We hear it commonly, as a complaint, "That there is little of this love extant in the world."

³ *Viz.* Soliloquy; or, Advice to an Author; treatise 3. vol. 1.

⁹ *Viz.* Inquiry, &c. treatise 4. vol. 2.

¹⁰ A multitude held together by force, though under one and the same head, is not properly united: nor does such a body make a people. It is the social league, confederacy, and mutual consent, founded in some common good or interest, which joins the members of a community, and makes a people one. Absolute power annuls the public: and where there is no public, or constitution, there is in reality no mother-Country, or Nation. See vol. 1. p. 89, 90.

From whence it is hastily concluded, "That
 " there is little or nothing of friendly or social af-
 " fection inherent in our nature, or proper to our
 " species." It is however apparent, that there is
 scarce a creature of human kind, who is not pos-
 sessed at least with some inferior degree or meaner
 sort of this natural affection to a country.

*Nescio qua natale solum dulcedine captos
 Ducit* ¹¹. —

It is a wretched aspect of humanity which we
 figure to ourselves, when we would endeavour to
 resolve the very essence and foundation of this ge-
 nerous passion into a relation to mere clay and dust,
 exclusively of any thing sensible, intelligent, or
 moral. It is, I must own, on certain relations ¹²,
 or respective proportions, that all natural affection
 does in some measure depend. And in this view
 it cannot, I confess, be denied, that we have each
 of us a certain relation to the mere earth itself,
 the very mould or surface of that planet, in which,
 with other animals of various sorts, we, poor
 reptiles! were also bred and nourished. But had
 it happened to one of us British men to have been
 born at sea, could we not therefore properly be
 called British men? Could we be allowed country-
 men of no sort, as having no distinct relation to
 any certain soil or region; no original neighbour-

¹¹ Ovid. Pont. lib. 1. eleg. 3. v. 35.

¹² Τα Καθηκόνια ταῖς σχέσεσι παραμελεῖται.

hood but with the watery inhabitants and sea-monsters? Surely, if we were born of lawful parents, lawfully employed, and under the protection of law; wherever they might be then detained, to whatever colonies sent, or whithersoever driven by any accident, or in expeditions or adventures in the public service, or that of mankind, we should still find we had a home, and country, ready to lay claim to us. We should be obliged still to consider ourselves as fellow-citizens, and might be allowed to love our country or nation, as honestly and heartily as the most inland inhabitant or native of the soil. Our political and social capacity would undoubtedly come in view, and be acknowledged full as natural and essential in our species, as the parental and filial kind, which gives rise to what we peculiarly call natural affection. Or supposing that both our birth and parents had been unknown, and that in this respect we were in a manner younger brothers in society to the rest of mankind; yet, from our nurture and education, we should surely espouse some country or other, and joyfully embracing the protection of a magistracy, should of necessity and by force of nature join ourselves to the general society of mankind, and those in particular, with whom we had entered into a nearer communication of benefits, and closer sympathy of affections. It may therefore be esteemed no better than a mean subterfuge of narrow minds, to assign this natural passion for society and a country, to such a relation as that of a mere fungus or common excrescence, to its parent-mould, or nursing dunghill.

The relation of countryman, if it be allowed any thing at all, must imply something moral and social. The notion itself presupposes a naturally civil and political state of mankind, and has reference to that particular part of society to which we owe our chief advantages as men, and rational creatures, such as are naturally and necessarily united for each other's happiness and support, and for the highest of all happinesses and enjoyments¹³; "The intercourse of minds, the free use of our reason, and the exercise of mutual love and friendship."

An ingenious physician among the moderns, having in view the natural dependency of the vegetable and animal kinds on their common mother Earth, and observing, that both the one and the other draw from her their continual sustenance, some rooted and fixed down to their first abodes, others unconfined, and wandering from place to place to suck their nourishment, he accordingly, as I remember, styles this latter animal race, her released sons; "*filios terræ emancipatos.*" Now, if this be our only way of reckoning for mankind, we may call ourselves indeed the sons of Earth, at large; but not of any particular soil, or district. The division of climates and regions is fantastic and artificial; much more the limits of particular countries, cities, or provinces. Our "*natale solum,*" or mother-earth, must, by this account, be the real globe itself which bears us, and in respect of which we must allow the common animals, and

¹³ Vol. 1. p. 84. &c. and vol. 2. p. 233. &c.

even the plants of all degrees, to claim an equal brotherhood with us, under this common Parent.

According to this calculation, we must, of necessity, carry our relation as far as to the whole material world or universe, where alone it can prove complete. But, for the particular district or tract of earth, which, in a vulgar sense, we call our Country, however bounded, or geographically divided, we can never, at this rate, frame any accountable relation to it, nor consequently assign any natural or proper affection towards it.

If unhappily a man had been born either at an inn, or in some dirty village; he would hardly, I think, circumscribe himself so narrowly, as to accept a denomination or character from those nearest appendices, or local circumstances of his nativity. So far should one be from making the hamlet or parish to be characteristical in the case, that hardly would the shire itself, or county, however rich or flourishing, be taken into the honorary term or appellation of one's Country.

“What then shall we presume to call our Country? Is it England itself? But what of Scotland? Is it therefore Britain? But what of the other islands, the northern Orcades, and the southern Jersey and Guernsey? What of the Plantations and poor Ireland?” — Behold here a very dubious circumscription!

But what, after all, if there be a conquest or captivity in the case? a migration? a national secession, or abandonment of our native seats for some other soil or climate? This has happened,

we know, to our forefathers. And as great and powerful a people as we have been of late, and have ever shown ourselves, under the influence of free councils, and a tolerable ministry; should we relapse again into slavish principles, or be administered long under such heads, as having no thought of liberty for themselves, can have much less for Europe or their neighbours; we may at last feel a war at home, become the seat of it, and in the end a conquest. We might then gladly embrace the hard condition of our predecessors, and exchange our beloved native soil for that of some remote and uninhabited part of the world. Now, should this possibly be our fate; should some considerable colony or body be formed afterwards out of our remains, or meet, as it were by miracle, in some distant climate; would there be for the future no Englishman remaining? no common bond of alliance and friendship by which we could still call countrymen, as before? How came we, I pray, by our ancient name of Englishmen? Did it not travel with us over land and sea? Did we not indeed bring it with us heretofore from as far as the remoter parts of Germany to this island?

I must confess, I have been apt sometimes to be very angry with our language, for having denied us the use of the word *Patria*, and afforded us no other name to express our native community than that of country; which already bore two different significations¹⁴, abstracted from mankind

¹⁴ *Rus et regio.* In French *campagne* and *païs*.

or society. Reigning words are many times of such force as to influence us considerably in our apprehension of things. Whether it be from any such cause as this, I know not; but certain it is, that, in the idea of a civil state or nation, we Englishmen are apt to mix somewhat more than ordinary gross and earthy. No people who owed so much to a constitution, and so little to a soil or climate, were ever known so indifferent towards one, and so passionately fond of the other. One would imagine, from the common discourse of our countrymen, that the finest lands near the Euphrates, the Babylonian or Persian paradises, the rich plains of Egypt, the Grecian Temple, the Roman Campania, Lombardy, Provence, the Spanish Andalusia, or the most delicious tracts in the Eastern or Western Indies, were contemptible countries in respect of Old England.

Now, by the good leave of these worthy patriots of the soil, I must take the liberty to say, I think Old England to have been in every respect a very indifferent country; and that Late England, of an age or two old, even since Queen Bess's days, is indeed very much mended for the better. We were, in the beginning of her grandfather's reign, under a sort of Polish nobility, and had no other liberties than what were in common to us with the then fashionable monarchies and Gothic lordships of Europe. For Religion indeed, we were highly famed above all nations, by being the most subject to our ecclesiastics at home, and the best tributaries and servants to the holy see abroad.

I must go further yet, and own, that I think Late England, since the revolution, to be better still than Old England, by many a degree; and that, in the main, we make somewhat a better figure in Europe, than we did a few reigns before. But however our people may of late have flourished, our name or credit have risen; our trade and navigation, our manufactures or our husbandry been improved; it is certain, that our region, climate, and soil, is, in its own nature, still one and the same. And to whatever politeness we may suppose ourselves already arrived, we must confess, that we are the latest barbarous, the last civilized or polished people of Europe. We must allow, that our first conquest by the Romans brought us out of a state hardly equal to the Indian tribes; and that our last conquest by the Normans brought us only into the capacity of receiving arts and civil accomplishments from abroad. They came to us by degrees, from remote distances, at second or third hand, from other courts, states, academies, and foreign nurseries of wit and manners.

Notwithstanding this, we have as overweening an opinion of ourselves, as if we had a claim to be original and earth-born. As oft as we have changed our masters, and mixed races with our several successive conquerors, we still pretend to be as legitimate and genuine possessors of our soil, as the ancient Athenians accounted themselves to have been of theirs. It is remarkable, however, in that truly ancient, wise, and witty people, that as fine territories and noble countries as they possessed, as

indisputable masters and superiors as they were in all science, wit, politeness, and manners, they were yet so far from a conceited, selfish, and ridiculous contempt of others, that they were, even in a contrary extreme, “Admirers of whatever was in
“the least degree ingenious or curious in foreign na-
“tions.” Their great men were constant travellers. Their legislators and philosophers made their voyages into Egypt, passed into Chaldea and Persia, and failed not to visit most of the dispersed Grecian governments and colonies, through the islands of the Ægean in Italy, and on the coasts of Asia and Africa. It was mentioned as a prodigy, in the case of a great philosopher¹⁵, though known to have been always poor, “That he should never have travelled,
“nor had ever gone out of Athens for his im-
“provement.” How modest a reflection in those who were themselves Athenians!

For our part, we neither care that foreigners should travel to us, nor any of ours should travel into foreign countries¹⁶. Our best policy and

¹⁵ Socrates.

¹⁶ An ill token of our being thoroughly civilized; since, in the judgment of the polite and wise, this inhospitable disposition was ever reckoned among the principal marks of barbarism. So Strabo, from other preceding authors, κοινὸν μὲν εἶναι τοῖς βαρβάροις πάντων ἔθος τὴν ΞΕΝΗΛΑΣΙΑΝ, l. 17. p. 802.

The Ζεὺς Εἰνός of the ancients was one of the solemn characters of Divinity; the peculiar attribute of the supreme Deity, benign to mankind, and recommending universal love, mutual kindness, and benignity, between the remotest and most unlike of human race. Thus their divine poet, in harmony with their sacred oracles, which were known frequently to confirm this doctrine.

breeding is, it seems, "To look abroad as little as possible; contract our views within the narrowest compass; and despise all knowledge, learning, or manners which are not of a home-growth." For hardly will the ancients themselves be regarded by those who have so resolute a contempt of what the politest moderns of any nation, besides their own, may have advanced in the way of literature, politeness, or Philosophy.

This disposition of our countrymen, from whatever causes it may possibly be derived, is, I fear, a very prepossessing circumstance against our author; whose design is, to advance something new, or at least something different from what is commonly current in Philosophy and Morals. To support this design of his, he seems intent chiefly on this single point, "To discover how we may, to best advantage, form within ourselves, what,

Ξῖν' ἔ μοι θέμις ἔσ', εἴ κακίων σέθεν ἔλθοι,
 Ξῖνον ἀτιμῆται· πρὸς γὰρ Διὸς εἰσιν ἅπαντες
 Ξῖνοι ————— ΟΔΥΣ. ξ.

Again,

—'Ουδέ τις ἄμμι βροτῶν ἐπιμίσγεται ἄλλος.
 Ἀλλ' ὅδε τις δύστηνος ἀλώμενος ἐνθάδ' ἰκάνει,
 Τὸν νῦν χρὴ κομέειν· πρὸς γὰρ Διὸς εἰσιν ἅπαντες
 Ξῖνοι ————— ΟΔΥΣ. ζ.

And again,

Ἀφνειὸς βιότοιο, φίλος δ' ἦν ἀνθρώποισι·
 Πάντας γὰρ φιλέσκειν, ὁδῶ ἐπὶ οἰκία ναίων. ΙΑΙΑΔ. ζ.
 See also Odyss. lib. 3. vers. 34. &c. and 67. &c. lib. 4. vers. 30.
 &c. and 60.

Such was ancient *Heathen* Charity, and pious duty, towards the whole of mankind; both those of different nations, and different worships. See vol. 2. p. 137, 138.

in

“ in the polite world, is called a relish, or good
“ taste.”

He begins, it is true, as near home as possible, and sends us to the narrowest of all conversations, that of Soliloquy or self-discourse. But this correspondence, according to his computation, is wholly impracticable, without a previous commerce with the world; and the larger this commerce is, the more practicable and improving the other, he thinks, is likely to prove. The sources of this improving art of self-correspondence he derives from the highest politeness and elegance of ancient dialogue and debate, in matters of wit, knowledge, and ingenuity. And nothing, according to our author, can so well revive this self-corresponding practice, as the same search and study of the highest politeness in modern conversation. For this, we must necessarily be at the pains of going further abroad than the province we call Home. And, by this account, it appears, that our author has little hopes of being either relished or comprehended by any other of his countrymen, than those who delight in the open and free commerce of the world, and are rejoiced to gather views, and receive light from every quarter; in order to judge the best of what is perfect, and according to a just standard, and true taste in every kind.

It may be proper for us to remark, in favor of our author, that the sort of ridicule or raillery which is apt to fall upon Philosophers, is of the same kind with that which falls commonly on the Virtuosi, or refined wits of the age. In this latter

general denomination we include the real fine gentlemen, the lovers of art and ingenuity; such as have seen the world, and informed themselves of the manners and customs of the several nations of Europe; searched into their antiquities and records; considered their police, laws, and constitutions; observed the situation, strength, and ornaments of their cities, their principal arts, studies, and amusements; their architecture, sculpture, painting, music, and their taste in poetry, learning, language, and conversation.

Hitherto there can lie no ridicule, nor the least scope for satiric wit or raillery. But when we push this virtuoso character a little further, and lead our polished gentlemen into more nice researches; when, from the view of mankind and their affairs, our speculative genius, and minute examiner of nature's works, proceeds with equal or perhaps superior zeal in the contemplation of the insect-life, the conveniencies, habitations, and œconomy of a race of shell-fish; when he has erected a cabinet in due form, and made it the real pattern of his mind, replete with the same trash and trumpery of correspondent empty notions, and chimerical conceits; he then indeed becomes the subject of sufficient raillery, and is made the jest of common conversations.

A worse thing than this happens commonly to these inferior Virtuosi. In seeking so earnestly for rarities, they fall in love with rarity for rareness sake. Now, the greatest rarities in the world are monsters. So that the study and relish of these

gentlemen, thus assiduously employed, becomes at last in reality monstrous: and their whole delight is found to consist in selecting and contemplating whatever is most monstrous, disagreeing, out of the way, and to the least purpose of any thing in nature.

In Philosophy, matters answer exactly to this virtuoso scheme. Let us suppose a man, who having this resolution merely, how to employ his understanding to the best purpose, considers "Who" or what he is; whence he arose, or had his being; to what end he was designed; and to what course of action he is, by his natural frame and constitution, destined:" should he descend on this account into himself, and examine his inward powers and faculties; or should he ascend beyond his own immediate species, city, or community, to discover and recognise his higher polity or community, that common and universal one of which he is born a member; nothing surely of this kind could reasonably draw upon him the least contempt or mockery. On the contrary, the finest gentleman must, after all, be considered but as an idiot, who talking much of the knowledge of the world and mankind, has never so much as thought of the study or knowledge of himself, or of the nature and government of that real public and World, from whence he holds his being.

*Quid sumus, et quidnam victuri gignimur*¹⁷? —

¹⁷ Pers. sat. 3. vers. 67.

“Where are we? Under what roof? or on board
“what vessel? Whither bound? On what busi-
“ness? Under whose pilotship, government, or
“protection?” are questions which every sensible
man would naturally ask, if he were on a sudden
transported into a new scene of life. It is admir-
able, indeed, to consider, that a man should have
been long come into a world, carried his reason
and sense about with him, and yet have never
seriously asked himself this single question, “Where
“am I? or what?” but, on the contrary, should
proceed regularly to every other study and inquiry,
postponing this alone, as the least considerable; or
leaving the examination of it to others commission-
ed, as he supposes, to understand and think for
him upon this head. To be bubbled, or put upon
by any sham advices in this affair, is, it seems, of
no consequence! We take care to examine accur-
ately, by our own judgment, the affairs of other
people, and the concerns of the world which least
belong to us: but what relates more immediately
to ourselves, and is our chief self-interest, we
charitably leave to others to examine for us, and
readily take up with the first comers; on whose
honesty and good faith, it is presumed, we may
safely rely.

Here, methinks, the ridicule turns more against
the philosophy-haters than the virtuosi or philoso-
phers. Whilst Philosophy is taken, as in its prime
sense it ought, for a mastership in life and man-
ners, it is like to make no ill figure in the world,
whatever impertinencies may reign, or however

extravagant the times may prove. But let us view Philosophy, like mere virtuoso-ship, in its usual career, and we shall find the ridicule rising full as strongly against the professors of the higher as the lower kind. Cockle-shell abounds with each. Many things exterior, and without ourselves, of no relation to our real interests, or to those of society and mankind, are diligently investigated: Nature's remotest operations, deepest mysteries, and most difficult phenomena, discussed, and whimsically explained; hypotheses and fantastic systems erected; a universe anatomised; and by some notable scheme¹⁸ so solved and reduced, as to appear an easy knack or secret to those who have the clew. Creation itself can, upon occasion, be exhibited; transmutations, projections, and other philosophical arcana, such as in the corporeal world can accomplish all things; whilst in the intellectual a set frame of metaphysical phrases and distinctions can serve to solve whatever difficulties may be propounded, either in logics, ethics, or any real science, of whatever kind.

It appears from hence, that the defects of Philosophy, and those of virtuoso-ship, are of the same nature. Nothing can be more dangerous than a wrong choice, or misapplication in these affairs. But as ridiculous as these studies are rendered by their senseless managers, it appears, however, that each of them are, in their nature,

¹⁸ Vol. 2. p. 151. 156.

essential to the character of a fine gentleman, and man of sense.

To philosophise, in a just signification, is but to carry good-breeding a step higher. For the accomplishment of breeding is, to learn whatever is decent in company, or beautiful in arts; and the sum of philosophy is, to learn what is just in society, and beautiful in nature, and the order of the world.

It is not wit merely, but a temper, which must form the well-bred man. In the same manner, it is not a head merely, but a heart and resolution, which must complete the real Philosopher. Both characters aim at what is excellent, aspire to a just taste, and carry in view the model of what is beautiful and becoming. Accordingly, the respective conduct and distinct manners of each party are regulated; the one according to the perfectest ease, and good entertainment of company; the other according to the strictest interest of mankind and society: the one according to a man's rank and quality in his private nation; the other according to his rank and dignity in nature.

Whether each of these offices, or social parts, are in themselves as convenient as becoming, is the great question which must some way be decided. The well-bred man has already decided this in his own case, and declared on the side of what is handsome: for whatever he practises in this kind¹⁹, he accounts no more than what he owes purely to

¹⁹ Vol. I. p. 111, 112.

himself; without regard to any further advantage. The pretender to Philosophy, who either knows not how to determine this affair, or if he has determined, knows not how to pursue his point with constancy and firmness, remains, in respect of philosophy, what a clown or coxcomb is in respect of breeding and behaviour. Thus, according to our author, the taste of beauty, and the relish of what is decent, just, and amiable, perfects the character of the gentleman, and the philosopher. And the study of such a taste or relish will, as we suppose, be ever the great employment and concern of him who covets as well to be wise and good, as agreeable and polite.

*Quid verum atque decens, curo, et rogo, et omnis in
hoc sum* ²⁰.

C H A P. I I.

Explanation of a taste continued. — Ridiculers of it. — Their wit and sincerity. — Application of the taste to affairs of government and politics. — Imaginary characters in the state. — Young nobility and gentry. — Pursuit of beauty. — Preparation for philosophy.

BY this time, surely, I must have proved myself sufficiently engaged in the project and design of our self-discouraging author, whose defence I have

²⁰ Horat. lib. 1. ep. 1. ver. 11.

undertaken. His pretention, as plainly appears in this third treatise, is to recommend Morals¹ on the same foot with what in a lower sense is called manners; and to advance Philosophy, as harsh a subject as it may appear, on the very foundation of what is called agreeable and polite. And it is in this method and management that, as his interpreter, or paraphrast, I have proposed to imitate and accompany him, as far as my miscellaneous character will permit.

Our joint endeavour, therefore, must appear this; to shew, “That nothing which is found
“ charming or delightful in the polite world, no-
“ thing which is adopted as pleasure, or entertain-
“ ment, of whatever kind, can any way be ac-
“ counted for, supported, or established, without
“ the pre-establishment or supposition of a certain
“ taste². ” Now, a taste or judgment, it is supposed, can hardly come ready formed with us into the world. Whatever principles or materials of this kind we may possibly bring with us; whatever good faculties, senses, or anticipating sensations and imaginations, may be of Nature’s growth, and arise properly, of themselves, without our art, promotion, or assistance; the general idea which is formed of all this management, and the clear notion we attain of what is preferable and principal in all these subjects of choice and estimation, will not, as I imagine, by any person, be taken for innate. Use, practice, and culture, must precede

¹ Vol. i. p. 289. &c.

² Ibid.

the understanding and wit of such an advanced size and growth as this. A legitimate and just taste can neither be begotten, made, conceived, or produced, without the antecedent labor and pains of criticism.

For this reason we presume not only to defend the cause of critics, but to declare open war against those indolent supine authors, performers, readers, auditors, actors, or spectators; who making their humor alone the rule of what is beautiful and agreeable, and having no account to give of such their humor or odd fancy, reject the criticising or examining art, by which alone they are able to discover the true beauty and worth of every object.

According to that affected ridicule which these insipid remarkers pretend to throw upon just critics, the enjoyment of all real arts or natural beauties would be entirely lost: even in behaviour and manners we should at this rate become in time as barbarous as in our pleasures and diversions. I would presume it, however, of these critic-haters, that they are not yet so uncivilized, or void of all social sense, as to maintain, "That the most barbarous life, or brutish pleasure, is as desirable as the most polished or refined."

For my own part, when I have heard sometimes men of reputed ability join in with that effeminate plaintive tone of invective against critics, I have really thought they had it in their fancy to keep down the growing geniuses of the youth, their rivals, by turning them aside from that examination

and search on which all good performance, as well as good judgment, depends. I have seen many a time a well-bred man, who had himself a real good taste, give way, with a malicious complaisance, to the humor of a company, where, in favor chiefly of the tender sex, this soft languishing contempt of critics, and their labors, has been the subject set afoot. "Wretched creatures!" says one, "impertinent things, these critics, as ye call them! — as if one could not know what was agreeable or pretty, without their help. — It is fine indeed, that one should not be allowed to fancy for one's self. — Now, should a thousand critics tell me, that Mr A — 's new play was not the wittiest in the world, I would not mind them one bit."

This our real man of wit hears patiently; and adds, perhaps of his own, "That he thinks it, truly, somewhat hard, in what relates to people's diversion and entertainment, that they should be obliged to chuse what pleased others, and not themselves." Soon after this he goes himself to the play, finds one of his effeminate companions commending or admiring at a wrong place. He turns to the next person who sits by him, and asks privately, "What he thinks of his companion's relish?"

Such is the malice of the world! They who by pains and industry have acquired a real taste in arts, rejoice in their advantage over others, who have either none at all, or such as renders them ridiculous. At an auction of books or pictures,

you shall hear these gentlemen persuading every one "To bid for what he fancies." But, at the same time, they would be soundly mortified themselves, if, by such as they esteemed good judges, they should be found to have purchased by a wrong fancy, or ill taste. The same gentleman who commends his neighbour for ordering his garden or apartment, as his humor leads him, takes care his own should be ordered as the best judgments would advise. Being once a judge himself, or but tolerably knowing in these affairs, his aim is not "To change the being of things, and bring
" Truth and Nature to his humor; but, leaving
" Nature and Truth just as he found them,
" to accommodate his humor and fancy to their
" standard." Would he do this in a yet higher case, he might in reality become as wise and great a man, as he is already a refined and polished gentleman. By one of these tastes he understands how to lay out his garden, model his house, fancy his equipage, appoint his table: by the other he learns of what value these amusements are in life, and of what importance to a man's freedom, happiness, and self-enjoyment. For if he would try effectually to acquire the real science or taste of life, he would certainly discover, "That a right
" mind, and generous affection, had more beauty
" and charm than all other symmetries in the
" world besides:" and, "that a grain of honesty and
" native worth was of more value than all the
" adventitious ornaments, estates, or preferments;
" for the sake of which some of the better fort

“ so often turn knaves ; forsaking their prin-
“ ciples, and quitting their honor and freedom,
“ for a mean, timorous, shifting state of gaudy
“ servitude. ”

A little better taste, were it a very little, in the affair of life itself, would, if I mistake not, mend the manners, and secure the happiness of some of our noble countrymen, who come with high advantage and a worthy character into the public. But ere they have long engaged in it, their worth unhappily becomes venal. Equipages, titles, precedencies, staves, ribands, and other such glittering ware, are taken in exchange for inward merit, honor, and a character.

This they may account perhaps a shrewd bargain. But there will be found very untoward abatements in it, when the matter comes to be experienced. They may have descended in reality from ever so glorious ancestors, patriots, and sufferers for their nation's liberty and welfare: they may have made their entrance into the world upon this bottom of anticipated fame and honor: they may have been advanced on this account to dignities, which they were thought to have deserved. But when induced to change their honest measures, and sacrifice their cause and friends to an imaginary private interest; they will soon find, by experience, that they have lost the relish and taste of life; and for insipid wretched honors, of a deceitful kind, have unhappily exchanged an amiable and sweet honor, of a sincere and lasting relish, and good favour. They may, after this, act farces, as

they think fit, and hear qualities and virtues assigned to them under the titles of graces, excellencies, honors, and the rest of this mock-praise and mimical appellation. They may even with serious looks be told of honor and worth, their principle, and their country: but they know better within themselves, and have occasion to find that, after all, the world too knows better; and that their few friends and admirers have either a very shallow wit, or a very profound hypocrisy.

It is not in one party alone that these purchases and sales of honor are carried on. I can represent to myself a noted patriot, and reputed pillar of the religious part of our constitution, who having by many and long services, and a steady conduct, gained the reputation of thorough zeal with his own party, and of sincerity and honor with his very enemies, on a sudden, the time being come that the fulness of his reward was set before him, submits complacently to the proposed bargain, and sells himself for what he is worth, in a vile detestable old age, to which he has reserved the infamy of betraying both his friends and country.

I can imagine, on the other side, one of a contrary party; a noted friend to liberty in church and state; an abhorrer of the slavish dependency on courts, and of the narrow principles of bigots: such a one, after many public services of note, I can see wrought upon, by degrees, to seek court-preferment; and this too under a patriot-character. But having perhaps tried this way with less success, he is obliged to change his character, and become

a royal flatterer, a courtier against his nature, submitting himself, and suing, in so much the meaner degree, as his inherent principles are well known at court, and to his new-adopted party, to whom he feigns himself a profelyte.

The greater the genius or character is of such a person, the greater is his slavery, and heavier his load. Better had it been that he had never discovered such a zeal for public good, or signalized himself in that party which can with least grace make sacrifices of national interests to a crown, or to the private will, appetite, or pleasure of a prince. For supposing such a genius as this had been to act his part of courtship in some foreign and absolute court; how much less infamous would his part have proved? how much less slavish, amidst a people who were all slaves? Had he peradventure been one of that forlorn begging troop of gentry extant in Denmark or Sweden, since the time that those nations lost their liberties; had he lived out of a free nation, and happily-balanced constitution, had he been either conscious of no talent in the affairs of government, or of no opportunity to exert any such, to the advantage of mankind: where had been the mighty shame, if perhaps he had employed some of his abilities in flattering like others, and paying the necessary homage required for safety's sake, and self-preservation, in absolute and despotic governments? The taste, perhaps, in strictness, might still be wrong, even in this hard circumstance: but how inexcusable in a quite contrary one! For let us suppose our courtier not only an

Englishman, but of the rank and stem of those old English patriots who were wont to curb the licentiousness of our court, arraign its flatterers, and purge away those poisons from the ear of princes; let us suppose him of a competent fortune and moderate appetites, without any apparent luxury or lavishness in his manners: what shall we, after this, bring in excuse, or as an apology, for such a choice as his? How shall we explain this preposterous relish, this odd preference of subtlety and indirectness, to true wisdom, open honesty, and uprightness?

It is easier, I confess, to give account of this corruption of taste in some noble youth of a more sumptuous gay fancy; supposing him born truly great, and of honorable descent; with a generous free mind, as well as ample fortune. Even these circumstances themselves may be the very causes perhaps of his being thus ensnared. The elegance of his fancy in outward things³, may have made him overlook the worth of inward character and proportion: and the love of grandeur and magnificence, wrong turned, may have possessed his imagination over-strongly with such things as frontispieces, parterres, equipages, trim varlets in party-colored cloaths; and others in gentlemens apparel. — Magnanimous exhibitions of honor and generosity! — “In town, a palace and suitable
“furniture! In the country the same; with the
“addition of such edifices and gardens as were

³ Vol. I. p. 119, 120.

“ unknown to our ancestors , and are unnatural
“ to such a climate as Great Britain ! ”

Mean while the year runs on , but the year's in-come answers not its expence. “ For which of
“ these articles can be retrenched ? which way
“ take up , after having thus set out ? ” A princely fancy has begot all this ; and a princely slavery , and court-dependence , must maintain it.

The young gentleman is now led into a chace , in which he will have slender capture , though toil sufficient. He is himself taken. Nor will he so easily get out of that labyrinth , to which he chose to commit his steps , rather than to the more direct and plainer paths in which he trod before.

“ Farewel that generous proud spirit , which was
“ wont to speak only what it approved , commend
“ only whom it thought worthy , and act only what
“ it thought right ! Favorites must be now ob-
“ served , little engines of power attended on , and
“ loathsomely carested : an honest man dreaded ,
“ and every free tongue or pen abhorred as dan-
“ gerous and reproachful. ” For till our gentleman is become wholly prostitute and shameless ; till he is brought to laugh at public virtue , and the very notion of common good ; till he has openly renounced all principles of honor and honesty , he must in good policy avoid those to whom he lies so much exposed , and shun that commerce and familiarity which was once his chief delight.

Such is the sacrifice made to a wrong pride , and ignorant self-esteem ; by one whose inward character must

must necessarily, after this manner, become as mean and abject, as his outward behaviour insolent and intolerable.

There are another sort of suitors to power, and traffickers of inward worth and liberty for outward gain, whom one would be naturally drawn to compassionate. They are themselves of a humane, compassionate, and friendly nature, well-wishers to their country and mankind. They could, perhaps, even embrace poverty contentedly, rather than submit to any thing diminutive either of their inward freedom or national liberty. But what they can bear in their own persons, they cannot bring themselves to bear in the persons of such as are to come after them. Here the best and noblest of affections are borne down by the excess of the next best, those of tenderness for relations and near friends.

Such captives as these would disdain, however, to devote themselves to any prince or ministry whose ends were wholly tyrannical, and irreconcilable with the true interest of their nation. In other cases of a less degeneracy, they may bow down perhaps in the temple of Rimmon, support the weight of their supine lords, and prop the steps and ruining credit of their corrupt patrons.

This is drudgery sufficient for such honest natures; such as by hard fate alone could have been made dishonest. But as for pride or insolence on the account of their outward advancement and seeming elevation; they are so far from any thing resembling it, that one may often observe what is

very contrary in these fairer characters of men. For though perhaps they were known somewhat rigid and severe before, you see them now grown in reality submissive and obliging. Though in conversation formerly dogmatical and overbearing, on the points of state and government; they are now the patientest to hear, the least forward to dictate, and the readiest to embrace any entertaining subject of discourse, rather than that of the public, and their own personal advancement.

Nothing is so near virtue as this behaviour; and nothing so remote from it, nothing so sure a token of the most profligate manners, as the contrary. In a free government, it is so much the interest of every one in place, who profits by the public, to demean himself with modesty and submission; that to appear immediately the more insolent and haughty on such an advancement, is the mark only of a contemptible genius, and of a want of true understanding, even in the narrow sense of interest and private good.

Thus we see, after all, that it is not merely what we call principle, but a taste, which governs men. They may think for certain, "This is right, or that wrong:" they may believe "This a crime, or that a sin; this punishable by man, or that by God:" yet, if the favour of things lie cross to honesty; if the fancy be florid, and the appetite high towards the subaltern beauties and lower order of worldly symmetries and proportions; the conduct will infallibly turn this latter way.

Even conscience, I fear, such as is owing to re-

ligious discipline, will make but a slight figure, where this taste is set amiss. Among the vulgar perhaps it may do wonders. A devil and a hell may prevail, where a jail and gallows are thought insufficient. But such is the nature of the liberal, polished, and refined part of mankind; so far are they from the mere simplicity of babes and sucklings; that, instead of applying the notion of a future reward or punishment to their immediate behaviour in society, they are apt, much rather, through the whole course of their lives, to show evidently, that they look on the pious narrations to be indeed no better than childrens tales, or the amusement of the mere vulgar:

Esse aliquos manes, et subterranea regna,

* * * * *

*Nec pueri credunt, nisi qui nondum are lavantur.**

Something therefore should, methinks, be further thought of, in behalf of our generous youths, towards the correcting of their taste, or relish in the concerns of life. For this at last is what will influence. And in this respect the youth alone are to be regarded. Some hopes there may be still conceived of these. The rest are confirmed and hardened in their way. A middle-aged knave, however devout or orthodox, is but a common wonder; an old one is no wonder at all: but a young one is still, thank Heaven! somewhat extraordinary.

* Juv. sat. 2. vers. 149.

And I can never enough admire what was said once by a worthy man, at the first appearance of one of these young able prostitutes, “ That he even trembled at the sight, to find nature capable of being turned so soon; and that he boded greater calamity to his country from this single example of young villany, than from the practices and arts of all the old knaves in being.”

Let us therefore proceed in this view, addressing ourselves to the grown youth of our polite world. Let the appeal be to these whose relish is retrievable, and whose taste may yet be formed in morals, as it seems to be already in exterior manners and behaviour.

That there is really a standard of this latter kind, will immediately, and on the first view, be acknowledged. The contest is only, “ Which is right? — which the unaffected carriage, and just demeanor? and which the affected and false?” Scarce is there any one who pretends not to know and to decide what is well-bred and handsome. There are few so affectedly clownish, as absolutely to disown good-breeding, and renounce the notion of a beauty in outward manners and deportment. With such as these, wherever they should be found, I must confess, I could scarce be tempted to bestow the least pains or labor, towards convincing them of a beauty in inward sentiments and principles.

Whoever has any impression of what we call gentility or politeness, is already so acquainted with the Decorum and Grace of things, that he

will readily confess a pleasure and enjoyment in the very survey and contemplation of this kind. Now, if in the way of polite pleasure, the study and love of beauty be essential; the study and love of symmetry and order, on which beauty depends, must also be essential, in the same respect.

It is impossible we can advance the least in any relish or taste of outward symmetry and order, without acknowledging that the proportionate and regular state is the truly prosperous and natural in every subject. The same features which make deformity, create incommodiousness and disease. And the same shapes and proportions which make beauty, afford advantage, by adapting to activity and use. Even in the imitative or designing arts, to which our author so often refers, the truth or beauty of every figure or statue is measured from the perfection of nature, in her just adapting of every limb and proportion to the activity, strength, dexterity, life, and vigor of the particular species or animal designed.

Thus beauty and truth³ are plainly joined with the notion of utility and convenience, even in the apprehension of every ingenious artist, the architect⁴, the statuary, or the painter. It is the

³ Vol. I. p. 123, &c.

⁴ *In Græcis operibus, nemo sub mutulo denticulos constituit, &c. Quod ergo supra cantherios et templa in veritate debet esse collocatum, id in imaginibus, si infra constitutum fuerit, mendosam habebit operis rationem. Etiamque Antiqui non probaverunt, neque instituerunt, &c. Ita quod non potest in veritate fieri, id non putaverunt in imaginibus factum, posse certam rationem habere. Omnia enim certa*

same in the physician's way. Natural health is the just proportion, truth, and regular course of things, in a constitution. It is the inward beauty of the body. And when the harmony and just measures of the rising pulses, the circulating humors, and the moving airs or spirits are disturbed or lost, deformity enters, and with it calamity and ruin.

Should not this, one would imagine, be still the same case, and hold equally as to the mind? Is there nothing there which tends to disturbance and dissolution? Is there no natural tenor, tone, or order of the passions or affections? no beauty or deformity in this moral kind? Or, allowing that there really is, must it not, of consequence, in the same manner, imply health or sickness, prosperity or disaster? Will it not be found in this respect above all, "That what is beautiful" is

proprietas, et a veris Naturæ deductis moribus, traduxerunt in operum perfectiones: et ea probaverunt quorum explicationes in disputationibus rationem possunt habere Veritatis. Itaque ex eis originibus symmetrias et proportionales uniuscujusque generis constitutas reliquerunt. Vitruvius, lib. 4. cap. 2. whose commentator Philander may be also read on this place. See above, vol. i. p. 179. 289. &c. 292. 301. &c. and below, Misc. 5. chap. i. parag. 38. 39. &c.

⁷ This is the Honestum, the Pulchrum, τὸ καλόν, on which our author lays the stress of Virtue, and the merits of this cause; as well in his other treatises, as in this of *Soliloquy* here commented. This beauty the Roman orator, in his rhetorical way, and in the majesty of style, could express no otherwise than as a mystery. *Honestum igitur id intelligimus, quod tale est, ut, detracta omni utilitate, sine ullis præmiis fructibusve, per seipsum possit jure laudari. Quod quale sit, non tam definitione qua sum usus intelligi potest, (quamquam aliquantum potest), quam communi omnium Judio, et optimi cujusque studiis, atque factis; qui permulta ob*

“ harmonious and proportionable; what is harmonious and proportionable is true; and what is

eam unam causam faciunt, quia decet, quia rectum, quia honestum est; etsi nullum consecuturum emolumentum vident. Our author, on the other side, having little of the *orator*, and less of the constraint of formality belonging to some graver *Characters*, can be more familiar on this occasion: and accordingly descending, without the least scruple, into whatever style or humor, he refuses to make the least difficulty or *mystery* of this matter. He pretends, on this head, to claim the assent not only of *orators*, *poets*, and the higher *virtuosi*, but even of the *beaux* themselves, and such as go no farther than the dancing-master to seek for *grace* and *beauty*. He pretends, we see, to fetch this *natural idea* from as familiar amusements as dress, equipage, the tiring-room, or toy-shop. And thus, in his proper manner of *Soliloquy*, or *self-discourse*, we may imagine him running on; beginning perhaps with some particular *scheme*, or fancied *scale* of *Beauty*, which, according to his philosophy, he strives to erect; by distinguishing, sorting, and dividing into things *animate*, *inanimate*, and *mixed*: as thus.

In the *Inanimate*, beginning from those *regular figures* and *symmetries* with which children are delighted, and proceeding gradually to the proportions of *architecture*, and the other *arts*. — The same in respect of *sounds* and *Music*. From beautiful stones, rocks, *minerals*, to *vegetables*, woods, aggregate parts of the world, seas, rivers, mountains, vales. — The *globe*. — Celestial bodies, and their order. The higher *architecture* of nature. — Nature herself, considered as *inanimate* and *passive*.

In the *Animate*, from *animals*, and their several kinds, tempers, sagacities, to *men*. — And from single *persons* of men, their private *characters*, understandings, *geniuses*, dispositions, manners, to public societies, *communities*, or *commonwealths*. — From flocks, herds, and other natural *assemblages* or *groups* of living creatures, to human intelligences and correspondences, or whatever is higher in the kind. The correspondence, union, and harmony of Nature herself, considered as *animate* and *intelligent*.

In the *Mixed*, as in a *single person*, a body and a mind, the union and harmony of this kind, which constitutes the real *person*; and the friendship, love, or whatever other affection is formed on

“ at once both beautiful and true, is, of consequence, agreeable and good ? ”

such an object. A *household*, a *city*, or *nation*, with certain lands, buildings, and other appendices, or local ornaments, which jointly form that agreeable idea of, *home*, *family*, *country*—

“ And what of this ? ” says an airy spark, no friend to meditation or deep thought ; “ what means this *catalogue* or *scale*, “ as you are pleased to call it ? Only, Sir, to satisfy myself, “ that I am not alone, or single in a certain fancy I have of a “ thing called Beauty ; that I have almost the whole world for “ my companions ; and that each of us *admirers* and earnest *pur-* “ *suers* of Beauty, such as in a manner we *all* are, if peradven- “ ture we take not a certain sagacity along with us, we must “ err widely, range extravagantly, and run ever upon a false “ sent. We may in the sportsman’s phrase *have many hares afoot*, “ but shall stick to no real *game*, nor be fortunate in *any capture* “ which may content us.

“ See with what ardor and vehemence, the young man, neg- “ lecting his proper race and fellow-creatures, and forgetting “ what is *decent*, *handsome*, or *becoming* in human affairs, pursues “ these Species in those common objects of his affection, a *horse*, “ a *hound*, a *hawk* ! — What doting on these *beauties* ! — What “ admiration of the *kind* itself ! And of the particular *animal*, “ what care, and in a manner idolatry and consecration ; when “ the beast beloved is, as often happens, even set apart from use, “ and only kept to gaze on, and feed the enamoured fancy with “ highest delight ! — See ! in another youth, not so forgetful of “ *human kind*, but remembering it still in a wrong way ! a *Φιλόκαλος* “ of another sort, a Chærea. *Quam elegans formarum spectator* ! — “ See ! as to other *beauties*, where there is no possession, no en- “ joyment or reward, but barely seeing and admiring : as in the “ *virtuoso*-passion, the love of *painting*, and the *designing* arts “ of every kind, so often observed. How fares it with our “ *princely genius*, our *grandee* who assembles all these *beauties*, and, “ within the bounds of his sumptuous palace, incloses all these “ *graces* of a thousand kinds ? — What pains ! study ! science ! —

Where then is this beauty or harmony to be found? How is this symmetry to be discovered

“ Behold the disposition and order of these finer sorts of apart-
“ ments, gardens, *villas*! — The kind of harmony to the eye,
“ from the various shapes and colors agreeably mixed, and
“ ranged in lines, intercrossing without confusion, and fortu-
“ nately coincident. — A *parterre*, cypresses, groves, wildernesses. —
“ Statues here and there, of *virtue*, *fortitude*, *temperance*. — *Heroes*
“ busts, *philosophers* heads, with suitable mottoes and inscrip-
“ tions. — Solemn representations of things deeply natural. —
“ *Caves*, *grottoes*, *rocks*. — *Urns* and *obelisks* in retired places,
“ and disposed at proper distances and points of sight; with all
“ those symmetries which silently express a reigning order, peace,
“ harmony, and beauty! — But what is there answerable to this
“ in the Minds of the possessors? — What possession or propriety
“ is theirs? What constancy or security of enjoyment? What
“ peace, what harmony Within.” —

Thus our Monologist, or *self-discoursing* author, in his usual strain; when incited to the search of Beauty and the Decorum, by vulgar admiration, and the universal acknowledgment of the Species in outward things, and in the meaner and subordinate subjects. By this inferior species, it seems, our strict inspector disdains to be allured: and refusing to be captivated by any thing less than the superior, original, and genuine kind, he walks at leisure, without emotion, in deep philosophical reserve, through all these pompous scenes; passes unconcernedly by those court-pageants, the illustrious and much-envied potentates of the place; overlooks the rich, the great, and even the fair; feeling no other astonishment than what is accidentally raised in him, by the view of these impostures, and of this specious snare. For here he observes those gentlemen chiefly to be caught and fastest held, who are the highest ridiculers of such reflections as his own, and who, in the very height of this ridicule, prove themselves the impotent contemners of a Species, which whether they will or no, they ardently pursue; some in a face, and certain regular lines or features; others in a palace and apartments; others in an

and applied? Is it any other art than that of Philosophy, or the study of inward numbers and proportions, which can exhibit this in life? If no other, who then can possibly have a taste of this kind, without being beholden to philosophy? Who can admire the outward beauties, and not recur instantly to the inward, which are the most real and essential, the most naturally affecting, and of the highest pleasure, as well as profit and advantage?

In so short a compass does that learning and knowledge lie, on which manners and life depend. It is we ourselves create and form our taste. If we resolve to have it just, it is in our power. We may esteem and value, approve and disapprove, as we would wish. For who would not rejoice to be always equal and consonant to

equipage and dress. — “ O Effeminacy! Effeminacy! who would
 “ imagine this could be the *vice* of such as appear no inconsiderable
 “ men! — But *person* is a subject of flattery which reaches beyond
 “ the bloom of youth. The experienced senator, and aged ge-
 “ neral, can, in our days, dispense with a *toilet*, and take
 “ his outward form into a very extraordinary adjustment and regu-
 “ lation. — All *embellishments* are affected, besides the true. And
 “ thus, led by example, whilst we run in search of *elegancy*
 “ and *neatness*, pursuing Beauty, and adding, as we imagine,
 “ more lustre and value to our own *person*, we grow, in our
 “ real *character* and truer *Self*, *deformed* and *monstrous*, *servile*
 “ and *abject*; stooping to the lowest terms of courtship; and
 “ sacrificing all internal proportion, all *intrinsic* and *real* Beauty
 “ and Worth, for the sake of things which carry scarce a shadow
 “ of the kind.” *Supra*, vol. 2. p. 327. &c. and vol. 1. p. 120.
 &c. and p. 290.

himself, and have constantly that opinion of things which is natural and proportionable? But who dares search Opinion to the bottom, or call in question his early and prepossessing taste? Who is so just to himself, as to recal his fancy from the power of fashion and education to that of Reason? Could we, however, be thus courageous, we should soon settle in ourselves such an opinion of good, as would secure to us an invariable, agreeable, and just taste in life and manners.

Thus have I endeavoured to tread in my author's steps, and prepare the reader for the serious and downright philosophy, which even in this last-commented treatise³ our author keeps still as a mystery, and dares not formally profess. His pretence has been to advise authors, and polish styles; but his aim has been to correct manners, and regulate lives. He has affected soliloquy, as pretending only to censure himself; but he has taken occasion to bring others into his company, and make bold with personages and characters of no inferior rank. He has given scope enough to railery and humor, and has intrenched very largely on the province of us miscellanarian writers. But the reader is now about to see him in a new aspect⁴, "A formal and professed philosopher, " a system-writer, a dogmatist, and expounder."
" — Habes confitentem reum. "

³ Viz. treatise 3. Advice to an author, vol. 1.

⁴ Viz. in treatise 4. the Inquiry, &c. vol. 2.

So to his philosophy I commit him: though, according as my genius and present disposition will permit, I intend still to accompany him at a distance, keep him in sight, and convoy him, the best I am able, through the dangerous seas he is about to pass.

M I S C E L L A N Y I V.

C H A P. I.

Connection and union of the subject-treatises. —
Philosophy in form. — Metaphysics. — Ego-
ity. — Identity. — Moral footing. — Proof
and discipline of the fancies. — Settlement of opi-
nion. — Anatomy of the mind. — A fable.

WE have already, in the beginning of our preceding miscellany, taken notice of our author's plan, and the connection and dependency of his joint tracts¹, comprehended in two preceding volumes. We are now, in our commentator-capacity, arrived at length to his second volume, to which the three pieces of his first appear preparatory. That they were really so designed, the advertisement to the first edition of his soliloquy is a sufficient proof. He took occasion there, in a line or two, under the name of his printer, or, as he otherwise calls him, his amanuensis, to prepare us for a more elaborate and methodical piece which was to follow. We have this system now before us. Nor need we wonder, such as it is, that it came so hardly into the world, and that

¹ Above, p. 112. Again below, Misc. 5. chap. 2. parag. 16. &c.

our author has been delivered of it with so much difficulty, and after so long a time. His amanuensis and he were not, it seems, heretofore upon such good terms of correspondence; otherwise such an unshapen fœtus, or false birth, as that of which our author in his title-page² complains, had not formerly appeared abroad. Nor had it ever risen again in its more decent form, but for the accidental publication of our author's first letter³, which, by a necessary train of consequences, occasioned the revival of this abortive, piece, and gave usherance to its companions.

It will appear therefore in this joint edition of our author's five treatises, that the three former are preparatory to the fourth, on which we are now entered; and the fifth, with which he concludes, a kind of apology for this revived treatise concerning virtue and religion.

As for his Apology, particularly in what relates to revealed religion, and a world to come, I commit the reader to the disputant divines and gentlemen, whom our author has introduced in that concluding piece of dialogue-writing, or rhapsodical philosophy. Mean while, we have here no other part left us, than to enter into the dry philosophy, and rigid manner of our author; without any excursions into various literature; without help from the comic or tragic Muse, or from the flowers of poetry or rhetoric.

² Viz. to the Inquiry, treatise 4., vol. 2.

³ Viz. letter of enthusiasm, vol. 1.

Such is our present pattern, and strict moral task; which our more humorous reader foreknowing, may immediately, if he pleases, turn over; skipping, as is usual in many grave works, a chapter or two, as he proceeds. We shall, to make amends, endeavour afterwards, in our following Miscellany, to entertain him again with more chearful fare, and afford him a dessert, to rectify his palate, and leave his mouth at last in good relish.

To the patient and grave reader, therefore, who, in order to moralize, can afford to retire into his closet, as to some religious or devout exercise, we presume thus to offer a few reflections, in the support of our author's profound Inquiry. And accordingly we are to imagine our author speaking, as follows.

How little regard soever may be shown to that moral speculation or Inquiry which we call the study of ourselves, it must, in strictness, be yielded, that all knowledge whatsoever depends upon this previous one; "And that we can in reality be assured of nothing, till we are first assured of what we are ourselves." For by this alone we can know what certainty and assurance is.

That there is something undoubtedly which thinks, our very doubt itself, and scrupulous thought, evinces. But in what subject that thought resides, and how that subject is continued one and the same, so as to answer constantly to the supposed train of thoughts or reflections which seem to run so harmoniously through a long course of life, with the

same relation still to one single and self-same person; this is not a matter so easily or hastily decided, by those who are nice self-examiners, or searchers after truth and certainty.

It will not, in this respect, be sufficient for us to use the seeming logic of a famous modern⁴, and say, "We think; therefore we are." Which is a notably invented saying, after the model of that like philosophical proposition; That "what is, is." — Miraculously argued! "If I am, I am." —

Nothing more certain! For the ego, or I, being established in the first part of the proposition, the ergo, no doubt, must hold in good in the latter. But the question is, "What constitutes the we or I?" and, "Whether the I of this instant, be the same "with that of any instant preceding, or to come." For we have nothing but memory to warrant us; and memory may be false. We may believe we have thought and reflected thus or thus; but we may be mistaken. We may be conscious of that as truth, which perhaps was no more than dream: and we may be conscious of that as a past dream, which perhaps was never before so much as dreamed of.

This is what metaphysicians mean, when they say, "That identity can be proved only by consciousness; but that consciousness, withal, may "be as well false as real, in respect of what is "past." So that the same successional we or I must remain still, on this account, undecided.

⁴ Monsieur Descartes.

To the force of this reasoning I confess I must so far submit, as to declare, that, for my own part, I take my being upon trust. Let others philosophize as they are able: I shall admire their strength, when, upon this topic, they have refuted what able metaphysicians object, and Pyrrhonists plead in their own behalf.

Mean while, there is no impediment, hindrance, or suspension of action, on account of these wonderfully refined speculations. Argument and debate go on still. Conduct is settled. Rules and measures are given out, and received. Nor do we scruple to act as resolutely upon the mere supposition that we are, as if we had effectually proved it a thousand times, to the full satisfaction of our metaphysical or Pyrrhonian antagonist.

This to me appears sufficient ground for a moralist. Nor do I ask more, when I undertake to prove the reality of virtue and morals.

If it be certain that I am; it is certain and demonstrable who and what I ought to be, even on my own account, and for the sake of my own private happiness and success. For thus I take the liberty to proceed.

The affections of which I am conscious, are either grief or joy, desire or aversion. For whatever mere sensation I may experience, if it amounts to neither of these, it is indifferent, and no way affects me.

That which causes joy and satisfaction when present, causes grief and disturbance when absent: and that which causes grief and disturbance when

present, does, when absent, by the same necessity, occasion joy and satisfaction.

Thus love, which implies desire, with hope of good, must afford occasion to grief and disturbance, when it acquires not what it earnestly seeks. And Hatred, which implies aversion, and fear of ill, must, in the same manner, occasion grief and calamity, when that which it earnestly shunned, or would have escaped, remains present, or is altogether unavoidable.

That which being present, can never leave the mind at rest, but must of necessity cause Aversion, is its ill. But that which can be sustained without any necessary abhorrence, or aversion, is not its ill; but remains indifferent in its own nature; the ill being in the affection only, which wants redress.

In the same manner, that which being absent, can never leave the mind at rest, or without disturbance and regret, is, of necessity, its good. But that which can be absent, without any present or future disturbance to the mind, is not its good, but remains indifferent in its own nature. From whence it must follow, that the affection towards it, as supposed good, is an ill affection, and creative only of disturbance and disease. So that the affections of love and hatred, liking and dislike, on which the happiness or prosperity of the person so much depends, being influenced and governed by opinion; the highest good or happiness must depend on right opinion, and the highest misery be derived from wrong.

To explain this, I consider, for instance, the fancy or imagination I have of death, according as I find this subject naturally passing in my mind. To this fancy perhaps I find united an opinion or apprehension of evil and calamity. Now, the more my apprehension of this evil increases, the greater, I find, my disturbance proves, not only at the approach of the supposed evil, but at the very distant thought of it. Besides that the thought itself, will of necessity so much the oftener recur, as the aversion or fear is violent and increasing.

From this supposed evil I must, however, fly with so much the more earnestness, as the opinion of the evil increases. Now, if the increase of the aversion can be no cause of the decrease or diminution of the evil itself, but rather the contrary; then the increase of the aversion must necessarily prove the increase of disappointment and disturbance. And so, on the other hand, the diminution or decrease of the aversion, if this may any way be effected, must, of necessity, prove the diminution of inward disturbance, and the better establishment of inward quiet and satisfaction.

Again, I consider with myself, that I have the imagination^s of something beautiful, great, and

^s Of the necessary being and prevalency of some such Imagination or Sense, natural and common to all men, irresistible, of original growth in the mind, the guide of our affections, and the ground of our *admiration, contempt, shame, honor, disdain*, and other natural and unavoidable impressions, see vol. 1. p. 119, 120. 289, 290. &c. vol. 2. p. 22, 23. 25. 327. 348, 349. 356; and above, p. 24, &c. and 151. &c. in the notes.

becoming in things. This imagination I apply perhaps to such subjects as plate, jewels, apartments, coronets, patents of honor, titles, or precedencies. I must therefore naturally seek these, not as mere conveniencies, means, or helps in life, for as such my passion could not be so excessive towards them, but as excellent in themselves, necessarily attractive of my admiration, and directly and immediately causing my happiness, and giving me satisfaction. Now, if the passion raised on this opinion, call it avarice, pride, vanity, or ambition, be indeed incapable of any real satisfaction, even under the most successful course of fortune; and then too, attended with perpetual fears of disappointment and loss; how can the mind be other than miserable, when possessed by it? But if, instead of forming thus the opinion of good; if, instead of placing worth or excellence in these outward subjects, we place it, where it is truest; in the affections or sentiments, in the governing part, and inward character; we have then the full enjoyment of it within our power: the imagination or opinion remains steady and irreversible: and the love, desire, and appetite is answered, without apprehension of loss or disappointment.

Here therefore arises work and employment for us within; "To regulate fancy, and rectify opinion", on which all depends." For if our loves,

"Ὅτι πάντα ἡ ὑπόληψις καὶ αὐτὴ ἐπὶ σοί. Ἄρσεν ἔν ὅτε θέλεις τὴν ὑπόληψιν, καὶ ὥσπερ κάμψαντι τὴν ὀκράν Γαλήνην, σταθερὰ πάντα καὶ κέλπος ἀκύμων. Μ. Αντ. βιβ. ιβ'.

desires, hatreds, and averfions, are left to themselves, we are necessarily exposed to endless vexation and calamity: but if these are found capable of amendment, or in any measure flexible or variable by opinion; we ought, methinks, to make trial at least, how far we might by this means acquire felicity and content.

Accordingly, if we find it evident, on one hand, that, by indulging any wrong appetite, as either debauch, malice, or revenge, the opinion of the false good increases; and the appetite, which is a real ill, grows so much the stronger; we may be as fully assured, on the other hand, that, by restraining this affection, and nourishing a contrary sort in opposition to it, we cannot fail to diminish what is ill, and increase what is properly our happiness and good.

On this account, a man may reasonably conclude, "That it becomes him, by working upon
" his own mind, to withdraw the fancy or opinion
" of good or ill from that to which justly, and
" by necessity, it is not joined; and apply it, with
" the strongest resolution, to that with which it
" naturally agrees." For if the fancy or opinion of good be joined to what is not durable, nor in my power either to acquire or to retain; the more

Οἷόν ἐστιν ἡ λεκάνη τῆς ὕδατος, τοιῶτον ἡ ψυχὴ. Οἷόν ἡ αὐγὴ ἡ προσπίπτουσα τῷ ὕδατι, τοιῶτον αἱ φαντασίαι. Ὅταν ἐν τῷ ὕδατι κινήσῃ, δοκεῖ μὲν καὶ ἡ αὐγὴ κινεῖσθαι· ὃ μὲν τοι κινεῖται· καὶ ὅταν τῶν συνελθόντων τίς, ὅχι αἱ τέχναι καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ συγχέονται, ἀλλὰ τὸ πνεῦμα ἐφ' ᾧ εἰσὶ καταστάτος δὲ, κερθίζονται καὶ κείναι. Αἱρετ. βιβλ. γ'. See vol. I. p. 160. Ἑρ. 254. Ἑρ. 279. Ἑρ.; and vol. 2. p. 362.

such an opinion prevails, the more I must be subject to disappointment and distress. But if there be that to which, whenever I apply the opinion or fancy of good, I find the fancy more consistent, and the good more durable, solid, and within my power and command; then the more such an opinion prevails in me, the more satisfaction and happiness I must experience.

Now, if I join the opinion of good to the possessions of the Mind; if it be in the affections themselves that I place my highest joy, and in those objects, whatever they are, of inward worth and beauty, such as honesty, faith, integrity, friendship, honor; it is evident I can never possibly, in this respect, rejoice amiss, or indulge myself too far in the enjoyment. The greater my indulgence is, the less I have reason to fear either reverse or disappointment.

This, I know, is far contrary in another regimen of life. The tutorage of Fancy and Pleasure, and the easy philosophy of taking that for good which pleases me, or which I fancy merely⁷, will, in time, give me uneasiness sufficient. It is plain, from what has been debated, that the less fanciful I am in what relates to my content and happiness, the more powerful and absolute I must be in self-enjoyment, and the possession of my good. And since it is fancy merely which gives the force of good, or power of passing, as such, to things of chance and outward dependency; it is

⁷ Vol. 1. p. 268. vol. 2. p. 187.

evident, that the more I take from fancy in this respect, the more I confer upon myself. As I am less led or betrayed by fancy to an esteem of what depends on others, I am the more fixed in the esteem of what depends on myself alone. And if I have once gained the taste of Liberty³, I shall easily understand the force of this reasoning, and know both my true Self and Interest.

The method therefore required in this my inward œconomy, is, to make those fancies themselves the objects of my aversion which justly deserve it, by being the cause of a wrong estimation and measure of good and ill, and consequently the cause of my unhappiness and disturbance.

Accordingly, as the learned masters in this science advise, we are to begin rather by the averse⁴, than by the prone and forward disposi-

³ Vol. 2. p. 358. and below, Misc. 5. chap. 3. parag. 19.

⁴ Ἄρον ἔν τήν ἐκκλησιν ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν ἐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ μετὰ τὰς ἐπὶ τὰ παρὰ φύσιν τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν. Εὐχ. κεφ. ζ'.

Ὁρεξιν αἰραί σε δεῖ παντὶ ἑλῶς, ἐκκλησιν ἐπὶ μόνα μεταθεῖναι τὰ προαιρετικά. Αἰρ. βιβ. γ'. κεφ. κβ'. This subdued moderated admiration or zeal in the highest subjects of virtue and divinity, the philosopher calls σύμμετρον καὶ κατισαμένην τὴν ὀρεξιν; the contrary disposition, τὸ ἄλογον καὶ ὠσικόν. Βιβ. γ'. κεφ. κς'. The reason why this over-forward ardor and pursuit of high subjects runs naturally into enthusiasm and disorder, is shewn in what succeeds the first of the passages here cited, viz. Τῶν δὲ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ὅσον ὀρέγεσθαι καλὸν ἂν, ἔδεν ἔδέπω σοι πάρεσι. And hence the repeated injunction, Ἀπόσχε ποτὲ παντὶ ἁπασιν ὀρέξεως, ἵνα ποτὲ καὶ εὐλόγως ὀρεχθῇς εἰ δ' εὐλόγως, ὅταν ἔχῃς τί ἐν σεαυτῷ ἀγαθὸν εὖ ὀρεχθήσῃ. Βιβ. γ. κεφ. ιγ'. To this Horace, in one of his latest epistles of the deeply philosophical kind, alludes.

tion. We are to work rather by the weaning than the engaging passions; since if we give way chiefly to inclination, by loving, applauding, and admiring what is great and good, we may possibly, it seems, in some high objects of that kind, be so amused and ecstasied as to lose ourselves, and miss our proper mark, for want of a steady and settled aim. But being more sure and infallible in what relates to our ill, we should begin, they tell us, by applying our aversion on that side, and raising our indignation against those meannesses of opinion and sentiment which are the causes of our subjection and perplexity.

Thus the Covetous Fancy, if considered as the cause of misery, and consequently detested as a

Insani sapiens nomen ferat, æquus iniqui,

Ultra quam satis est virtutem si petat ipsam. Epist. 6. lib. 1.

And in the beginning of the epistle,

Nil admirari prope res est una, Numici,

Solaque quæ posset facere et servare beatum. Ibid.

For though these first lines as many other of *Horace's* on the subject of philosophy have the air of the *Epicurean discipline* and *Lucretian style*; yet, by the whole taken together, it appears evidently on what system of ancient philosophy this epistle was formed. Nor was this prohibition of the *pondering* or *admiring* habit, in early students, peculiar to *one* kind of philosophy alone. It was common to many; however, the reason and account of it might differ in one sect from the other. The *Pythagoreans* sufficiently checked their tyro's, by silencing them so long on their first courtship to *philosophy*. And though *admiration*, in the Peripatetic sense, as above mentioned, may be justly called the inclining principle or first motive to Philosophy; yet this mistress, when once espoused, teaches us *to admire*, after a different manner from what we did before. See above, p. 31. and vol. 1. p. 35.

real ill, must of necessity abate: and the ambitious fancy, if opposed in the same manner, with resolution, by better thought, must resign itself, and leave the mind free and disincumbered in the pursuit of its better objects.

Nor is the case different in the passion of Cowardice, or Fear of Death. For if we leave this passion to itself, or to certain tutors to manage for us, it may lead us to the most anxious and tormenting state of life. But if it be opposed by sounder opinion, and a just estimation of things, it must diminish of course: and the natural result of such a practice must be, the rescue of the mind from numberless fears, and miseries of other kinds.

Thus at last a Mind, by knowing itself, and its own proper powers and virtues, becomes free and independent. It sees its hindrances and obstructions, and finds they are wholly from itself, and from opinions wrong conceived. The more it conquers in this respect, be it in the least particular, the more it is its own master, feels its own natural Liberty, and congratulates with itself on its own advancement and prosperity.

Whether some who are called philosophers have so applied their meditations, as to understand any thing of this language, I know not. But well I am assured, that many an honest and free-hearted fellow, among the vulgar rank of people, has naturally some kind of feeling or apprehension of this self-enjoyment; when refusing to act for lucre or outward profit, the thing which from his soul

he abhors, and thinks below him; he goes on, with harder labor, but more content, in his direct plain path. He is secure within; free of what the world calls policy, or design; and sings, according to the old ballad,

My mind to me a kingdom is, &c.

Which in Latin we may translate,

— — — *Et mea*
Virtute me involvo, probamque
*Pauperiem sine dote quero*¹⁰.

But I forget, it seems, that I am now speaking in the person of our grave Inquirer. I should consider I have no right to vary from the pattern he has set; and that whilst I accompany him in this particular treatise, I ought not to make the least escape out of the high road of demonstration, into the diverting paths of poetry or humor.

As grave, however, as Morals are presumed in their own nature, I look upon it as an essential matter in their delivery, to take now and then the natural air of pleasantry. The first Morals which were ever delivered in the world, were in parables, tales, or fables. And the latter and most consummate distributors of morals, in the very politest times, were great tale-tellers, and retainers to honest Æsop.

After all the regular demonstrations and deduc-

¹⁰ Horat. od. 29. lib. 3.

tions of our grave author, I dare say it would be a high relief and satisfaction to his reader, to hear an apologue, or fable, well told, and with such humor as to need no sententious moral at the end, to make the application.

As an experiment in this case, let us at this instant imagine our grave inquirer taking pains to show us, at full length, the unnatural and unhappy excursions, roving, or expeditions of our ungoverned Fancies and Opinions over a world of riches, honors, and other ebbing and flowing goods. He performs this, we will suppose, with great sagacity, to the full measure and scope of our attention. Mean while, as full or fatiated as we might find ourselves of serious and solid demonstration, it is odds but we might find vacancy still sufficient to receive instruction by another method. And I dare answer for success, should a merrier moralist of the Æsopian school present himself; and, hearing of this chace described by our philosopher, beg leave to represent it to the life, by a homely cur or two of his master's ordinary breed.

“ Two of this race, he would tell us, having
“ been daintily bred, and in high thoughts of
“ what they called pleasure and good living,
“ travelled once in quest of game and rarities,
“ till they came by accident to the sea-side. They
“ saw there, at a distance from the shore, some
“ floating pieces of wreck, which they took a
“ fancy to believe some wonderful rich dainty,
“ richer than ambergreese, or the richest product

“ of the ocean. They could prove it, by their
“ appetite and longing, to be no less than quintef-
“ fence of the main, ambrosial substance, the
“ repast of marine deities, surpassing all which
“ earth afforded. — By these rhetorical arguments,
“ after long reasoning with one another in this
“ florid vein, they proceeded from one extrava-
“ gance of fancy to another, till they came at
“ last to this issue. Being unaccustomed to swim-
“ ming, they would not, it seems, in prudence,
“ venture so far out of their depth as was neces-
“ sary to reach their imagined prize: but being
“ stout drinkers, they thought with themselves,
“ they might compass to drink all which lay in
“ their way, even the Sea itself; and that by
“ this method they might shortly bring their
“ goods safe to dry land. To work therefore they
“ went, and drank till they were both burst.”

For my own part, I am fully satisfied that there are more sea-drinkers than one or two to be found among the principal personages of mankind; and that if these dogs of ours were silly curs, many who pass for wise in our own race are little wiser, and may properly enough be said to have the sea to drink.

It is pretty evident, that they who live in the highest sphere of human affairs have a very uncertain view of the thing called happiness or good. It lies out at sea, far distant, in the offing; where those gentlemen ken it but very imperfectly: and the means they employ in order to come up with it, are very wide of the matter, and far short of

their proposed end. — “First, a general acquaint-
 “ance. — Visits, levees. — Attendance upon the
 “great and little. — Popularity. — A place in
 “parliament. — Then another at court. — Then
 “intrigue, corruption, prostitution. — Then a
 “higher place. — Then a title. — Then a re-
 “move. — A new Minister! — Factions at
 “court. — Shipwreck of ministries. — The new:
 “the old. — Engage with one: piece up with
 “the other. — Bargains; losses; after-games;
 “retrievals.” — Is not this the sea to drink?

*At si divitiæ prudentem reddere possent,
 Si cupidum timidumque minus te! nempe ruberes;
 Viveret in terris te si quis avarior uno*¹¹.

But lest I should be tempted to fall into a manner
 I have been obliged to disclaim in this part of
 my miscellaneous performance; I shall here set a
 period to this discourse, and renew my attempt
 of serious reflection and grave thought, by taking
 up my clew in a fresh chapter.

¹¹ Horat. epist. 2. lib. 2.

C H A P. II.

Passage from terra incognita to the visible world. — Mistresship of Nature. — Animal - confederacy, degrees, subordination. — Master - animal man. — Privilege of his birth. — Serious countenance of the author.

AS heavenly as it went with us in the deep philosophical part of our preceding chapter, and as necessarily engaged as we still are to prosecute the same serious Inquiry, and search into those dark sources; it is hoped, that our remaining philosophy may flow in a more easy vein, and the second running be found somewhat clearer than the first. However it be, we may, at least, congratulate with ourselves for having thus briefly passed over that metaphysical part, to which we have paid sufficient deference. Nor shall we scruple to declare our opinion, "That it is, in a manner, necessary for one who would usefully philosophize, to have a knowledge in this part of philosophy, sufficient to satisfy him that there is no knowledge or wisdom to be learned from it." For of this truth nothing besides experience and study will be able fully to convince him.

When we are even past these empty regions and shadows of philosophy, it will still perhaps appear an uncomfortable kind of travelling through those other invisible ideal worlds; such as the

study of morals, we see, engages us to visit. Men must acquire a very peculiar and strong habit of turning their eye inwards, in order to explore the interior regions and recesses of the Mind, the hollow caverns of deep thought, the private seats of fancy, and the wastes and wildernesses, as well as the more fruitful and cultivated tracts of this obscure climate.

But what can one do? or how dispense with these darker disquisitions and moon-light voyages, when we have to deal with a sort of moon-blind Wits, who, though very acute and able in their kind, may be said to renounce day-light, and extinguish, in a manner, the bright, visible, outward world, by allowing us to know nothing beside what we can prove, by strict and formal demonstration?

It is therefore to satisfy such rigid inquirers as these, that we have been necessitated to proceed by the inward way; and that in our preceding chapter we have built only on such foundations as are taken from our very perceptions, fancies, appearances, affections, and opinions themselves, without regard to any thing of an exterior World, and even on the supposition that there is no such world in being.

Such has been our late dry task. No wonder if it carries, indeed, a meagre and raw appearance. It may be looked on, in philosophy, as worse than a mere Egyptian imposition. For to make brick without straw or stubble, is perhaps an easier labor, than to prove Morals without a

world, and establish a conduct of life without the supposition of any thing living or extant besides our immediate fancy, and World of imagination.

But having finished this mysterious work, we come now to open day, and sun-shine: and, as a poet perhaps might express himself, we are now ready to quit

*The dubious labyrinths, and Pyrrhonean cells
Of a Cimmerian darkness. —*

We are, henceforward, to trust our eyes, and take for real the whole creation, and the fair forms which lie before us. We are to believe the anatomy of our own body, and, in proportionable order, the shapes, forms, habits, and constitutions of other animal-races. Without demurring on the profound modern hypothesis of animal insensibility, we are to believe firmly and resolutely, “that other creatures have their sense and feeling, “their mere passions and affections, as well as “ourselves.” And in this manner we proceed accordingly, on our author’s scheme, “to inquire “what is truly natural to each creature; and “whether that which is natural to each, and is “its perfection, be not withal its happiness, or “good.”

To deny there is any thing properly natural, after the concessions already made, would be undoubtedly very preposterous and absurd. Nature and the outward world being owned existent,
the

the rest must of necessity follow. The anatomy of bodies, the order of the spheres, the proper mechanisms of a thousand kinds, and the infinite ends and suitable means established in the general constitution and order of things; all this being once admitted, and allowed to pass as certain and unquestionable, it is as vain afterwards to except against the phrase of natural and unnatural, and question the propriety of this speech applied to the particular forms and beings in the world, as it would be to except against the common appellations of vigor and decay in plants, health or sickness in bodies, sobriety or distraction in minds, prosperity or degeneracy in any variable part of the known creation.

We may, perhaps, for humor's sake, or after the known way of disputant hostility, in the support of any odd hypothesis, pretend to deny this natural and unnatural in things. It is evident, however, that though our humor or taste be, by such affectation, ever so much depraved; we cannot resist our natural anticipation in behalf of Nature¹; according to whose supposed standard

¹ See what is said above on the word *sensus communis*, in that second treatise, vol. I. p. 86. &c. and p. 93. 119. &c. and in the same vol. p. 289. &c. and 301, 302. &c. and in vol. 2. p. 254. 340, 341. &c. concerning the *natural ideas*, and the *preconceptions* or *presentations* of this kind; the *προλήψεις*, of which a learned critic and master in all philosophy, modern and ancient, takes notice, in his lately-published volume of *Socratic dialogues*; where he adds this reflection, with respect to some philosophical notions much in vogue amongst us, of late, here in *England*: Obi-

we perpetually approve and disapprove, and to whom in all natural appearances, all moral actions,

ter dumtaxat addemus, Socraticam, quam exposuimus, doctrinam magno usui esse posse, si probe expendatur, dirimendæ inter viros doctos controversiæ, ante paucos annos in Britannia præsertim, exortæ, de ideis innatis, quas dicere possis ἐμδότες ἐννοίας. Quamvis enim nullæ sint, si accurate loquamur, notiones a natura animis nostris infixæ; attamen nemo negarit ita esse facultates animorum nostrorum natura adfectas, ut, quam primum ratione uti incipimus, verum a falso, malum a bono aliquo modo distinguere incipiamus. Species veritatis nobis semper placet; displicet contra mendacii: imo et Honestum Inhonesto præferimus; ob femina nobis indita, quæ tum demum in lucem prodeunt, cum ratiocinari possumus, eoque uberiores fructus proferunt, quo melius ratiocinamur, accuratioreque institutione adjuvamus. Æsch. dial. cum Silvis philol. Jo. Cler. ann. 1711. p. 176. They seem indeed to be but weak philosophers, though able sophists, and artful confounders of words and notions, who would refute Nature and Common Sense. But Nature will be able still to shift for herself, and get the better of those schemes, which need no other force against them, than that of Horace's single verse:

Dente lupus, cornu taurus petit. Unde, nisi Intus

Monstratum?

Sat. 1. lib. 2.

An Ass as an *English* author says never butts with his ears; though a creature born to an armed forehead, exercises his butting faculty long ere his horns are come to him. And perhaps if the philosopher would accordingly examine himself, and consider his natural passions, he would find there were such belonged to him as Nature had premeditated in his behalf, and for which she had furnished him with ideas long before any particular practice or experience of his own. Nor would he need be scandalized with the comparison of a goat, or boar, or other of *Horace's* premeditating animals, who have more natural wit, it seems, than our philosopher; if we may judge of him by his own hypothesis,

whatever we contemplate, whatever we have in debate, we inevitably appeal, and pay our constant homage, with the most apparent zeal and passion.

It is here, above all other places, that we may say with strict justice,

*Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret*².

The airy gentlemen, who have never had it in their thoughts to study Nature in their own species; but being taken with other loves, have applied their parts and genius to the same study in a horse, a dog, a game-cock, a hawk, or any other animal of that degree³, know very well, that to each species there belongs a several humor, temper, and turn of inward disposition, as real and peculiar as the figure and outward shape which is with so much curiosity beheld and admired. If there be any thing ever so little amiss or wrong in the inward frame, the humor or temper of the creature, which denies the same *implanted* Sense and *natural ideas* to his own kind.

Cras donaberis hædo:

Cui frons turgida cornibus

Primis, et venerem et prælia destinat.

Od. 13. lib. 3.

And

Verris obliquum meditantis ictum.

Ib. od. 22.

² Hor. lib. 1. ep. 10.

³ Vol. 2. p. 74, 75. &c. and 108, &c. and 254, &c.

it is readily called vicious; and when more than ordinarily wrong, unnatural. The humors of the creatures, in order to their redress, are attentively observed; sometimes indulged and flattered; at other times controlled and checked with proper severities. In short, their affections, passions, appetites, and antipathies are as duly regarded as those in human kind, under the strictest discipline of education. Such is the sense of inward proportion and regularity of affections, even in our noble youths themselves; who in this respect are often known expert and able masters of education, though not so susceptible of discipline and culture in their own case, after those early indulgences to which their greatness has entitled them.

As little favorable, however, as these sportly gentlemen are presumed to show themselves towards the care or culture of their own species; as remote as their contemplations are thought to lie from nature and philosophy; they confirm plainly and establish our philosophical foundation of the natural ranks, orders, interior and exterior proportions of the several distinct species and forms of animal beings. Ask one of these gentlemen, unawares, when solicitously careful and busied in the great concerns of his stable or kennel, "whether his
"hound or greyhound-bitch who eats her puppies,
"is as natural as the other who nurses them?"
and he will think you frantic. Ask him again,
"whether he thinks the unnatural creature who
"acts thus, or the natural one who does otherwise,
"is best in its kind, and enjoys itself the most?"

and he will be inclined to think still as strangely of you. Or if perhaps he esteems you worthy of better information, he will tell you, “ That his
“ best-bred creatures, and of the truest race, are
“ ever the noblest and most generous in their na-
“ tures: that it is this chiefly which makes the
“ difference between the horse of good blood, and
“ the errant jade of a base breed; between the
“ game-cock, and the dunghill-craven; between
“ the true hawk, and the mere kite or buzzard;
“ and between the right mastiff, hound, or spaniel,
“ and the very mungrel.” He might, withal, tell
you perhaps with a masterly air in this brute-
science, “ That the timorous, poor-spirited, lazy,
“ and gluttonous of his dogs, were those whom he
“ either suspected to be of a spurious race, or who
“ had been, by some accident, spoiled in their
“ nursing and management; for that this was not
“ natural to them: That in every kind, they
“ were still the miserablest creatures who were thus
“ spoiled; and that having each of them their pro-
“ per chace or business, if they lay resty and out
“ of their game, chambered and idle, they were
“ the same as if taken out of their element: That
“ the saddest curs in the world, were those who
“ took the kitchen-chimney and dripping-pan for
“ their delight; and that the only happy dog,
“ were one to be a dog one’s self, was he, who,
“ in his proper sport and exercise, his natural
“ pursuit and game, endured all hardships, and had
“ so much delight in exercise and in the field, as
“ to forget home and his reward.”

Thus the natural habits and affections of the inferior creatures are known, and their unnatural and degenerate part discovered. Depravity and corruption is acknowledged as real in their affections, as when any thing is mishapen, wrong, or monstrous in their outward make. And notwithstanding much of this inward depravity is discoverable in the creatures tamed by man, and, for his service or pleasure merely, turned from their natural course into a contrary life and habit; notwithstanding that, by this means, the creatures who naturally herd with one another, lose their associating humor, and they who naturally pair and are constant to each other, lose their kind of conjugal alliance and affection; yet when released from human servitude, and returned again to their natural wilds, and rural liberty, they instantly resume their natural and regular habits, such as are conducing to the increase and prosperity of their own species.

Well it is perhaps for mankind, that though there are so many animals who naturally herd for company's sake, and mutual affection, there are so few who, for conveniency, and by necessity, are obliged to a strict union, and kind of confederate state. The creatures who, according to the œconomy of their kind, are obliged to make themselves habitations of defence against the seasons and other incidents; they who, in some parts of the year, are deprived of all subsistence, and are therefore necessitated to accumulate in another, and to provide withal for the safety of their collected stores, are by their nature indeed as strictly joined, and

with as proper affections towards their public and community, as the looser kind, of a more easy subsistence and support, are united in what relates merely to their offspring, and the propagation of their species. Of these thoroughly-associating and confederate animals, there are none I have ever heard of, who, in bulk or strength, exceed the beaver. The major part of these political animals, and creatures of a joint stock, are as inconsiderable as the race of ants or bees. But had nature assigned such an œconomy as this to so puissant an animal, for instance, as the elephant, and made him, withal, as prolific as those smaller creatures commonly are; it might have gone hard perhaps with mankind: and a single animal, who, by his proper might and prowess, has often decided the fate of the greatest battles which have been fought by human race, should he have grown up into a society, with a genius for architecture and mechanics, proportionable to what we observe in those smaller creatures; we should, with all our invented machines, have found it hard to dispute with him the dominion of the continent.

Were we in a disinterested view, or with somewhat less selfishness than ordinary, to consider the œconomies, parts, interests, conditions, and terms of life, which Nature has distributed and assigned to the several species of creatures round us, we should not be apt to think ourselves so hardly dealt with. But whether our lot in this respect be just or equal, is not the question with us at present. It is enough that we know, "There is

“ certainly an assignment and distribution: that each
 “ œconomy or part so distributed, is in itself uni-
 “ form, fixed, and invariable: and that if any thing
 “ in the creature be accidentally impaired, if any
 “ thing in the inward form, the disposition, temper,
 “ or affections, be contrary or unsuitable to the
 “ distinct œconomy or part, the creature is wretch-
 “ ed and unnatural.”

The social and natural affections, which our author considers as essential to the health, wholeness, or integrity of the particular creature, are such as contribute to the welfare and prosperity of that whole or species, to which he is by nature joined. All the affections of this kind our author comprehends in that single name of natural. But as the design or end of nature in each animal system, is exhibited chiefly in the support and propagation of the particular species; it happens, of consequence, that those affections of earliest alliance and mutual kindness between the parent and the offspring, are known more particularly by the name of natural affection*. However, since it is evident that all defect or depravity of affection, which counterworks or opposes the original constitution and œconomy of the creature, is unnatural; it follows,
 “ That in creatures, who, by their particular œco-
 “ nomy, are fitted to the strictest society and rule
 “ of common good, the most unnatural of all
 “ affections are those which separate from this

* Στόργη. For which we have no particular name in our language.

“ community; and the most truly natural, gener-
“ ous, and noble, are those which tend towards
“ public service, and the interest of the society
“ at large.”

This is the main problem which our author, in more philosophical terms, demonstrates, in this treatise^s, “ That for a creature whose natural end
“ is society, to operate as is by Nature appointed
“ him, towards the good of such his society or
“ whole, is in reality to pursue his own natural
“ and proper good;” and, “ That to operate con-
“ trarywise, or by such affections as sever from
“ that common good, or public interest, is in re-
“ ality, to work towards his own natural and pro-
“ per ill.”

Now, if man, as has been proved, be justly ranked in the number of those creatures whose œconomy is according to a joint stock and public weal; if it be understood, withal, that the only state of his affections which answer rightly to this public weal, is the regular, orderly, or virtuous state; it necessarily follows, “ That Virtue is his
“ natural good, and Vice his misery and ill.”

As for that further consideration, “ Whether
“ Nature has orderly and justly distributed the
“ several œconomies or parts; and whether the
“ defects, failures, or calamities of particular sys-
“ tems are to the advantage of all in general, and
“ contribute to the perfection of the one common
“ and universal system;” we must refer to our author’s profounder speculations in this his Inquiry,

^s *Viz.* the Inquiry concerning Virtue, vol. 2.

and in his following philosophic Dialogue. But if what he advances in this respect be real, or at least the most probable by far of any scheme or representation which can be made of the universal nature and cause of things; it will follow, "That
" since man has been so constituted, by means of
" his rational part, as to be conscious of this his
" more immediate relation to the universal system,
" and principle of order and intelligence; he is not
" only by nature sociable, within the limits of his
" own species or kind; but in a yet more generous and extensive manner. He is not only born
" to virtue, friendship, honesty, and faith; but
" to religion, piety, adoration, and a generous
" surrender of his mind to whatever happens from
" that supreme cause, or order of things, which
" he acknowledges entirely just and perfect."

These are our author's formal and grave sentiments; which if they were not truly his, and sincerely espoused by him, as the real result of his best judgment and understanding, he would be guilty of a more than common degree of imposture. For, according to his own rule⁷, an affected gravity, and feigned seriousness, carried on through any subject, in such a manner as to leave no insight into the fiction or intended raillery, is, in truth, no raillery or wit at all; but a gross, immoral, and illiberal way of abuse, foreign to the character of a good writer, a gentleman, or man of worth.

⁶ Vol. 2. p. 58. &c.

⁷ Vol. 1. p. 51.

But since we have thus acquitted ourselves of that serious part, of which our reader was beforehand well apprized, let him now expect us again in our original miscellaneous manner and capacity. It is here, as has been explained to him, that raillery and humor are permitted; and flights, fallies, and excursions of every kind, are found agreeable and requisite. Without this, there might be less safety found perhaps in thinking. Every light reflection might run us up to the dangerous state of meditation. And in reality, profound thinking is many times the cause of shallow thought. To prevent this contemplative habit and character, of which we see so little good effect in the world, we have reason perhaps to be fond of the diverting manner in writing and discourse, especially if the subject be of a solemn kind. There is more need, in this case, to interrupt the long spun thread of reasoning, and bring into the mind, by many different glances and broken views, what cannot so easily be introduced by one steady bent, or continued stretch of sight.

MISCELLANY V.

CHAP. I.

Ceremonial adjusted between author and reader. —
Affectation of precedency in the former. — Various
claim to inspiration. — Bards; prophets; Sibylline
scripture. — Written oracles; in verse and
prose. — Common interest of ancient letters and
Christianity. — State of wit, elegance, and cor-
rectness. — Poetic truth. — Preparation for
criticism on our author, in his concluding treatise.

OF all the artificial relations formed between mankind, the most capricious and variable is that of author and reader. Our author, for his part, has declared his opinion of this, where he gives his advice to modern authors¹. And though he supposes that every author in form, is, in respect of the particular matter he explains, superior in understanding to his reader; yet he allows not that any author should assume the upper-hand, or pretend to withdraw himself from that necessary subjection to foreign judgment and criticism, which must determine the place of honor on the reader's side.

¹ Viz. treatise 3. vol. 1.

It is evident that an author's art and labor are for his reader's sake alone. It is to his reader he makes his application, if not openly and avowedly, yet at least with implicit courtship. Poets indeed, and especially those of a modern kind, have a peculiar manner of treating this affair with a high hand. They pretend to set themselves above mankind. "Their pens are sacred; their style and utterance divine." They write often, as in a language foreign to human kind; and would disdain to be reminded of those poor elements of speech, their alphabet and grammar.

But here inferior mortals presume often to intercept their flight, and remind them of their fallible and human part. Had those first poets who began this pretence to inspiration, been taught a manner of communicating their rapturous thoughts and high ideas by some other medium than that of style and language; the case might have stood otherwise. But the inspiring divinity or muse having, in the explanation of herself, submitted her wit and sense to the mechanic rules of human arbitrary composition; she must, in consequence, and by necessity, submit herself to human arbitration, and the judgment of the literate world. And thus the reader is still superior, and keeps the upper-hand.

It is indeed no small absurdity, to assert a work or treatise, written in human language, to be above human criticism or censure. For if the art of writing be from the grammatical rules of human invention and determination; if even these rules are

formed on casual practice and various use ; there can be no scripture but what must, of necessity, be subject to the reader's narrow scrutiny and strict judgment ; unless a language and grammar, different from any of human structure, were delivered down from heaven, and miraculously accommodated to human service and capacity.

It is no otherwise in the grammatical art of characters, and painted speech, than in the art of painting itself. I have seen, in certain Christian churches, an ancient piece or two, affirmed, on the solemn faith of priestly tradition, "To have been angelically and divinely wrought, by a supernatural hand and sacred pencil." Had the piece happened to be of a hand like Raphael's, I could have found nothing certain to oppose to this tradition. But having observed the whole style and manner of the pretended heavenly workmanship to be so indifferent as to vary in many particulars from the truth of art, I presumed within myself to beg pardon of the tradition, and assert confidently, "That if the pencil had been heaven-guided, it could never have been so lame in its performance ; it being a mere contradiction to all divine and moral truth, that a celestial hand, submitting itself to the rudiments of a human art, should sin against the art itself, and express falsehood and error, instead of justness and proportion.

It may be alledged perhaps, "That there are, however, certain authors in the world, who though, of themselves, they neither boldly claim the privilege of divine inspiration, nor carry

“ indeed the least resemblance of perfection in their
“ style or composition; yet they subdue the reader,
“ gain the ascendant over his thought and
“ judgment, and force from him a certain implicit
“ veneration and esteem. ” To this I can only
answer, “ That if there be neither spell nor en-
“ chantment in the case, this can plainly be no
“ other than mere enthusiasm; ” except, per-
haps, where the supreme powers have given their
sanction to any religious record, or pious writ:
and in this case, indeed, it becomes immoral and
profane in any one to deny absolutely, or dispute
the sacred authority of the least line or syllable
contained in it. But should the record, instead of
being single, short and uniform, appear to be
multifarious, voluminous, and of the most difficult
interpretation; it would be somewhat hard, if not
wholly impracticable in the magistrate, to suffer
this record to be universally current, and at the
same time prevent its being variously apprehended
and descanted on, by the several differing geniuses
and contrary judgments of mankind.

It is remarkable, that, in the politest of all na-
tions, the writings looked upon as most sacred
were those of their great poets; whose works
indeed were truly divine, in respect of art, and
the perfection of their frame and composition. But
there was yet more divinity ascribed to them²,
than what is comprehended in this latter sense.
The notions of vulgar religion were built on their

² Supra, p. 127. in the notes.

miraculous narrations. The wiser and better sort themselves paid a regard to them in this respect; though they interpreted them indeed more allegorically. Even the philosophers who criticised them with most severity, were not their least admirers; when they ascribed to them that divine inspiration³, or sublime enthusiasm, of which our author has largely treated elsewhere⁴.

It would, indeed, ill become any pretender to divine writing, to publish his work under a character of divinity, if, after all his endeavours, he came short of a consummate and just performance. In this respect the Cumean Sibyl was not so indiscreet or frantic, as she might appear, perhaps, by writing her prophetic warnings and pretended inspirations upon joint leaves: which, immediately after their elaborate superscription, were torn in pieces, and scattered by the wind.

*Insanam vatem aspicias; quæ rupe sub ima
Fata canit, foliisque notas et nomina mandat.
Quacunque in foliis descripsit carmina virgo,
Digerit in numerum, atque antro seclusa relinquit.
Illa manent immota locis, neque ab ordine cedunt.
Verum eadem, verso tenuis cum cardine ventus
Impulit, et teneras turbavit janua frondes:
Nunquam deinde cavo volitantia prendere saxo,
Nec revocare situs, aut jungere carmina curat.
Inconsulti abeunt, sedemque odere Sibyllæ⁵.*

³ Vol. I. p. 44, 45. &c.

⁴ Viz. letter of enthusiasm, vol. I; and above, Misc. 2. chap. I, 2.

⁵ Virg. Æn. lib. 3.

It was impossible to disprove the divinity of such writings, whilst they could be perused only in fragments. Had the sister-priestess of Delphos, who delivered herself in audible plain metre, been found at any time to have transgressed the rule of verse, it would have been difficult in those days to father the lame poetry upon Apollo himself. But where the invention of the leaves prevented the reading of a single line entire; whatever interpretations might have been made of this fragile and volatile scripture, no imperfection could be charged on the original text itself.

What those volumes^e may have been, which the disdainful Sibyl or prophetess committed to the flames; or what the remainder was, which the Roman prince received and consecrated; I will not pretend to judge: though it has been admitted for truth by the ancient Christian fathers, that these writings were so far sacred and divine, as to have prophesied of the birth of our religious founder, and bore testimony to that holy writ which has preserved his memory, and is justly held, in the highest degree, sacred among Christians.

The policy, however, of old Rome was such, as not absolutely to rest the authority of their religion

^e *Libri tres in sacrarium conditi, Sibyllini appellati. Ad eos quasi ad oraculum quindecimviri adeunt, cum Dii immortales publice consulendi sunt. Aul. Gell. lib. 1. cap. 19. et Plin. lib. 13. cap. 13.* But of this first *Sibylline* scripture, and of other canonised books and additional sacred writ among the Romans, see what *Dionysius Halicarnassensis* cites from *Vurro's Roman Theologics* in his history, lib. 4. cap. 62.

on any composition of literature. The Sibylline volumes were kept safely locked, and inspected only by such as were ordained, or deputed for that purpose. And in this policy the new Rome has followed their example, in scrupling to annex the supreme authority and sacred character of infallibility to scripture itself, and in refusing to submit that scripture to public judgment, or to any eye or ear but what they qualify for the inspection of such sacred mysteries.

The Mahometan clergy seem to have a different policy. They boldly rest the foundation of their religion on a book; such a one as, according to their pretension, is not only perfect, but inimitable. Were a real man of letters, and a just critic, permitted to examine this scripture by the known rules of art, he would soon perhaps refute this plea. But so barbarous is the accompanying policy and temper of these Eastern religionists, that they discourage, and in effect extinguish all true learning, science, and the politer arts, in company with the ancient authors and languages, which they set aside; and by this infallible method leave their sacred writ the sole standard of literate performance. For being compared to nothing besides itself, or what is of an inferior kind, it must undoubtedly be thought incomparable.

It will be yielded, surely, to the honor of the Christian world, that their faith, especially that of the Protestant churches, stands on a more generous foundation. They not only allow comparison of authors, but are content to derive their proofs of

the validity of their sacred record and revelation, even from those authors called profane; as being well apprized, according to the maxim of our divine master⁷, “That in what we bear witness only to ourselves, our witness cannot be established as a truth.” So that there being at present no immediate testimony of miracle or sign in behalf of holy writ; and there being in its own particular composition or style nothing miraculous or self-convincing; if the collateral testimony of other ancient records, historians, and foreign authors, were destroyed, or wholly lost, there would be less argument or plea remaining against that natural suspicion of those who are called sceptical, “That the holy records themselves were no other than the pure invention or artificial complement of an interested party, in behalf of the richest corporation and most profitable monopoly which could be erected in the world.”

Thus, in reality, the interest of our pious clergy is necessarily joined with that of ancient letters, and polite learning. By this they perpetually refute the crafty arguments of those objectors. When they abandon this, they resign their cause. When they strike at it, they strike even at the root and foundation of our holy faith, and weaken that pillar on which the whole fabric of our religion depends.

It belongs to mere enthusiasts and fanatics to plead the sufficiency of a reiterated translated text,

⁷ John. v. 31.

derived to them through so many channels, and subjected to so many variations, of which they are wholly ignorant. Yet would they persuade us, it seems, that from hence alone they can recognise the divine Spirit, and receive it in themselves, unsubject, as they imagine, to any rule, and superior to what they themselves often call the dead letter, and unprofitable science. — This, any one may see, is building castles in the air, and demolishing them again at pleasure; as the exercise of any aerial fancy, or heated imagination.

But the judicious divines of the established Christian churches have sufficiently condemned this manner. They are far from resting their religion on the common aspect, or obvious form of their vulgar Bible, as it presents itself in the printed copy, or modern version. Neither do they, in the original itself, represent it to us as a very masterpiece of writing, or as absolutely perfect in the purity and justness, either of style or composition. They allow the holy authors to have written according to their best faculties, and the strength of their natural genius: “A shepherd like a shepherd, “and a prince like a prince: A man of reading, “and advanced in letters, like a proficient in the “kind; and a man of meaner capacity and reading, like one of the ordinary sort, in his own “common idiom and imperfect manner of narration.”

It is the substance only of the narrative, and the principal facts confirming the authority of the revelation, which our divines think themselves con-

cerned to prove, according to the best evidence of which the matter itself is capable. And whilst the sacred authors themselves allude not only to the annals and histories of the Heathen world, but even to the philosophical works, the regular poems⁸, the very plays and comedies⁹ of the learned and polite ancients; it must be owned, that as those ancient writings are impaired, or lost, not only the light and clearness of holy writ, but even the evidence itself of its main facts, must in proportion be diminished and brought in question. So ill advised were those devout churchmen¹⁰ here.

⁸ *Aratus*, Acts xvii. 28.; and *Epimenides*, Titus i. 12. *Even one of their own Prophets*. For so the holy apostle deigned to speak of a Heathen poet, a physiologist, and divine; who prophesied of events, wrought miracles, and was received as an inspired writer, and author of revelations, in the chief cities and states of Greece.

⁹ *Menander*, I. Cor. xv. 33.

¹⁰ Even in the sixth century, the famed *Gregorius* Bishop of Rome, who is so highly celebrated for having planted the Christian religion, by his missionary monks, in our *English* nation of Heathen Saxons, was so far from being a cultivator or supporter of arts or letters, that he carried on a kind of general massacre upon every product of human wit. His own words, in a letter to one of the French bishops, a man of the highest consideration and merit, as a noted modern critic, and satirical genius of that nation acknowledges, are as follow. *Pervenit ad nos, quod sine verecundia memorare non possumus, fraternitatem tuam Grammaticam quibusdam exponere. Quam rem ita moleste suscepimus, ac sumus vehementius aspernati, ut ea quæ prius dicta fuerunt, in gemitum et tristitiam verteremus, quia in uno se ore cum Jovis laudibus Christi laudes non capiunt. * * * * Unde si post hoc evidenter ea quæ ad nos perlata sunt, falsa esse claruerint, nec vos Nugis et Secularibus Literis studere contigerit, Deo nostro gratias agimus, qui cor vestrum maculari blasphemis nefandorum laudibus non permisit.* *Gregorii opera*, epist. 48.

tofore, who in the height of zeal did their utmost to destroy all footsteps of Heathen literature, and

lib. 9. Paris. ann. 1533. And in his dedication, or first preface to his morals, after some very insipid *rhetoric*, and *figurative* dialect, employed against the *study* and *art* of *speech*, he has another fling at the classic authors and discipline; betraying his inveterate hatred to ancient learning, as well as the natural effect of this *zealot-passion*, in his own barbarity both of style and manners. His words are, *Unde et ipsam artem loquendi, quam magisteria disciplinæ exterioris insinuant, servare despexi. Nam sicut hujus quoque epistolæ tenor enunciat, non metacismi collisionem fugio: non barbarismi confusionem devito, situs motusque præpositionum casusque servare contemno: quia indignum vehementer existimo, ut verba cælestis oraculi restringam sub regulis Donati.* That he carried this savage zeal of his so far as to destroy, what in him lay, the whole body of *learning*, with all the *classic authors* then in being, was generally believed. And, what was yet more notorious and unnatural in a *Roman pontiff*, the destruction of the *statues, sculptures*, and finest pieces of antiquity in *Rome*, was charged on him by his successor in the See; as, besides *Platino*, another writer of his life, without the least apology, confesses, See in the above-cited edition of *St Gregory's* works, at the beginning, *viz. Vita D. Gregorii ex Joan. Laziardo Cælestino*. It is no wonder, therefore, if other writers have given account of that folly of the prelate's zeal against the *books* and *learning* of the *ancients*; for which the reason alledged was very extraordinary, "That the holy scriptures would be the better relished, and receive a considerable advantage, by the destruction of these rivals." It seems they had no very high idea of the *holy scriptures*, when they supposed them such losers by a *comparison*. However, it was thought advisable by other *fathers*, who had a like view, to frame new pieces of literature, after the model of these condemned ancients. Hence those ridiculous attempts of new *heroic poems*, new *epics* and *dramatics*, new *Homers*, *Euripides*, *Menanders*, which were with so much pains and so little effect industriously set afoot by the zealous priesthood; when ignorance prevailed, and the hierarchal dominion was so universal. But though their power had well nigh compassed the destruction of those *great originals*, they were far from being able to procure any reception for their *puny imitations*. The *mock-works* have lain in

consequently all further use of learning or antiquity.

But happily the zeal of this kind is now left as proper only to those despised and ignorant modern enthusiasts we have described. The Roman church itself is so recovered from this primitive fanaticism, that their great men, and even their pontiffs¹¹, are found ready to give their helping hand, and confer their bounty liberally, towards the advancement of all ancient and polite learning. They justly observe, that their very traditions stand in need of

their deserved obscurity; as will all other attempts of that kind, concerning which our author has already given his opinion, vol. I. p. 306. &c. But as to the *ill policy*, as well as *barbarity* of this *zealot-enmity* against the works of the ancients, a foreign Protestant divine, and most learned defender of religion, making the best excuse he can for the *Greek fathers* and endeavouring to clear them from this general charge of havock and massacre committed upon *science and erudition*, has these words. *Si cela est, voi à encore un nouveau sujet de mépriser les patriarches de Constantinople qui n'étoient d'ailleurs rien moins que gens de bien; mais j'ai de la peine à le croire, parce qu'il nous est resté d's poetes infiniment plus sales que ceux qui se sont perdus. Personne ne doute qu'Aristophane ne soit beaucoup plus sale, que n'étoit Menander. Plutarque en est un bon témoin, dans la comparaison qu'il a faite de ces deux poetes. Il pourroit être néanmoins arrivé, que quelques ecclesiastiques ennemis des belles lettres, en eussent usé comme dit Chalcondyle, sans penser qu'en conservant toute l'antiquité Grecque, ils conserveroient la langue de leurs predecesseurs, et une infinité de faits qui servoient beaucoup à l'intelligence et à la confirmation de l'histoire sacrée, et même de la religion Chretienne. Ces gens-là devoient au moins nous conserver les histoires anciennes des orientaux, comme des Chaldéens, des Tyriens, et des Egyptiens; mais ils agissoient plus par ignorance et par negligence, que par raison.* Bibl. Chois. tom. 14. p. 131. 132. 133.

¹¹ Such a one is the present prince, Clement XI. an encourager of all arts and sciences.

some collateral proof. The conservation of these other ancient and disinterested authors, they wisely judge essential to the credibility of those principal facts, on which the whole religious history and tradition depend.

It would indeed be in vain for us to bring a Pontius Pilate into our creed, and recite what happened under him in Judea, if we knew not “under whom he himself governed, whose authority he had, or what character he bore, in that remote country, and amidst a foreign people.” In the same manner, it would be in vain for a Roman pontiff to derive his title to spiritual sovereignty from the seat, influence, power, and donation of the Roman Cæsars, and their successors; if it appeared not by any history, or collateral testimony, “who the first Cæsars were; and how they came possessed of that universal power, and long residence of dominion.”

My reader, doubtless, by this time, must begin to wonder through what labyrinth of speculation, and odd texture of capricious reflections I am offering to conduct him. But he will not, I presume, be altogether displeased with me, when I give him to understand, that being now come into my last miscellany, and being sensible of the little courtship I have paid him, comparatively with what is practised in that kind by other modern authors; I am willing, by way of compensation, to express my loyalty or homage towards him, and show, by my natural sentiments and principles, “What particular deference and high respect I think to be his due.”

The issue therefore of this long deduction is, in the first place, with due compliments, in my capacity of author, and in the name of all modest workmen willingly joining with me in this representation, to congratulate our English reader on the establishment of what is so advantageous to himself; I mean, that mutual relation between him and ourselves, which naturally turns so much to his advantage, and makes us to be in reality the subservient party. And in this respect, it is to be hoped he will long enjoy his just superiority and privilege over his humble servants, who compose and labor for his sake. The relation in all likelihood must still continue, and be improved. Our common religion and Christianity, founded on letters and scripture, promises thus much. Nor is this hope likely to fail us, whilst readers are really allowed the liberty to read; that is to say, to examine, construe, and remark with understanding. Learning and science must of necessity flourish, whilst the language of the wisest and most learned of nations is acknowledged to contain the principal and essential part of our holy revelation. And criticism, examinations, judgments, literate labors, and inquiries, must still be in repute and practice, whilst ancient authors, so necessary to the support of the sacred volumes, are in request, and afford employment of such infinite extent to us moderns, of whatever degree, who are desirous to signalize ourselves by any achievement in letters, and be considered as the investigators of knowledge and politeness.

I may undoubtedly, by virtue of my preceding argument in behalf of criticism, be allowed, without suspicion of flattery or mere courtship, to assert the Reader's privilege above the author, and assign to him, as I have done, the upper hand, and place of honor. As to fact, we know for certain, that the greatest of philosophers, the very founder of philosophy itself, was no author. Nor did the divine author and founder of our religion condescend to be an author in this other respect. He who could best have given us the history of his own life, with the entire sermons and divine discourses which he made in public, was pleased to leave it to others, "to take in hand:" as there were many, it seems, long afterwards, who did; and undertook accordingly "to write in order, and as seemed good to them, "for the better information of particular persons, "what was then believed among the initiated or "catechized, from tradition, and early instruction "in their youth; or what had been transmitted, "by report, from such as were the presumed "auditors, and eye-witnesses of those things in "former time"¹².

¹² So *Luke*, chap. i. v. 1. 2. 3. 4. 1. "Forasmuch as Many
 "have taken in hand to set forth, in order, a declaration *exposition*
 "or *narrative*, διήγησιν of those things which are most surely believe-
 "ed among or were fulfilled in, or among us; 2. Even as they
 "delivered them unto us, which from the beginning were eye-wit-
 "nesses and ministers of the word: 3. It seemed good to Me al-
 "so, having had perfect understanding of all things from the very
 "first, or having looked back, and searched accurately into all matters

Whether those sacred books ascribed to the divine legislator of the Jews, and which treat of his death, burial, and succession, as well as of his life and actions¹³, are strictly to be understood as coming from the immediate pen of that holy founder, or rather from some other inspired hand, guided by the same influencing Spirit; I will not presume so much as to examine or inquire. But in general, we find, that both as to public concerns in religion and in philosophy, the great and eminent actors were of a rank superior to the writing-worthies. The great Athenian legislator, though noted as a poetical genius, cannot be

“ from the beginning, or highest time, παρηκολαθηκότι ἄνωθεν πάντιν

“ ἀκριβῶς, to write unto thee in order, most excellent Theophilus;

“ 4. That thou mightest know the certainty or validity, sound dis-

“ cussion, ἀσφάλειαν of those things wherein Thou hast been in-

“ structed or catechized, περὶ ὧν κατήχηθης.” Whether the words

πεπληροφωρημένων ἐν ἡμῖν, in the first verse, should be rendered belie-

ved among; or fulfilled in, or among us, may depend on the different

reading of the original. For in some copies, the ἐν next following is

left out. However, the exact interpreters, or verbal translators, ren-

der it fulfilled. Vid. Ar. Montan. edit. Plantin. 1584. In γ 4. the

word Certainty, ἀσφάλειαν, is interpreted ἀκρίβειαν, validity,

soundness, good foundation, from the sense of the preceding verse.

See the late edition of our learned Dr Mill, ex recensione Kusteri,

Rot. 1710. For the word catechized, κατήχηθης, the last of the fourth

verse, Rob. Constantine has this explanation of it. Priscis theologis

apud Ægyptios mos erat, ut mysteria voce tantum, veluti per manus,

posteris relinquerent. Apud Christianos, qui baptismatis erant candi-

dati, iis, viva voce, tradebantur fidei Christianæ mysteria, sine scriptis:

quod Paulus et Lucas κατηχεῖν vocant. Unde qui docebantur, cate-

chumeni vocabantur; qui docebant, catechistæ.

¹³ Deut. xxxiv. 5. 6. 7. &c.

esteemed an author, for the sake of some few verses he may occasionally have made. Nor was the great Spartan founder, a poet himself, though author or redeemer, if I may so express it, to the greatest and best of poets, who owed in a manner his form and being to the accurate searches and collections of that great patron. The politicians and civil Sages, who were fitted in all respects for the great scene of business, could not, it seems, be well taken out of it, to attend the slender and minute affairs of letters, and scholastic science.

It is true indeed, that without a capacity for action, and a knowledge of the world and mankind, there can be no author naturally qualified to write with dignity, or execute any noble or great design. But there are many, who, with the highest capacities for business, are, by their fortune, denied the privilege of that higher sphere. As there are others, who having once moved in it, have been afterwards, by many impediments and obstructions, necessitated to retire, and exert their genius in this lower degree.

It is to some catastrophe of this kind that we owe the noblest historians, even the two princes and fathers of history, as well as the greatest philosophical writers, the founder of the Academy, and others, who were also noble in respect of their birth, and fitted for the highest stations in the public; but discouraged from engaging in it, on account of some misfortunes experienced either in their own persons, or that of their near friends.

It is to the early banishment and long retirement of a heroic youth out of his native country, that we owe an original system of works, the politest, wisest, usefullest, and, to those who can understand the divineness of a just simplicity, the most amiable¹⁴, and even the most elevating and exalting of all uninspired and merely human authors.

To this fortune we owe some of the greatest of the ancient poets. It was this chance which produced the Muse of an exalted Grecian Lyric¹⁵, and of his follower Horace¹⁶; whose character, though easy to be gathered from history, and his own works, is little observed by any of his commentators: the general idea, conceived of him, being drawn chiefly from his precarious and low circumstances at court, after the forfeiture of his estate, under the usurpation and conquest of an Octavius, and the ministry of a Mæcenas; not from his better condition, and nobler employments in earlier days, under the favor and friendship of greater and better men, whilst the Roman state and liberty subsisted. For of this change he himself,

¹⁴ Τὸν ἡδίστον καὶ χαρίεστος Εὐνοῦμωνα, as *Athenæus* calls him, lib. 2. See vol. 1. p. 220.

¹⁵ *Et te sonantem plenius aureo,*

Alcæe, plectro dura navis,

Dura fugæ mala, dura belli.

Horat. Od. 13. lib. 2.

¹⁶ ———— *Age, dic Latinum,*

Barbite, carmen,

Lesbio primum modulate civi;

Qui ferox bello, &c.

Horat. Od. 32. lib. 1.

as great a courtier as he seemed afterwards, gives sufficient intimation¹⁷.

¹⁷ *Dura sed emovere loco me tempora grato,
Civilisque rudem belli tulit æstus in arma,
Cæsaris Augusti non responsura lacertis.
Unde simul primum me dimisere Philippi,
Decisis humilem pennis, inopemque paterni
Et laris et fundi, paupertas impulit audax
Ut versus facerem.*

Horat. epist. 2. lib. 2. et sat. 6. lib. 1.

————— *At olim*

Quod mihi pareret legio Romana tribuno.

Viz. under Brutus. Whence again that natural boast:

Me primis urbis Belli placuisse domique.

Epist. 20.

And again,

————— *Cum Magnis vixisse invita fatebitur usque*

Invidia.

Sat. 1. lib. 2.

Where the *vixisse* shows plainly whom he principally meant by his *Magni*, his early patrons and great men in the state: his apology and defence here, as well as in his fourth and sixth satires of his first book, and his 2d epistle of his second, and elsewhere, being supported still by the open and bold assertion of his good education, equal to the highest senators, and under the best masters, his employments at home and abroad, and his early commerce and familiarity with former great men, before these his new friendships and this latter court-acquaintance, which was now envied him by his adversaries.

Nunc quia Mæcenæ, tibi sum convictor: at Olim

Quod mihi pareret legio Romana tribuno.

The reproach now was with respect to a *Mæcenæ* or *Augustus*. It was the same formerly with respect to a *Brutus*, and those who were then the principal and leading men. The complaint or murmur against him on account of his being an *upstart* or *favorite* under a *Mæcenæ* and *Augustus*, could not be answered, by a

Let Authors therefore know themselves; and though conscious of worth, virtue, and a genius, such as may justly place them above flattery or mean courtship to their Reader; yet let them reflect, that as authors merely, they are but of the second rank of men. And let the Reader withal consider, “That when he unworthily resigns
 “the place of honor, and surrenders his taste, or
 “judgment, to an author of ever so great a
 “name, or venerable antiquity, and not to reason,
 “and truth, at whatever hazard; he not only
 “betrays himself, but withal the common cause
 “of Author and Reader, the interest of letters
 “and knowledge, and the chief liberty, privilege,
 “and prerogative of the rational part of man-
 “kind.”

It is related in history of the Cappadocians,

vixisse relating to the same persons, any more than his *placuisse* joined with his *Belli domique* could relate to those under whom he never went to war, nor would ever consent to bear any honors. For so he himself distinguishes Sat. 6. to *Mæcenat*

————— *Quia non ut forsit honorem
 Jure mihi invidet quivis, ita te quoque amicum.*

He was formerly an actor, and in the ministry of affairs; now only a Friend to a minister; himself still a private and retired man. That he refused *Augustus's* offer of the secretaryship, is well known. But in these circumstances, the politeness as well as artifice of *Horace* is admirable; in making *futurity* or *posterity* to be the speaking party in both those places, where he suggests his intimacy and favor with the great, that there might, in some measure, be room left though in strictness there was scarce any for an *Octavius* and a *Mæcenat* to be included. See vol. I. p. 233. in the notes.

that being offered their liberty by the Romans, and permitted to govern themselves by their own laws and constitutions, they were much terrified at the proposal; and, as if some fore harm had been intended them, humbly made it their request, “ That they might be governed by arbitrary power, “ and that an absolute governor might without “ delay be appointed over them at the discretion “ of the Romans.” For such was their disposition towards mere slavery and subjection, that they dared not pretend so much as to chuse their own Master. So essential they thought Slavery, and so divine a thing the right of Mastership, that they dared not be so free even as to presume to give themselves that blessing, which they chose to leave rather to providence, fortune, or a conqueror to bestow upon them. They dared not make a king; but would rather take one from their powerful neighbours. Had they been necessitated to come to an election, the horror of such a use of liberty in government, would perhaps have determined them to chuse blindfold, or leave it to the decision of the commonest lot, cast of dye, cross or pile, or whatever it were which might best enable them to clear themselves of the heinous charge of using the least foresight, choice, or prudence in such an affair.

I should think it a great misfortune, were my reader of the number of those, who, in a kind of Cappadocian spirit, could easily be terrified with the proposal of giving him his liberty, and making him his own judge. My endeavour, I
must

must confess, has been to show him his just prerogative in this respect, and to give him the sharpest eye over his author, invite him to criticise honestly, without favor or affection, and with the utmost bent of his parts and judgment. On this account it may be objected to me, perhaps, "That I am not a little vain and presumptuous, in my own, as well as in my author's behalf, who can thus, as it were, challenge my reader to a trial of his keenest wit."

But to this I answer, That should I have the good fortune to raise the masterly spirit of just Criticism in my readers, and exalt them ever so little above the lazy, timorous, over-moëst, or resigned state, in which the generality of them remain; though by this very spirit I myself might possibly meet my doom: I should, however, abundantly congratulate with myself on these my low flights, be proud of having plumed the arrows of better wits, and furnished artillery, or ammunition of any kind, to those powers, to which I myself had fallen a victim.

—— *Fungar vice cotis*¹⁸. ——

I could reconcile my ambition in this respect to what I call my loyalty to the Reader, and say of his elevation in criticism and judgment, what a Roman princess said of her son's advancement to empire, "*Occidat, dum imperet*"¹⁹."

¹⁸ Horat. de arte poet.

¹⁹ Tacit. annal. lib. 14.

Had I been a Spanish Cervantes, and, with success equal to that comic author, had destroyed the reigning taste of Gothic or Moorish Chivalry, I could afterwards contentedly have seen my burlesque-work itself despised, and set aside; when it had wrought its intended effect, and destroyed those giants and monsters of the brain, against which it was originally designed. Without regard, therefore, to the prevailing relish or taste which, in my own person, I may unhappily experience, when these my miscellaneous works are leisurely examined; I shall proceed still in my endeavour to refine my reader's Palate; whetting and sharpening it, the best I can, for use and practice, in the lower subjects; that by this exercise it may acquire the greater keenness, and be of so much the better effect in subjects of a higher kind, which relate to his chief happiness, his liberty, and manhood.

Supposing me therefore a mere comic humorist, in respect of those inferior subjects, which, after the manner of my familiar prose-satire, I presume to criticise; may not I be allowed to ask, "whether
" there remains not still among us noble Britons,
" something of that original barbarous and Gothic
" relish, not wholly purged away; when, even at
" this hour, romances and gallantries of like sort,
" together with works as monstrous of other
" kinds, are current, and in vogue, even with
" the people who constitute our reputed polite
" world?" Need I on this account refer again to

our author²⁰, where he treats in general of the style and manner of our modern authors, from the divine to the comedian? What person is there of the least judgment or understanding, who cannot easily, and without the help of a divine, or rigid moralist, observe the lame condition of our English Stage; which nevertheless is found the rendezvous and chief entertainment of our best company, and from whence in all probability our youth will continue to draw their notion of manners, and their taste of life, more directly and naturally, than from the rehearsals and declamations of a graver Theatre?

Let those whose business it is, advance, as they best can, the benefit of that sacred oratory, which we have lately seen and are still like to see employed to various purposes, and further designs than that of instructing us in religion or manners. Let them in that high scene endeavour to refine our taste and judgment in sacred matters. It is the good critic's task to amend our common Stage; nor ought this dramatic performance to be decried or sentenced by those critics of a higher sphere. The practice and art is honest in itself. Our foundations are well laid. And in the main, our English Stage, as has been remarked²¹, is capable of the highest improvement; as well from the present genius of our nation, as from the

²⁰ Viz. in his Advice to authors, treatise 3. vol. 1.

²¹ Vol. 1. p. 187, 188. &c. 193, 194. 224, 237, 238, 239.

rich ore of our early poets in this kind. But faults are easier imitated than beauties.

We find, indeed, our Theatre become of late the subject of a growing criticism. We hear it openly complained, “ that in our newer plays, “ as well as in our older, in comedy as well as “ tragedy, the stage presents a proper scene of “ uproar; — duels fought; swords drawn, many “ of a side; wounds given, and sometimes dressed “ too; the surgeon called, and the patient probed “ and tented upon the spot: That in our tragedy, “ nothing is so common as wheels, racks, and “ gibbets properly adorned; executions decently “ performed; headless bodies, and bodiless heads, “ exposed to view: battles fought; murders “ committed; and the dead carried off in great “ numbers.” — Such is our politeness!

Nor are these plays, on this account, the less frequented by either of the sexes: which inclines me to favor the conceit our author has suggested concerning the mutual correspondence and relation between our royal Theatre, and popular Circus or bear-garden²². For in the former of these assemblies, it is undeniable that at least the two upper regions or galleries contain such spectators, as indifferently frequent each place of sport. So that it is no wonder we hear such applause resounded on the victories of an Almanzor; when the same parties had possibly, no later than the day before, bestowed their applause as freely on the victorious

²² Vol. I. p. 234. &c.

butcher, the Hero of another stage: where, amidst various frays, bestial and human blood, promiscuous wounds and slaughter, one sex are observed as frequent and as pleased spectators as the other, and sometimes not spectators only, but actors in the gladiatorian parts. — These congregations, which we may be apt to call Heathenish²³, though in reality never known among the politer Heathens, are, in our Christian nation, unconcernedly allowed and tolerated, as no way injurious to religious interests; whatever effect they may be found to have on national manners, humanity, and civil life. Of such indulgencies as these we hear no complaints. Nor are any assemblies, though of the most barbarous and enormous kind, so offensive, it seems, to men of zeal, as religious assemblies of a different fashion or habit from their own.

I am sorry to say, that though in the many parts of poetry our attempts have been high and noble; yet in general the taste of wit and letters lies much upon a level with what relates to our stage.

I can readily allow to our British genius what was allowed to the Roman heretofore:

—— *Natura sublimis et acer:*

*Nam spirat tragicum satis, et feliciter audet*²⁴.

But then I must add too, that the excessive indul-

²³ Vol. I. p. 232, 233. &c.

²⁴ Horat. epist. I. lib. 2.

gence and favor shown to our authors on account of what their mere genius and flowing vein afford, has rendered them intolerably supine, conceited, and admirers of themselves. The public having once suffered them to take the ascendant, they become, like flattered princes, impatient of contradiction or advice. They think it a disgrace to be criticised, even by a friend; or to reform, at his desire, what they themselves are fully convinced is negligent and uncorrect.

*Sed turpem putat in scriptis, metuitque lituram*²⁵.

The *limæ labor*²⁶ is the great grievance with our countrymen. An English author would be all genius. He would reap the fruits of art; but without study, pains, or application. He thinks it necessary indeed, lest his learning should be called in question, to show the world that he errs knowingly against the rules of art. And for this reason, whatever pieces he publishes at any time, he seldom fails, in some prefixed apology, to speak in such a manner of criticism and art, as may confound the ordinary reader, and prevent him from taking up a part, which, should he once assume, would prove fatal to the impotent and mean performance.

It were to be wished, that when once our authors had considered of a model or plan, and

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ars poet.

attained the knowledge of a whole and parts²⁷; when from this beginning they had proceeded to morals, and the knowledge of what is called poetic manners and truth²⁸; when they had learned

²⁷ ὍΛΟΝ δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ἔχον ἀρχήν, καὶ μέσον, καὶ τελευτήν. Ἀρχὴ δὲ ἐστὶν, ὃ αὐτὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, μὴ μετ' ἄλλο ἐστὶ μετ' ἐκείνο δ' ἕτερον πέφυκεν εἶναι ἢ γένεσθαι. Τελευτὴ δὲ τὸ ἀνελπίστον, ὃ αὐτὸ μετ' ἄλλο πέφυκεν εἶναι, ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἢ ὡς ἐπιτοπολύ· μετὰ δὲ τῷτο ἄλλο ἔδεν. Μέσον δὲ, καὶ αὐτὸ μετ' ἄλλο, καὶ μετ' ἐκείνο ἕτερον. Arist. de poet. cap. 7. And in the following chapter, Μῦθος δ' ἐστὶν Εἰς, ὅς ὡς περ τινὲς οἰοντοί, ἐὰν περὶ ἓνα ἢ, &c.

Denique sit quod vis simplex duntaxat et Unum.

Horat. de art. poet. See vol. I. p. 114.

It is an infallible proof of the want of just integrity in every writing, from the *epopee* or *heroic* poem down to the familiar epistle, or slightest essay either in *verse* or *prose*, if every several part or portion fits not its proper place so exactly, that the least transposition would be impracticable. Whatever is *episodic*, though perhaps it be *a whole*, and in itself *entire*, yet being inserted, as *a part*, in a work of greater length, it must appear only in its *due place*. And that place alone can be called its *due* one, which alone befits it. If there be any passage in the middle or end which might have stood in the beginning, or any in the beginning which might have stood as well in the middle or end; there is properly in such a piece neither beginning, middle, or end. It is a mere *rhapsody*, not a work. And the more it assumes the air or appearance of *a real work*, the more ridiculous it becomes. See above, p. 21.; and vol. I. p. 126, 127.

²⁸ *Respicere exemplar vitæ morumque jubebo*

Doctum imitatore, et veras hinc ducere voces.

Horat. de arte poet.

The chief of ancient critics, we know, extols *Homer* above all things, for understanding how to *Lie in perfection*; as the passage shows which we have cited above, vol. I. p. 297. His *Lies*, according to that master's opinion, and the judgment of many of the

to reject false thought, embarrassing and mixed metaphors, the ridiculous paint in comedy, and

gravest and most venerable writers, were, in themselves, the justest *moral truths*, and exhibitive of the best doctrine and instruction in life and manners.

It may be asked perhaps, "How comes the poet then to draw no single pattern of the kind, no *perfect character*, " in either of his heroic pieces?"

I answer, That should he attempt to do it, he would, *as a poet*, be preposterous and false.

It is not *the possible*, but the *probable* and *likely*, which must be the poet's guide in *manners*. By this he wins attention, and moves the

conscious reader or spectator; who judges best from *within*, by what he naturally feels and experiences in his own heart. The perfection

of virtue is from long *art* and *management*, *self-control*, and, as it were, *force on Nature*. But the common auditor or spectator,

who seeks pleasure only, and loves to engage his passion, by view of other passion and emotion, comprehends little of the restraints,

allays, and corrections, which form this *new* and *artificial creature*. For such indeed is the *truly virtuous man*; whose Art, though

ever so *natural* in itself, or justly founded in *reason* and *nature*, is an improvement far beyond the common stamp, or known character

of human kind. And thus the completely virtuous and perfect character is *unpoetical* and *false*. Effects must not appear where causes

must necessarily remain unknown and incomprehensible. A Hero without *passion* is, in poetry, as absurd as a Hero without *life*

or *action*. Now, if *passion* be allowed, *passionate action* must ensue. The same heroic genius and seeming magnanimity which transport

us when beheld, are naturally transporting in the lives and manners of *the great*, who are described to us. And thus the able *designer*

who feigns in behalf of *truth*, and draws his characters after the *moral rule*, fails not to discover Nature's propensity, and assigns to

these high spirits their proper exorbitancy, and inclination to exceed in that tone or species of passion which constitutes the eminent

or shining part of each poetical character. The passion of an *Achilles* is towards that glory which is acquired by arms and personal

valor. In favor of this character, we forgive the generous youth his excess of ardor in the field, and his resentment when injured

the false sublime, and bombast in heroic; they would at last have some regard to numbers, har-

and provoked in council, and by his allies. The passion of an *Ulysses* is towards that glory which is acquired by prudence, wisdom, and ability in affairs. It is in favor of this character that we forgive him his subtle, crafty, and deceitful air; since the *intriguing spirit*, the *over-reaching manner*, and *over-refinement of art and policy*, are as naturally incident to the experienced and thorough politician, as *sudden resentment*, *indiscreet and rash behaviour*, to the open undesigning character of a warlike youth. The gigantic force and military toil of an *Ajax*, would not be so easily credible or engaging, but for the honest simplicity of his nature, and the heaviness of his parts and genius. For strength of body being so often noted by us, as unattended with equal parts and strength of mind; when we see this natural effect expressed, and find our secret and malicious kind of reasoning confirmed on this hand, we yield to an *hyperbole* of our poet, on the other. He has afterwards his full scope, and liberty of enlarging, and exceeding in the peculiar virtue and excellence of his hero. He may *lie* splendidly, raise wonder, and be as *astonishing* as he pleases. Every thing will be allowed him in return for this frank allowance. Thus the tongue of a *Nestor* may work prodigies, whilst the accompanying allays of a rhetorical fluency, and aged experience, are kept in view. An *Agamemnon* may be admired as a noble and wise chief, whilst a certain princely haughtiness, a stiffness and stately carriage natural to the character, are represented in his person, and noted in their ill effects. For thus the *excesses* of every character are by the poet *redressed*. And the misfortunes naturally attending such excesses, being justly applied, our passions, whilst in the strongest manner engaged and moved, are in the wholesomest and most effectual manner corrected and purged. Were a man to form himself by one single pattern or original, however perfect, he would himself be a mere copy. But whilst he draws from various models, he is *original*, *natural*, and *unaffected*. We see in outward carriage and behaviour, how ridiculous any one becomes who imitates another, be he ever so graceful. They are mean spirits who love to copy *merely*. Nothing is agree-

mony, and an ear²⁹; and correct, as far as possible, the harsh sounds of our language; in poetry at least, if not in prose.

But so much are our British poets taken up in seeking out that monstrous ornament which we call rhyme³⁰; that it is no wonder if other orna-

able or natural, but what is *original*. Our manners, like our faces, though ever so beautiful, must differ in their beauty. An over-regularity is next to a deformity. And in a *poem* whether *epic* or *dramatic* a complete and *perfect* character is the greatest *monster* and of all poetic fictions not only the least *engaging*, but the least *moral* and *improving*. — Thus much by way of remark upon *poetical Truth*, and the just fiction or artful *lying* of the able poet, according to the judgment of the *master-critic*. What *Horace* expresses of the same *lying* virtue, is of an easier sense, and needs no explanation.

Atque ita mentitur, sic veris falsa remiscet,

Primo ne medium, medio ne discrepet inum. De arte poet.

The same may be observed not only in *heroic* draughts, but in the inferior characters of *comedy*.

Quam similis uterque est sui! Ter. Phorm. act. 3. sc. 2.

See vol. I. p. 2. 123. 289. 301. &c. in the notes, at the end.

²⁹ Vol. I. p. 188.

³⁰ The reader, if curious in these matters, may see *Is. Vossius de viribus rhythmis*; and what he says, withal, of ancient *music*, and the degrees by which they surpass us moderns, as has been demonstrated by late mathematicians of our nation; contrary to a ridiculous notion some have had, that because in this, as in all other arts, the ancients studied *simplicity*, and affected it as the highest perfection in their performances, they were therefore ignorant of *parts* and *symphony*. Against this, *Is. Vossius*, amongst other authors, cites the ancient Peripatetic *περὶ κόσμου* at the beginning of his fifth chapter. To which he might have added another passage in chap. 6. The suitableness of this ancient author's thought to what has been often advanced in the philoso-

ments, and real graces, are unthought of, and left unattempted. However, since in some parts of poetry, especially in the dramatic, we have been so happy as to triumph over this barbarous taste; it is unaccountable that our poets, who from this privilege ought to undertake some further refinements, should remain still upon the same level as before. It is a shame to our authors, that in their elegant style, and metred prose, there should not be found a peculiar grace and harmony, resulting from a more natural and easy disengagement of their periods, and from a careful avoiding the

phical parts of these volumes, concerning the universal *symmetry*, or union of the whole, may make it excusable if we add here the two passages together, in their inimitable original. "Ἴσως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ φύσις γλῆσαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἀπολεῖν τὸ σύμφωνον, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ὥσπερ ἀμείλει τὸ ἄρρεν συνηγαγὴ πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ, καὶ ἔχ᾽ ἐκάτερον πρὸς τὸ ὁμόφυλον, καὶ τὴν πρώτην ὁμόνοιαν διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων συνῆψεν, καὶ διὰ τῶν ὁμοίων. Ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἡ τέχνη τὴν φύσιν μιμημένη, τῆτο ποιεῖν. Ζωγραφία μὲν γὰρ, λευκῶν τε καὶ μελάνων, ὠχρῶν τε καὶ ἐρυθρῶν χρωμάτων ἐγκερασασμένη φύσεις, τὰς εἰκόνας τοῖς προηγουμένοις ἀπέλεσε συμφώνως. Μουσική δὲ, ὅξεις ἅμα καὶ βαρεῖς, μακρὰς τε καὶ βραχεῖς φθόγους μίξασα, ἐν διαφόροις φωναῖς, μίαν ἀπέλεσεν ἁρμονίαν. Γραμμικὴ δὲ, ἐκ φωνηέντων καὶ ἀφώνων γραμμάτων κράσιν ποιησασμένη, τὴν ὅλην τέχνην ἀπ' αὐτῶν συνεστήσατο. ταῦτο δὲ τῆτο ἦν καὶ τὸ παρὰ τῷ σκλερινῷ λεγόμενον Ἡρακλείτω. συνάψαις ἔλα καὶ ἔχι ἔλα, συμφερόμενον καὶ διαφερόμενον, συναῖδον καὶ διαῖδον, καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἓν, καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα. And in the following passage, Μία δὲ ἐκ πάντων ἁρμονία συναδόντων καὶ χορευόντων κατὰ τον ἔρμον, ἐξ ἑνὸς τε γίνεσθαι, καὶ εἰς ἓν ἀπολήγει. Κόσμον δ' ἐτύμως τὸ σύμπαν, ἀλλ' ἔχ᾽ ἀκοσμίαν ὀνομάταις ἄν. Καθάπερ δὲ ἐν χορῷ κορυφαίη καὶ ἀρχαῖος, συνεπηχῆι πᾶς ὁ χορὸς ἀνδρῶν, ἔσθ' ὅτε καὶ γυναικῶν, ἐν διαφόροις φωναῖς ὀξυτέραις καὶ βαρυτέραις, μίαν ἁρμονίαν ἐμμελῆ κεραυνύνων, ἔτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ τὸ σύμπαν διέποντος ΘΕΟΥ. See vol. 2. p. 175.; and above, p. 150. &c. in the notes.

encounter of the shocking consonants and jarring sounds to which our language is so unfortunately subject.

They have of late, it is true, reformed in some measure the gouty joints and darning-work of whereuntos, wherebys, thereof, therewiths, and the rest of this kind; by which complicated periods are so curiously strung, or hooked on, one to another, after the long-spun manner of the bar or pulpit. But to take into consideration no real accent or cadency of words, no sound or measure of syllables; to put together, at one time, a set of compounds, of the longest Greek or Latin termination; and at another, to let whole verses, and those too of our heroic and longest sort, pass currently in monosyllables; is, methinks, no slender negligence. If single verses at the head, or in the most emphatical places, of the most considerable works, can admit of such a structure, and pass for truly harmonious and poetical in this negligent form; I see no reason why more verses than one or two of the same formation, should not be as well admitted; or why an uninterrupted succession of these well strung monosyllables might not be allowed to clatter after one another, like the hammers of a paper-mill, without any breach of music, or prejudice to the harmony of our language. But if persons who have gone no farther than a smith's anvil to gain an ear, are yet likely, on fair trial, to find a plain defect in these ten monosyllable heroics; it would follow, methinks, that even a prose-author, who attempts to write politely,

should endeavour to confine himself within those bounds, which can never, without breach of harmony, be exceeded in any just metre, or agreeable pronunciation.

Thus have I ventured to arraign the authority of those self-privileged writers, who would exempt themselves from criticism, and save their ill-acquired reputation, by the decial of an art, on which the cause and interest of wit and letters absolutely depend. Be it they themselves, or their great patrons in their behalf, who would thus arbitrarily support the credit of ill writings; the attempt, I hope, will prove unsuccessful. Be they moderns or ancients, foreigners or natives, ponderous and austere writers, or airy and of the humorous kind; whoever takes refuge here, or seeks protection hence; whoever joins his party or interest to this cause; it appears from the very fact and endeavour alone, that there is just ground to suspect some insufficiency or imposture at the bottom. And on this account the reader, if he be wise, will the rather redouble his application and industry, to examine the merit of his assuming author. If, as reader and judge, he dare once assert that liberty to which we have shown him justly intitled, he will not easily be threatened or ridiculed out of the use of his examining capacity, and native privilege of criticism.

It was to this art, so well understood and practised heretofore, that the wise ancients owed whatever was consummate and perfect in their productions. It is to the same art we owe the recovery

of letters in these latter ages. To this alone we must ascribe the recognition of ancient manuscripts, the discovery of what is spurious, and the discernment of whatever is genuine of those venerable remains which have passed through such dark periods of ignorance, and raised us to the improvements we now make in every science. It is to this art, that even the sacred authors themselves owe their highest purity and correctness. So sacred ought the art itself to be esteemed; when from its supplies alone is formed that judicious and learned strength by which the defenders of our holy religion are able so successfully to refute the Heathens, Jews, sectarians, heretics, and other enemies or opposers of our primitive and ancient faith.

But having thus, after our author's example, asserted the use of criticism, in all literate works, from the main frame or plan of every writing, down to the minutest particle; we may now proceed to exercise this art upon our author himself, and, by his own rules, examine him in this his last treatise; reserving still to ourselves the same privilege of variation, and excursion into other subjects, the same episodic liberty, and right of wandering, which we have maintained in the preceding chapters.

C H A P. II.

Generation and succession of our national and modern wit. — Manners of the proprietors. — Corporation and joint stock. — Statute against criticism. A coffeehouse-committee. — Mr Bays. — Other Bays's in divinity. — Censure of our author's dialogue-piece; and of the manner of dialogue-writing used by reverend wits.

ACCORDING to the common course of practice in our age, we seldom see the character of writer and that of critic united in the same person. There is, I know, a certain species of authors who subsist wholly by the criticising or commenting practice upon others, and can appear in no other form besides what this employment authorizes them to assume. They have no original character, or first part; but wait for something which may be called a work, in order to graft upon it, and come in for shares, at second hand.

The penmen of this capacity and degree are, from their function and employment, distinguished by the title of answerers. For it happens in the world, that there are readers of a genius and size just fitted to these answering authors. These, if they teach them nothing else, will teach them, they think, to criticise. And though the new practising critics are of a sort unlikely ever to un-

derstand any original book or writing; they can understand, or at least remember and quote the subsequent reflections, flouts, and jeers, which may accidentally be made on such a piece, Wherever a gentleman of this sort happens at any time to be in company, you shall no sooner hear a new book spoken of, than it will be asked, "Who has answered it?" or, "When is there an answer to come out?"—Now, the answer, as our gentleman knows, must needs be newer than the book. And the newer a thing is, the more fashionable still, and the genteeler the subject of discourse. For this the bookseller knows how to fit our gentleman to a nicety: for he has commonly an answer ready bespoke, and perhaps finished, by the time his new book comes abroad. And it is odds but our fashionable gentleman, who takes both together, may read the latter first, and drop the other for good and all.

But of these answering wits, and the manner of rejoinders, and reiterate replies, we have said what is sufficient in a former Miscellany¹. We need only remark in general, "That it is necessary a writing critic should understand how to write. And though every writer is not bound to show himself in the capacity of a critic every writing critic is bound to show himself capable of being a writer. For if he be apparently impotent in this latter kind, he is to be denied all title or character in the other."

¹ Viz. *supra*, Misc. 1. chap. 2.

To censure merely what another person writes; to twitch, snap, snub up, or banter; to torture sentences and phrases, turn a few expressions into ridicule, or write what is now-a-days called an answer to any piece, is not sufficient to constitute what is properly esteemed a writer, or author in due form. For this reason, though there are many answerers seen abroad, there are few or no critics or satirists. But whatever may be the state of controversy in our religion or politic concerns; it is certain, that, in the mere literate world, affairs are managed with a better understanding between the principal parties concerned. The writers or authors in possession, have an easier time than any ministry, or religious party, which is uppermost. They have found a way, by decrying all criticism in general, to get rid of their dissenters, and prevent all pretences to further reformation in their state. The critic is made to appear distinct, and of another species; wholly different from the writer. None who have a genius for writing, and can perform with any success, are presumed so ill-natured or illiberal, as to endeavour to signalize themselves in criticism.

It is not difficult, however, to imagine why this practical difference between writer and critic has been so generally established amongst us, as to make the provinces seem wholly distinct and irreconcilable. The forward wits, who, without waiting their due time, or performing their requisite studies, start up in the world as authors, having with little pains or judgment, and by the strength of

fancy merely, acquired a name with mankind, can, on no account, afterwards submit to a decrual or disparagement of those raw works to which they owed their early character and distinction. Ill would it fare with them indeed, if, on these tenacious terms, they should venture upon criticism, or offer to move that spirit which would infallibly give such disturbance to their established title.

Now we may consider, that in our nation, and especially in our present age, whilst wars, debates, and public convulsions, turn our minds so wholly upon business and affairs; the better geniuses being in a manner necessarily involved in the active sphere, on which the general eye of mankind is so strongly fixed; there must remain in the theatre of wit, a sufficient vacancy of place: and the quality of actor upon that stage, must, of consequence, be very easily attainable, and at a low price of ingenuity or understanding.

The persons therefore who are in possession of the prime parts in this deserted theatre, being suffered to maintain their ranks and stations in full ease, have naturally a good agreement and understanding with their fellow-wits. Being indebted to the times for this happiness, that, with so little industry or capacity, they have been able to serve the nation with wit, and supply the place of real dispensers and ministers of the Muses treasures, they must necessarily, as they have any love for themselves, or fatherly affection for their works, conspire with one another, to preserve their common interest of indolence, and justify their remissness,

incorrectness, insipidness, and downright ignorance of all literate art, or just poetic beauty.

*Magna inter molles concordia*².

For this reason, you see them mutually courteous and benevolent; gracious and obliging beyond measure; complimenting one another interchangeably, at the head of their works, in recommendatory verses, or in separate panegyrics, essays, and fragments of poetry; such as in the miscellaneous collections, our yearly retail of wit, we see curiously compacted, and accommodated to the relish of the world. Here the tyrocinium of geniuses is annually displayed. Here, if you think fit, you may make acquaintance with the young offspring of wits, as they come up gradually under the old; with due courtship, and homage, paid to those high predecessors of fame, in hope of being one day admitted, by turn, into the noble order, and made wits by patent and authority.

This is the young fry which you may see busily surrounding the grown poet, or chief playhouse-author, at a coffeehouse. They are his guards; ready to take up arms for him; if, by some presumptuous critic he is at any time attacked. They are indeed the very shadows of their immediate predecessor, and represent the same features, with some small alteration perhaps for the worse. They are sure to aim at nothing above or beyond their ma-

² Juvenal, sat. 2.-vers. 47.

ster; and would, on no account, give him the least jealousy of their aspiring to any degree or order of writing above him. From hence that harmony and reciprocal esteem, which, on such a bottom as this, cannot fail of being perfectly well established among our poets: the age, mean while, being after this manner hopefully provided, and secure of a constant and like succession of meritorious wits, in every kind!

If by chance a man of sense, unapprized of the authority of these high powers, should venture to accost the gentlemen of this fraternity, at some coffeehouse-committee, whilst they were taken up in mutual admiration, and the usual praise of their national and contemporary wits; it is possible he might be treated with some civility, whilst he inquired, for satisfaction sake, into the beauties of those particular works so unanimously extolled. But should he presume to ask in general, "Why is our
" epic or dramatic, our essay or common prose no
" better executed?" or, "Why in particular
" does such or such a reputed wit write so incor-
" rectly, and with so little regard to justness of
" thought or language?" the answer would presently be given, "That we Englishmen are not
" tied up to such rigid rules as those of the ancient
" Grecian, or modern French critics."

"Be it so, Gentlemen! it is your good pleasure. Nor ought any one to dispute it with you.
"You are masters, no doubt, in your own country. But, Gentlemen! the question here is not
" what your authority may be over your own

“ writers. You may have them of what fashion
 “ or size of wit you please; and allow them to
 “ entertain you at the rate you think sufficient and
 “ satisfactory. But can you, by your good plea-
 “ sure, or the approbation of your highest patrons,
 “ make that to be either wit or sense, which would
 “ otherwise have been bombast and contradiction?
 “ If your poets are still Mr Bays³, and your prose-
 “ authors Sir Rogers, without offering at a bet-

* To see the incorrigibleness of our poets in their pedantic man-
 ner, their vanity, defiance of criticism, their rhodomontade, and
 poetical bravado; we need only turn to our famous poet-laureat, the
 very Mr Bays himself, in one of his latest and most valued pieces,
 writ many years after the ingenious author of the *Rehearsal* had drawn
 his picture. “ I have been listening, ” says our poet, in his preface
 to *Don Sebastian*, “ what objections had been made against the con-
 “ duct of the play; but found them all so trivial, that if I should
 “ name them, a true critic would imagine that I played booty.—
 “ Some are pleased to say the writing is dull. But *ætatem habet, de*
 “ *se loquatur*. Others, that the double poison is unnatural. Let the
 “ common received opinion, and *Ausonius's* famous epigram, answer
 “ that. Lastly, a more ignorant sort of creatures than either of the
 “ former, maintain that the character of *Dorax* is not only unnatu-
 “ ral, but inconsistent with itself. Let them read the play, and
 “ think again. — A longer reply is what those cavillers deserve
 “ not. But I will give them and their fellows to understand, that
 “ the Earl of * * * was pleased to read the tragedy twice over be-
 “ fore it was acted, and did me the favor to send me word, that I
 “ had written beyond any of my former plays, and that he was dis-
 “ pleased any thing should be cut away. If I have not reason to
 “ prefer his single judgment to a whole faction, let the world be
 “ judge: for the opposition is the same with that of *Lucan's* hero
 “ against an army, *concurrere. bellum atque virum*. I think I may
 “ modestly conclude, ” &c.

Thus he goes on, to the very end, in the self-same strain. Who,
 after this, can ever say of the *Rehearsal*-author, that his picture of
 our poet was overcharged, or the national humor wrong described?

“ter manner; must it follow that the manner itself
“is good, or the wit genuine? — What say you,
“Gentlemen! to this new piece? — Let us ex-
“amine these lines which you call shining! this
“string of sentences which you call clever! this
“pile of metaphors which you call sublime! —
“Are you unwilling, Gentlemen! to stand the
“test? Do you despise the examination?
“Sir! — since you are pleased to take this li-
“berty with us; may we presume to ask you a
“question? O Gentlemen! as many as you
“please: I shall be highly honored. Why
“then, pray Sir! inform us, whether you have
“ever writ? Very often, Gentlemen!,
“especially on a post-night. But have you
“writ, for instance, Sir! a play, a song, an es-
“say, or a paper, as, by way of eminence, the
“current pieces of our weekly wits are generally
“styled? Something of this kind I may per-
“haps, Gentlemen! have attempted, though with-
“out publishing my work. But pray, Gentlemen!
“what is my writing, or not writing, to the ques-
“tion in hand? Only this, Sir! and you
“may fairly take our words for it; that, when-
“ever you publish, you will find the town against
“you. Your piece will infallibly be condemned.
“So let it. But for what reason, Gen-
“tlemen? I am sure you never saw the piece.
“No, Sir. But you are a critic. And we know by
“certain experience, that when a critic writes accor-
“ding to rule and method, he is sure never to
“hit the English taste. Did not Mr. R——, who

“ criticised our English tragedy, write a forry one
“ of his own? If he did, Gentlemen! it
“ was his own fault, not to know his genius better.
“ But is his criticism the less just on this account?
“ If a musician performs his part well in the hard-
“ est symphonies, he must necessarily know the
“ notes, and understand the rules of harmony and
“ music. But must a man therefore, who has an
“ ear, and has studied the rules of music, of ne-
“ cessity have a voice or hand? Can no one pos-
“ sibly judge a fiddle, but who is himself a fiddler?
“ Can no one judge a picture, but who is himself
“ a layer of colors?” —

Thus far our rational gentleman perhaps might venture, before his coffeehouse-audience. Had I been at his elbow to prompt him as a friend, I should hardly have thought fit to remind him of any thing further. On the contrary, I should have rather taken him aside, to inform him of this cabal, and established corporation of wit; of their declared aversion to criticism, and of their known laws and statutes in that case made and provided. I should have told him, in short, that learned arguments would be mispent on such as these; and that he would find little success, though he should ever so plainly demonstrate to the gentlemen of this size of wit and understanding, “ that the greatest masters
“ of art, in every kind of writing, were eminent
“ in the critical practice.” But that they really were so, witness, among the ancients, their greatest philosophers *, whose critical pieces lie inter-

* *Viz. Plato, Aristotle.* See, in particular, the *Phædrus* of

mixed with their profound philosophical works, and other politer tracts ornamentally writ, for public use'. Witness in history and rhetoric, Isocrates, Dionysius Halicarnassæus, Plutarch, and the corrupt Lucian himself; the only one perhaps of these authors whom our gentlemen may, in some modern translation, have looked into, with any curiosity or delight. To these among the Romans we may add Cicero, Varro, Horace, Quintilian, Pliny, and many more.

Among the moderns, a Boileau and a Corneille are sufficient precedents in the case before us. They applied their criticism with just severity, even to their own works. This indeed is a manner hardly practicable with the poets of our own nation. It would be unreasonable to expect of them, that they should bring such measures in use, as being applied to their works, would discover them to be wholly deformed and disproportionable. It is no wonder therefore if we have so little of this critical genius extant, to guide us in our taste. It is no wonder if what is generally current in this kind, lies in a manner buried, and in disguise under burlesque, as particularly in the witty comedy of a noble author of this last age'. To the shame, however, of our professed wits and enterprisers in the higher spheres

the former; where an entire piece of the orator *Lysias* is criticised in form.

' The distinction of treatises was into the ἀπογραφαὶ, and ἐξωτέριαι.

' The *Rehearsal*. See vol. 1. p. 224. and just above, p. 229. in the notes.

of poetry, it may be observed, that they have not wanted good advice and instruction of the graver kind, from as high a hand in respect of quality and character: since one of the justest of our modern poems, and so confessed even by our poets themselves, is a short criticism, and art of poetry; by which if they themselves were to be judged, they must in general appear no better than mere bunglers, and void of all true sense and knowledge in their art. But if in reality both critic and poet, confessing the justice of these rules of art, can afterwards, in practice, condemn and approve, perform and judge, in a quite different manner from what they acknowledge just and true; it plainly shows, that, though perhaps we are not indigent in wit, we want what is of more consequence, and can alone raise wit to any dignity or worth; even plain honesty, manners, and a sense of that moral truth, on which, as has been often expressed in these volumes⁷, poetic truth and beauty must naturally depend.

*Qui didicit patriæ quid debeat, et quid amicis,
Quo sit amore parens, quo frater amandus et hospes,
Quod sit conscripti, quod judicis officium, ———
——— ille profecto
Reddere personæ scit convenientia cuique*⁸

As for this species of morality which distinguishes

⁷ Viz. vol. I. p. 179. &c. and 239. & 289. &c. So above, p. 214. and in the notes.

⁸ Horat. de art. poet. v. 312. &c.

the civil offices of life, and describes each becoming personage or character in this scene; so necessary it is for the poet and polite author to be apprized of it, that even the divine himself may with juster pretence be exempted from the knowledge of this sort. The composer of religious discourses has the advantage of that higher scene of mystery, which is above the level of human commerce. It is not so much his concern or business to be agreeable. And often when he would endeavour it, he becomes more than ordinarily displeasing. His theatre, and that of the polite world, are very different: infomuch that in a reverend author, or declaimer of this sort, we naturally excuse the ignorance of ordinary decorum, in what relates to the affairs of our inferior temporal world. But for the poet or genteel writer, who is of this world merely, it is a different case. He must be perfect in this moral science. We can easily bear the loss of indifferent poetry or essay. A good bargain it were, could we get rid of every moderate performance in this kind. But were we obliged to hear only excellent sermons, and to read nothing, in the way of devotion, which was not well writ; it might possibly go hard with many Christian people, who are at present such attentive auditors and readers. Established pastors have a right to be indifferent. But voluntary discourses and attempters in wit or poetry, are as intolerable, when they are indifferent, as either fiddlers or painters:

— *Poterat duci quia cæna sine istis.*²

Other Bays and poetafters may be lawfully baited; though we patiently submit to our Bays in divinity.

Had the author of our subject-treatifes confidered thoroughly of thefe literate affairs^{1°}, and found how the intereft of wit ftood at prefent in our nation, he would have had fo much regard furely to his own intereft, as never to have writ, unlefs either in the fingle capacity of mere critic, or that of author in form. If he had refolved never to produce a regular or legitimate piece, he might pretty fafely have writ on ftill after the rate of his firft volume, and mixed manner. He might have been as critical, as fatirical, or as full of raillery, as he had pleafed. But to come afterwards as a grave actor upon the ftage, and expofe himfelf to criticism in his turn, by giving us a work or two in form, after the regular manner of compofition, as we fee in this fecond volume; this, I think, was no extraordinary proof of his judgment or ability, in what related to his own credit and advantage.

One of thefe formal pieces, the Inquiry already examined, we have found to be wholly after the manner which in one of his critical pieces he calls the methodic. But his next piece, the Moralifts, which we have now before us, muft, according

² Hor. ars poet. v. 376.

^{1°} Supra, p. 112. 157, 158.

to his own rules ¹¹, be reckoned as an undertaking of greater weight. It is not only, at the bottom, as systematical, didactic, and preceptive, as that other piece of formal structure; but it assumes withal another garb, and more fashionable turn of wit. It conceals what is scholastical. under the appearance of a polite work. It aspires to dialogue, and carries with it not only those poetic features of the pieces anciently called mimes; but it attempts to unite the several personages and characters in one action, or story, within a determinate compass of time, regularly divided, and drawn into different and proportioned scenes: and this too with variety of style; the simple, comic, rhetorical, and even the poetic or sublime; such as is the aptest to run into enthusiasm and extravagance. So much is our author, by virtue of this piece ¹², a poet in due form, and by a more

Vol. I. p. 167. &c. and p. 220, 221.

¹² That he is conscious of this, we may gather from that line or two of advertisement, which stands at the beginning of his first edition. "As for the characters and incidents, they are neither wholly feigned," says he, "nor wholly true: but according to the liberty allowed in the way of Dialogue, the principal matters are founded upon truth, and the rest as near resembling as may be. It is a *sceptic* recites; and the hero of the piece passes for an *enthusiast*. If a perfect character be wanting, it is the same case here, as with the poets in some of their best pieces. And this surely is a sufficient warrant for the author of a Philosophical Romance. — Thus our author himself, who, to conceal, however, his strict imitation of the ancient poetic Dialogue, has prefixed an auxiliary title to his work, and given it the surname of Rhapsody; as if it were, merely of that *essay* or

apparent claim, than if he had writ a play, or dramatic piece, in as regular a manner, at least, as any known at present on our stage.

It appears, indeed, that as high as our author, in his critical capacity, would pretend to carry the refined manner and accurate simplicity of the ancients, he dares not, in his own model and principal performance, attempt to unite his philosophy in one solid and uniform body, nor carry on his argument in one continued chain or thread. Here our author's timorousness is visible. In the very plan or model of his work, he is apparently put to a hard shift to contrive how or with what probability he might introduce men of any note or

mixed kind of works, which come abroad with an affected air of negligence and irregularity. But whatever our author may have affected in his *title-page*, it was so little his intention to write after that model of incoherent workmanship, that it appears to be solely against his will, if this *dialogue-piece* of his has not the just character, and correct form of those ancient *poems* described. He would gladly have constituted One single *action* and *time*, suitable to the just simplicity of those dramatic works. And this, one would think, was easy enough for him to have done. He needed only to have brought his first speakers immediately into action, and saved the *narrative* or *recitative* part of *Philocles* to *Palemon*, by producing them as speaking personages upon his stage. The scene all along might have been *the park*. From the early evening to the late hour of night, that the two gallants withdrew to their town-apartments, there was sufficient time for the narrator *Philocles* to have *recited* the whole transaction of the second and third part; which would have stood throughout as it now does: only at the conclusion, when the *narrative* or *recitative* part had ceased, the *simple* and *direct* Dialogue would have again returned, to grace the *exit*. By this means the *temporal* as well as *local* unity of the

fashion, reasoning expressly and purposely¹³, without play or trifling, for two or three hours together, on mere philosophy and morals. He finds these subjects, as he confesses, so wide of common conversation, and, by long custom, so appropriated to the school, the university-chair, or pulpit, that he thinks it hardly safe or practicable to treat of them elsewhere, or in a different tone. He is forced therefore to raise particular machines, and constrain his principal characters, in order to carry a better face, and bear himself out against the appearance of pedantry. Thus his gentleman-philosopher Theocles, before he enters into his real character, becomes a feigned preacher. And even when his real character comes on, he hardly dares stand it out; but to deal the better with his sceptic friend, he falls again to personating, and takes up the humor of the poet and enthusiast. Palemon the man of quality, and who is first introduced as speaker in the piece, must, for fashion-sake, appear in love, and under a kind of melancholy produced by some misadventures in the world. How else should he be supposed so serious? Philocles his friend, an airy gentleman of the world, and a thorough rallyer, must have a home-charge upon him, and feel the anger of his grave friend before he can be supposed grave enough to

piece had been preserved. Nor had our author been necessitated to commit that *anachronism*, of making his first part *in order*, to be last *in time*.

¹³ Vol. I. p. 172. &c.

enter into a philosophical discourse. A quarter of an hour's reading must serve to represent an hour or two's debate. And a new scene presenting itself, ever and anon, must give refreshment, it seems, to the faint reader, and remind him of the characters and business going on.

It is in the same view that we miscellanarian authors, being fearful of the natural lassitude and satiety of our indolent reader, have prudently betaken ourselves to the way of chapters and contents; that as the reader proceeds, by frequent intervals of repose, contrived on purpose for him, he may from time to time be advertised of what is yet to come, and be tempted thus to renew his application.

Thus in our modern plays we see, almost in every other leaf, descriptions or illustrations of the action, not in the poem itself, or in the mouth of the actors; but by the poet, in his own person; in order, as appears, to help out a defect of the text, by a kind of marginal note, or comment, which renders these pieces of a mixed kind between the narrative and dramatic. It is in this fashionable style, or manner of dumb show, that the reader finds the action of the piece more amazingly expressed than he possibly could by the lines of the drama itself, where the parties alone are suffered to be speakers.

It is out of the same regard to ease, both in respect of writer and reader, that we see long characters and descriptions at the head of most dramatic pieces, to inform us of the relations, kindred,

interests, and designs of the *dramatis personæ*; this being of the highest importance to the reader, that he may the better understand the plot, and find out the principal characters and incidents of the piece; which otherwise could not possibly discover themselves, as they are read in their due order. And to do justice to our play-readers, they seldom fail to humor our poets in this respect, and read over the characters with strict application, as a sort of grammar or key, before they enter on the piece itself. I know not whether they would do so much for any philosophical piece in the world. Our author seems very much to question it, and has therefore made that part easy enough which relates to the distinction of his characters, by making use of the narrative manner: though he had done as well, perhaps, not to have gone out of the natural plain way, on this account. For with those to whom such philosophical subjects are agreeable, it could be thought no laborious task to give the same attention to characters in dialogue, as is given at the first entrance by every reader to the easiest play, composed of fewest and plainest personages. But for those who read these subjects with mere supineness and indifference, they will as much begrudge the pains of attending to the characters thus particularly pointed out, as if they had only been discernible by inference and deduction from the mouth of the speaking parties themselves.

More reasons are given by our author himself²⁴,

²⁴ Vol. 2. p. 153.

for

for his avoiding the direct way of dialogue; which at present lies so low, and is used only now and then in our party-pamphlets, or new-fashioned theological essays. For of late, it seems, the manner has been introduced into church-controversy, with an attempt of raillery and humor, as a more successful method of dealing with heresy and infidelity. The burlesque-divinity grows mightily in vogue. And the cried-up answers to heterodox discourses are generally such as are written in drollery, or with resemblance of the facetious and humorous language of conversation.

Joy to the reverend authors who can afford to be thus gay, and condescend to correct us in this lay-wit. The advances they make in behalf of piety and manners, by such a popular style, are doubtless found, upon experience, to be very considerable. As these reformers are nicely qualified to hit the air of breeding and gentility, they will in time, no doubt, refine their manner, and improve this jocular method, to the edification of the polite world; who have been so long seduced by the way of raillery and wit. They may do wonders by their comic Muse, and may thus, perhaps, find means to laugh gentlemen into their religion, who have unfortunately been laughed out of it. For what reason is there to suppose, that orthodoxy should not be able to laugh as agreeably, and with as much refinedness, as heresy or infidelity?

At present, it must be owned, the characters, or personages, employed by our new orthodox

dialogists, carry with them little proportion or coherence; and in this respect may be said to suit perfectly with that figurative metaphorical style and rhetorical manner in which their logic and arguments are generally couched. Nothing can be more complex or multiform than their moral draughts or sketches of humanity. These, indeed, are so far from representing any particular man, or order of men, that they scarce resemble any thing of the kind. It is by their names only that these characters are figured. Though they bear different titles, and are set up to maintain contrary points; they are found, at the bottom, to be all of the same side; and, notwithstanding their seeming variance, to co-operate in the most officious manner with the author, towards the display of his own proper wit, and the establishment of his private opinion and maxims. They are indeed his very legitimate and obsequious puppets; as like real men in voice, action, and manners, as those wooden or wire engines of the lower stage. Philotheus and Philatheus; Philautus and Philalethes, are of one and the same order: just tallies to one another: questioning and answering in concert, and with such a sort of alternative as is known in a vulgar play, where one person lies down blindfold, and presents himself, as fair as may be, to another, who, by favor of the company, or the assistance of his good fortune, deals his companion many a sound blow, without being once challenged, or brought into his turn of lying down.

There is the same curious mixture of chance,

and elegant vicissitude, in the style of these mock-personages of our new theological drama: with this difference only, "that after the poor phantom
" or shadow of an adversary has said as little for
" his cause as can be imagined, and given as many
" opens and advantages as could be desired,
" he lies down for good and all, and passively
" submits to the killing strokes of his unmerciful
" conqueror."

Hardly, as I conceive, will it be objected to our Moralist, the author of the philosophic dialogue above, "That the personages who sustain
" the sceptical or objecting parts, are over tame
" and tractable in their disposition." Did I perceive any such foul dealing in his piece, I should scarce think it worthy of the criticism here bestowed. For in this sort of writing, where personages are exhibited, and natural conversation set in view; if characters are neither tolerably preserved, nor manners with any just similitude described; there remains nothing but what is too gross and monstrous for criticism or examination.

It will be alledged, perhaps, in answer to what is here advanced, "That should a dialogue be
" wrought up to the exactness of these rules, it
" ought to be condemned as the worse piece, for
" affording the infidel or sceptic such good quarter,
" and giving him the full advantage of his argument and wit."

But to this I reply, That either dialogue should never be attempted; or if it be, the parties should appear natural, and such as they really are. If

we paint at all, we should endeavour to paint like life, and draw creatures as they are knowable, in their proper shapes and better features; not in metamorphosis, not mangled, lame, distorted, awkward forms, and impotent chimeras. Atheists have their sense and wits, as other men; or why is Atheism so often challenged in those of the better rank? why charged so often to the account of wit and subtle reasoning?

Were I to advise these authors, towards whom I am extremely well affected on account of their good-humored zeal, and the seeming sociableness of their religion; I should say to them, “Gentlemen! be not so cautious of furnishing your representative Sceptic with too good arguments, or too shrewd a turn of wit or humor. Be not so fearful of giving quarter. Allow your adversary his full reason, his ingenuity, sense, and art. Trust to the chief character or Hero of your piece. Make him as dazzling bright as you are able. He will undoubtedly overcome the utmost force of his opponent, and dispel the darkness or cloud which the adversary may unluckily have raised. But if, when you have fairly wrought up your antagonist to his due strength and cognisable proportion, your chief character cannot afterwards prove a match for him, or shine with a superior brightness; whose fault is it? — the subject’s? — This, I hope, you will never allow. — Whose, therefore, beside your own? — Beware then, and consider well your strength and mastery in this manner

“ of writing, and in the qualifying practice of
“ the polite world, ere you attempt these accurate
“ and refined limnings or portraitures of mankind,
“ or offer to bring gentlemen on the stage. For
“ if real gentlemen seduced, as you pretend, and
“ made erroneous in their religion or philosophy,
“ discover not the least feature of their real faces
“ in your looking-glass, nor know themselves,
“ in the least, by your description; they will
“ hardly be apt to think they are refuted. How
“ wittily soever your comedy may be wrought
“ up, they will scarce apprehend any of that
“ wit to fall upon themselves. They may laugh
“ indeed at the diversion you are pleased to give
“ them: but the laugh perhaps may be different
“ from what you intend. They may smile secretly
“ to see themselves thus encountered, and your
“ scholastic weapons quitted, in favor of this
“ weak attempt, to master them by their own
“ arms, and proper ability.”

Thus we have performed our critical task, and tried our strength, both on our author, and those of his order, who attempt to write in dialogue, after the active dramatic, mimical or personating way¹⁵; according to which a writer is properly poetical.

What remains, we shall examine in our succeeding and last chapter.

¹⁵ See vol. 1. p. 167. &c.

C H A P. III.

Of extent or latitude of thought. — Free - thinkers. — Their cause, and character. — Dishonesty, a half-thought. — Short-thinking, cause of vice and bigotry. — Agreement of slavery and superstition. — Liberty, civil, moral, spiritual. — Free-thinking divines. — Representatives incognito. — Ambassadors from the moon. — Effectual determination of Christian controversy and religious belief.

BEING now come to the conclusion of my work, after having defended the cause of critics in general, and employed what strength I had in that science upon our adventurous author in particular; I may, according to equity, and with the better grace, attempt a line or two, in defence of that freedom of thought which our author has used, particularly in one of the personages of his last dialogue - treatise.

There is good reason to suppose, that, however, equally framed, or near alike, the race of mankind may appear in other respects, they are not always equal thinkers, or of a like ability in the management of this natural talent which we call Thought. The race, on this account, may therefore justly be distinguished, as they often are, by the appellation of the thinking, and the unthinking sort. The mere unthinking are such as have

not yet arrived to that happy thought by which they should observe, "how necessary thinking is, " and how fatal the want of it must prove to " them." The thinking part of mankind, on the other side, having discovered the assiduity and industry requisite to right thinking, and being already commenced Thinkers upon this foundation, are, in the progress of the affair, convinced of the necessity of thinking to good purpose, and carrying the work to a thorough issue. They know, that if they refrain or stop once upon this road, they had done as well never to have set out. They are not so supine as to be withheld by mere laziness, when nothing lies in the way to interrupt the free course and progress of their thought.

Some obstacles, it is true, may, on this occasion, be pretended. Spectres may come across, and shadows of reason rise up against Reason itself. But if men have once heartily espoused the reasoning or thinking habit, they will not easily be induced to lay the practice down; they will not at an instant be arrested, or made to stand, and yield themselves, when they come to such a certain boundary, land-mark, post, or pillar, erected here or there, for what reason may probably be guessed, with the inscription of a "Ne plus ultra."

It is not, indeed, any authority on earth, as we are well assured, can stop us on this road, unless we please to make the arrest, or restriction, of our own accord. It is our own thought which

must restrain our thinking. And whether the restraining thought be just, how shall we ever judge, without examining it freely, and out of all constraint? How shall we be sure that we have justly quitted Reason, as too high and dangerous, too aspiring or presumptive; if, through fear of any kind, or submitting to mere command, we quit our very examining thought, and in the moment stop short, so as to put an end to further thinking on the matter? Is there much difference between this case, and that of the obedient beasts of burden, who stop precisely at their appointed inn, or at whatever point the charioteer, or governor of the reins, thinks fit to give the signal for a halt?

I cannot but from hence conclude, that of all species of creatures said commonly to have brains, the most insipid, wretched, and preposterous are those whom, in just propriety of speech, we call half-thinkers.

I have often known pretenders to Wit break out into admiration, on the sight of some raw, heedless, unthinking gentleman; declaring on this occasion, that they esteemed it the happiest case in the world, "never to think, or trouble one's head with study or consideration." This I have always looked upon as one of the highest airs of distinction, which the self-admiring wits are used to give themselves in public company. Now, the echo or antiphony which these elegant exclaimers hope, by this reflection, to draw necessarily from their audience, is, "that they themselves are

“ overfreighted with this merchandise of thought;
“ and have not only enough for balast, but such
“ a cargo over and above, as is enough to sink
“ them by its weight.” I am apt, however, to
imagine of these gentlemen, that it was never
their over-thinking which oppressed them; and
that if their thought had ever really become
oppressive to them, they might thank themselves,
for having under-thought, or reasoned short, so
as to rest satisfied with a very superficial search
into matters of the first and highest importance.

If, for example, they overlooked the chief
enjoyments of life, which are founded in honesty
and a good mind; if they presumed mere life to
be fully worth what its tenacious lovers are pleased
to rate it at; if they thought public distinction,
fame, power, an estate, or title to be of the same
value as is vulgarly conceived, or as they con-
cluded, on a first thought, without further
scepticism or after-deliberation; it is no wonder,
if being in time become such mature dogmatists,
and well-practised dealers in the affairs of what
they call a settlement or fortune, they are so
hardly put to it, to find ease or rest within
themselves.

These are the deeply-loaded and over-pensive
gentlemen, who esteeming it the truest wit to
pursue what they call their interest, wonder to
find they are still as little at ease when they
have succeeded, as when they first attempted to
advance.

There can never be less self enjoyment than

in these supposed wise characters, these selfish computers of happiness and private good; whose pursuits of interest, whether for this world or another, are attended with the same steady vein of cunning and low thought, sordid deliberations, perverse and crooked fancies, ill dispositions, and false relishes of life and manners. The most negligent undesigning thoughtless rake has not only more of sociableness, ease, tranquillity, and freedom from worldly cares, but in reality more of worth, virtue, and merit, than such grave plodders, and thoughtful gentlemen as these.

If it happens, therefore, that these graver, more circumspect, and deeply-interested gentlemen, have, for their soul's sake, and through a careful provision for hereafter, engaged in certain speculations of Religion; their taste of Virtue, and relish of Life is not the more improved on this account. The thoughts they have on these new subjects of divinity are so biased, and perplexed, by those half-thoughts and raw imaginations of interest, and worldly affairs, that they are still disabled in the rational pursuit of happiness and good: and being necessitated thus to remain short-thinkers, they have the power to go no further than they are led by those to whom, under such disturbances and perplexities, they apply themselves for cure and comfort.

It has been the main scope and principal end of these volumes, "to assert the reality of a Beauty
" and Charm in moral as well as natural subjects,
" and to demonstrate the reasonableness of a pro-

“portionate Taste, and determinate Choice, in life and manners.” The Standard of this kind, and the noted character of moral Truth, appear so firmly established in nature itself, and so widely displayed through the intelligent world, that there is no genius, mind, or thinking principle, which, if I may say so, is not really conscious in the case. Even the most refractory and obstinate understandings are by certain reprises or returns of thought, on every occasion, convinced of this existence, and necessitated, in common with others, to acknowledge the actual Right and Wrong.

It is evident, that whensoever the mind, influenced by passion or humor, consents to any action, measure, or rule of life contrary to this governing Standard and primary Measure of intelligence, it can only be through a weak thought, a scantiness of judgment, and a defect in the application of that unavoidable impression and first natural rule of honesty and worth; against which, whatever is advanced, will be of no other moment than to render a life distracted, incoherent, full of irresolution, repentance, and self-disapprobation.

Thus every immorality and enormity of life can only happen from a partial and narrow view of happiness and good. Whatever takes from the largeness or freedom of thought, must of necessity detract from that first relish, or Taste, on which virtue and worth depend.

For instance, when the eye or appetite is eagerly fixed on treasure, and the moneyed bliss

of bags and coffers; it is plain there is a kind of fascination in the case. The sight is instantly diverted from all other views of excellence or worth. And here, even the vulgar, as well as the more liberal part of mankind, discover the contracted genius, and acknowledge the narrowness of such a mind.

In luxury and intemperance we easily apprehend how far thought is oppressed, and the mind debarred from just reflection, and from the free examination and censure of its own opinions or maxims, on which the conduct of a life is formed.

Even in that complicated good of vulgar kind, which we commonly call Interest, in which we comprehend both pleasure, riches, power, and other exterior advantages; we may discern how a fascinated sight contracts a genius, and by shortening the view even of that very interest which it seeks, betrays the Knave, and necessitates the ablest and wittiest proselyte of the kind, to expose himself on every emergency and sudden turn.

But above all other enslaving vices, and restrainers of reason and just thought, the most evidently ruinous and fatal to the understanding is that of Superstition, Bigotry, and vulgar Enthusiasm. This passion, not contented like other vices to deceive, and tacitly supplant our reason, professes open war, holds up the intended chains and fetters, and declares its resolution to enslave.

The artificial managers of this human frailty

declaim against free-thought, and latitude of understanding. To go beyond those bounds of thinking which they have prescribed, is by them declared a sacrilege. To them, Freedom of mind, a Mastery of sense, and a Liberty in thought and action, imply debauch, corruption and depravity.

In consequence of their moral maxims, and political establishments, they can indeed advance no better notion of human happiness and enjoyment, than that which is in every respect the most opposite to liberty. It is to them doubtless that we owe the opprobriousness and abuse of those naturally honest appellations of free-livers, free-thinkers, latitudinarians, or whatever other character implies a largeness of mind, and generous use of understanding. Fain would they confound licentiousness in morals, with liberty in thought and action; and make the libertine, who has the least mastery of himself, resemble his direct opposite. For such indeed is the man of resolute purpose and immoveable adherence to Reason, against every thing which passion, prepossession, craft, or fashion can advance in favor of ought else. But here, it seems, the grievance lies. It is thought dangerous for us to be over-rational, or too much masters of ourselves, in what we draw, by just conclusions, from reason only. Seldom therefore do these expositors fail of bringing the thought of Liberty into disgrace. Even at the expense of virtue, and of that very idea of Goodness on which they built the mysteries of their profitable science, they derogate from

morals, and reverse all true philosophy; they refine on selfishness, and explode generosity; promote a slavish obedience in the room of voluntary duty and free service; exalt blind ignorance for devotion, recommend low thought, decry reason, extol voluptuousness, wilfulness, vindictiveness, arbitrariness, vain-glory¹; and even deify those weak passions which are the disgrace rather than ornament of human nature².

But so far is it from the nature of Liberty to indulge such passions as these³, that whoever acts at any time under the power of any single one, may be said to have already provided for himself an absolute master. And he who lives under the power of a whole race, since it is scarce possible to obey one without the other, must of necessity undergo the worst of servitudes, under the most capricious and domineering lords.

That this is no paradox, even the writers for entertainment can inform us; however others may moralise who discourse or write, as they pretend, for profit and instruction. The Poets even of the wanton sort give ample testimony of this slavery and wretchedness of vice. They may extol voluptuousness to the skies, and point their wit as sharply as they are able against a virtuous state. But when they come afterwards to pay the neces-

¹ Vol. 2. p. 211.; and below, p. 238, 239.

² Vol. 1. p. 31.

³ Vol. 2. p. 207. 358.

sary tribute to their commanding pleasures, we hear their pathetic moans, and find the inward discord and calamity of their lives. Their example is the best of precepts; since they conceal nothing, are sincere, and speak their passion out aloud. And it is in this that the very worst of poets may justly be preferred to the generality of modern philosophers, or other formal writers of a yet more specious name. The Muses pupils never fail to express their passions, and write just as they feel. It is not, indeed, in their nature to do otherwise, whilst they indulge their vein, and are under the power of that natural enthusiasm which leads them to what is highest in their performance. They follow Nature: they move chiefly as she moves in them; without thought of disguising her free motions, and genuine operations, for the sake of any scheme or hypothesis, which they have formed at leisure, and in particular narrow views. On this account, though at one time they quarrel perhaps with Virtue, for restraining them in their forbidden loves, they can at another time make her sufficient amends; when with indignation they complain, “that
“ Merit is neglected, and their worthless rival
“ preferred before them⁴. ”

Contrane lucrum nil valere candidum

Pauperis ingenium⁵?

⁴ Vol. I. p. 122.

⁵ Horat. epod. II.

And thus even in common elegiac, in song, ode, or epigram, consecrated to pleasure itself, we may often read the dolorous confession in behalf of virtue, and see, at the bottom, how the case stands:

*Nam veræ voces tum demum pectore ab imo
Eliciuntur.*

The airy poets, in these fits, can, as freely as the tragedian, condole with Virtue, and bemoan the case of suffering Merit:

*The oppressor's wrong, the proud man's contumely,
The insolence of office, and the spurns
That patient Merit of the unworthy takes.*

The poetic chiefs may give what reason they think fit for their humor of representing our mad appetites, especially that of Love, under the shape of urchins and wanton boys, scarce out of their state of infancy. The original design and moral of this fiction, I am persuaded, was to show us, how little there was of great and heroic in the government of these pretenders, how truly weak and childish they were in themselves, and how much lower than mere children we then became, when we submitted ourselves to their blind tutorage. There was no fear left in this fiction the boyish nature should be misconstrued as innocent and gentle. The storms of passion, so well known in every kind, kept the tyrannic quality of this

wanton

wanton race sufficiently in view. Nor could the poetical description fail to bring to mind their mischievous and malignant play. But when the image of imperious threatening, and absolute command, was joined to that of ignorance, puerility, and folly; the notion was completed, of that wretched slavish state, which modern libertines, in conjunction with some of a graver character, admire, and represent, as the most eligible of any. — “Happy condition!” says one, “happy life, that of the indulged passions; might we pursue it! — Miserable condition! miserable life, that of Reason and Virtue, which we are bid pursue!”

It is the same, it seems, with men, in morals, as in politics. When they have been unhappily born and bred to slavery, they are so far from being sensible of their slavish course of life, or of that ill usage, indignity, and misery they sustain, that they even admire their own condition; and being used to think short, and carry their views no further than those bounds which were early prescribed to them, they look upon tyranny as a natural case, and think mankind in a sort of dangerous and degenerate state, when under the power of laws, and in the possession of a free government.

We may by these reflections come easily to apprehend what men they were who first brought reason and free thought under disgrace, and made

the noblest of characters, that of a freethinker, to become invidious. It is no wonder if the same interpreters would have those also to be esteemed free in their lives, and masters of good living, who are the least masters of themselves, and the most impotent in passion and humor of all their fellow-creatures. But far be it, and far surely will it ever be, from any worthy genius, to be consenting to such a treacherous language, and abuse of words. For my own part, I thoroughly confide in the good powers of Reason, "That Liberty" and Freedom shall never, by any artifice or "delusion, be made to pass with me as frightful" "sounds, or as reproachful, or invidious, in any" "sense."

I can no more allow that to be free-living, where unlimited passion and unexamined fancy govern, than I can allow that to be a free government where the mere people govern, and not the laws. For no people in a civil state can possibly be free, when they are otherwise governed than by such laws as they themselves have constituted, or to which they have freely given consent. Now, to be released from these, so as to govern themselves by each day's will or fancy, and to vary on every turn the rule and measure of government, without respect to any ancient constitutions or establishments, or to the stated and fixed rules of equity and justice, is as certain slavery, as it is violence, distraction, and misery; such as in the issue must prove the establishment of an irretrievable state of tyranny and absolute dominion.

In the determinations of life, and in the choice and government of actions, he alone is free who has within himself no hindrance, or control, in acting what he himself, by his best judgment, and most deliberate choice, approves. Could vice agree possibly with itself, or could the vicious any way reconcile the various judgments of their inward counsellors; they might with justice perhaps assert their liberty and independency. But whilst they are necessitated to follow least, what, in their sedate hours, they most approve; whilst they are passively assigned, and made over from one possessor to another⁷, in contrary extremes, and to different ends and purposes, of which they are themselves wholly ignorant; it is evident, that the more they turn their eyes⁸, as many times their are obliged, towards virtue and a free life, the more they must confess their misery and subjection. They discern their own captivity, but not with force and resolution sufficient to redeem themselves, and become their own. Such is the real tragic state, as the old tragedian represents it:

—— *Video meliora proboque,
Deteriora sequor*⁹.

⁷ *Hunc cine an hunc sequeris? Subeas alternus oportet
Ancipiti obsequio dominos.*

Perf. sat. 5.

See vol. I. p. 246, 247. 266, 278. &c.

⁸ *Magne Pater divum, sævos punire tyrannos
Haud alia ratione velis, cum dira libido
Moverit ingenium ferventi tincta veneno,
Virtutem videant, intabescantque relicta.*

Perf. sat. 3.

⁹ Καὶ μανθάνω μὲν ὅτι τολμήσω κακὰ· θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βεβρυμάτων. Eurip. Med. act. 4.

And thus the highest spirits, and most refractory wills, contribute to the lowest servitude and most submissive state. Reason and Virtue alone can bestow Liberty. Vice is unworthy, and unhappy, on this account only, "That it is slavish and debasing."

Thus have we pleaded the cause of liberty in general; and vindicated, withal, our author's particular freedom, in taking the person of a sceptic, as he has done in this last treatise^{1o}, on which we have so largely paraphrased. We may now perhaps, in compliance with general custom, justly presume to add something in defence of the same kind of freedom we ourselves have assumed in these latter miscellaneous comments; since it would doubtless be very unreasonable and unjust, for those who had so freely played the critic, to expect any thing less than the same free treatment, and thorough criticism in return.

As for the style or language used in these comments; it is very different we find, and varies in proportion with the author commented, and with the different characters and persons frequently introduced in the original treatises. So that there will undoubtedly be scope sufficient for censure and correction.

As for the observations on antiquity, we have in most passages, except the very common and

^{1o} *Viz.* the Moralists, or *philosophical dialogue*, recited in the person of a *sceptic*, under the name of *Philocles*. See treatise 5. vol. 2. p. 170. &c.

obvious, produced our vouchers and authorities in our own behalf. What may be thought of our judgment or sense in the application of these authorities, and in the deductions and reasonings we have formed from such learned topics, must be submitted to the opinion of the wise and learned.

In morals, of which the very force lies in a love of discipline, and in a willingness to redress and rectify false thought, and erring views; we cannot but patiently wait redress and amicable censure from the sole competent judges, the wise and good; whose interest it has been our whole endeavour to advance.

The only subject on which we are perfectly secure, and without fear of any just censure or reproach, is that of faith and orthodox belief. For, in the first place, it will appear, that, through a profound respect, and religious veneration, we have forbore so much as to name any of the sacred or solemn mysteries of revelation¹¹. And, in the next place, as we can with confidence declare, that we have never in any writing, public or private, attempted such high researches, nor have ever in practice acquitted ourselves otherwise than as just conformists to the lawful church: so we may, in a proper sense, be said faithfully and dutifully to embrace those holy mysteries, even in their minutest particulars, without the least exception on account of their amazing depth. And though we are sensible, that it would be no small hardship to deprive

¹¹ Supra, p. 58. &c.

others of a liberty of examining and searching, with due modesty and submission, into the nature of those subjects; yet as for ourselves, who have not the least scruple whatsoever, we pray not any such grace or favor in our behalf; being fully assured of our own steady orthodoxy, resignation, and entire submission to the truly Christian and catholic doctrines of our holy church, as by law-established.

It is true indeed, that as to critical learning, and the examination of originals, texts, glosses, various readings, styles, compositions, manuscripts, complements, editions, publications, and other circumstances, such as are common to the sacred books with all other writings and literature, this we have confidently asserted to be a just and lawful study¹². We have even represented this species of criticism as necessary to the preservation and purity of scripture: that sacred scripture, which has been so miraculously preserved in its successive copies and transcriptions, under the eye, as we must needs suppose, of holy and learned critics, through so many dark ages of Christianity, to these latter times; in which learning has been happily revived.

But if this critical liberty raises any jealousy against us, we shall beg leave of our offended reader to lay before him our case, at the very worst: that if, on such a naked exposition, it be found criminal, we may be absolutely condemned;

¹² Vol. I. p. 126, 127.

if otherwise, acquitted; and with the same favor indulged, as others, in the same circumstances, have been before us.

On this occasion, therefore, we may be allowed to borrow something from the form or manner of our dialogue-author, and represent a conversation of the same free nature as that recited by him in his night-scene¹³; where the supposed sceptic or freethinker delivers his thoughts, and reigns in the discourse.

It was in a more considerable company, and before a more numerous audience, that not long since, a gentleman of some rank, one who was generally esteemed to carry a sufficient caution and reserve in religious subjects of discourse, as well as an apparent deference to religion, and in particular to the national and established church, having been provoked by an impertinent attack of a certain violent bigotted party, was drawn into an open and free vindication, not only of free-thinking, but free professing and discoursing, in matters relating to religion and faith.

Some of the company, it seems, after having made bold with him, as to what they fancied to be his principle, began to urge "the necessity of reducing men to one profession and belief." And several gentlemen, even of those who passed for moderate in their way, seemed so far to give into this zealot-opinion, as to agree, "That, notwithstanding the right method was not yet

¹³ Vol. 2. p. 266, 267, 268. &c.

“ found, it was highly requisite that some way
“ should be thought on, to reconcile differences in
“ opinion; since so long as this variety should last,
“ Religion, they thought, could never be success-
“ fully advanced.”

To this our gentleman at first answered coldly,
That, “ what was impossible to be done, could not,
“ he thought, be properly pursued as necessary to
“ be done.” But the raillery being ill taken, he
was forced at last to defend himself the best he
could, upon this point; “ That variety of opinion
“ was not to be cured;” and, “ That it was im-
“ possible all should be of one mind.”

“ I well know,” said he, “ that many pious
“ men, seeing the inconveniencies which the dis-
“ union of persuasions and opinions accidentally
“ produces, have thought themselves obliged to
“ stop this inundation of mischiefs, and have made
“ attempts accordingly. Some have endeavoured
“ to unite these factions, by propounding such a
“ guide as they were all bound to follow; hoping
“ that the unity of a guide would have produced
“ unity of minds. But who this guide should be,
“ after all, became such a question, that it was
“ made part of that fire itself which was to be
“ extinguished. Others thought of a rule. — This
“ was to be the effectual means of union! this
“ was to do the work, or nothing could! — But
“ supposing all the world had been agreed on
“ this rule, yet the interpretation of it was so
“ full of variety, that this also became part of the
“ disease.”

The company, upon this preamble of our gentleman, pressed harder upon him than before; objecting the authority of holy scripture against him, and affirming this to be of itself a sufficient guide and rule. They urged again and again that known saying of a famed controversial divine of our church against the divines of another, "That the scripture, the scripture was the religion of Protestants."

To this our gentleman, at first, replied only, by desiring them to explain their word scripture, and by inquiring into the original of this collection of ancients and later tracts, which in general they comprehended under that title: whether it were the apocryphal scripture, or the more canonical? the full or the half authorized? the doubtful, or the certain? the controverted, or uncontroverted? the singly-read, or that of various reading? the texts of these manuscripts, or of those? the transcripts, copies, titles, catalogues of this church and nation, or of that other? of this sect and party, or of another? of those in one age called orthodox, and in possession of power, or of those who in another overthrew their predecessors' authority, and in their turn also assumed the guardianship and power of holy things? For how these sacred records were guarded in those ages, might easily, he said, be imagined by any one who had the least insight into the history of those times which we called primitive, and those characters of men whom we styled Fathers of the church.

“It must be confessed,” continued he, “it was
“a strange industry and unlucky diligence which
“was used, in this respect, by these ecclesiastical
“fore-fathers. Of all those heresies which gave
“them employment, we have absolutely no
“record, or monument, but what themselves
“who were adversaries have transmitted to us;
“and we know that adversaries, especially such
“who observe all opportunities to discredit both
“the persons and doctrines of their enemies, are
“not always the best recorders or witnesses of
“such transactions. We see it,” continued he,
in a very emphatical, but somewhat embarrassed
style, “we see it now in this very age, in the
“present distemperatures, that parties are no good
“registers of the actions of the adverse side: and
“if we cannot be confident of the truth of a story
“now, now, I say, that it is possible for any
“man, especially for the interested adversary, to
“discover the imposture, it is far more unlikely,
“that after-ages should know any other truth than
“such as serves the ends of the representers.”

Our gentleman by these expressions had already
given considerable offence to his zealot-auditors.
They plied him faster with passionate reproaches,
than with arguments or rational answers. This,
however, served only to animate him the more,
and made him proceed the more boldly, with the
same assumed formality and air of declamation, in
his general criticism of holy literature.

“There are,” said he, “innumerable places
“that contain, no doubt, great mysteries; but so

“ wrapped in clouds , or hid in umbrages ; so
“ heightened with expressions , or so covered with
“ allegories and garments of rhetoric ; so profound
“ in the matter , or so altered and made intricate
“ in the manner , that they may seem to have
“ been left as trials of our industry , and as occa-
“ sions and opportunities for the exercise of mu-
“ tual charity and toleration , rather than as the
“ repositories of faith , and furniture of creeds.
“ For when there are found in the explications of
“ these writings , so many commentaries ; so many
“ senses and interpretations ; so many volumes in
“ all ages , and all like mens faces , no one exactly
“ like another : either this difference is absolutely
“ no fault at all ; or if it be , it is excusable.
“ There are , besides , so many thousands of copies
“ that were writ by persons of several interests
“ and persuasions , such different understandings
“ and tempers , such distinct abilities and weakneses ,
“ that it is no wonder there is so great variety
“ of readings : ——— whole verses in one , that
“ are not in another : ——— whole books admitted
“ by one church or communion , which are
“ rejected by another : and whole stories and
“ relations admitted by some fathers , and rejected
“ by others. ——— I consider withal , that there
“ have been many designs and views in expound-
“ ing these writings : many senses in which they
“ are expounded ; and when the grammatical
“ sense is found out , we are many times never
“ the nearer. Now , there being such variety of
“ senses in scripture , and but few places so marked

“ out , as not to be capable of more than one ;
“ if men will write commentaries by fancy , what
“ infallible criterion will be left to judge of the
“ certain sense of such places as have been the
“ matter of question ? I consider again , that there
“ are indeed divers places in these sacred volumes ,
“ containing in them mysteries and questions of
“ great concernment : yet such is the fabric and
“ constitution of the whole , that there is no cer-
“ tain mark to determine whether the sense of
“ these passages should be taken as literal or figu-
“ rative. There is nothing in the nature of the
“ thing to determine the sense or meaning : but it
“ must be gotten out as it can. And therefore it
“ is unreasonably required , that what is of itself
“ ambiguous , should be understood in its own
“ prime sense and intention , under the pain of
“ either a sin , or an anathema. Very wise men ,
“ even the ancient fathers , have expounded things
“ allegorically , when they should have expounded
“ them literally. Others expound things literally
“ when they should understand them in allegory.
“ If such great spirits could be deceived in finding
“ out what kind of senses were to be given to
“ scriptures , it may well be endured that we ,
“ who sit at their feet , should be subject at least
“ to equal failure. If we follow any one translation ,
“ or any one man’s commentary , what rule or
“ direction shall we have , by which to chuse that
“ one aright ? Or is there any one man that hath
“ translated perfectly , or expounded infallibly ?
“ If we resolve to follow any one as far only as

“ we like, or fancy, we shall then only do wrong
“ or right by chance. If we resolve absolutely to
“ follow any one, witherfoever he leads, we shall
“ probably come at last where, if we have any
“ eyes left, we shall see ourselves become sufficiently
“ ridiculous. ”

The reader may here perhaps, by his natural sagacity, remark a certain air of studied discourse and declamation, not so very proper or natural in the mouth of a mere gentleman, nor suitable to a company where alternate discourse is carried on, in unconcerted measure, and unpremeditated language. Something there was so very emphatical, withal, in the delivery of these words, by the sceptical gentleman, that some of the company who were still more incensed against him for these expressions, began to charge him as a preacher of pernicious doctrines, one who attacked religion in form, and carried his lessons or lectures about with him, to repeat by rote, at any time, to the ignorant and vulgar, in order to seduce them.

It is true, indeed, said he, Gentlemen! that what I have here ventured to repeat is addressed chiefly to those you call ignorant; such, I mean, as, being otherwise engaged in the world, have had little time perhaps to bestow upon inquiries into divinity-matters. As for you, Gentlemen! in particular, who are so much displeased with my freedom, I am well assured; you are in effect so able and knowing, that the truth of every assertion I have advanced is sufficiently understood and acknowledged by you; however it may happen, that,

in your great wisdom, you think it proper to conceal these matters from such persons as you are pleased to style the vulgar.

It is true, withal, Gentlemen! continued he; I will confess to you, that the words you have heard repeated are not my own. "They are no other than what have been publicly and solemnly delivered, even by one of the Episcopal order"¹⁴,

¹⁴ The pious and learned Bishop *Taylor*, in his treatise *on the liberty of prophesying*, printed in his collection of polemical and moral discourses, anno 1657. The pages answering to the places above cited are, 401. 402. and in the epistle dedicatory, three or four leaves before, 438. 439—444. 451. 452. After which, in the succeeding page, he sums up his sense on this subject of sacred literature, and the liberty of criticism, and of private judgment and opinion in these matters, in the following words: "Since there are
" so many copies, with infinite varieties of reading; since a various
" interpunction, a parenthesis, a letter, an accent, may much alter
" the sense; since some places have divers literal senses, many have
" spiritual, mystical, and allegorical meanings; since there are so
" many tropes, metonymies, ironies, hyperboles, proprieties, and
" improprieties of language, whose understanding depends upon such
" circumstances, that it is almost impossible to know the proper interpretation, now that the knowledge of such circumstances and
" particular stories is irrecoverably lost; since there are some mysteries, which, at the best advantage of expression, are not easy
" to be apprehended, and whose explication, by reason of our imperfections, must needs be dark, sometimes weak, sometimes
" unintelligible: and lastly, since those ordinary means of expounding scripture, as searching the originals, conference of places, parity of reason, and analogy of faith, are all dubious, uncertain, and very fallible; he that is the wisest, and by consequence the likeliest to expound truest, in all probability of reason, will be very far from confidence; because every one of these, and many more, are like so many degrees of improbability and uncertainty, all depressing our certainty of finding out truth, in such mysteries, and amidst so many difficulties. And therefore a

a celebrated churchman, and one of the highest sort; as appears by his many devotional works, which carry the rites, ceremonies, and pomp of worship, with the honor and dignity of the priestly and Episcopal order, to the highest degree. In effect, we see the Reverend Doctor's treatises standing, as it were, in the front of this order of authors, and as the foremost of those good books used by the politest and most refined devotees of either sex. They maintain the principal place in the study of almost every elegant and high divine. They stand in folios and other volumes, adorned

“ wise man that considers this, would not willingly be prescribed to
“ by others; for it is best every man should be left in that liberty
“ from which no man can justly take him, unless he could secure
“ him from error.” The reverend prelate had but a few pages before
viz. p. 427. acknowledged, indeed, “ that we had an aposto-
“ lical warrant to *contend earnestly for the faith*. But then, ” says
the good Bishop, very candidly and ingenuously, “ as these things
“ recede further from the foundation, our certainty is the less. —
“ And therefore it were very fit that our *confidence* should be ac-
“ cording to our *evidence*, and our *zeal* according to our *confidence*.”
He adds, p. 507. “ All these disputes concerning tradition, coun-
“ cils, fathers, &c. are not arguments against or besides reason,
“ but contestations and pretences of the best arguments, and the
“ most certain satisfaction of our reason. But then all these coming
“ into question, submit themselves to reason; that is, to be judged
“ by human understanding upon the best grounds and information
“ it can receive. So that scripture, tradition, councils, and fathers,
“ are the evidence in a question; but Reason is the judge: that is,
“ we being the persons that are to be persuaded, we must see that
“ we be persuaded reasonably, and it is unreasonable to assent to a
“ lesser evidence, when a greater and clearer is propounded: but of
“ that every man for himself is to take cognizance, if he be able to
“ judge: if he be not, he is not bound under the tie of necessity
“ to know any thing of it. ”

with variety of pictures, gildings, and other decorations, on the advanced shelves or glass-cupboards of the ladies closets. They are in use at all seasons, and for all places, as well for church-service as closet-preparation; and, in short, may vie with any devotional books in British Christendom. And for the life and character of the man himself, I leave it to you, Gentlemen, you, I mean, of the zealot kind, to except against it, if you think proper. It is your manner, I know, and what you never fail to have recourse to, when any authority is produced against you. Personal reflection is always seasonable, and at hand, on such an occasion. No matter what virtue, honesty, or sanctity, may lie in the character of the person cited. No matter though he be ever so much, in other respects, of your own party, and devoted to your interest. If he has indiscreetly spoken some home-truth, or discovered some secret which strikes at the temporal interests of certain spiritual societies, he is quickly doomed to calumny and defamation.

I shall try this experiment, however, once more, continued our gentleman; and, as a conclusion to this discourse, will venture to produce to you a further authority of the same kind. You shall have it before you, in the exact phrase and words of the great author, in his theological capacity; since I have now no further occasion to conceal my citations, and accommodate them to the more familiar style and language of conversation.

Our excellent archbishop¹⁵, and late father of

¹⁵ *Viz.* Archbishop Tillotson, in his *Rule of faith*, p. 677.

our church, when expressly treating that very subject of a rule in matters of belief; in opposition to M. S — and Mr R —, his Romish antagonists, shows plainly how great a shame it is for us Protestants at least, whatever the case may be with Romanists, to disallow difference of opinions, and forbid private examination, and search into matters of ancient record, and scriptural tradition; when, at the same time, we have no pretence to oral or verbal; no claim to any absolute superior judge, or decisive judgment in the case; no polity, church, or community; no particular man, or number of men, who are not, even by our own confession, plainly fallible, and subject to error and mistake.

“The Protestants,” says his Grace, speaking in the person of M. S — and the Romanists, “cannot know how many the books of scripture ought to be; and which of the many controverted ones may be securely put in that catalogue; which not. — But I shall tell him,” replies his Grace, “that we know that just so many ought to be received as uncontroverted books, concerning which it cannot be shown there was ever any controversy.” It was not incumbent perhaps on my Lord Archbishop to help Mr S — so far in his objection, as to add, that in reality the burning, suppressing, and interpolating method, so early in fashion, and so tightly practised on the epistles, comments, histories, and writings of the orthodox and heretics of old, made it impossible to say with any kind of assurance,

“ what books , copies , or transcripts those were ,
 “ concerning which there was never any contro-
 “ versy at all ” This indeed would be a point
 not so easily to be demonstrated. But his Grace
 proceeds in showing the weakness of the Romish
 pillar , tradition. “ For it must either ,” says he ,
 “ acknowledge some books to have been contro-
 “ verted , or not. If not , why doth he make a
 “ supposition of controverted books ? If oral tra-
 “ dition acknowledges some books to have been
 “ controverted , then it cannot assure us that they
 “ have not been controverted , nor consequently
 “ that they ought to be received as never having
 “ been controverted ; but only as such , concern-
 “ ing which those churches who did once raise a
 “ controversy about them , have been since satisf-
 “ fied that they are canonical ”. — Where is then
 “ the infallibility of oral tradition ? How does the
 “ living voice of the present church assure us , that
 “ what books are now received by her , were ever
 “ received by her ? And if it cannot do this , but
 “ the matter must come to be tried by the best

¹⁵ His Grace subjoins immediately : “ The traditionary church
 “ *now* receives the epistle to the *Hebreus* as canonical. I ask ,
 “ Do they receive it as ever delivered for such ? That they must ,
 “ if they receive it from oral tradition , which conveys things
 “ to them under this notion as ever delivered ; and yet St *Hierom*
 “ speaking not as a *speculator* , but a *testifier* says expressly of it ,
 “ *that the custom of the Latin church doth not receive it among the cano-*
 “ *nical scriptures.* What faith Mr S—to this ? It is clear from this
 “ testimony , that the *Roman* church in St *Hierom*’s time did not
 “ acknowledge this *epistle* for canonical ; and it is as plain , that the
 “ present *Roman* church doth receive it for canonical.”

“ records of former ages, which the Protestants
“ are willing to have the catalogue tried by; then
“ it seems the Protestants have a better way to
“ know what books are canonical, than is the in-
“ fallible way of oral tradition. And so long as it
“ is better, no matter though it be not called
“ infallible.” —

Thus the free and generous Archbishop. For, indeed, what greater generosity is there, than in owning truth frankly and openly, even where the greatest advantages may be taken by an adversary? Accordingly, our worthy Archbishop, speaking again immediately in the person of his adversary, “The Protestants,” says he “, “cannot know
“ that the very original, or a perfectly true copy
“ of these books, hath been preserved. Nor
“ is it necessary,” replies the Archbishop, “that
“ they should know either of these. It is suffi-
“ cient that they know that those copies which
“ they have are not materially corrupted. — But
“ how do the church of Rome know that they
“ have perfectly true copies of the scriptures in the
“ original languages? They do not pretend to
“ know this. The learned men of that church
“ acknowledge the various readings as well as we,
“ and do not pretend to know, otherwise than by
“ probable conjecture, as we also may do, which
“ of those readings is the true one”¹⁷. —

¹⁶ Page 678.

¹⁷ The reader perhaps may find it worth while to read after this what the Archbishop, represents p. 716. &c. of the plausible introduction of the grossest article of belief, in the times when the ha-

And thus, continued our lay-gentleman, I have finished my quotations, which I have been necessi-

bit of making creeds came in fashion. And accordingly it may be understood, of what effect the *dogmatizing* practice in divinity has ever been. "We will suppose then, that about the time when universal *ignorance*, and the genuine daughter of it, call her *Devotion* or *Superstition*, had overspread the world, and the generality of people were strongly inclined to believe *strange things*; and even the greatest contradictions were recommended to them under the notion of *Mysteries*; being told by their *priests* and *guides*, that the more contradictory any thing is to reason, the greater merit there is in believing it: I say let us suppose, that in this state of things one or more of the most eminent then in the church, either out of design, or out of superstitious ignorance and mistake of the sense of our Saviour's words used in the consecration of the sacrament, should advance this new doctrine, that the words of consecration, &c. * * * Such a doctrine as this was very likely to be advanced by the ambitious *clergy* of that time, as a probable means to draw in the people to a greater veneration of them. * * * Nor was such a doctrine less likely to take and prevail among the *people* in an age prodigiously ignorant and strongly inclined to superstition, and thereby well prepared to receive the grossest absurdities under the notion of *mysteries*. * * * Now, supposing such a doctrine as this, so fitted to the humor and temper of the age, to be once asserted, either by chance or out of design, it would take like *wild-fire*; especially if, by some one or more who bore sway in the church, it were but recommended with *convenient gravity and solemnity*. * * * And for the contradictions contained in this doctrine, it was but telling the people *then*, as they do in effect *now*, that contradictions ought to be no scruple in the way of faith; that the more impossible any thing is, it is the fitter to be believed; that it is not praiseworthy to believe plain possibilities, but this is the gallantry and heroical power of faith, this is the way to oblige God almighty for ever to us, to believe flat and downright contradictions. * * *

tated to bring in my own defence; to prove to you that I have asserted nothing on this head of religion, faith, or the sacred mysteries, which has not been justified and confirmed by the most celebrated churchmen and respected divines. You may now proceed in your invectives; bestowing as free language of that kind, as your charity and breeding will permit. And you, Reverend Sirs! who have assumed a character which sets you above that of the mere gentleman, and releases you from those decorums, and constraining measures of behaviour, to which we of an inferior sort are bound; you may liberally deal your religious compliments and salutations in what dialect you think fit; since, for my own part, neither the names of heterodox, schismatic, heretic, sceptic, nor even infidel, or atheist itself, will in the least scandalise me, whilst the sentence comes only from your mouths. On the contrary, I rather strive with myself to suppress whatever vanity might naturally arise in me from such favor bestowed. For whatever may, in the bottom, be intended me by such a treatment, it is impossible for me to term it other than favor; since there are certain enmities which it will be ever esteemed a real honor to have merited.

“ The more absurd and unreasonable any thing is, it is for that
“ very reason the more proper matter for an article of faith.
“ And if any of these innovations be objected against, as contrary
“ to former belief and practice, it is but putting forth a lusty
“ act of faith, and believing another contradiction, that though
“ they be contrary, yet they are the same.” Above, p. 68. &c.

If, contrary to the rule and measure of conversation, I have drawn the company's attention towards me thus long, without affording them an intermission, during my recital; they will, I hope, excuse me, the rather, because they heard the other recitals, and were witnesses to the heavy charge and personal reflection, which, without any real provocation, was made upon me in public by these zealot-gentlemen to whom I have thus replied. And notwithstanding they may, after such breaches of charity as are usual with them, presume me equally out of charity, on my own side; I will take upon me, however, to give them this good advice at parting, "That since they have of late been
" so elated by some seeming advantages, and a
" prosperity, which they are ill fitted to bear;
" they would at least beware of accumulating too
" hastily those high characters, appellations, titles,
" and ensigns of power, which may be tokens,
" perhaps, of what they expect hereafter, but
" which, as yet, do not answer the real power
" and authority bestowed on them." The garb and countenance will be more graceful, when the thing itself is secured to them, and in their actual possession. Mean while, the anticipation of high titles, honors, and nominal dignities, beyond the common style and ancient usage; though it may be highly fashionable at present, may not prove beneficial or advantageous in the end.

I would, in particular, advise my elegant antagonists of this zealot kind, that among the many titles they assume to themselves, they would be

rather more sparing in that high one of Ambassador, till such time as they have just means and foundation to join that of Plenipotentiary together with it. For, as matters stand hitherto in our British world, neither their commission from the sovereign, nor that which they pretend from heaven, amounts to any absolute or determining power.

The first holy messengers, for that I take to be the highest apostolic name, brought with them their proper testimonials in their lives, their manners, and behaviour; as well as in powerful works, miracles, and signs from heaven. And though indeed it might well be esteemed a miracle in the kind, should our present Messengers go about to represent their predecessors in any part of their demeanor or conversation; yet there are further miracles remaining for them to perform, ere they can in modesty plead the apostolic or messenger authority. For though, in the torrent of a sublime and figurative style, a holy apostle may have made use, perhaps, of such a phrase as that of embassy or Ambassador, to express the dignity of his errand; it were to be wished, that some who were never sent of any errand or message at all from God himself, would use a modester title to express their voluntary negotiation between us and heaven.

I must confess for my own part, that I think the notion of an embassy from thence to be at best somewhat high strained, in the metaphorical way of speech. But certain I am, that if there be

any such residency or agency now established, it is not immediately from God himself, but through the magistrate, and by the prince or sovereign power here on earth, that these gentlemen - agents are appointed, distinguished, and set over us. They have undoubtedly a legal charter¹⁸ and character, legal titles and precedencies, legal habits, coats of arms, colors, badges. But they may do well to consider, that a thousand badges or liveries bestowed by men merely, can never be sufficient to entitle them to the same authority as theirs who bore the immediate testimony and miraculous signs of power, from above. For in this case there was need only of eyes, and ordinary senses, to distinguish the commission, and acknowledge the embassy or message as divine.

But allowing it ever so certain a truth, "That there has been a thousand, or near two thousand years succession in this commission of embassy;" where shall we find this commission to have lain? — How has it been supplied still, or renewed? — how often dormant? — how often divided, even in one and the same species of claimants? — What party are they, among moderns, who, by virtue of any immediate testimonial from heaven, are thus entitled? — Where are the letters-patent? the credentials? For these should in the nature of the thing be open, visible, and apparent.

A certain Indian of the train of the ambassa-

¹⁸ Vol. I. p. 308, 309, 310.

dor-princes sent to us lately from some of those Pagan nations, being engaged, one Sunday, in visiting our churches, and happening to ask his interpreter, "Who the eminent persons were whom he observed haranguing so long with such authority from a high place?" was answered, "They were ambassadors from the Almighty, or, according to the Indian language, from the Sun." Whether the Indian took this seriously or in raillery, did not appear. But having afterwards called in, as he went along, at the chapels of some of his brother ambassadors, of the Romish religion, and at some other Christian dissenting congregations, where matters, as he perceived, were transacted with greater privacy, and inferior state; he asked, "Whether these also were ambassadors from the same place?" He was answered, "That they had indeed been heretofore of the embassy, and had possession of the same chief places he had seen: but they were now succeeded there by others. If those, therefore," replied the Indian, "were ambassadors from the Sun; these, I take for granted, are from the Moon."

Supposing, indeed, one had been no Pagan, but a good Christian; conversant in the original holy scriptures, but unacquainted with the rites, titles, habits, and ceremonials, of which there is no mention in those writings; might one not have inquired with humble submission into this affair? Might one not have softly, and at a distance, applied for information concerning this high em-

bassy ; and addressing perhaps to some inferior officer or liveryman of the train , asked modestly ,
“ How and whence they came ? whose equipage
“ they appeared in ? at whose charges they were
“ entertained ? and by whose suffrage or com-
“ mand appointed and authorized ? ——— Is it
“ true, pray, Sirs ! that their excellencies of the
“ present establishment are the sole-commissioned ?
“ or are there as many real commissioners as
“ there are pretenders ? If so , there can be no
“ great danger for us whichever way we apply
“ ourselves. We have ample choice , and may
“ adhere to which commission we like best. If
“ there be only one single true one , we have
“ then , it seems , good reason to look about us ,
“ search narrowly into the affair , be scrupulous in
“ our choice , and , as the current physic-bills ad-
“ monish us , beware of counterfeits ; since there
“ are so many of these abroad , with earthly powers ,
“ and temporal commissions , to back their spiritual
“ pretences. ”

It is to be feared , in good earnest , that the discernment of this kind will prove pretty difficult ; especially amidst this universal contention , embroil , and fury of religious challengers , these high defiance of contrary believers , this zealous opposition of commission to commission ; and this din of hell , anathemas , and damnations , raised every where by one religious party against another.

So far are the pretendedly commissioned parties from producing their commission openly , or proving it from the original record , or court-rolls of

heaven, that they deny us inspection into these very records they plead', and refuse to submit their title to human judgment or examination.

A poet of our nation insinuates indeed in their behalf, that they are fair enough in this respect. For when the murmuring people, speaking by their chosen orator, or spokesman, to the priest, says to them,

*With ease you take what we provide with care,
And we who your Legation must maintain,
Find all your tribe in the commission are,
And none but Heaven could send so large a train;*

the apologist afterwards excusing this boldness of the people, and soothing the incensed priests with fairer words, says to them, on a foot of moderation, which he presumes to be their character,

*You with such temper their intemperance bear,
To show your solid science does rely
So on itself, as you no trial fear:
For arts are weak that are of sceptics shy*¹⁹

The poet, it seems, never dreamed of a time when the very countenance of moderation should be out of fashion with the gentlemen of this order, and the word itself exploded as unworthy of their profession. And, indeed, so far are they at present from bearing with any sceptic, or inquirer, ever

¹⁹ *Gondibert*, book. 2. canto 1.

so modest or discreet, that to hear an argument on a contrary side to theirs, or read whatever may be writ in answer to their particular assertions, is made the highest crime. Whilst they have among themselves such differences, and sharp debates, about their heavenly commission, and are even in one and the same community or establishment, divided into different sects and headships; they will allow no particular survey or inspection into the foundations of their controverted title. They would have us inferior passive mortals, amazed as we are, and beholding with astonishment from afar these tremendous subjects of dispute, wait blindfold the event and final decision of the controversy. Nor is it enough that we are merely passive. It is required of us, that, in the midst of this irreconcilable debate concerning heavenly authorities and powers, we should be as confident of the veracity of some one, as of the imposture and cheat of all the other pretenders; and that believing firmly there is still a real commission at the bottom, we should endure the misery of these conflicts, and engage on one side or the other, as we happen to have our birth or education; till by fire and sword, execution, massacre, and a kind of depopulation of this earth, it be determined at last amongst us²⁰, “which
“ is the true commission, exclusive of all others,
“ and superior to the rest.”

Here our secular Gentleman, who in the latter end of his discourse had already made several

²⁰ Supra, p. 75.

motions and gestures which betokened a retreat, made his final bow in form, and quitted the place and company for that time; till, as he told his auditors, he had another opportunity, and fresh leisure to hear, in his turn, whatever his antagonists might anew object to him, in a manner more favorable and moderate; or, if they so approved, in the same temper, and with the same zeal, as they had done before.

T R E A T I S E VII.

V I Z.

A N O T I O N

O F T H E

HISTORICAL DRAUGHT

O R

T A B L A T U R E

O F T H E

J U D G M E N T

O F

H E R C U L E S,

According to *Prodicus*, lib. 2. *Xen. de Mem. Soc.*

Potiores

Herculis ærumnas credat, sævosque labores,

Et Venere, et cænis, et pluma Sardanapali.

Juv. sat. 10.

TABLE
 OF THE
 HISTORICAL DRAUGHT
 OR
 TABLET
 OF THE
 JUDGMENT
 OF
 HERCULES

According to Tradition, by A. K. M. de M. de M. de M.

Paris
 At the Press of the National Assembly, in the Year 1793.
 No. 10.

THE
J U D G M E N T
O F
H E R C U L E S.

I N T R O D U C T I O N.

BEFORE we enter on the examination of our historical sketch, it may be proper to remark, that by the word tablature, for which we have yet no name in English, besides the general one of picture, we denote, according to the original word Tabula, a work not only distinct from a mere portraiture, but from all those wilder sorts of painting which are in a manner absolute and independent; such as the paintings in fresco upon the walls, the cielings, the stair-cases, the cupolas, and other remarkable places either of churches or palaces.

Accordingly we are to understand, that it is not merely the shape or dimension of a cloth, or board, which denominates the piece or tablature; since a work of this kind may be composed of any

colored substance, as it may of any form; whether square, oval, or round. But it is then that in painting we give to any particular work the name of tablature, when the work is in reality
“ A single piece, comprehended in one view,
“ and formed according to one single intelligence,
“ meaning, or design; which constitutes a real
“ Whole, by a mutual and necessary relation of
“ its parts, the same as of the members in a natural body.” So that one may say of a picture composed of any number of figures differently ranged, and without any regard to this correspondency or union described, that it is no more a real piece or tablature than a picture would be a man's picture, or proper portraiture, which represented on the same cloth, in different places, the legs, arms, nose, and eyes of such a person, without adjusting them according to the true proportion, air, and character which belonged to him.

This regulation has place even in the inferior degrees of painting; since the mere flower-painter is, we see, obliged to study the form of festoons, and to make use of a peculiar order or architecture of vases, jars, canisters, pedestals, and other inventions, which serve as machines, to frame a certain proportionate assemblage, or united mass, according to the rules of perspective; and with regard as well to the different shapes and sizes of his several flowers, as to the harmony of colors resulting from the whole; this being the only

thing capable of rendering his work worthy the name of a composition or real piece.

So much the more, therefore, is this regulation applicable to history-painting, where not only men, but manners, and human passions, are represented. Here the unity of design must with more particular exactness be preserved, according to the just rules of poetic art; that in the representation of any event, or remarkable fact, the probability, or seeming truth, which is the real truth of art, may with the highest advantage be supported and advanced; as we shall better understand in the argument which follows on the historical tablature of the judgment of Hercules; who being young, and retired to a solitary place, in order to deliberate on the choice he was to make of the different ways of life, was accosted, as our historian relates, by the two goddesses, Virtue and Pleasure. It is on the issue of the controversy between these two that the character of Hercules depends. So that we may naturally give to this piece and history, as well the title of the Education, as the choice or judgment of Hercules.

C H A P. I.

Of the general constitution or ordinance of the tablature.

THIS fable or history may be variously represented, according to the order of time:

Either in the instant when the two goddesses, Virtue and Pleasure, accost Hercules;

Or when they are entered on their dispute;

Or when their dispute is already far advanced, and Virtue seems to gain her cause.

According to the first notion, Hercules must of necessity seem surpris'd on the first appearance of such miraculous forms. He admires, he contemplates; but is not yet engaged or interested. According to the second notion, he is interested, divided, and in doubt. According to the third, he is wrought, agitated and torn by contrary passions. It is the last effort of the vicious one, striving for possession over him. He agonizes, and with all his strength of reason endeavours to over-come himself:

Et premitur ratione animus, vincique laborat,

Of these different periods of time the latter has been chosen; as being the only one of the three which can well serve to express the grand event, or consequent resolution of Hercules, and the choice he actually made of a life full of toil and

hardship, under the conduct of Virtue, for the deliverance of mankind from tyranny and oppression. And it is to such a piece, or tablature, as represents this issue of the balance, in our pondering hero, that we may justly give the title of the decision or judgment of Hercules.

The same history may be represented yet according to a fourth date or period; as at the time when Hercules is entirely won by Virtue. But then the signs of this resolute determination reigning absolutely in the attitude and air of our young hero, there would be no room left to represent his agony, or inward conflict; which indeed makes the principal action here; as it would do in a poem, were this subject to be treated by a good poet. Nor would there be any more room left in this case, either for the persuasive rhetoric of Virtue, who must have already ended her discourse, or for the insinuating address of Pleasure, who having lost her cause, must necessarily appear displeased, or out of humor: a circumstance which would no way suit her character.

In the original story or fable of this adventure of our young Hercules, it is particularly noted, that Pleasure, advancing hastily before Virtue, began her plea, and was heard with prevention, as being first in turn. And as this fable is wholly philosophical and moral, this circumstance in particular is to be considered as essential.

In this third period therefore of our history, dividing it, as we have done, into four successive dates or points of time, Hercules being auditor,

and attentive, speaks not. Pleasure has spoken. Virtue is still speaking. She is about the middle, or towards the end of her discourse; in the place where, according to just rhetoric, the highest tone of voice and strongest action are employed.

It is evident, that every master in painting, when he has made choice of the determinate date or point of time according to which he would represent his history, is afterwards debarred the taking advantage from any other action than what is immediately present, and belonging to that single instant he describes. For if he passes the present only for a moment, he may as well pass it for many years. And by this reckoning he may with as good right repeat the same figure several times over, and in one and the same picture represent Hercules in his cradle, struggling with the serpents; and the same Hercules of full age, fighting with the Hydra, with Anteus, and with Cerberus: which would prove a mere confused heap, or knot of pieces, and not a single entire piece, or tablatore, of the historical kind.

It may, however, be allowable, on some occasions, to make use of certain enigmatical or emblematical devices, to represent a future time; as when Hercules, yet a mere boy, is seen holding a small club, or wearing the skin of a young lion. For so we often find him in the best antiques. And though history had never related of Hercules, that being yet very young, he killed a lion with his own hand; this representation of him would nevertheless be entirely conformable

to poetic truth; which not only admits, but necessarily presupposes prophecy or prognostication, with regard to the actions and lives of heroes and great men. Besides that, as to our subject, in particular, the natural genius of Hercules, even in his tenderest youth, might alone answer for his handling such arms as these, and bearing, as it were in play, these early tokens of the future hero.

To preserve therefore a just conformity with historical truth, and with the unity of time and action, there remains no other way by which we can possibly give a hint of any thing future, or call to mind any thing past, than by setting in view such passages or events as have actually subsisted, or according to nature might well subsist, or happen together in one and the same instant. And this is what we may properly call the rule of consistency.

How is it therefore possible, says one, to express a change of passion in any subject, since this change is made by succession; and that in this case the passion which is understood as present, will require a disposition of body and features wholly different from the passion which is over, and past? To this we answer, That notwithstanding the ascendancy or reign of the principal and immediate passion, the artist has power to leave still in his subject the tracks or footsteps of his predecessor; so as to let us behold not only a rising passion together with a declining one, but, what is more, a strong and determinate passion,

with its contrary already discharged and banished. As for instance, when the plain tracts of tears new fallen, with other fresh tokens of mourning and dejection, remain still in a person newly transported with joy at the sight of a relation or friend, who the moment before had been lamented as one deceased or lost.

Again, by the same means which are employed to call to mind the past, we may anticipate the future; as would be seen in the case of an able painter, who should undertake to paint this history of Hercules according to the third date or period of time proposed for our historical tablature. For in this momentary turn of action, Hercules remaining still in a situation expressive of suspense and doubt, would discover nevertheless, that the strength of this inward conflict was over, and that victory began now to declare herself in favor of Virtue. This transition, which seems at first so mysterious a performance, will be easily comprehended, if one considers, that the body, which moves much slower than the mind, is easily outstripped by this latter; and that the mind on a sudden turning itself some new way, the nearer situated and more sprightly parts of the body, such as the eyes, and muscles about the mouth and forehead, taking the alarm, and moving in an instant, may leave the heavier and more distant parts to adjust themselves, and change their attitude some moments after.

This different operation may be distinguished by the names of anticipation and repeal.

If by any other method an artist should pretend to introduce into this piece any portion of time, future or past, he must either sin directly against the law of truth and credibility, in representing things contrary and incompatible; or against that law of unity and simplicity of design which constitutes the very being of his work. This particularly shows itself in a picture, when one is necessarily left in doubt, and unable to determine readily, which of the distinct successive parts of the history or action is that very one represented in the design. For even here the case is the same as in the other circumstances of poetry and painting, "That what is principal or chief should immediately show itself, without leaving the mind in any uncertainty."

According to this rule of the unity of time, if one should ask an artist, who had painted this history of the judgment of Hercules, "Which of these four periods or dates of time above proposed he intended in his picture to represent?"

* If the same question concerning the *instantaneous* action, or present moment of time, were applied to many famous historical paintings much admired in the world, they would be found very defective; as we may learn by the instance of that single subject of Acteon, one of the commonest in painting. Hardly is there any where seen a design of this poetical history, without a ridiculous anticipation of the *metamorphosis*. The horns of Acteon which are the effect of a charm, should naturally wait the execution of that act in which the charm consists. Till the goddess therefore has thrown her cast, the hero's person suffers not any change. Even while the water flies, his forehead is still found. But in the usual design we see it otherwise. The horns are already *sprouted*, if not full grown; and the goddess is seen watering the *sprouts*.

and it should happen that he could not readily answer, It was this, or that: it would appear plainly he had never formed a real notion of his workmanship, or of the history he intended to represent. So that when he had executed, even to a miracle, all those other beauties requisite in a piece, and had failed in this single one, he would from hence alone be proved to be in truth no history-painter, or artist in the kind, who understood not so much as how to form the real design of a historical piece.

C H A P. II.

Of the first or principal figure.

TO apply therefore what has been said above to our immediate design or tablature in hand; we may observe, in the first place, with regard to Hercules, the first or principal figure of our piece, that being placed in the middle between the two goddesses, he should by a skilful master be so drawn, as, even setting aside the air and features of the face, it should appear by the very turn or position of the body alone, that this young hero had not wholly quitted the balancing or pondering part. For in the manner of his turn towards the worthier of these goddesses, he should

by no means appear so averse or separate from the other, as not to suffer it to be conceived of him, that he had ever any inclination for her, or had ever hearkened to her voice. On the contrary, there ought to be some hopes yet remaining for this latter goddess's Pleasure, and some regret apparent in Hercules; otherwise we should pass immediately from the third to the fourth period, or at least confound one with the other.

Hercules, in his agony described, may appear either sitting or standing; though it be more according to probability for him to appear standing, in regard to the presence of the two goddesses, and by reason the case is far from being the same here, as in the judgment of Paris, where the interested goddesses plead their cause before their judge. Here the interest of Hercules himself is at stake. It is his own cause which is trying. He is in this respect not so much the judge, as he is in reality the party judged.

The superior and commanding passion of Hercules may be expressed either by a strong admiration, or by an admiration which holds chiefly of love.

— — — *Ingenti percussus amore.*

If the latter be used, then the reluctant passion, which is not yet wholly overcome, may show itself in pity and tenderness, moved in our hero by the thought of those pleasures and companions of his youth which he is going

for ever to abandon. And in this sense Hercules may look either on the one or the other of the goddesses ; with this difference , that if he looks on Pleasure , it should be faintly , and as turning his eyes back with pity ; having still his action and gesture turned the other way towards Virtue. If , on the contrary , he looks on Virtue , it ought to be earnestly , and with extreme attention , having some part of the action of his body inclining still towards Pleasure , and discovering , by certain features of concern and pity , intermixed with the commanding or conquering passion , that the decision he is about to make in favor of Virtue cost him not a little.

If it be thought fit rather to make use of admiration , merely to express the commanding passion of Hercules ; then the reluctant one may discover itself in a kind of horror , at the thought of the toil and labor to be sustained in the rough rocky way apparent on the side of Virtue.

Again , Hercules may be represented as looking neither towards Virtue nor Pleasure , but as turning his eyes either towards the mountainous rocky way pointed out to him by Virtue , or towards the flowery way of the vale and meadows , recommended to him by Pleasure. And to these different attitudes may be applied the same rules for the expression of the turn or balance of judgment in our pensive hero.

Whatever may be the manner chosen for the designing of this figure of Hercules , according to that part of the history in which we have taken

him; it is certain he should be so drawn, as neither by the opening of his mouth, or by any other sign, to leave it in the least dubious whether he is speaking or silent. For it is absolutely requisite that silence should be distinctly characterized in Hercules, not only as the natural effect of his strict attention, and the little leisure he has from what passes at this time within his breast; but in order withal to give that appearance of majesty and superiority becoming the person and character of pleading Virtue; who, by her eloquence and other charms, has ere this made herself mistress of the heart of our enamoured hero:

—— *Pendetque iterum narrantis ab ore*¹.

This image of the sublime, in the discourse and manner of Virtue, would be utterly lost, if, in the instant that she employed the greatest force of action, she should appear to be interrupted by the ill-timed speech, reply, or utterance of her auditor. Such a design of representation as this would prove contrary to order, contrary to the history, and to the decorum or decency of manners. Nor can one well avoid taking notice here of that general absurdity committed by many of the esteemed great masters in painting; who, in one and the same company or assembly of persons jointly employed and united, according to the history, in one single or common action, represent

¹ Virg. *Æn.* lib. 4. ver. 79.

to us not only two or three, but several, and sometimes all, speaking at once: which must naturally have the same effect on the eye, as such a conversation would have upon the ear, were we in reality to hear it.

C H A P. III.

Of the second figure.

AFTER what has been said on the subject of Hercules, it appears plainly what the attitude must be of our second figure, Virtue; who, as we have taken her in this particular period of our history, must of necessity be speaking with all the force of action, such as would appear in an excellent orator, when at the height, and in the most affecting part of his discourse.

She ought therefore to be drawn standing; since it is contrary to all probable appearance, and even to nature itself, that, in the very heat and highest transport of speech, the speaker should be seen sitting, or in any posture which might express repose.

She may be habited either as an Amazon, with the helmet, lance, and in the robe or vest of Pallas; or as any other of the virtues, goddesses, or heroines, with the plain original crown, without rays, according to genuine antiquity. Our history makes no mention of a helmet, or any other armour of Virtue. It gives us only to un-

derstand, that she was dressed neither negligently, nor with much study or ornament. If we follow this latter method, we need give her only in her hand the imperial and magisterial sword¹; which is her true characteristic mark, and would sufficiently distinguish her, without the helmet, lance, or other military habit. And in this manner the opposition between herself and her rival would be still more beautiful and regular. — “But this beauty,” says one, “would be discoverable only by the learned.” — Perhaps so. But then again there would be no loss for others; since no one would find this piece the less intelligible on the account of this regulation. On the contrary, one who chances to know little of antiquity in general, or of this history in particular, would be still further to seek, if, upon seeing an armed woman in the piece, he should represent to himself either a Pallas, a Bellona, or any other warlike form or deity of the female kind.

As for the shape, countenance, or person of Virtue; that which is usually given to Pallas may fitly serve as a model for this dame; as, on the other side, that which is given to Venus may serve in the same manner for her rival. The historian whom we follow represents Virtue to us as a lady of a goodly form, tall and majestic. And, by what he relates of her, he gives us sufficiently to understand, that though she was neither lean, nor of a tanned complexion, she must have discovered

¹ Panazonium.

however, by the substance and color of her flesh, that she was sufficiently accustomed to exercise. Pleasure, on the other hand, by an exact opposition, is represented in better case, and of a softness of complexion, which speaks her manners, and gives her a middle character between the person of a Venus, and that of a Bacchanal nymph.

As for the position or attitude of Virtue; though in a historical piece, such as ours is designed, it would on no account be proper to have immediate recourse to the way of emblem; one might, on this occasion, endeavour nevertheless, by some artifice, to give our figure, as much as possible, the resemblance of the same goddess, as she is seen on medals, and other ancient emblematic pieces of like nature. In this view, she should be so designed, as to stand firm with her full poise upon one foot, having the other a little advanced, and raised on a broken piece of ground or rock, instead of the helmet or little globe on which we see her usually setting her foot, as triumphant, in those pieces of the emblematic kind. A particular advantage of this attitude, so judiciously assigned to Virtue by ancient masters, is, that it expresses as well her aspiring effort, or ascent towards the stars and heaven, as her victory and superiority over fortune and the world. For so the poets have, of old, described her.

——— *Negata tentat iter via*².

*Virtutisque viam deserit ardua*³.

² Horat. lib. 3. od. 2.

³ Idem, ibid. od. 24.

And

And in our piece particularly, where the arduous and rocky way of Virtue requires to be emphatically represented, the ascending posture of this figure, with one foot advanced, in a sort of climbing action, over the rough and thorny ground, must of necessity, if well executed, create a due effect, and add to the sublime of this ancient poetic work[†].

As for the hands or arms, which in real oratory, and during the strength of elocution, must of necessity be active; it is plain, in respect of our goddess, that the arm in particular which she has free to herself, and is neither incumbered with lance or sword, should be employed another way, and come in, to second the discourse, and accompany it, with a just emphasis and action. Accordingly, Virtue would then be seen with this hand turned either upwards to the rocky way marked out by her with approbation; or to the sky, or stars, in the same sublime sense; or downwards to the flowery way and vale, as in a detesting manner, and with abhorrence of what passes there; or last of all, in a disdainful sense, and with the same appearance of detestation, against Pleasure

[†] As ancient as the poet *Hesiod*: which appears by the following verses, cited by our historian as the foundation or first draught of this *Herculean* tablature.

Τὴν μὲν γὰρ κακότητα καὶ ἱλαδὸν ἔστιν ἐλέσθαι
 Ρηϊδίως· λείη μὲν ὁδὸς, μάλα δ' ἐγγύθι ναίει.
 Τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἰδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάρουθεν ἔθνη καὶ
 Ἀθάνατοι, μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρεθιος ὁμιος ἐπ' αὐτήν,
 Καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον· ἐπὴν δ' εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηται,
 Ρηϊδίη δ' ἥπειλα πέλει, χαλεπή περ ἔσται.

herself. Each manner would have its peculiar advantage. And the best profit should be made of this arm and hand at liberty, to express either the disapprobation or the applause proposed. It might prove, however, a considerable advantage to our figure of Virtue, if holding the lance, or imperial sword, slightly, with one of her hands stretched downwards, she could, by that very hand and action, be made to express the latter meaning; opening for that purpose some of the lower fingers of this hand, in a refusing or repelling manner; whilst, with the other arm and hand at liberty, she should express as well the former meaning, and point out to Hercules the way which leads to honor, and the just glory of heroic actions.

From all these circumstances of history, and action, accompanying this important figure, the difficulty of the design will sufficiently appear to those who carry their judgment beyond the mere form, and are able to consider the character of the passion to which it is subjected. For where a real character is marked, and the inward form peculiarly described, it is necessary the outward should give place. Whoever should expect to see our figure of Virtue, in the exact mien of a fine talker, curious in her choice of action, and forming it according to the usual decorum and regular movement of one of the fair ladies of our age, would certainly be far wide of the thought and genius of this piece. Such studied action and artificial gesture may be allowed to the actors and actresses of

the stage. But the good painter must come a little nearer to truth, and take care that his action be not theatrical, or at second hand; but original, and drawn from Nature herself. Now, although, in the ordinary tenor of discourse, the action of the party might be allowed to appear so far governed and composed by art, as to retain that regular contrast and nice balance of movement which painters are apt to admire as the chief grace of figures; yet in this particular case, where the natural eagerness of debate, supported by a thorough antipathy and animosity, is joined to a sort of enthusiastic agitation incident to our prophetic dame, there can be little of that fashionable mien, or genteel air, admitted. The painter who, in such a piece as we describe, is bound to preserve the heroic style, will doubtless beware of representing his heroine as a mere scold. Yet this is certain, that it were better for him to expose himself to the meanness of such a fancy, and paint his lady in a high rant, according to the common weakness of the sex, than to engage in the embellishment of the mere form; and forgetting the character of severity and reprimand belonging to the illustrious rival, present her to us a fair specious personage, free of emotion, and without the least bent or movement which should express the real pathetic of the kind.

C H A P. IV.

Of the third figure.

CONCERNING Pleasure, there needs little to be said, after what has been already remarked in relation to the two preceding figures. The truth of appearance, that of history, and even the decorum itself, according to what has been explained above, require evidently, that, in this period or instant described, Pleasure should be found silent. She can have no other language allowed her than that merely of the eyes. And it would be a happy management for her in the design, if, in turning her eyes to meet those of Hercules, she should find his head and face already turned so much on the contrary side, as to show it impossible for her as yet to discover the growing passion of this hero in favor of her rival. By this means she might still with good right retain her fond airs of dalliance and courtship; as having yet discovered no reason she has to be dissatisfied.

She may be drawn either standing, leaning, sitting, or lying; without a crown, or crowned either with roses, or with myrtle, according to the painter's fancy. And since in this third figure the painter has so great a liberty left him, he may make good advantage of it for the other two, to which this latter may be subjected, as the last in order, and of least consequence.

That which makes the greatest difficulty in the disposition or ordinance of this figure Pleasure, is, that, notwithstanding the supine air and character of ease and indolence which should be given her, she must retain still so much life and action as is sufficient to express her persuasive effort, and manner of indication towards her proper paths; those of the flowery kind, and vale below, whither she would willingly guide our hero's steps. Now, should this effort be over-strongly expressed, not only the supine character and air of indolence would be lost in this figure of Pleasure; but, what is worse, the figure would seem to speak, or at least appear so, as to create a double meaning, or equivocal sense in painting; which would destroy what we have established as fundamental, concerning the absolute reign of silence throughout the rest of the piece, in favor of Virtue, the sole speaking party at this instant, or third period of our history.

According to a computation, which in this way of reasoning might be made, of the whole motion or action to be given to our figure of Pleasure; she should scarce have one fifth reserved for that which we may properly call active in her, and have already termed her persuasive or indicative effort. All besides should be employed to express, if one may say so, her inaction, her supineness, effeminacy, and indulgent ease. The head and body might entirely favor this latter passion. One hand might be absolutely resigned to it; serving only to support, with much ado, the lolling lazy

body. And if the other hand be required to express some kind of gesture or action toward the road of pleasures recommended by this dame; the gesture ought however to be slight and negligent, in the manner of one who has given over speaking, and appears weary and spent.

For the shape, the person, the complexion, and what else may be further remarked as to the air and manner of Pleasure; all this is naturally comprehended in the opposition, as above stated, between herself and Virtue.

C H A P. V.

Of the ornaments of the piece; and chiefly of the drapery, and perspective.

IT is sufficiently known, how great a liberty painters are used to take in the coloring of their habits, and of other draperies belonging to their historical pieces. If they are to paint a Roman people, they represent them in different dresses; though it be certain the common people among them were habited very near alike, and much after the same color. In like manner, the Egyptians, Jews, and other ancient nations, as we may well suppose, bore in this particular their respective likeness or resemblance one to another, as at present the Spaniards, Italians, and several other

people of Europe. But such a resemblance as this would, in the way of painting, produce a very untoward effect; as may easily be conceived. For this reason the painter makes no scruple to introduce philosophers, and even apostles, in various colors, after a very extraordinary manner. It is here that the historical truth must of necessity indeed give way to that which we call poetical, as being governed not so much by reality, as by probability, or plausible appearance. So that a painter who uses his privilege or prerogative in this respect, ought, however, to do it cautiously, and with discretion. And when occasion requires that he should present us his philosophers or apostles thus variously colored, he must take care at least so to mortify his colors, that these plain poor men may not appear in his piece adorned like so many lords or princes of the modern garb.

If, on the other hand, the painter should happen to take for his subject some solemn entry or triumph, where, according to the truth of fact, all manner of magnificence had without doubt been actually displayed, and all sorts of bright and dazzling colors heaped together and advanced, in emulation, one against another; he ought on this occasion, in breach of the historical truth, or truth of fact, to do his utmost to diminish and reduce the excessive gaiety and splendor of those objects, which would otherwise raise such a confusion, oppugnancy, and riot of

colors, as would to any judicious eye appear absolutely intolerable.

It becomes therefore an able painter in this, as well as in the other parts of his workmanship, to have regard principally, and above all, to the agreement or correspondency of things. And to that end it is necessary he should form in his mind a certain note or character of unity; which being happily taken, would, out of the many colors of his piece, produce, if one may say so, a particular distinct species of an original kind; like those compositions in music, where, among the different airs, such as sonatas, entries, or sarabands, there are different and distinct species; of which we may say in particular, as to each, "That it has its own proper character or genius, peculiar to itself."

Thus the harmony of painting requires, "that in whatever key the painter begins his piece, he should be sure to finish it in the same."

This regulation turns on the principal figure, or on the two or three which are eminent, in a tablature composed of many. For if the painter happens to give a certain height or richness of coloring to his principal figure, the rest must in proportion necessarily partake this genius. But if, on the contrary, the painter should have chanced to give a softer air, with more gentleness and simplicity of coloring, to his principal figure; the rest must bear a character proportionable, and appear in an extraordinary simplicity; that one and the same spirit may, without contest, reign through the whole of his design.

Our historical draught of Hercules will afford us a very clear example in the case. For considering that the hero is to appear on this occasion retired and gloomy, being withal in a manner naked, and without any other covering than a lion's skin, which is itself of a yellow and dusky color; it would be really impracticable for a painter to represent this principal figure in any extraordinary brightness or lustre. From whence it follows, that, in the other inferior figures or subordinate parts of the work, the painter must necessarily make use of such still quiet colors, as may give to the whole piece a character of solemnity and simplicity, agreeable with itself. Now, should our painter honestly go about to follow his historian, according to the literal sense of the history, which represents Virtue to us in a resplendent robe of the purest and most glossy white, it is evident he must, after this manner, destroy his piece. The good painter in this, as in all other occasions of like nature, must do as the good poet; who undertaking to treat some common and known subject, refuses, however, to follow strictly, like a mere copyist or translator, any preceding poet or historian; but so orders it, that his work in itself becomes really new and original.

*Publica materies privati juris erit; si
Nec circa vilem patulumque moraberis orbem;
Nec verbum verbo curabis reddere fidus
Interpres*¹.

¹ Hor. de arte poet. ver. 131.

As for what relates to the perspective or scene of our historical piece, it ought so to present itself, as to make us instantly conceive that it is in the country, and in a place of retirement, near some wood or forest, that this whole action passes. For it would be impertinent to bring architecture, or buildings of whatever kind, in view, as tokens of company, diversion, or affairs, in a place purposely chosen to denote solitude, thoughtfulness, and premeditated retreat. Besides that, according to the poets, our guides and masters in this art, neither the goddesses, nor other divine forms of whatever kind, cared ever to present themselves to human sight, elsewhere than in these deep recesses. And it is worth observing here, how particularly our philosophical historian affects to speak, by way of prevention, of the solitary place where Hercules was retired, and of his thoughtfulness preceding this apparition: which from these circumstances may be construed henceforward as a mere dream; but as such, a truly rational and divine one.

As to the fortrefs, temple, or palace of Virtue, situated on a mountain, after the emblematical way, as we see represented in some pieces formed upon this subject; there is nothing of this kind expressed by our historian. And should this, or any thing of a like nature, present itself in our design, it would fill the mind with foreign fancies, and mysterious views, no way agreeable to the taste and genius of this piece. Nor is there any thing, at the same time, on Pleasure's side,

to answer, by way of opposition, to this palace of Virtue; which, if expressed, would on this account destroy the just simplicity and correspondency of our work.

Another reason against the perspective part, the architecture, or other studied ornaments of the landskip kind, in this particular piece of ours, is, that in reality there being no occasion for these appearances, they would prove a mere incumbrance to the eye, and would of necessity disturb the sight, by diverting it from that which is principal, the history and fact. Whatsoever appears in a historical design, which is not essential to the action, serves only to confound the representation, and perplex the mind: more particularly, if these episodic parts are so lively wrought, as to vie with the principal subject, and contend for precedency with the figures and human life. A just design, or tablature, should, at first view, discover, what nature it is designed to imitate; what life, whether of the higher or lower kind, it aims chiefly to represent. The piece must by no means be equivocal or dubious; but must with ease distinguish itself, either as historical and moral, or as perspective and merely natural. If it be the latter of these beauties which we desire to see delineated according to its perfection, then the former must give place. The higher life must be allayed, and in a manner discountenanced and obscured; whilst the lower displays itself, and is exhibited as principal. Even that which, according to a term of art, we commonly call still-life, and

is in reality of the last and lowest degree of painting, must have its superiority and just preference in a tablature of its own species. It is the same in animal pieces, where beasts or fowl are represented. In landskip, inanimates are principal: it is the earth, the water, the stones, and rocks, which live. All other life becomes subordinate. Humanity, sense, manners, must in this place yield, and become inferior. It would be a fault even to aim at the expression of any real beauty in this kind, or go about to animate or heighten, in any considerable degree, the accompanying figures of men, or deities which are accidentally introduced, as appendices, or ornaments, in such a piece. But if, on the contrary, the human species be that which first presents itself in a picture; if it be the intelligent life which is set to view; it is the other species, the other life, which must then surrender, and become subservient. The merely natural must pay homage to the historical or moral. Every beauty, every grace, must be sacrificed to the real Beauty of this first and highest order. For nothing can be more deformed than a confusion of many beauties: and the confusion becomes inevitable, where the subjection is not complete.

By the word Moral are understood, in this place, all sorts of judicious representations of the human passions; as we see even in battle-pieces; excepting those of distant figures, and the diminutive kind; which may rather be considered as a sort of landskip. In all other martial pieces, we

see expressed in lively action the several degrees of valor, magnanimity, cowardice, terror, anger, according to the several characters of nations, and particular men. It is here that we may see heroes and chiefs, such as the Alexanders or Constantines, appear, even in the hottest of the action, with a tranquillity and sedateness of mind peculiar to themselves: which is, indeed, in a direct and proper sense, profoundly moral.

But as the moral part is differently treated in a poem from what it is in history, or in a philosophical work; so must it, of right, in painting, be far differently treated from what it naturally is, either in the history or poem. For want of a right understanding of this maxim, it often happens, that, by endeavouring to render a piece highly moral and learned, it becomes thoroughly ridiculous and impertinent.

For the ordinary works of Sculpture, such as the low-relieves, and ornaments of columns and edifices, great allowance is made. The very rules of perspective are here wholly reversed, as necessity requires, and are accommodated to the circumstance and genius of the place or building, according to a certain œconomy or order of a particular and distinct kind; as will easily be observed by those who have thoroughly studied the Trajan and Antoninus pillars, and other relieve works of the ancients. In the same manner, as to pieces of engraved work, medals, or whatever shows itself in one substance, as brass or stone, or only by shade and light, as in ordinary drawings,

or stamps, much also is allowed, and many things admitted, of the fantastic, miraculous, or hyperbolical kind. It is here that we have free scope, withal, for whatever is learned, emblematical, or enigmatic. But for the completely imitative and illusive art of Painting, whose character it is to employ in her works the united force of different colors; and who, surpassing by so many degrees, and in so many privileges, all other human fiction, or imitative art, aspires in a directer manner towards deceit, and a command over our very sense; she must of necessity abandon whatever is over learned, humorous, or witty; to maintain herself in what is natural, credible, and winning of our assent; that she may thus acquit herself of what is her chief province, the specious appearance of the object she represents. Otherwise we shall naturally bring against her the just criticism of Horace, on the scenical representation so nearly allied to her:

Quodcunque ostendis mihi sic, incredulus odi.

We are therefore to consider this as a sure maxim or observation in painting, “That a
“ historical and moral piece must of necessity lose
“ much of its natural simplicity and grace, if
“ any thing of the emblematical or enigmatic kind
“ be visibly and directly intermixed:” As if, for instance, the circle of the zodiac², with its twelve

² This is what *Raphael* himself has done, in his famous de-

signs, were introduced. Now, this being an appearance which carries not any manner of similitude or colorable resemblance to any thing extant in real nature; it cannot possibly pretend to win the sense, or gain belief, by the help of any poetical enthusiasm, religious history, or faith. For by means of these, indeed, we are easily induced to contemplate as realities those divine personages and miraculous forms, which the leading painters, ancient and modern, have speciously designed, according to the particular doctrine or theology of their several religious and national beliefs. But for our tablature in particular, it carries nothing with it of the mere emblematical or enigmatical kind; since, for what relates to the double way of the vale and mountain, this may naturally, and with colorable appearance, be represented at the mountain's foot. But if, on the summit or highest point of it, we should place the fortress or palace of Virtue, rising above the clouds; this would immediately give the enigmatical mysterious air to our picture, and of necessity destroy its persuasive simplicity, and natural appearance.

In short, we are to carry this remembrance still along with us, "That the fewer the objects
" are, besides those which are absolutely necessary

sign of *the judgment of Paris*. But this piece having never been painted, but designed only for *Marc Antonio's* engraving, it comes not within our censure; as appears by what is said in the paragraph just preceding.

“ in a piece, the easier it is for the eye, by one
 “ simple act, and in one view, to comprehend
 “ the sum or whole.” The multiplication of
 subjects, though subaltern, renders the subordina-
 tion more difficult to execute in the ordinance or
 composition of a work. And if the subordination
 be not perfect, the order, which makes the beauty,
 remains imperfect. Now, the subordination can
 never be perfect, except “ when the ordinance is
 “ such, that the eye not only runs over with ease
 “ the several parts of the design, reducing still
 “ its view each moment on the principal subject
 “ on which all turns, but when the same eye,
 “ without the least detainment in any of the
 “ particular parts, and resting, as it were, im-
 “ moveable in the middle or centre of the tablature,
 “ may see at once, in an agreeable and perfect
 “ correspondency, all which is there exhibited to
 “ the sight’.”

C H A P. VI.

Of the casual or independent ornaments.

THERE remains for us now to consider only of
 the separate ornaments, independent both of figures

³ This is what the Grecian masters so happily expressed by the
 single word *εὐσύνοπλον*. See vol. 1. p. 123.

and

and perspective; such as the machine-work or divinities in the sky¹, the winds, Cupids, birds, animals, dogs, or other loose pieces which are introduced without any absolute necessity, and in a way of humor. But as these belong chiefly to the ordinary life, and to the comic or mixed kind; our tablature, which, on the contrary, is wholly epic, heroic, and in the tragic style, would not so easily admit of any thing in this light way.

We may besides consider, that whereas the mind is naturally led to fancy mystery in a work of such a genius or style of painting as ours, and to confound with each other the two distinct kinds of the emblematic and merely historical, or poetic; we should take care not to afford it this occasion of error and deviation, by introducing into a piece of so uniform a design, such appendices, or supplementary parts, as, under pretext of giving light to the history, or characterizing the figures, should serve only to distract or dissipate the sight, and confound the judgment of the more intelligent spectators.

“Will it then,” says one, “be possible to make
“out the story of these two dames in company
“with Hercules, without otherwise distinguishing
“them than as above described?” We answer, it is possible; and not that only, but certain and infallible, in the case of one who has the least

¹ This is understood of the *machine-work*, when it is merely ornamental, and not essential in the piece, by making part of the history, or fable itself.

genius, or has ever heard in general concerning Hercules, without so much as having ever heard this history in particular. But if, notwithstanding this, we would needs add some exterior marks, more declaratory and determinative of these two personages, Virtue and Pleasure; it may be performed, however, without any necessary recourse to what is absolutely of the emblem kind. The manner of this may be explained as follows.

The energy or natural force of Virtue, according to the moral philosophy of highest note among the ancients, was expressed in the double effect of forbearance and endurance², or what we may otherwise call restraint and support. For the former, the bit or bridle, placed somewhere on the side of Virtue, may serve as emblem sufficient; and for the second, the helmet may serve in the same manner; especially since they are each of them appurtenances essential to heroes, who, in quality of warriors, were also subduers or managers of horses³, and that at the same time these are really portable instruments, such as the martial dame, who represents Virtue, may be well supposed to have brought along with her.

On the side of Pleasure, certain vases, and other pieces of embossed plate, wrought in the figures of satyrs, fawns, and bacchanals, may serve to

² Καρτερία, ἐξουχία. They were described as sisters in the emblematic moral philosophy of the ancients. Whence that known precept, Ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ ἀπέχεσθαι, *Sustine et abstine*.

³ Castor, Pollux; all the heroes of Homer; Alexander the Great, &c.

express the debauches of the table-kind. And certain draperies thrown carelessly on the ground, and hung upon a neighbouring tree, forming a kind of bower and couch for this luxurious dame, may serve sufficiently to suggest the thought of other indulgences, and to support the image of the effeminate, indolent, and amorous passions. Besides that, for this latter kind, we may rest satisfied, it is what the painter will hardly fail of representing to the full. The fear is, lest he should overdo this part, and express the affection too much to the life. The appearance will, no doubt, be strongly wrought in all the features and proportions of this third figure; which is of a relish far more popular, and vulgarly engaging, than that other opposed to it, in our historical design.

C O N C L U S I O N.

WE may conclude this argument with a general reflection, which seems to arise naturally from what has been said on this subject in particular, "That in a real history-painter, the same knowledge, the same study, and views, are required, as in a real poet." Never can the poet, whilst he justly holds that name, become a relator, or historian at large. He is allowed only to describe a single action, not the actions of a single man, or people. The painter is a historian at the same rate, but still more narrowly confined, as in fact

appears; since it would certainly prove a more ridiculous attempt to comprehend two or three distinct actions or parts of history in one picture, than to comprehend ten times the number in one and the same poem.

It is well known, that to each species of poetry there are natural proportions and limits assigned. And it would be a gross absurdity indeed to imagine, that in a poem there was nothing which we could call measure or number, except merely in the verse. An elegy, and an epigram, have each of them their measure and proportion, as well as a tragedy, or epic poem. In the same manner, as to painting, sculpture, or statuary, there are particular measures which form what we call a piece: as for instance, in mere portraiture, a head, or bust: the former of which must retain always the whole, or at least a certain part of the neck; as the latter the shoulders, and a certain part of the breast. If any thing be added or retrenched, the piece is destroyed. It is then a mangled trunk, or dismembered body, which presents itself to our imagination; and this too not through use merely, or on the account of custom, but of necessity, and by the nature of the appearance; since there are such and such parts of the human body, which are naturally matched, and must appear in company; the section, if unskillfully made, being in reality horrid, and representing rather an amputation in surgery, than a seemly division or separation according to art. And thus it is, that in general, through all the plastic arts, or works of imitation,

“ what-soever is drawn from nature , with the
 “ intention of raising in us the imagination of the
 “ natural species or object , according to real
 “ beauty and truth , should be comprised in certain
 “ complete portions or districts , which represent
 “ the correspondency or union of each part of
 “ nature with entire Nature herself.” And it is
 this natural apprehension , or anticipating sense of
 unity , which makes us give even to the works of
 our inferior artificers the name of pieces , by way of
 excellence , and as denoting the justness and truth
 of work.

In order therefore to succeed rightly in the for-
 mation of any thing truly beautiful in this higher
 order of design ; it were to be wished , that the ar-
 tist , who had understanding enough to comprehend
 what a real piece or tablature imported , and who ,
 in order to this , had acquired the knowledge of a
 whole and parts , would afterwards apply himself
 to the study of moral and poetic truth ; that by
 this means the thoughts , sentiments , or manners ,
 which hold the first rank in his historical work ,
 might appear suitable to the higher and nobler
 species of humanity in which he practised , to the
 genius of the age which he described , and to the
 principal or main action which he chose to repre-
 sent. He would then naturally learn to reject those
 false ornaments of affected graces , exaggerated
 passions , hyperbolical and prodigious forms ; which ,
 equally with the mere capricious and grotesque ,
 destroy the just simplicity and unity essential in a
 piece. And for his coloring , he would then soon

find how much it became him to be reserved, severe, and chaste, in this particular of his art; where luxury and libertinism are, by the power of fashion and the modern taste, become so universally established.

It is evident however from reason itself, as well as from history ⁴ and experience, that nothing is more fatal, either to painting, architecture, or the other arts, than this false relish, which is governed rather by what immediately strikes the sense, than by what consequentially, and by reflection, pleases the mind, and satisfies the thought and reason. So that whilst we look on painting with the same eye as we view commonly the rich stuffs and colored silks worn by our ladies, and admired in dress, equipage, or furniture; we must of necessity be effeminate in our taste, and utterly set wrong as to all judgment and knowledge in the kind. For of this imitative art we may justly say, “That
 “ though it borrows help indeed from colors, and
 “ uses them, as means, to execute its designs;
 “ it has nothing, however, more wide of its real
 “ aim, or more remote from its intention, than
 “ to make a show of colors, or from their mixture
 “ to raise a separate and flattering pleasure to
 “ the sense ⁵.”

⁴ See *Vitruvius* and *Pliny*.

⁵ The pleasure is plainly foreign and *separate*, as having no concern or share in the proper delight or entertainment which naturally arises from the subject, and workmanship itself. For the subject, in respect of pleasure, as well as science, is absolutely completed, when the design is executed, and the proposed imitation once accomplished. And thus it always is the best, when the colors are most subdued, and made subservient.

A
L E T T E R
CONCERNING THE
ART OR SCIENCE,
OF
D E S I G N,

WRITTEN FROM ITALY, ON THE OCCASION OF

THE JUDGMENT OF HERCULES,

TO

My LORD * * *

— *Ante omnia Musæ.*

Virg. Georg. lib. 2.

THE HISTORY OF THE

ARTS AND MANUFACTURES

OF GREAT BRITAIN

AND OF THE

CONCERNING THE

ART OR SCIENCE

OF THE

ARTS AND MANUFACTURES

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OF GREAT BRITAIN

AND OF THE

L E T T E R

C O N C E R N I N G

D E S I G N.

MY LORD,

THIS letter comes to your Lordship, accompanied with a small writing, intitled, A Notion: for such alone can that piece deservedly be called, which aspires no higher than to the forming of a project, and that too in so vulgar a science as painting. But whatever the subject be, if it can prove any way entertaining to you, it will sufficiently answer my design. And if possible it may have that good success, I should have no ordinary opinion of my project; since I know how hard it would be to give your Lordship a real entertainment by any thing which was not in some respect worthy and useful.

On this account I must, by way of prevention, inform your Lordship, that after I had conceived my Notion such as you see it upon paper; I was not contented with this, but fell directly to work; and, by the hand of a master-painter, brought it into practice, and formed a real design. This was not enough, I resolved afterwards to see what effect it would have, when taken out of mere black

and white, into colors : and thus a sketch was afterwards drawn. This pleased so well, that being encouraged by the virtuosi, who are so eminent in this part of the world, I resolved at last to engage my painter in the great work. Immediately a cloth was bespoke of a suitable dimension, and the figures taken as big or bigger than the common life; the subject being of the heroic kind, and requiring rather such figures as should appear above ordinary human stature.

Thus my Notion, as light as it may prove in the treatise, is become very substantial in the workmanship. The piece is still in hand, and like to continue so for some time; otherwise the first draught or design should have accompanied the treatise, as the treatise does this letter. But the design having grown thus into a sketch, and the sketch afterwards into a picture, I thought it fit your Lordship should either see the several pieces together, or be troubled only with that which was the best; as undoubtedly the great one must prove, if the master I employ sinks not very much below himself, in this performance.

Far surely should I be, my Lord, from conceiving any vanity or pride in amusements of such an inferior kind as these, especially were they such as they may naturally at first sight appear. I pretend not here to apologise either for them, or for myself. Your Lordship however knows, I have naturally ambition enough to make me desirous of employing myself in business of a higher order; since it has been my fortune in public affairs to act often

in concert with you, and in the same views, on the interest of Europe and mankind. There was a time, and that a very early one of my life, when I was not wanting to my country in this respect. But after some years of hearty labor and pains in this kind of workmanship, an unhappy breach in my health drove me not only from the seat of business, but forced me to seek these foreign climates; where, as mild as winters generally are, I have with much ado lived out this latter one; and am now, as your Lordship finds, employing myself in such easy studies as are most suitable to my state of health, and to the genius of the country where I am confined.

This in the mean time I can, with some assurance, say to your Lordship, in a kind of spirit of prophecy, from what I have observed of the rising genius of our nation, That if we live to see a peace any way answerable to that generous spirit with which this war was begun and carried on, for our own liberty and that of Europe; the figure we are like to make abroad, and the increase of knowledge, industry, and sense, at home, will render united Britain the principal seat of arts; and, by her politeness and advantages in this kind, will show evidently, how much she owes to those counsels which taught her to exert herself so resolutely in behalf of the common cause, and that of her own liberty, and happy constitution, necessarily included.

I can myself remember the time, when, in respect of music, our reigning taste was in many degrees inferior to the French. The long reign of

luxury and pleasure under King Charles II. and the foreign helps and studied advantages given to music in a following reign, could not raise our genius the least in this respect. But when the spirit of the nation was grown more free, though engaged at that time in the fiercest war, and with the most doubtful success; we no sooner began to turn ourselves towards music, and inquire what Italy in particular produced, than in an instant we outstripped our neighbours the French, entered into a genius far beyond theirs, and raised ourselves an ear and judgment not inferior to the best now in the world.

In the same manner, as to painting: Though we have as yet nothing of our own native growth in this kind worthy of being mentioned; yet since the public has of late begun to express a relish for engravings, drawings, copyings, and for the original paintings of the chief Italian schools, so contrary to the modern French, I doubt not that, in very few years, we shall make an equal progress in this other science. And when our humor turns us to cultivate these designing arts, our genius, I am persuaded, will naturally carry us over the slighter amusements, and lead us to that higher, more serious, and noble part of imitation, which relates to history, human nature, and the chief degree or order of beauty; I mean that of the rational life, distinct from the merely vegetable and sensible, as in animals, or plants; according to those several degrees or orders of painting which your Lordship will find suggested in this extemporary notion I have sent you.

As for architecture, it is no wonder if so many noble designs of this kind have miscarried amongst us; since the genius of our nation has hitherto been so little turned this way, that through several reigns we have patiently seen the noblest public buildings perish, if I may say so, under the hand of one single court-architect; who, if he had been able to profit by experience, would long since, at our expense, have proved the greatest master in the world. But I question whether our patience is like to hold much longer. The devastation so long committed in this kind, has made us begin to grow rude and clamorous at the hearing of a new palace spoilt, or a new design committed to some rash or impotent pretender.

It is the good fate of our nation in this particular, that there remain yet two of the noblest subjects for architecture; our prince's palace, and our house of parliament. For I cannot but fancy, that when Whitehall is thought of, the neighbouring Lords and Commons will at the same time be placed in better chambers and apartments than at present; were it only for majesty's sake, and as a magnificence becoming the person of the prince, who here appears in full solemnity. Nor do I fear that when these new subjects are attempted, we should miscarry as grossly as we have done in others before. Our state, in this respect, may prove perhaps more fortunate than our church, in having waited till a national taste was formed, before these edifices were undertaken. But the zeal of the nation could not, it seems, admit so long a delay in their ecclesiastical structures, parti-

cularly their metropolitan. And since a zeal of this sort has been newly kindled amongst us, it is like we shall see from afar the many spires arising in our great city, with such hasty and sudden growth as may be the occasion perhaps that our immediate relish shall be hereafter censured, as retaining much of what artists call the Gothic kind.

Hardly, indeed, as the public now stands, should we bear to see a Whitehall treated like a Hampton-Court, or even a new cathedral like St Paul's. Almost every one now becomes concerned, and interests himself in such public structures. Even those pieces too are brought under the common censure, which, though raised by private men, are of such a grandeur and magnificence, as to become national ornaments. The ordinary man may build his cottage, or the plain gentleman his country-house, according as he fancies: but when a great man builds, he will find little quarter from the public, if, instead of a beautiful pile, he raises, at a vast expense, such a false and counterfeit piece of magnificence, as can be justly arraigned for its deformity by so many knowing men in art, and by the whole people, who in such a conjuncture, readily follow their opinion.

In reality, the people are no small parties in this cause. Nothing moves successfully without them. There can be no public, but where they are included. And without a public voice, knowingly guided and directed, there is nothing which can raise a true ambition in the artist; nothing which can exalt the genius of the workman, or make him emulous of after fame, and of the approbation

of his country, and of posterity. For with these he naturally, as a freeman, must take part; in these he has a passionate concern and interest, raised in him by the same genius of liberty, the same laws and government, by which his property and the rewards of his pains and industry, are secured to him, and to his generation after him.

Every thing co-operates, in such a state, towards the improvement of art and science. And for the designing arts in particular, such as architecture, painting, and statuary, they are in a manner linked together. The taste of one kind brings necessarily that of the others along with it. When the free spirit of a nation turns itself this way, judgements are formed; critics arise; the public eye and ear improve; a right taste prevails, and in a manner forces its way. Nothing is so improving, nothing so natural, so congenial to the liberal arts, as that reigning liberty and high spirit of a people, which, from the habit of judging in the highest matters for themselves, makes them freely judge of other subjects, and enter thoroughly into the characters as well of men and manners, as of the products or works of men, in art and science. So much, my Lord, do we owe to the excellence of our national constitution, and legal monarchy; happily fitted for us, and which alone could hold together so mighty a people; all shares, though at so far a distance from each other, in the government of themselves, and meeting under one head in one vast metropolis; whose enormous growth, however censurable in other respects, is actually a

cause that workmanship and arts of so many kinds arise to such perfection.

What encouragement our higher powers may think fit to give these growing arts, I will not pretend to guess. This I know, that it is so much for their advantage and interest to make themselves the chief parties in the cause, that I wish no court or ministry, besides a truly virtuous and wise one, may ever concern themselves in the affair. For should they do so, they would in reality do more harm than good; since it is not the nature of a court, such as courts generally are, to improve, but rather corrupt a taste. And what is in the beginning set wrong by their example, is hardly ever afterwards recoverable in the genius of a nation.

Content therefore I am, my Lord, that Britain stands in this respect as she now does. Nor can one, methinks, with just reason, regret her having hitherto made no greater advancement in these affairs of art. As her constitution has grown, and been established, she has in proportion fitted herself for other improvements. There has been no anticipation in the case. And in this surely she must be esteemed wise, as well as happy, that ere she attempted to raise herself any other taste or relish, she secured herself a right one in government. She has now the advantage of beginning in other matters on a new foot. She has her models yet to seek, her scale and standard to form, with deliberation and good choice. Able enough she is at present to shift for herself, however abandoned or helpless she has been left by those whom it became
to

to assist her. Hardly, indeed, could she procure a single academy for the training of her youth in exercises. As good soldiers as we are, and as good horses as our climate affords, our princes, rather than expend their treasure this way, have suffered our youth to pass into a foreign nation to learn to ride. As for other academies, such as those for painting, sculpture, or architecture, we have not so much as heard of the proposal; whilst the prince of our rival nation raises academies, breeds youth, and sends rewards and pensions into foreign countries, to advance the interest and credit of his own. Now if, notwithstanding the industry and pains of this foreign court, and the supine unconcernedness of our own, the national taste however rises, and already shews itself in many respects beyond that of our so highly-assisted neighbours; what greater proof can there be of the superiority of genius in one of these nations above the other?

It is but this moment that I chance to read in an article of one of the gazettes from Paris, that it is resolved at court to establish a new academy for political affairs. “ In it the present chief minister
 “ is to preside; having under him six academists,
 “ doués des talens nécessaires: — No person to
 “ be received under the age of twenty-five. A
 “ thousand livres pension for each scholar. — Able
 “ masters to be appointed for teaching them the
 “ necessary sciences, and instructing them in the
 “ treaties of peace and alliances which have been
 “ formerly made. — The members to assemble
 “ three times a-week. — C’est de ce séminaire,

“ (says the writer), qu'on tirera les secretares
“ d'ambassade, qui par degres pourront monter à
“ de plus hauts emplois.”

I must confess, my Lord, as great an admirer as I am of these regular institutions, I cannot but look upon an academy for ministers as a very extraordinary establishment, especially in such a monarchy as France, and at such a conjuncture as the present. It looks as if the ministers of that court had discovered lately some new methods of negotiation, such as their predecessors Richelieu and Mazarine never thought of; or that, on the contrary, they have found themselves so declined, and at such a loss in the management of this present treaty, as to be forced to take their lesson from some of those ministers with whom they treat: a reproach, of which, no doubt, they must be highly sensible.

But it is not my design here to entertain your Lordship with any reflections upon politics, or the methods which the French may take to raise themselves new ministers, or new generals; who may prove a better match for us than hitherto, whilst we held our old. I will only say to your Lordship on this subject of academies, that indeed I have less concern for the deficiency of such a one as this, than of any other which could be thought of for England; and that as for a seminary of statesmen, I doubt not but, without this extraordinary help, we shall be able, out of our old stock, and the common course of business, constantly to furnish a sufficient number of well-qualified persons to serve upon occasion, either

at home, or in our foreign treaties, as often as such persons accordingly qualified shall duly, honestly, and bona fide, be required to serve.

I return therefore to my virtuoso - science; which being my chief amusement in this place and circumstance, your Lordship has by it a fresh instance that I can never employ my thoughts with satisfaction on any subject, without making you a party. For even this very Notion had its rise chiefly from the conversation of a certain day, which I had the happiness to pass a few years since in the country with your Lordship. It was there you showed me some engravings which had been sent you from Italy. One in particular I well remember, of which the subject was the very same with that of my written Notion inclosed. But by what hand it was done, or after what master, or how executed, I have quite forgot. It was the summer-season, when you had recess from business. And I have accordingly calculated this epistle and project for the same recess and leisure. For by the time this can reach England, the spring will be far advanced, and the national affairs in a manner over, with those who are not in the immediate administration.

Were that indeed your Lordship's lot at present, I know not whether, in regard to my country, I should dare throw such amusements as these in your way. Yet, even in this case, I would venture to say, however, in defence of my project, and of the cause of painting, that could my young hero come to your Lordship as well represented

as he might have been, either by the hand of a Marat* or a Jordano, the masters who were in being, and in repute, when I first travelled here in Italy, the picture itself, whatever the treatise proved, would have been worth notice, and might have become a present worthy of our court, and prince's palace; especially were it so blessed as to lodge within it a royal issue of her Majesty's. Such a piece of furniture might well fit the gallery, or hall of exercises, where our young princes should learn their usual lessons. And to see Virtue in this garb and action, might perhaps be no slight memorandum hereafter to a royal youth, who should one day come to undergo this trial himself; on which his own happiness, as well as the fate of Europe and of the world, would in so great a measure depend.

This, my Lord, is making, as you see, the most I can of my project, and setting off my amusements with the best color I am able; that I may be the more excusable in communicating them to your Lordship, and expressing thus, with what zeal I am,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's,

Naples, March 6.

N. S. 1712.

most faithful

humble servant,

SHAFTESBURY.

* Carlo Marat was yet alive, at the time this letter was written; but had been long superannuated, and incapable of any considerable performance.

I N D E X.

The volumes are denoted by numeral letters, the pages by figures.

A.

A *Abraham*, patriarch, his character and life, iii. 43, 44. 102.

Absolute power. See *Arbitrary* power.

Absolute princes, i. 175. Seem to act by counsel and advice, 182. Their education and manners, 183. No real society in absolute government, 89. No public, or sense of public good, 90. No social or common affection, *ib.* No community or mother-country, iii. 119. Absolute monarchy, debauching in religious and moral principles, i. 90. iii. 257. Necessary subjection and homage in absolute government, i. 189. iii. 142.

Academic philosophy, i. 14. 218. Its excellence, 65. 221, 222. ii. 155. 190, &c. 253, &c. See *Sceptic*. Academic founder and successor, ii. 209. Academic discipline amongst the ancients, i. 104. ii. 156.

Academies for exercise, wanted for our youth; unhappily neglected, i. 287. See *Exercises*, *School*, *University*.

Academists, their way of arguing unsuitable to the impatient humor of our age, ii. 156.

Acteon, a common absurdity in the pictures of his metamorphosis, iii. 297.

Actions, spring of actions, ii. 70.

Activity, or action, how necessary to mankind, ii. 108.

Actor, stage, i. 5. In the public *ib.*

Admiration, weakness of the passion, i. 124, &c. ii. 269, &c. See *Miracle*, *Wonder*. Just admiration, ii. 22. Admiration founded in the natural and necessary imagination of a sublime and beautiful in things, i. 118, 119. 289. ii. 22. 327. 348, &c. iii. 24, 25, &c. 150, &c. Admiration, motive or incentive to philosophy, iii. 29, 30. Restraint of it in philosophy, 29, 30. 167, &c. A strong admiration distinguished from that of love, 300.

Advice. See treatise of, *viz.* vol. 1. 133, &c.

I N D E X.

- Ægypt*, its description, ii. 320. Origin and enormous growth of superstition from *Ægypt*, ii. 321. iii. 34, 35, &c. Natural as well as political causes, iii. 37, 38. Unsociableness of religion, mutual abhorrence of worshippers, and persecution of sects, begun from hence, *ib.* iii. 35. 49, 50. 66, 67, &c. Unhappy settlement, cantonment, and agrarian of the primitive *Ægyptians*, iii. 35, 36, &c. *Ægyptian* mysteries, 203. See *Hierarchy*, *Priesthood*. *Ægyptian* loan, i. 307. Catechism and catechumens originally *Ægyptian*, iii. 202. See *Circumcision*.
- Æsop*, iii. 170, &c.
- Æthiopia*, its empire and priesthood, iii. 40, 41. *Æthiopian* spectator, i. 69, 70.
- Affectation* in behaviour opposite to grace, i. 164. In belief, faith, religion, praise, i. 3, 4. 27, 28. 34, 35. &c.
- Affection*, natural, towards moral beauty, i. 241, 242. Social enjoyment, 267. Confessed in love of country, &c. iii. 119, 120. &c. In parental, filial affection, 120, &c. Strength of social affection, i. 11. Conjugal affection, ii. 108, 109. iii. 182. It is by affection merely that a creature is esteemed good or ill, ii. 14. Private or self affection, 14, 15. When vicious, 15, 16, 17. When good, 16. Reflex affection 20. Unequal affection, or iniquity, 24. Opposition of the affections, 41. Religious affection, 61. See *Devotion*, *Enthusiasm*. System of the affections, 68. That system explained, 70. Three kinds of affections, *ib.* Degrees of affections, 71. Private affection too weak, when, 72. Affections towards private good, necessary, 73. Energy of natural affections, 83, &c. What pleasure attends the very disturbances belonging to natural affection, 87. Effects of natural affection, 88, &c. Partial affection has no foundation in reason, iii. 92. How slender satisfaction it affords, ii. 92. Entire affection, its advantages, 93. Analysis or plan of the affections, as they relate to human happiness or unhappiness, iii. 161, &c. Natural affection, *σὸς*, 184. The same parental or filial kind, 120. Balance of the affections, ii. 76, 77. 107, &c. Exercise of the social or natural affections, how necessary to man, 111, &c.

I N D E X.

- Of the affections which relate to the immediate self, or private interest of the creature, 115. Unnatural affections, 134, &c. Their consequences, 137, &c.
- Age*, the present, improving, in our nation, why, i. 7.
- Agrarian*, untoward, one in the Ægyptian state, iii. 34, &c.
How occasioned, 39, 40. 48, 49.
- Air* of person. See *Grace*.
- Alchymy*, ii. 151. 155. 312. iii. 132, 133.
- Alchymists*, why their philosophy still prevails so much in our age, ii. 155.
- Alcibiades*, iii. 105.
- Alexander* the Great, i. 215. 280. Modern Alexanders, 196.
- Amanuensis*, the author's, i. 263. iii. 13. 158.
- Ambassadors* from heaven, in what sense, iii. 279, 280, 281, &c. from the moon, 281. Apostolic commission, embassy, succession, 279, 280.
- Ambition*, i. 276, 277, 278, &c. ii. 129. 359. 364, 365, &c.
- Amble*, common amble, pace, or canterbury of writers, iii. 21.
- Amorous* passion, what occasion of disorder, ii. 125, &c.
- Amour*, manner of it with the fair sex, iii. 95. History of an amour, i. 152, &c. See *Gallantry*, *Love*, *Novel*.
- Amphictonian* council, iii. 115.
- Amphitheatre*. See *Gladiator*. Amphitheatrical spectacles, i. 233.
- Anacharsis*, i. 75, 76.
- Anatomy* of the mind, i. 178. Of the body, ii. 250, &c.
- Ancients*, their discipline of youth, i. 104. ii. 156. See *Academy*. Ancient policy, in the affairs of religion and philosophy, i. 13, 14. ii. 216.
- Andrew*, Merry-Andrew and executioner, a picture, i. 54.
- Angelical* company, i. 4.
- Anger*, use of the passion in the inferior orders of creatures, and in the ordinary characters of men, ii. 119. Its ill effects when indulged, 120, &c. Void in the highest and most virtuous characters, 119. Anger an acknowledgment of just and unjust, 347, &c.
- Animal*, how becomes a part of another system, ii. 11.

I N D E X.

- Animal system, 12. Wild and tame animals of the same species, how different, 108.
- Answers* to books, iii. 7, 8, 9. Answer-writers, *ib.* 224.
- Ant*, ii. 78. iii. 183.
- Anticipation*, ii. 348. See *Preconception*. Anticipation and repeal, iii. 296.
- Antidote* to Enthusiasm. See *Enthusiasm*.
- Antipater*, i. 215.
- Antipathy*, religious. See *Religion*.
- Apelles*, i. 196. See *Painter*.
- Apollo*, iii. 193. Apollo and Muses, i. 2, 3, 4. See *Delphic*, *Muses*, *Pythian*.
- Apologue*, iii. 171. See *Æsop*, *Fable*, *Mythology*.
- Apology*, practice of, i. 284. See *Preface*.
- Appearances* See *Species*.
- Appetite*, elder brother to reason, i. 162. Appetites high, eager, iii. 146.
- Applause*. See *praise*.
- Aratus*, poet, iii. 197.
- Arbitrary* power, i. 190, 191. The sweet and bitter, 190. Arbitrary power, or absolute monarchy, destructive of arts, i. 189, 190. 206, &c. iii. 18, 19. See *Absolute power*, *Tyranny*, *Will*.
- Arcadia*, i. 16.
- Architect* ambitious, iii. 111.
- Architecture*, barbarous, Gothic, i. 303. True and natural, independent of fancy, *ib.* Founded in truth and nature, iii. 149.
- Aristides*, i. 231.
- Aristophanes*, i. 212.
- Aristotle* cited, i. 123. 125. 209, 210, &c. iii. 54. 55. 116. 215. 231. See *Peripatetic*.
- Arm*, secular arm, deliver over, i. 54. iii. 91, 92.
- Arms* and hands, expressive in oratory, iii. 305.
- Arthur*, King, iii. 93.
- Articles* of belief. See *Belief*, *Divinity*.
- Artisan* honest, resolute, i. 226.
- Artists* rejoice in criticism, i. 202. 226, &c. Virtue and generosity of artists, 225. See *Architect*, *Painter*, *Poet*, &c.

I N D E X.

Arts and sciences, how raised and improved, i. 206, &c. 214, &c. iii. 113, &c. Arts and virtues mutual friends, i. 290.

Assemblies, public, demand respect, i. 62.

Atellan, plays, i. 217.

Atheism. See *Chance*, Ill humor. The consequences of Atheism with respect to virtue, ii. 55, &c. Compared in that respect with Theism, 57. Atheism from superstition, 278, &c. Martyrs for Atheism, iii. 53. Atheism preferable to superstition, i. 33. iii. 103, &c. Faith of Atheism, ii. 297. Atheism charged on the people of the better rank and fashion, ii. 218. iii. 244. Charged upon wit and subtile reasoning, *ib.*

Atheist, a strong believer, ii. 296. A complete one, his belief or faith, 246, &c. Hard to pronounce certainly of any man, that he is an Atheist, 7. Atheists personated, iii. 244, &c. Best writers against Atheists, ii. 214. Two sorts of people called Atheists, 215. Different in themselves, and to be used differently, 215, 216. Atheists miscalled, i. 296. Enthusiasts, i. 44. iii. 54.

Atheistical hypothesis, ii. 247. Certain principles common to Atheists with the devout, or zealots, i. 82. 100. 106. 114. 276, 277, &c. ii. 54. 64. 211, &c. iii. 252, 253. Atheistical writers or talkers, no genuine Atheists, i. 74, 75.

Athenians, i. 24, 25. Their antiquity, genius, iii. 126. Manners, modesty, *ib.* See *Greece*. Progress of arts and letters amongst them, i. 213, &c. Attic elegance, 291.

Atticus, iii. 17.

Attila, Gothic prince, iii. 76.

Audience, i. 228, 229. 238. See *Stage*.

Augustus, i. 190. 197. 235, &c. iii. 17. 207, 208.

Authors, saint-authors, i. 143. iii. 197, 198. Author in solitude, i. 152. Prince-authors, 185. Author's courtship to the reader, 173. 283. Selfishness of authors, 173. Coquetry of an author, *ibid.* Author once an honorable name, iii. 2. A character or note of understanding, 3. Jealousy of free authors, ii. 2. 216. Author orthodox, i. 307, &c. Orthodoxy of our author in particular, iii. 58, 59. 262, 263. Authors not excusable for their

I N D E X.

ill performance, because neglected by the great, i. 192, 193, &c. 198, 199, &c. or because of criticism and censure, 200, &c. or because of the public genius or ear, 225, &c. Author and reader, their mutual relation, interest, iii. 188, 189, &c. Their pretensions, privileges, place, ceremonial, 189. Divineſt characters and perſonages no authors, either in ſacred or profane letters, 201, &c. Great authors capable of buſineſs, though out of it, 204, 225, 226. &c. Authors of narrow geniſes, incapable of action or ſpeculation, 225, 226. Bookſeller makes the author, i. 228. iii. 21, 22. Modern author profeſſes lazineſs, precipitancy, careleſſneſs, i. 200, 201. In doubt about his own work, iii. 22. See *Miſcellany*, *Penman*, *Piece*. Author of theſe treatiſes, accidentally engaged in them, iii. 158. His firſt treatiſe, *viz.* letter of enthuſiaſm, a real letter, *ib.* 9, 10. 15, 16.

Authority, divine, judged by morals, i. 257.

Avarice, i. 275. iii. 164. 251, 252. Avaricious temper, how miſerable, ii. 128, &c.

Awe, its effects on men's underſtandings, i. 81. See *Fear*.

B.

B*abylonian* empire and hierarchy, iii. 39. See *Hierarchy*.

Bacon, Lord, cited, iii. 57.

Banter, fashionable with modern politicians and negociators, i. 51. Banter from perſecution, 59.

Barbarian. See *Goth*, *Indian*.

Barbariſm, chief mark of, iii. 127. From univerſal monarchy, i. 191.

Bartholomew fair, i. 23.

Bays, Mr. iii. 229, 230, &c. Other Bays in divinity, 235, &c.

Bear-garden, i. 233. iii. 212.

Beaſts: Beaſt or brute ſcience, iii. 154. 180, 181. Paſſionate love and fondneſs towards the beſtial or animal forms, virtues, beauties, 154. 179, 180, &c. Beaſts, their natural inſtincts, ii. 254, 255. Oeconomy or order of nature in beaſts. See *Oeconomy*.

I N D E X.

Beaver, iii. 183.

Beauty, where to be found, ii. 334. Mysterious charms of beauty, 173, &c. Knowledge in the degrees and orders of beauty, *ib.* Three degrees or orders of beauty, 336, 337. Scale or scheme of beauty, iii. 151, &c. Moral beauty, ii. 340. Confessed, i. 242. ii. 348, &c. iii. 250, 251. Moral beauty and deformity, ii. 22. Beauty of sentiments, characters, mind, i. 116. 179. iii. 250. See *Character*, *Heart*, *Mind*, *Virtue*. Beauty is truth, i. 122, 123. iii. 149, &c. Beauty of virtue, i. 272, &c. of the soul, ii. 345. of the body, 344. Beauty dangerous, i. 158. Outward beauty expressive of inward, 118. Natural health the inward beauty of the body, iii. 150. Mechanic beauties in opposition to moral and intellectual, i. 119. Beauty in animals, iii. 180, &c. How attractive, enchanting, 179, &c. The scale of beauty, iii. 150, &c. The odd and pretty in the room of the graceful and beautiful, 4. Idea of beauty natural, ii. 344. Beauty and good the same, 331. Not the object of the sense, 349, 350. Its extent, 173, 174, &c.

The Beautiful, *honestum*, *pulchrum*, τὸ καλόν. See *Decorum*, *Enthusiasm*, *Fair*.

Bee, ii. 76. 78. iii. 183.

Beggars, i. 29. Beggary religion, *ib.* iii. 103, &c.

Belief. See *Faith*. Belief at a venture, i. 28. No merit in believing on weak grounds, *ib.* Affectation of belief, 29. Articles of belief, i. 310. iii. 50, 51, 52. 66, 67. Groffest article of belief, how introduced of old into the church, iii. 275. Sacred and indisputable articles of belief, 57, 58. Whether a man can be accountable for his wrong belief, ii. 270, &c. Men persuade themselves into whatever opinion or belief, iii. 83, &c. Belief at the stretch of reason, i. 27. iii. 87.

Believer against his will, i. 28. iii. 105. Superstitious believer wishes there were no God, iii. 105.

Belly: Gluttonous imagination, or belly-sense, i. 244.

Bibliothèque Choisie, iii. 15, 16, 199. See *Clerc*.

Bigotry, its spirit, i. 62. First rise, iii. 67. Force of the word, 68.

I N D E X.

Bird, ii. 249, &c.

Bit or bridle, proper emblem for the figure of virtue, iii. 322.

Body politic, head and members, i. 95, 96. See *Constitution*.

Boileau, French satirist, i. 189. iii. 232.

Bombast, i. 201. 208. iii. 217.

Books. See *Burning*, *Reading*, *Scholar*. Good books so called, i. 143. iii. 271. Books of chivalry, gallantry, prodigies, travels, barbarous nations, and customs, i. 293, &c. Interpolating, suppressing practice on books, iii. 273, 274. See *Fathers*, *Scripture*.

Bookseller, i. 262. See *Amanuensis*, *Author*. Begets a fray or learned scuffle, iii. 8, 9. 12, 13, &c. Bookseller and glazier, 12, 13. Bookseller's shop and trade, 13. Bookseller determines titles, 22. Fits his customers, 224.

Bossu, Pere, du poeme epique, i. 123.

Breeding. See *Academy*, *University*. Good-breeding, i. 53. ii. 199. Leading character to virtue, i. 111. 116. 287. iii. 134. 139. Good-breeding and liberty necessarily joined, i. 62, 63. Man of good-breeding incapable of a brutal action, 111. Acts from his nature, without reflection, and by a kind of necessity, 111, 112. Compared with the thorough honest man, 113. See *Gentleman*.

Britain, its advantages, i. 189. Old Britain, 234.

British liberty, i. 186, 187. 192. British sense in politics, 66. British countrymen fellow-citizens, iii. 121, &c.

Britons, their sense of government, and a constitution, i. 91, 92. See *England*, *Englishmen*.

Brute, ii. 253. See *Beast*.

Brutus, iii. 206.

Buffoons, i. 60. See *Banter*, *Burlesque*, *Italian*, *Laugh*.

Build, easier to demolish than build, iii. 111.

Burlesque, its principal source, i. 58, 59. See *Banter*. Mere Burlesque rejected by the ancients, i. 60, 61. See *Comedy*, *Parodies*. Burlesque wit and buffoonry on the stage, iii. 232. Burlesque-divinity. See *Divinity*.

Burnet's Archæol. cited, iii. 101.

Burning zeal. See *Zeal*. Burning and destruction of books, learning, &c. iii. 197, &c. See *Fathers of the church*.

Business, man of business, i. 267.

I N D E X.

C.

- C**abalistic learning, iii. 67.
- Cæsar*, Julius, i. 234, 235. *Cæsar's commentaries*, 194.
His ability, 197.
- Cæsars*, Roman, i. 20. 114, 115. 190. iii. 34. 71, 72. 75.
- Cake*, not eat and have, i. 112.
- Camp*, i. 287.
- Cantonizing*, i. 96.
- Canterbury*. See *Amble*.
- Cappadocians*, iii. 208.
- Carnival*, i. 69, &c.
- Carver*, carnal, spiritual, iii. 93, &c.
- Catechism*, theological, metaphysical, i. 264. Moral, philosophical, *ib.* 265. Catechism and catechumens originally Egyptian, iii. 202. See *Circumcision*.
- Catholic church*. See *Church*, *Pope*, *Rome*. Catholic opinion, how formed, iii. 72, 73, &c. See *Uniformity*.
- Catullus*, i. 197.
- Cause*, common cause, i. 192.
- Cebes*, ii. 209.
- Censors of manners*, i. 207. *Censure free*, 6.
- Ceremony*, i. 176. See *Compliments*.
- Ceremonial* between author and reader, iii. 188, &c.
- Ceremonies*. See *Rites*.
- Cervantes*, Michael, iii. 210.
- Chaldea*, iii. 40.
- Challenge*. See *Duel*. Spiritual challengers, lists, combatants, i. 312. iii. 282. See *Priests*, *Religion*.
- Chance* preferred to providence by the superstitious, i. 33. iii. 105, &c. See *Atheism*.
- Chaos* and darkness from universal monarchy, i. 191, 192.
Chaos of the English poets, iii. 51, 52.
- Characters*: Dealer in characters must know his own, i. 163.
Sacred characters, i. 243.
- Character* divine, i. 19, 30. in God, in man, 31. 33, 34.
Beauty of character, 116. See *Beauty*. Character with one's self and others, i. 112. 254. Character, generous

I N D E X.

- and vile, set in opposition, 121. Real characters and manners, 168. 173, &c. See *Manners*. Perfect character veiled, 168. Perfect character unartificial in poetry, 290. Monstrous in epic, or on the stage, iii. 215, 216, &c. Homer's characters. See *Homer*. Principal characters and underparts, i. 168. Characters in holy writ, not subjects for a poem, 306. Characters or personages in dialogue, iii. 241, 242. See *Dialogue*. Sublime of characters, i. 288. Inward character, i. 291. iii. 28. Character from circumstances of nativity, iii. 123. Characters in the state, 136. 141, &c. Inward character and worth, 145. Character of a critic. See *Critic*.
- Characteristic* of understandings, i. 174.
- Charity* and good-will, pretext to what ends, i. 73. 114. iii. 95. 111. See *Morals*. Christian charity, i. 85. Charitable foundations, to whose benefit, 114. Supernatural charity, i. 14. iii. 95. Heathen charity, iii. 126, 127, 128.
- Charm* of nature, in moral objects. See *Beauty*, *Harmony*, *Nature*, *Taste*.
- Childrens* play, i. 54.
- Chivalry*, i. 235. Originally, Moorish, Gothic, i. 295, &c. iii. 210. Books of chivalry, i. 296. Dregs of it, ii. 160. See *Gallantry*.
- Christian* author, i. 54. Good Christian, 84. Christian, Mahometan, Pagan, i. 303. iii. 86. Sceptic Christian, iii. 60.
- Christianity* no way concerned in modern miracles, ii. 270. 274, &c. Not founded in miracle merely, *ib.* and, i. 256.
- Church*, i. 6. See *Catholic*, *Hierarchy*. Roman Christian and catholic church, iii. 75. See *Monarchy*. National church, i. 13. 22. Its interest asserted, 13. Panic fear for the church, iii. 69, 70, &c. Church-lands, i. 20. 114. iii. 37. 66. Writing church-militant, iii. 7, 8, 9, &c. and 241, &c. Ancient Heathen church, i. 41. iii. 105, 106, &c. Church of England, iii. 11, 12, &c. See *divines*. Church-patriot, iii. 141.
- Chymistry*. See *Alchymy*.

I N D E X.

Cicero, i. 180. 287. iii. 17, 18. 150. 232.

Circumcision, its origin among the Ægyptians, iii. 43, 44.

Received by the Hebrew patriarch their guest, *ib.* by Moses on his return, 45. Laid down again, on his retreat, 43. Again renewed, by Joshua, with regard to the same Ægyptians, 43, 44, 45, 46.

City, heavenly city Jerusalem, i. 243.

Clan. See *Tribe*.

Cleanliness, i. 106.

Clerc (Mr. Le, Sylv. Phil.) iii. 178. See *Bibliothèque Choisie*.

Clergy, benefit of, i. 263. Interest of Christian clergy in ancient and polite learning, iii. 195. Management and practices of the ancient clergy, iii. 276, 277, &c. See *Clerics*, *Fathers of the church*, *Priesthood*.

Clerics seditious, iii. 74. See *Government*, *Magistrate*.

Climates, regions, soils, compared, iii. 125.

Closet-thoughts, i. 120.

Clown, judges philosophers, iii. 89. Better philosopher than some so called, 170.

Club, liberty of the club, i. 62. See *Committee*. Club-method, 230.

Coffeehouse, iii. 12. 227, &c. Coffeehouse-committee, 227, &c. Coffeehouse-hero, *ib.*

College, i. 287. ii. 151.

Collision amicable, i. 53.

Comedy, i. 171. Posterior to tragedy, 210, 211. See *Burlesque*, *Drama*, *Farce*, *Play*, *Theatre*. Comedy, ancient, first, second, third, i. 211, 212, &c. 218, 219, &c.

Comic style, i. 222, 223. See *Satire*, *Style*.

Commission, sole commission for authorship, i. 288.

Heavenly commission, pretences to it examined, iii. 85. 132. 279, 280, &c.

Committee, iii. 227, &c. See *Club*.

Common sense. See *Nature*, *Sense*. Men not to be reasoned out of it, i. 81.

Company provocative to fancy, i. 137, 138. See *Assemblies*, *Conversations*.

I N D E X.

- Complexions*, religious, i. 70. See *Persecution*, *Salvation*.
Compliments, i. 176, 177. See *Ceremony*.
Comprehension in religion. See *Uniformity*.
Conference, free, i. 57, 58.
Conformity in religion, iii. 261, 262. See *Uniformity*.
Conformists occasional, iii. 71.
Conjurer, a wise and able one, i. 274. *Conjurers*, 73, 152, 300. See *Inchanter*, *Magi*, *Priest*.
Conquest, national, iii. 123.
Conscience, moral, ii. 99. Its effects, 100, &c. Religious conscience supposes moral conscience, 99. False conscience, its effects, 100. Conscience from interest, 102, 103.
Consecration of opinions, notions, i. 50.
Consistency, rule of, iii. 295.
Constitution, state or government, i. 92, 206. English constitution, i. 184, 185. iii. 125.
Contemplation, ii. 60, 61. See *Meditation*.
Controversy: Controversial writings, iii. 7, 8, 9, 10, 223, 224. Church-controversy, 241, &c. Religious controversy, and decision of the cause, according to modern priesthood, 282, 283, &c.
Conversation, i. 56, 57, &c. 62, 63. iii. 277, 278. Life of conversation, i. 62, 63. Sterility of the best conversations, the cause, 63, 64. Remedy, 65. Modern conversation effeminate, enervate, ii. 153.
Convocation, synod, council, what candor, temper, i. 309.
Coquetry. See *Author*.
Corneille, French tragedian, cited, iii. 72, 232.
Corporation of wit, iii. 229. See *Wit*.
Correctness. See *Critic*, *Genius*. In writing, i. 201, 207. iii. 68. Incorrectness, iii. 2, 3, &c. 184. Cause of incorrectness in our English writers, *ib.* and 225, 226, &c.
Covetousness. See *Avarice*.
Counsellor, privy counsellors, of wise aspect, i. 189.
Countenances. See *Complexions*.
Cowardice, i. 270. ii. 116, 117. See *Fear*.

Country,

I N D E X.

- Country*, love of native country, iii. 119. See *Love*.
 Native country, name wanting, 124. Higher city or country recognised, 131, 132.
- Court*, i. 6. 287. Court-power, iii. 18, 19. Grandeur of a court, what influence on art and manners, i. 190, &c. 205, &c. 294. iii. 18, 19. Spirit of a court, i. 89, 90. Spectres met with there, 120. Place at court, iii. 139, 140. 173. Court-slavery, 139, 140, &c. See *Slavery*. Court-engines, 144. See *Favorites*.
- Courtier*, i. 166. Honest courtier, iii. 20. 145, 146.
- Creature*, every one a private interest, ii. 10, &c. Private ill of every creature, *ib.* No creature good, if by his nature injurious to his species, or to the whole in which he is included, 11. When a creature is supposed good, 16, 17, &c. What makes an ill creature, 19, 20. What makes a creature worthy or virtuous, 23, 24. Creature void of natural affection, 66. Creature, when too good, 73, 74.
- Creed*, iii. 200. Furniture of creeds 267. Creed-making, 50, 51. 53. 67, 68. 253, &c. See *Article*, *Belief*, *Watch-word*.
- Credulity* and *incredulity*, i. 296. *Credulity*, how dangerous, ii. 271, 272.
- Criterion* of truth, i. 50.
- Critical* truth. See *Truth*. *Critical* liberty, iii. 262. *Critical* art, support of sacred writ, 194, 195, 196, &c.
- Criticism*, rejoices the real artist, i. 202, &c. Toleration of criticism essential to wit, 224. Sacred criticism, iii. 58, 59. 190, 191, &c. Prevention against, 136, 137.
- Critics*, the ingenious and fair sort, i. 67. Formidable to the author or poet, why, i. 199, 200. iii. 225, 226, &c. French critics, iii. 232. See *Bossu*, *Journalists*. Critic-haters, i. 203, 204. iii. 136, &c. 214. 225. 227, 228. Self-critic, i. 145. Interest, party, cause, or writing, to be suspected, which declares against criticism, or declines the proof, iii. 245. 283, 284. Critics, pillars of state in wit and letters, i. 203, &c. 207, 208. iii. 221, 222. Critics, notaries, expositors, prompters,

I N D E X.

- i. 207, 208. Treated as whimsical, 234. Their cause defended, iii. 136, 137. Critics by fashion, i. 235. Writing-critics, or satirists, iii. 224. Critics, satirists, sceptics, scrupulists, 90, 91.
- Crocodile*, worshipped, ii. 25. iii. 66. Emblem of superstition, ii. 320, 321. Crocodiles, chimeras, scholastic, iii. 66, 67.
- Crowns*, how purchased on some occasions, i. 114.
- Crudities*, i. 142, 143, 144.
- Cudworth*, Dr. his character, ii. 216. Why accused of being a friend to Atheists, *ib.* Cited, iii. 53.
- Custom* and fashion powerful seducers, i. 305. Custom vicious, ii. 27.
- Cybele*, goddesses, ii. 209.

D.

- D***æmon*, or guardian spirit, i. 146. iii. 23. Dæmon, to what that name belongs, ii. 5. See *Witch*.
- Dæmonist*, who, what, ii. 5. 6.
- Dancer*, i. 167. Figured dances, iii. 76. High dance in religion and prophecy, 96.
- Death*, king of terrors, i. 270. ii. 208. See *Fear*.
- Debate*, free, i. 57. iii. 129. See *Conference*, *Freedom*.
- Debauch* has a reference to society, i. 266, 267. ii. 105.
- Declamation*, i. 58. See *Preaching*.
- Decorum*, i. 119. 290. ii. 343. iii. 148, 149. 163, 164. Decorum and sublime of actions, iii. 28. See *Beauty*, *Grace*. Dulce et decorum, i. 86. 105.
- Dedication*. See *Preface*.
- Defender* of the faith, i. 185.
- Deist*, the name set in opposition to Christianity ii. 172.
- Deity*, when viewed amiss, i. 26, 27. Deity fought in chaos and confusion, not in order and beauty, ii. 279, 280. Various combinations of opinions concerning Deity 4, 5. How men are influenced by the belief of a Deity 37, 38, 39. Terror of the Deity implies not moral conscience 99. Different characters, aspects, or views

I N D E X.

- of Deity iii. 31, 32. Species multiplied 39. 41, 42.
 Heathen attributes of Deity 127. &c. See *Genius, Mind*.
 Deity, the sovereign beauty, and source of all beauties,
 ii. 245. See *God*.
Delphic inscription, i. 147.
Demosthenes, i. 139. 179. iii. 117.
Denmark and Sweden, iii. 142.
Despotic. See *Absolute, Arbitrary*.
Devil. See *Hell*.
Devotion of the dismal sort, its effects, ii. 95, 96. The
 abject, beggarly, illiberal, sycophantic, knavish kind, i.
 27, 28. iii. 103, &c.
Dialogue, manner of writing used by the ancients, i. 60.
 Preliminary science to poetry and just writing, 164, 165.
 Moderns, why so sparing and unsuccessful in the way of
 dialogue-writing, ii. 152, 153. How practised by some
 modern divines, iii. 241, 242, 243. Dialogue between
 an author and his bookseller, 13, 14. between God and
 man, 101. between man and beast *ib.* between God and
 satan, *ib.* between God and Jonah, 98, 99, 100.
Diana, iii. 66. 69.
Diodorus Siculus cited, iii. 35. 40, 41.
Dion Cassius, wretched historian, i. 233. iii. 20.
Dionysius Halicarnassensis, iii. 194. 232.
Discourse continued and alternate, i. 57, 58. Vicissitude
 in discourse, a law, 58. 63.
Disbonesty, a half-thought, iii. 247. 250. See *Knavery*,
Thinking.
Disinterestedness in friendship, i. 84, 85. See *Friendship*.
Disinterestedness in religion, and its holy founders, 242,
 243, 244. See *Love, Reward*.
Distraction, real, i. 277, &c.
Divine, or godlike, i. 27. 31. See *Character, Theogony*,
Theology. Divine example, ii. 45. Divine presence, 45, 46.
Divines, theologists, iii. 101. 196, 197, &c. 234. 241,
 &c. 251, 252, 253, 254. 269, 270, &c. Why
 incautious, and ill managers, in the cause of religion,

I N D E X.

- il. 298, 299. Divine, in humor, out of humor, iii. 107, 108, 109.
- Divinity-doctor*, combatant in print, iii. 8, 9, 10. Polemic divinity, 7, 8, &c. Burlesque Divinity, 241, &c. Surnames and titles of divinity, 50. See *Deity*, *Theology*, *Doctrine*. See *Hypothesis*.
- Dog*. See *Beast*, *Fable*.
- Dogmatists*, why so fashionable in this age, ii. 155, 156. Dogmatizing in religion, and on a future state, *ib.* 195, 265. See *Sceptic*.
- Dominion* founded in property, iii. 41.
- Drama*, English drama, lame support of it, iii. 239. *Dramatis personæ*, *ib.* See *Bays*, *Comedy*, *Play*, *Stage*, *Tragedy*. Theological drama, 243.
- Drapery*, rules concerning it, iii. 310, 311.
- Dryden*, iii. 51, 52. See *Bays*.
- Duels*, i. 235. 312. See *Challenges*.

E.

- E***AR* in music, i. 35. 116. 188. 203, 204. Ear lost, 296. Public ear, 228. 237, 238. See *Audience*. Distemper in the ear, 279. Ears to hear, &c. 52. Ear in poetry, 188. 237. iii. 218.
- Earth*, system of the earth, how a part of some other system, ii. 12, 13. Another earth or world, i. 244. Our relation to mere earth and soil, iii. 120, 121, &c. Sons of earth, 122.
- Education*. See *Academy*, *School*, *Tutor*, *University*.
- Effeminacy*, i. 269, 270. ii. 153. iii. 154.
- Effeminate wit*, iii. 136, 137.
- Egypt*. See *Ægypt*.
- Elephant*, iii. 183.
- Eloquence*, i. 5. Leprosy of, 138. Corruption of, iii. 17, 18. &c. Eloquence and other arts depend on liberty, i. 189. See *Liberty*.

I N D E X.

- Emblematical*, nothing of that kind to be directly mingled in an historical piece, iii. 317, 318. An instance from Raphael, 318, &c.
- Emperors*, Roman, i. 20. 114. 190, 197. Convert emperors, i. 114. iii. 65, 66.
- Empiric*, i. 141. 203.
- Engine*, court-engines, iii. 144.
- Engineer* of letters, iii. 13. in philosophy and sciences, 111.
- England*, a conquest, whence to be feared, iii. 123, 124. Old England, 125. Late England, *ib.* See *Britain*. Church of England. See *Church*, *Divines*.
- Englishmen*, fellow-citizens, countrymen, iii. 120, 121, &c. Name whence brought, 124.
- English* inhospitable humor, iii. 125, 126. English authors in general, i. 229. Speeches and admired wit of our English ancestors, iii. 118, 119. English liberty, i. 187. 192, 193. English poetry. See *Muses*. Incorrectness of English poets, i. 226. iii. 213, 214. 218, &c. English divines, iii. 101. See *Divines*.
- Enjoyment*, deceitful kind, i. 266, 267. Sincere, 268. Social, 269.
- Enthusiasm*, definition of the natural sort, &c. iii. 24. Enthusiasm of holy souls, 56. Legitimate and bastard sort, i. 44. iii. 56. Raised from internals, ii. 222. iii. 75. from externals, iii. 35. 75. Philosophical enthusiasm, 68. Prophetical, 56. Poetical, i. 16. Mathematical, ii. 85. Enthusiasm of the lover, hero, virtuoso, &c. ii. 321, &c. 357. iii. 25. Universal, or in all, i. 45. iii. 24. Enthusiasms of different sorts, iii. 34. Comprehended in the Romish church, 75, 76, &c. Vulgar sort, and more refined, *ib.* Enthusiasm divine, i. 45. Modification of enthusiasm, 13, 14. Various operations, 39, &c. Enthusiasm at second hand, 36. Enthusiasm justified, i. 45, 46. ii. 46. 326. 333. 339. iii. 23, 24, &c. Ravage of enthusiasm, i. 75. Antidote to enthusiasm, 46. Virtue itself a noble enthusiasm, iii. 27, 28. Enthusiasm a natural and honest passion, 31. Soft and lovely, ii. 179, 180. Enthusiasm works differently, by fear, by love, iii. 31.

I N D E X.

- Its amorous lineage, *ib.* Contrary and miraculous effects of enthusiasm, 32, 33. Enthusiasm catching, communicable, imparted, i. 36, 37. iii. 23, 24. See *Melancholy*, *Prophecy*. Sociable enthusiast, ii. 179.
- Enthusiast* itinerant, i. 248. Epicureans, enthusiastical Atheists, i. 44. iii. 53. Enthusiastic inebriation, iii. 55.
- Envy*, unnatural passion, ii. 136.
- Epbesian* worshippers, iii. 69, 70. &c. Zeal for their church, *ib.*
- Epicurus*, his connivance in matters of vision and fanaticism, i. 40. &c. Recognition of the force of nature, and natural affection, 100, 101. Toleration of natural enthusiasm, i. 40, &c. iii. 27, 28. Epicurus, primitive father to some concealed moderns, i. 100, 101. Love and religion cruelly treated by Epicurus, iii. 26, 27, 28, 29. Nature, a deity to the Epicuriean Atheist, i. 42, 43. iii. 53. See *Enthusiasm*, *Atheism*. Epicurean atomist, i. 260. Epicurean hypothesis iii. 27, 28. 58. Epicurean sect tolerated, i. 14. Vulgar Epicurism, ii. 103, 104.
- Epimenides*, iii. 197.
- Epistles*: Tully's epistles, iii. 17. Seneca's epistles, 18, 19, 20.
- Epistolar* style, iii. 14, &c.
- Epistle* dedicatory. See *Preface*.
- Ergamenes*, King, destroys a hierarchy, iii. 41.
- Essays*, i. 148. Essay-writing, *ib.* See *Miscellaneous*.
- Euphranor*, painter, i. 124.
- Euripides*, i. 212, &c. iii. 117. 198. 259.
- Executioner*. See *Magistrate*.
- Excellency*. See *Titles*.
- Exemplars*, in the writing-art, i. 166, 167. 178.
- Exercises*, i. 165. See *Academy*.
- Eyes*, fitted to certain lights, i. 51. Eye in painting, 116. 202, 203. Eye in painting lost, how, 296. Distemper in the eye, 279. Harmony to the eye, iii. 4. Eye debauched, *ib.*

I N D E X.

F.

Fables used by wise men and moralists, i. 52. iii. 170.

See *Mythology*, *Parable*. Fable of the man and lion, ii. 154. of the travelling dogs, iii. 171. &c. Truth of fable. See *Truth*.

Fact: Matter of fact, how judged by zealots, i. 37, 38. 46. 127. 128. Matter of fact, in the language of the superstitious, 36, 37. Matters of fact, unably though sincerely related, prove the worst sort of deceit, 260. See *Truth*.

Faction, spirit of, i. 97.

Fair, Bartholomew, i. 22.

Fair, beautiful, i. 119. See *Beauty*, *Decorum*, *Numbers*.

Fair, species of, 119.

Fairies, i. 3, 4.

Faith, religious, ancient, modern, i. 3, 4. Implicit faith, i. 80. iii. 191. Definition, iii. 61. Extension of faith, i. 3, 4, 5. Act of faith, *ib.* Faith on any terms, 30. Heroic faith, iii. 276. Religious faith, dependent on what, i. 32. Historical faith, iii. 60. Personal, 61. Faith national, hereditary, entailed by law, i. 296. 311. iii. 85. Faith in travellers, romancers, legends, i. 295, 296. &c. Rule of faith, iii. 264, 265, &c. See *Belief*. Rule of faith, treatise of Abp. Tillotson, cited, iii. 229, &c. Chinese or indian faith, i. 296. Historical, critical faith, iii. 18. Confession of faith, the author's, 261. Gradual decay of the evidence relating to the matters of our faith, 179, &c.

Fanatics, ancient, i. 39, 40, &c. Compared with modern, *ib.* Fanatic errant, ii. 274. See *Lymphatics*. Fanatics in all churches and religions, i. 41, 42. iii. 31, 32. Fanaticism, its true character, ii. 273. Fanatic sense and judgment of scripture, iii. 196. Popish fanaticism, 78. 197, 198.

Fancies apostrophised, i. 162. Sophisters, impostors, *ib.* Government of fancy, i. 265. &c. ii. 190. Fancy, her assault, combat, fortrefs, i. 268, &c. 276, &c. Fancies,

I N D E X.

- sollicitresses, enchantresses, 269. Reprimanded, questioned,
 examined, dismissed, 279, &c. Disagreement with fancy
 makes the man himself; agreement, not himself, 279,
 &c. Lady Fancy crossed by a what next, 280. Fancies
 in a tribe, 276. 281. Florid fancy, iii. 146. Power of
 fancy in religion, 56. See *Humor*.
Farce, i. 128, 129. iii. 4, 5, 6. See *Atellan*, *Fescennin*,
Parody.
Fasces, i. 13. See *Magistrate*.
Fashion. See *Custom*, *Modes*.
Father of a country, i. 30. 277.
Fathers of the church disputing and disputed, iii. 270,
 271. Industrious in suppressing all scripture arguments of
 their adversaries which made against them, 265, 266,
 &c. 274, &c. Burning method of Roman and Greek
 fathers, bishops, &c. 197, 198.
Favorites, i. 166. ii. 114. See *Court*.
Fear, passion of, i. 253. ii. 44, &c. Description by Des
 Cartes, i. 253. Its root and cure, 254, &c. Fear of death,
 ii. 116. &c. How improved or abated, i. 271. iii. 162,
 163. 168. Fear and hope in religion, ii. 44. See *Future*
state, *Rewards and punishments*.
Ferments. See *Humors*.
Fescennin, plays, i. 217.
Fiction. See *Fable*.
Figure, principal in a picture, to govern the rest, iii.
 311, 312.
Flattery in devotion, i. 28. See *Devotion*, *Sycophant*.
Fly, ii. 12. See *Spider*.
Fools, the greatest, who, ii. 190.
Football, i. 162. iii. 12, 13.
Force and arbitrary power destructive of all arts, i. 189,
 190. 206, 207, &c.
Form, outward, in a figure, to give place where the
 inward is described, iii. 306.
Formality, i. 9, 10. 61, 62.
Formalists, i. 10. 151. 288. iii. 81. The author himself a
 formalist, iii. 112.

I N D E X.

- Foreigners*, treatment of them by different nations, iii. 126, 127. See *Hospitality*.
- Free thought*. See *Thought*.
- Freethinker*. See *Thought*.
- Free writer*, ii. 2.
- Free states*, i. 205, &c.
- Freedom of wit*, i. 57. See *Debate*, *Discourse*, *Wit*. Consequence of a restraint, 58.
- French authors*, i. 288. Theatre, iii. 5, 6. French critics. See *Bossu*, *Critics*.
- Friend*, knowledge, unknowable, i. 245. Friend of mankind, ii. 203.
- Friendship*, real good, ii. 196, &c. Comprehends society and mankind, 197, &c. Friendship, how prevalent and diffusive, 83. Friendship, Christian, Heathen, i. 83, 84. See *Charity*; *Disinterestedness*, *Hospitality*. Friendship its own reward, 84.
- Fucus*, mask or vizor of superstition, i. 71.
- Fugus*, iii. 121.
- Future state*, i. 14. 82, 83, 84, 85. ii. 194. iii. 250. See *Rewards and punishments*.

G.

- G***Allant*, i. 166.
- Gallantry*, original and progress, i. 234, 235, 236. 284. ii. 159, 160. iii. 210. Devout gallantry, i. 16. 311. Gallantry and heroic power of faith, iii. 276. Merit in the gallant world, i. 285. See *Chivalry*, *Ladies*, *Novel*.
- Gallows*, i. 108. iii. 147. See *Jail*.
- Gardens*, iii. 139. See *Palace*.
- Gellius*, Aulus, cited, iii. 193.
- Generation*, natural instinct in the case, ii. 341.
- Genius*, or guardian-angel, i. 146. Genius of the world, ii. 201. 235. 244. 284. 288. 293. &c. See *Deity*.
- Genius*, not sufficient to form a writer or poet, i. 167. iii. 213. English author would be all genius, i. 201. iii. 214. Fashionable affectation of a genius, without

I N D E X.

- correctness, in our English writers, i. 226, 227. iii. 213, 214. See *English poets*.
- Gentleman*: Character of a gentleman, i. 115, 116. iii. 130, &c. See *Breeding*. Amusements of gentlemen more improving than the profound researches of pedants, i. 288. iii. 139. Fine gentleman, owing to masters, i. 165.
- Gibbet*, i. 107. See *Gallows*, *Jail*, *Hell*.
- Gibbets* and rods succeed to charity and love, when, iii. 95.
- Giddiness* in life, i. 287.
- Gladiators*, barbarity of gladiatorian spectacles, i. 233. iii. 211, 212.
- Gladiatorian* penmen, iii. 10.
- Glass*. See *Looking-glass*.
- Glazier*, iii. 12, 13.
- Glory*, acting for glory's sake, how far divine. i. 31.
- Gnostics*, ancient heretics, iii. 62, 63.
- God*: God and goodness the same, i. 27, &c. 32, &c. Nothing in God but what is godlike, *ib.* Question concerning his being, what issue, 33. See *Attributes*, *Deity*, *Praise*. God, what, ii. 4, 5. What idea given of God in certain religions, 7, 8. Ill character of a God, its consequences in respect to morality, 37, 38, 39, 40. How God can be said to witness for himself to men, 276, 277. Belief of a God, considered as powerful, 40. as worthy and good, 41.
- Gondibert*, iii. 283.
- Good*, how predominant in nature, ii. 178, 179. What is truly good, 185, 186. God of the whole, i. 32. Private good, what, 175. See *Interest*, *Pleasure*. Good, what, where found, 265, &c. Good and happiness, ii. 186, 187. iii. 162, &c. Opinion of good, *ib.*
- Goods* of fortune, and goods of the mind, compared, ii. 359, 360, &c.
- Goodness*, divine, i. 19. Opinion of goodness creates trust, i. 79. ii. 277. iii. 95. Goodness, what, in a sensible creature, ii. 14.
- Gorgias* Leontinus, i. 61.
- Goth*, i. 72. 75. Gothic influence in philosophy and religion,

I N D E X.

as well as arts, 301. Gothic government, iii. 125. Gothic notion, i. 72. Gothic poetry, 187, 188. Gothic architecture, 204. Gothic conqueror, conquered by spiritual arms, iii. 76.

Gothicism. See *Barbarians*, *Barbarism*.

Government absolute. See *Absolute*. Free government or constitution, i. 187. Definition, iii. 259. Origin or rise of civil government, ridiculous account of it, i. 92. See *State of nature*. Natural account, 93, 94. 203. &c. Civil government conforming and subordinate, 93. 204. Defied, insulted, embroiled, i. 312. iii. 75, 76.

Grace. See *Decorum*. The naturally graceful, i. 116. See *Beauty*, *Numbers*. Grace and action in human bodies, 164. Grace. See *Titles*.

Grammatical rules necessarily applicable to scripture, of whatever kind, iii. 189, 190.

Grandeess. See *Ministers*.

Grapes not from thorns, i. 247.

Gratitude, ii. 54, 55.

Gratuity, i. 197. See *Reward*.

Gravity, tried, proved, i. 7, 8. True and false, 9. Of the essence of imposture, 9, 10. Convenient gravity of this sort, iii. 275. See *Formality*, *Grimace*, *Solemnity*.

Great men. See *Ministers*. The great, great people, their influence on wit, and in the literate world, i. 5. 181, &c. Their character, ii, 113, 114.

Greece, fountain of arts, science, and politeness, i. 190. iii. 115, 116, 117. Early writers of Greece formed the public taste, i. 227, 228. Grecian religion, iii. 103, 104, &c. Manners, 126, 127. See *Athenians*.

Greek language, original beauty and refinement, iii. 116. &c.

Gregorius the Great, iii. 197, 198.

Grimace, religious and zealot kind, i. 54, 55. 61. 128, 129. See *Gravity*. Grimace, from constraint and perfection, 70.

Grotesque figures, i. 128, 129.

Guardian, honest, when, i. 107, 108.

I N D E X.

H.

H*alf-jesters*, i. 67.

Half-knave, thorough fool, i. 112, 113, 114.

Half-thinkers, iii. 248, 249. See *Thought*.

Harmony, such by nature, not by fashion or will, i. 303.

Natural harmony, how advanced, 205. Harmony, rules of, 120. See *Music*.

Haunt. See *Spectre*.

Heart, unsound, hollow, i. 36. A heart in lovers language, 117. Descent on the territories of the heart, 305.

Heart merely human, 307. Heart after the pattern of God almighty, *ib.* Numbers of the heart, iii. 28. Wisdom of, i. 239. See *Beauty*, *Character*. Heart makes the philosopher, iii. 134.

Heathen charity. See *Charity*.

Heathen church. See *Church*.

Hell, iii. 147. See *Devil*, *Gallows*, *Jail*.

Heraldry, i. 311.

Herald of fame, i. 194.

Hercules, ii. 54. Judgment of Hercules, the subject of it, iii. 290, 291. The principal figure in the piece, 298.

His different appearance in the several parts of the dispute, 292, 293. 298, 299. Herculean, law, i. 230.

Hereafter, a question with a sceptic, ii. 194. See *Future state*.

Heretic by birth, iii. 86. Good-humored man properly no heretic, 87.

Hermit, never by himself, i. 151.

Hero: Philosophic hero, i. 168. 171. Hero of the black tribe, 300.

Heroic prince, a character and story, i. 152. Heroic virtue. See *Virtue*. Heroic sign-post, i. 195.

Heroism and philanthropy, i. 96. Heroism in faith. See *Faith*, *Volunteer*.

Herodotus, iii. 203. Cited, 35.

Hierarchy, i. 73. iii. 39. See *Magi*, *Priest*. Its power in Persia, Ethiopia, Egypt, *ib.* Its growth over the civil

I N D E X.

- magistrate, 34. 39. Acquisition of lands and consequent dominion, *ib.* Certain law, permission, or indulgence, necessarily producing this effect, and fatal to the civil magistrate, 36, 37. 64, 65, 66. Establishment of the hierarchy over the monarchy, or state in the Egyptian, Ethiopian, Babylonian empires, 39, 40. Parallel effect in the Roman, 64. 66. 71, &c. Roman Christian and Catholic hierarchy, its growth under the universal Roman monarchy, 75. and afterwards over the barbarous nations, 75, 76. Its prevalency, policy, comprehensiveness, majesty, and grandeur, 77, 78. Affected pretenders, imitators, and copists after these originals, 88.
- History* compared with poetry, i. 125.
- History* of critics, i. 207, 208.
- Historian*, i. 105. 163. Disinterested, 194. See *Poet*.
- Historical*, truth. See *Truth*.
- Hobbes*, i. 74, &c. 79.
- Homer*, ii. 169. 182. His character, i. 180. iii. 26. Cited, iii. 127. Characters of his works, i. 169. iii. 26. 127. Father and prince of poets, iii. 26. i. 210. Age when he rose, 210. Revolution made by him, *ib.*
- Homerical* characters or personages, i. 170. 179. iii. 215, 216, &c. Homer understood how to lie in perfection, i. 297. iii. 215, 216, 217.
- Honest* in the dark, i. 107.
- Honesty*, its value, i. 103. Honesty and harmony reside together, 180. See *Integrity*, *Virtue*. Honesty the best policy, i. 113. iii. 170.
- Honors*. See *Titles*. Point of honor, ii. 160. Auctions or sales of honor, iii. 140. 173.
- Hope* and fear in religion, ii. 43. 46. &c. See *Future state*, *Reward and punishment*.
- Horace* cited, *passim*—Passages of Horace explained, i. 43. (*viz.* sat. 5. vers. 97.), iii. 167, 168. (*viz.* epist. 6. lib. 1. bis.), 205, 206, 207. (*viz.* epist. 20. sat. 1. lib. 2. &c. also his epistle to Augustus, lib. 2.), i. 233. Horace best genius and most gentleman-like of Roman poets, i. 282. His history, character, iii. 168. ii. 184.

I N D E X.

Horse, hound, hawk, &c. See *Beast*. Hobby-horse, i. 188.
Horseman and horsemanship, 167.

Hospitality, what kind of virtue, ii. 137. Ancient, Heathen, iii. 119, 120. See *Charity*, *Friendship*. Inhospitable disposition or hatred of foreigners, what sign, 128. Inhospitability, English, 126, 127.

Hot-cockles, iii. 242.

Hound, horse. See *Beast*.

Humility, what virtue, in religion and love, i. 284.

Humor, good-humor, best security against enthusiasm, i. 17. 46. Force of humor in religion, iii. 80, 81, 82. 89, &c. Ill-humor, cause of Atheism, i. 17, 18. Good-humor and imposture, enemies, 26, 27. Good humor proof of religion, 26. of wit, 61. A natural lenitive against vice, 110. Specific against superstition and enthusiasm, 110. 146. Humor and fancy, ill rule of taste, i. 291, 292. &c. iii. 136, 137, &c. Ill rule of good and ill, *ib.* & 165, 166.

Humors, as in the body, so in the mind, i. 10, 11.

Hydrophobia, i. 42.

Hylomania, iii. 54, 55.

Hypocrites, i. 69.

Hypothesis. See *System*. Fantastic hypothesis, ii. 156. iii. 133. Hypotheses, systems, destroyed, blown up, i. 73, 74. Religious hypotheses multiplied, iii. 38, 39.

I.

Jail, i. 107. iii. 147. See *Gallows*.

Janus face of zealot-writers, i. 54.

Ideas, simple, complex, adequate, &c. i. 248, 249, 250. 258, 259, 260. See *Metaphysics*. Comparison of mere ideas and articulate sounds, equally important, 249, 250. Examination of our ideas not pedantic, when, 268, 269. True and useful comparison, proof, and ascertainment of ideas, 258, 259, &c. Ideas innate, i. 41. 303, 304. ii. 34, &c. 332. iii. 30. 176, 177, &c. Not innate, of what kind, iii. 136. Ideas of the world,

I N D E X.

- pleasure, riches, &c. what, i. 259. See *Fancy*, *Opinion*.
- Ideal* world, iii. 175.
- Identity*, ii. 290, 291. 293, 294. iii. 159, &c.
- Idol-notions*, idolaters, i. 50. 306.
- Jephthah*, iii. 102.
- Jest*, true, false, i. 62. 67. 110, 111. See *Ridicule*.
- Jews*, a cloudy people, i. 24. 243. iii. 45, 46, &c. 95, 96. Sullen, bitter, persecuting, *ib.* Their character by God himself, iii. 46. Jews understanding, i. 244, 245. Disposition towards the darker superstitions, iii. 102. Jews, a chosen people, i. 307. iii. 67. Left to philosophy for instruction in virtue, i. 86.
- Jewish* people, originally dependent on the Egyptians, iii. 43.—50. Their rites, ceremonies, learning science, manners, how far derived thence, *ib.* How tenacious and bigotted in this respect, *ib.* Spirit of persecution and religious massacre, propagated from hence, *ib.* &c. 49, 50, 51. 67, 68. 71, 72, &c. See *Persecution*. Jewish princes, 95, 96, 97, 98.
- Ill*, whether really existent in the universe, ii. 3, 4. Absolute ill, what, 13. Relative ill, 13, 14. The appearances of ill no argument against the existence of a perfect sovereign mind, 300, 301. No real ill in things, 301. Appearance of ill necessary, 239, 240.
- Imitation* poetical, i. 167. See *Poet*. Works of imitation, how to be regulated, iii. 324, 325.
- Imperium in imperio*, i. 97.
- Impostors* speak the best of human nature, i. 79. See *Goodness*.
- Imposture* arraigned, i. 6. Hid under formality, 61. Essence of imposture, 7. Imposture fears not a grave enemy, 26. Strangely mixed with sincerity, hypocrisy, zeal, and bigotry, ii. 268, 269.
- Inchanter*, i. 299. See *Conjurer*, *Magi*, *Priest*.
- Indian* music and painting, i. 209. 292. Indian princes late ambassadors, iii. 281.
- Indolence*, i. 266. &c. Its dangerous consequences, ii. 130, 131.

I N D E X.

- Informers*, i. 108.
- Ingratitude*, a negative vice, ii. 138.
- Inhumanity* not compatible with good-breeding, ii. 135.
- Unnatural, *ib.*
- Inquiry* concerning virtue, Deity, &c. See vol. 2. treatise
1. and, i. 256. Occasion of this treatise, ii. 1, 2,
3. Its defence, 216.—232. Inquiry, freedom of, i. 28.
- Inquisition*, i. 16. 160. iii. 86.
- Inquisitors*, i. 54. Self-inquisitor, 160.
- Inspiration*, i. 4. 37. See *Poets, Prophets*. Inspiration a
divine enthusiasm, 45. Atheistical inspiration, iii. 54.
True and false, alike in their outward symptoms, i. 45.
Inspiration credited, how, iii. 32, 33. Judgment of the
inspired concerning their own inspiration, 53. 61 62.
202. See *Poets, Sibyls*.
- Instinct* from nature, ii. 341, 342. See *Ideas*.
- Intelligent* being, what contributes most to his happiness,
ii. 82, 83.
- Interest* governs the world, a false maxim, i. 98, 99.
Self-interest, ii. 64. Rightly and wrong taken, i. 243,
244. iii. 249, 250. Unwisely committed to the care of
others, iii. 132. How formed, i. 255. Varied, steered,
ib. True interest either wholly with honesty or villany,
111. 149. Judgment of true interest, i. 265. iii. 166.
Disinterestedness real, if virtue and goodness be such, i.
82, 83.
- Job*, i. 28.
- Jonah*, prophet, iii. 92. 94, 95.
- Joseph*, patriarch, education, character, iii. 48.
- Joshua*, i. 306, 307.
- Jove*, ii. 38, 39. 167.
- Journalists*: Journal des savans de Paris, iii. 14. Histoire
des ouvrages des savans, 15. Nouvelles de la république
des lettres, *ib.* Bibliothèque choisie, 15, 16. See
Bibliothèque choisie.
- Irony*, i. 60. See *Banter, Raillery*.
- Isis*, iii. 39.
- Isocrates*, iii. 232.

Italians,

I N D E X.

Italians, buffoons, i. 60. 110. Italian wit and authors, 288. 297. Italian taste, the best in painting, music, &c. 291, 292.

Judgment, preliminary right, i. 9. Previous judgment, 46.

Julian, emperor, i. 20. iii. 72, 73, 74, 75. His letter to the Bostrens, iii. 73.

Jupiter. See *Jove*.

Just and unjust acknowledged, ii. 347.

Justin, historian, iii. 45. 48.

Juvenal explained, i. 87, &c. Cited, i. 58. 90. 108. 219. iii. 19. 34. 42. 147. 227.

K.

K*Ind*, species, union with a kind, ii. 63. Opposed by self-interest 64.

Kings. See *Court*, *Great*, *Monarchy*, *Princes*.

Knave, natural and civil, i. 93. By what principle different from the faint, or how distinguished from the honest man 107, &c. 150, 151. Knave incapable of enjoyment, 112, Betrays himself, however able, iii. 253. Knaves in principle, in practice, i. 79. Knave, no quarrel with religion, *ib.* Half-knave, thorough fool, i. 112, 113, 150. ii. 114. Zealot-knave, i. 113, 114. See *Zeal*. Court-knaves, iii. 140, &c. Knaves, friends to moderation, in what sense, i. 96. Knave, young, middle-aged, old iii. 147, &c.

Knavery, mere dissonance and disproportion, i. 180. See *Dishonesty*.

Knavish indulgence, the consequences, i. 103, 104. 112, 113. 149. 267. iii. 251, 252. Knavish religion, iii. 103. See *Religion*.

Knight-errantry, i. 15. See *Chivalry*, *Gallantry*.

Knights-templar, growing to be an over-match for the magistrate, i. 72. Extirpated, *ib.* See *Hierarchy*, *Magophony*.

I N D E X.

Knowledge, first principle, previous, i. 33, 34, &c. 46.
232. 287, 288. Knowledge of men and things, true
philosophy, how learned, i. 103, 104.

L.

Ladies, fainted, worshipped, deified, i. 235. 284, 285.
ii. 160, 161. See *Chivalry*, *Gallantry*. English ladies
seduced by tales and impostures, i. 299, 300. Type or
prophecy of this in our ancient stage-poet, 299. See
Sex, *Superstition*, *Women*.

Lampoons, i. 229.

Lands. See *Agrarian*, *Property*. Religious land-bank, iii.
36, 37, &c.

Latitude of thought, iii. 247, 248, &c.

Latitudinarians, iii. 247.

Laugh, half-way, i. 67. Both ways, iii. Laugh wrong
turned, iii. 245. See *Ridicule*. Men not to be laughed
out of their wits, i. 81. Men laughed out of and into
religion, iii. 241, 242. Difference in seeking what to
laugh at, and what deserves laughter, i. 110. Laugh,
mutual, and in turn, 128.

Laws, royal counsellors in our English constitution, i. 183.
Guardian-laws, 189. Religion by law established, 311.
iii. 59, 86. 191. 261. 281, 282, 283. See *Mysteries*,
Revelation, *Rites*. Heraldry by law established, i. 312.
Herculean law, 230.

Laziness, i. 267. See *Indolence*.

Learning, passion for learning or science ranked with natural
affection, ii. 85, 86.

Legitimate work or piece, in writing, i. 289. iii. 1. 23.

Leon, St. iii. 76.

Letters. See *Epistles*.

Leviathan hypotheses, i. 74. See *Hobbes*, *Wolf*.

Liberal arts. See *Arts*. Liberal education, ii. 52. Liberal
and illiberal service, 44. 52.

Liberty of criticism, iii. 221. 261, 262. See *Critics*.
Liberty civil, philosophical, or moral, personated, ii.

I N D E X.

207. Abuse of the notion of liberty in morals and government, iii. 254.—257, &c. Liberty of the will, i. 154, &c. Liberty or free disposition to follow the first motion of the will, is the greatest slavery, 183. ii. 190. Liberty philosophical, moral, ii. 207, &c. 359, &c. iii. 167. 254, 255, 256, &c. Protestant liberty. See *Protestant*. Liberty, See *British*, *Constitution*, *English*, *Government*. Its patrons, well-wishers, i. 4, 5. Consequence of its rise and fall, 188, &c. Liberty in conversation, 62. False censured, 6, 7. See *Freedom*, *Wit*. Prejudice against liberty, 75. Arts, sciences, and virtues, its dependents, 52, 53. 60. 81. 189, &c. See *Arts*, *Sciences*, *Virtue*.
- Lies*, judiciously composed, teach truth in the best manner, i. 297. Homer perfect in this science, *ib.* & iii. 215, &c.
- Life*, its value, i. 103. 106. 260. Living well, or good living, false sense of the phrase, 106. Living fast, false application of the phrase, i. 271. ii. 104, 105. Life sometimes a misery, ii. 116. Over-love of life contrary to the interest of a creature, 116.—120. Future life, the belief, of what advantage, 47—52.
- Lineage* of philosophy and poetry, i. 205, 219. &c. iii. 113, 114, 115. &c.
- Livy*, the historian, i. 40.
- Logic* of modern schools, i. 247, 248. 287, 288. 301.
- Looking-glass*, vocal, i. 148. Magical pocket looking-glass, 169. Looking-glass to the age, 172. 176. False looking-glasses, iii. 244, 245.
- Love*. See *Charity*. Love of friends, ii. 196. Love of mankind 198. Love of one's country, iii. 119.—125, &c. Love of order and perfection, ii. 174. Love imperfect and narrow, generous and equal, iii. 119, 120, &c. See *Affection*. Public love, i. 30. See *Public*. Love, highest, noblest, ii. 174, &c. Divine love, 201. See *Enthusiasm*. Love, dangerous sophister, i. 158, 159. Passion of love in the sexes, 153, &c. Subject the most affecting, in the passion of love between the sexes, ii.

I N D E X.

- 87, 88. Flattery of love, i. 118, 119. Religious love between the sexes, iii. 31. Love cruelly treated by Epicurus, 25, 26. Self-love, ii. 46. Its effects in religion, 47, 48. Silly reasoning about self-love by pretended wits, i. 75. 100, 101, 102. See *Self*. Religion and love, 285. Gallant love, and religious charity of a certain kind, compared, iii. 95.
- Lover*, martyr. See *Martyr*. Lover solitary, i. 152. Story of a heroic lover, 153, &c. Lovers pursuit and enjoyment, of what kind, 265. See *Enjoyment*.
- Luke*, St, cited, commented, iii. 202.
- Lucretius*, i. 43. 100. iii. 26.
- Luxury*, i. 267. 271. 275, &c. ii. 122, 123, &c. iii. 164, 165. 250, 251.
- Lycurgus*, iii. 204.
- Lymphatics*, i. 42. See *Enthusiasm*, *Fanatics*.
- Lysias*, orator, iii. 232.

M.

- M***achine*, in epic and dramatic, i. 308. World a machine, ii. 279.
- Madman*, real, how, i. 277—281, &c.
- Mæcenæ*, i. 190. 233. iii. 17. 205, 206.
- Magi of Persia*, &c. i. 72. Their power, iii. 40. See *Hierarchy*.
- Magicians*. See *Magi*.
- Magic*, moral, i. 117. Magic of enthusiasm, iii. 23.
- Magistrate*, his duty and becoming part in religion, i. 6. 13. 15. ii. 215. iii. 86, 87, &c. Executioner to the priest, when, i. 54, iii. 91, 92. A dresser, i. 70. Dressed in his own turn, *ib.* See *Government*, *Hierarchy*. Civil magistrate insulted, i. 312. iii. 75, 76. Controlled, iii. 36. Overawed, 38. Deposed, sentenced, 39, 40.
- Magnificence*, true and false, i. 119, 120.
- Magophony*, Persian, i. 72, &c. Ethiopian, iii. 40. European and Christian, i. 71, 72.
- Mahometism*, iii. 86. Mahometan clergy, 194, 195.

I N D E X.

Malice, only where interests are opposed, i. 33. None in the general mind, nor in mere nature, *ib.*

Malignity, passion unnatural, ii. 136.

Man, a good, an ill, ii. 13, 14. Formidable, in what sense, 76. Subject to nature, ii. 249. Why no wings, 249, 250. Man's excellency different from that of a brute, 253. Why man has not the same instincts which are in brutes, 254, 255. Whether sociable by nature, 257, &c. Whether a man can be accounted a wolf to a man, 265. Absurdity of that saying, *ib.* Man's dignity and interest, 351. Different manners of men 356, &c.

Mankind, how corrupt, ii. 162, 163.

Manners, poetic, and truth, iii. 215—219. See *Poet*, *Truth*.

Marsham's chronicle canon, iii. 44, 45. 103, 104.

Martyrdom, i. 22, &c. iii. 102.

Martyrs for Atheism, i. 75, 76. iii. 53. Pro and con, for any opinion, iii. 33. Amorous, heroic, religious martyrs, ii. 87. iii. 28.

Mask. See *Carnival*.

Mass, i. 21.

Massacre. See *Magophony*.

Masters in exercises and philosophy, i. 165. Masters in mechanics. See *Mechanics*. Young masters of the world, i. 89. 183.

Mathematical demonstration in morals. See *Morals*.

Mathematics, i. 15. Delightful, whence, ii. 85. necessary, i. 249. modest, *ib.*

Matter, whole and parts, ii. 305. Not capable of real simplicity, 292. Not constitutive of identity, *ib.* Substance material, immaterial, 293. Matter and thought, how mutually affecting or productive, 244. 305, &c.

Maximus Tyrius cited, ii. 244. iii. 26.

Mechanics, masters in, i. 202, 203.

Mechanic forms, beauties, i. 117, 118. See *Palaces*.

Mechanism, human, i. 28. 253. Divine, ii. 279, 280.

Medea, iii. 259.

I N D E X.

- Meditation* rural-philosophical, ii. 285. Meditations published, i. 142. Meditation imposing, conceited, pedantic, 142, 143. 294, 295. Meditation in the praise of a Deity, ii. 285, 286. upon the works of Nature, 303—311. upon the elements, 312—315. upon the variety of seasons and climates, 316—324.
- Melancholy*, a pertinacious and religious complexion, iii. 56. Melancholy in religion, love, i. 10. Power of melancholy in religion, iii. 55. Devout melancholy, i. 17. 26. 37. iii. 55. 56. Treatises of melancholy, iii. 24. See *Enthusiasm*, *Religion*.
- Memoirs*, i. 141. Memoir-writing, 173. 194. 297. See *Miscellany*.
- Memory*, τὸ ἐμνημόνευτον, i. 124.
- Menander*, i. 212. iii. 197.
- Mental* enjoyment, whence, ii. 82, 83. 96—105.
- Mercenariness*, i. 108. See *Reward*.
- Merit* in believing. See *Belief*.
- Messias*, iii. 65. See *Monarchy*.
- Metaphor*, or metaphoric style or manner, i. 208, &c.
- Metaphysics*, i. 250. 258, 259. ii. 294. iii. 160, 161. Metaphysics, necessary knowledge of nothing knowable or known, iii. 174.
- Metaphysicians*, their character, i. 250, 251.
- Metaphysical* articles of belief, i. 264.
- Milo*, ii. 252.
- Milton*, i. 238. 308.
- Mimes*, i. 167. iii. 236. See *Imitation*, *Mimicry*.
- Mimicry*, i. 170. Mimographer, *ib*.
- Mind*, free, i. 111. A kingdom, iii. 170. Beauty of the mind, i. 118. Value of a mind, ii. 364. iii. 139, 140. 170. Its inward proportion, ii. 66, 67. Mind, particular minds prove an universal one, 294, 295. Universal mind, how proved, 240.
- Minister* of state, i. 30. 166. Ministers of state concerned for their character and memory, 195. Conduct necessary to preserve them, 196, &c. Claim of the people over them, *ib*. Dangerous conceit of ministers and great men,

I N D E X.

198. Ministers Mæcenas's, 186. Good minister, how to be valued and judged, 19.
- Ministry*, good, in England, iii. 123, 124. The new, the old, 173. Ill and slavish ministry, of what consequence, 125, 126.
- Miracles*, scriptural, traditional, i. 3. Modern, i. 37. iii. 58. Christian, Moorish, Pagan, i. 297, &c. Past, present, ii. 275. The danger of believing new miracles, 272, 273. Whether miracles can witness for God or men, 274, 275. Mere miracles insufficient proof of divinity or revelation, ii. 276, iii. 94, 95. Merry miracle, iii. 101.
- Mirror*. See *Looking-glass*.
- Misanthropy*, what kind of passion, ii. 136. Sometimes, in a manner, national, ii. 136. iii. 126, 127.
- Miscellanarian* authors, their policy and art, iii. 239. Miscellanies, 1, 2, 3, &c. Miscellaneous memoir, essay-writing, style, and manner, *ib.* & 79, 80. 187. See *Essay*, *Memoir*. Miscellaneous collections, annual, iii. 227.
- Modes* of religion, i. 70.
- Models*, current, of religion, i. 70. Models for poetry and writing, 178. See *Exemplar*.
- Moderation* philosophical, iii. 30. When in fashion with the zealots of every party, 92, 93. Moderation disclaimed, 283. Moderation in a writer, i. 229.
- Monarch*, grand, now, and of old in Greece, i. 193.
- Monarchy*. See *Hierarchy*. Monarchy universal, i. 187. 190, 191. iii. 19. See *Barbarians*, *Tyranny*. Absolute monarchy destructive of arts, manhood, reason, sense, i. 189, 190. 205, &c. iii. 18, 19. 64, &c. World groaning under the Roman Monarchy, iii. 64, 65. Hopes of a divine deliverer or Messiah from hence, 65. See *Emperor*, *Roman*.
- Monarchs*, ii. 113, 114.
- Monosyllables* in files or strings, iii. 219. Clash or clattering rencounter of them in our language, *ib.*

I N D E X.

- Monstrous* imaginations, i. 50. *Monstrous* objects and taste, i. 296. 298, &c. iii. 130, 131.
- Moon*, ambassadors from it, iii. 281. *Moon* and planets, ii. 309, &c. Traveller from the moon, 163.
- Moorish* hero, i. 298.
- Moor* of Venice, play, i. 299, &c.
- Morals*, rule and distinction of revelation, i. 256. Difference about morals, 57, 58. *Morals* interwove with political religious institutions, 73. Brought into disgrace, 75. See *Charity*. New forgers of morals, 114. *Moral* magic, 117. *Morals* and government, how related 90, 91. *Morals* essential to poetical performance, 239. See *Manners*, *Poetic truth*. *Morals* mathematically demonstrated, ii. 142, &c. iii. 161, &c. 176, &c. See *Philosophy*.
- Moral sense*, rise of it, ii. 21. 41, &c. Foundation in nature, 342, 343, &c. Whether it can be perfectly lost in any rational creature, 32. Impaired by opposite affection, 33. Not by opinion merely, 34. Corruption of moral sense, 36. Causes of this corruption, 36—41. Rise of moral sense, antecedent to the belief of a God, 142. *Moral* inquiries, why out of fashion, 152. *Moral* excellence, i. 32. *Moral* Venus and graces, 289. *Moral* species. See *Species*. *Moral*, the word, in painting, signifies the representation of the passions, iii. 316.
- The Moralists*, viz. treatise, 5. p. 149, &c. criticised, iii. 236. *Moralists*, the fashionable sort, i. 70. 106. See *Philosophy*, *Virtue*.
- More*, Dr. iii. 54, 55, 56.
- Moroseness*, i. 19.
- Moses*, i. 307. Character and life, iii. 43, 44, 45, 46. 96. 203.
- Mountebanks*, modern Prometheus, ii. 168. *Mountebanks*. See *Empirics*.
- Mummius*, i. 235.
- Muse*, i. 1. 4. 5. Divine, orthodox, 309. *Muses* what, in the Heathen creed, 4, 5. British muses, 187—193. In their cradle, 187. 226. Lispingspeech, 187. Hobby-horse and rattle, 188. *Muses*, tutoresses, 190. Favorites,

I N D E X.

- i. 194. Chief recorders, *ib.* Muses degraded by Epicurus, iii. 26. Muses personating the passions, virtues, and vices, i. 269—275, &c. Profane mistresses in respect of sacred letters, 308.
- Music* barbarian, i. 209. Just, real, independent on caprice or will, 303. See *Harmony*.
- Musician* ashamed of praise from the unskilful, i. 35. Delighted with examination and criticism, 203. Musician-legislators, 205.
- Mystery* makes any opinion become considerable, i. 76. Gives rise to party-sects, *ib.* Mysteries by law established, 309. Religious mysteries, 310. Mysteries debated, iii. 8, 9. Sacred mysteries inviolable with our author, and, as such, unnamed by him, 58. 261. Mysteries the most absurd, how introduced into the church, 275, 276, 277.
- Mystical* love, ii. 173. 200.
- Mystics*, ii. 173. 200. Consequences of their indiscreet zeal, 223, 224. Mystics, i. 152. See *Quietists*.
- Mythology*, i. 308. Mythological or fabulous style of our blessed Saviour, iii. 101.

N.

N*astiness.* See *Cleanliness*.

- National* church, i. 13. See *Church*. National opinion, 6.
- Natural* affection, confessed, i. 71. See *Affection*. The natural and unnatural in things, iii. 176, 177, &c.
- Natural ideas. See *Ideas*, *Instinct*.
- Nature*, its energy, ii. 298. Nature in man, 248. In brutes, 249. Its admirable distribution, 254, 255. State of nature, imaginary, fantastical, i. 92, 93. ii. 257—267. See *Society*. Nature, Divinity with Epicurus, iii. 53, 54. See *Epicurus*. Power of nature in moral actions and behaviour, i. 76. ii. 106. *Naturam expellas furca*, iii. 178. Nature will not be mocked, i. 304. Has a strong party within ourselves, *ib.* Makes reprisals on her antagonists, *ib.* Prerogative of nature, *ib.*

I N D E X.

Nero, i. 19. 89. iii. 19.

Nobility, Polish-English, iii. 125. Young noblemen, i. 87, 88, 89, 90. Young noblemen, English, iii. 140, 141, 142, &c. 179, 180.

Nose, discernment or sense, in morals, life, &c. i. 107. See *Sense Taste*. Noses counted, 127.

Novels, sweet natural pieces, highly in vogue, ii. 160. iii. 210, 211. See *Chivalry*, *Gallantry*.

Numbers and proportion, i. 120. 289. Numbers of life, 121. See *Beauty*, *Proportion*.

Nympholepti, i. 41. See *Fanatics*.

O.

O*Economy* of the animal races, ii. 74, 75, 76. 107, 108, &c. 248—253, &c. 263—267. iii. 182, 183, &c. See *Society*.

Olympics, ancient, modern, i. 232. Olympic games, and congress of Greece, iii. 115.

Omnipotence, what, i. 33. ii. 4, 5. 46. 56, 57, &c. 167, 168. 298, &c. What not, i. 90, 91. ii. 8.

Opinion. See *Doctrine*, *Hypothesis*. National, or by inheritance, i. 6. iii. 86. Governor, and governed, i. 160. Ground of passion, 253, &c. Principle of conduct, 265. Opinion all in all, ii. 361, &c. iii. 155, 156, 157, &c. Freedom in examining our own opinions, as well as the opinions of others, i. 49, 50. Corrupt opinion cause of wrong, ii. 24, 25. Opinion and fashion supposed measure of virtue and vice, i. 66, 67. 302. ii. 345, &c. Life regulated by opinion, 361, 362, 363.

Oracle, i. 108. Divine oracles guardianship, 309. Heathen and Christian oracles, ii. 274, 275. iii. 192—200, &c.

Oration. See *Declamation*, *Preaching*, *Rhetoric*.

Orator, i. 139. Orators, 230.

Order, principle of, universal, ii. 299, 300. Love of order, 174. Study and contemplation of it, a natural joy, inclination and affection in man, 85, 86. Order and Providence, 227, 228. in writing. See *Style*.

I N D E X.

Ornament independent, to be cautiously employed in the action of Hercules, iii. 320. The emblematic and historical not to be confounded, *ib.* An objection concerning it answered, 320, 321. False ornaments to be avoided, 325. *Orthodoxy*, casual, fortunate, iii. 86, &c. Orthodox muse, i. 308. Orthodoxy of the author, iii. 58, 59. 241, 242. Orthodox divine, or churchman, 8, 9.

Osiris, iii. 39.

Ovid cited, iii. 120.

P.

P *Ace.* See *Amble*.

Pageant of state, i. 176. Court-pageant, iii. 153.

Pain and pleasure mixed, ii. 193.

Paint. See *Fucus*.

Painter of history, to fix his date, iii. 294. Not at liberty to mingle actions of different dates, *ib.* Test of his judgment, 297, 298. Not to make his action theatrical; but according to nature, 307. The same qualifications necessary in him as in a poet, 325. Painters, ill, compared with like poets, i. 195. Painter put to his shift, 177. Painters: Raphael, i. 291. iii. 190. Carache, i. 291. Painters after the life, iii. 243. Face-painters, i. 125. Painting and painters, 123, 124, &c. Master-painter, 170. 178. 196. Battle-painter, 174. See *Artists*, *Statuary*.

Painting, false taste in, i. 291. True taste how gained, *ib.* Dignity, severity, austerity of the art, *ib.* 292. Style in painting, ii. 153. Simplicity and unity of style and coloring, i. 123, 124. 292. Unity and truth of design, the εὐσύννοπον 124 & 304. Greatness, 124, 125. Ancient masters, *ib.* 292, 293. False taste and corruption of the art, whence, *ib.* Grotesque painting, iii. 5. Imposture in painting, 190. Pretended heavenly style and divine hand disproved, *ib.* Painting of history, the regulation of it, 289, 290.

I N D E X.

- Palaces* and their ornaments, i. 119. iii. 143, 144, 145.
See *Beauty*.
- Palestine*, the country, its superstitions, iii. 102, 103.
See *Jew*, *Syria*.
- Pan*, i. 12, 13, 14. Panic fear, *ib.* Panic rage or popular
fury, *ib.* Religious panic, *ib.* & iii. 55, 56, 57. Panic
fear for the church, iii. 69, 70, 71. Panic zeal, *ib.*
& 57. i. 36, 37.
- Panegyrics* the worst of satires, i. 195. Panegyrics, English
229, &c. Panegyric games, 231. Herculean law, or
club-method in panegyric, 230. Panegyrics modern,
iii. 226.
- Parables*, double meaning to amuse, i. 52.
- Paracelsus*, i. 248.
- Parasites*, i. 29. See *Sycophants*.
- Paris*, judgment of, how distinguished from that of Hercules,
iii. 299.
- Parody*, i. 171. 212. See *Comedy*.
- Parterre*. See *Palace*.
- Passion*, genealogy of the passions, i. 98, 99. 254. Study
of the passions, i. 254, 255. iii. 25, 26, 27. Belle
passion, i. 3. iii. 25. Heroic passion of the devout, i. 15.
Oeconomy of the passions, ii. 74, 75, 76, &c. See
Oeconomy. Passion too strong or too weak, 74. Human
and weak passion deified, i. 31. ii. 211. iii. 254. Passion,
how the change of it may be expressed in a subject,
iii. 295, 296.
- Patch-work*, iii. 3, 4.
- Patent*, letters-patent, iii. 280.
- Patentees* for authorship, i. 288. for religion, iii. 280.
- Patria*: Non ille, &c. i. 105. Dulce & decorum, 86.
The word wanting in our language, iii. 124.
- Patriot*, i. 85. Bought and sold, iii. 140, &c. Patriots
of the soil, 125.
- Patrons*, modern, i. 198. 231, 232. 262.
- Paul*, St. his character, i. 24, 25. iii. 61. 62. 69, &c.
Style, iii. 69, &c. 279. Cited, i. 21. 86. 243. 256.
iii. 197. 202. St. Paul allows to the Heathen their own

I N D E X.

- prophets, iii. 197, 198. Cites their poets with honor, *ib.*
- Pedagogue*, i. 60. See *Pedant*, *Tutor*.
- Pedant* baited, iii. 11. *Pedant* and pupil, i. 104. *Pedant*. See *Pedagogue*, *Scholastic*, *University*, *Zealot*.
- Pedantry* a millstone, i. 55. *Pedantry* in conversation, 57. *Pedantry* opposed to true knowledge, 104.
- Pencil*, sacred, or heaven guided, iii. 190. See *Painting*.
- Penmen*, gladiatorian, iii. 10.
- People*, naturally good judges of the poet, i. 239.
- Perfection* of workmanship, i. 285. 289, 290.
- Peripatetic* philosophy, genius, i. 220, 221. Author de mundo, ii. 176, 177, iii. 218.
- Persecution*, ii. 27. iii. 95. In Arcadia, i. 16. Unknown to the polite Heathen world, ii. 137, 138. iii. 127. How begun, i. 19, 20. iii. 49, 50. 72, 73, &c. See *Ægypt*, *Jews*. Romish persecution, of any other the most tolerable, and of best grace and countenance, iii. 78, 79. 86. 88. Persecution of features, airs, complexions, miens, i. 70.
- Persian* empire and hierarchy, iii. 39. See *Hierarchy*.
- Persius*, i. 140. 147, 148. 164. 271. iii. 131. 259, 260.
- Perspective*, the rules of it reversed in sculpture, iii. 317.
- Persuasion*, goddesses, i. 205, &c. Mother of Music, poetry, and other arts, *ib.* Sister to liberty, *ib.* Men persuade themselves into whatever opinions, iii. 257.
- Petronius* cited, i. 166.
- Petulancy*, wanton mischievousness, unnatural, ii. 135.
- Phænomena* in scripture, i. 243. Moral phænomena, *ib.*
- Phallica*, i. 216. See *Farce*.
- Phenix-señ*, i. 22.
- Philip*, i. 215.
- Philologists*, i. 208. 212. ii. 244.
- Philosophers*, savage, i. 75. 80. 206, 207. See *Clown*. Moral philosophers of a modern sort, more ignorant and corrupt than the mere vulgar, i. 113. 303, iii. 169. Run a tale-gathering, i. 300. Philosophers, their original and rise, 208. Posterior in birth to poets, musicians, critics, sophists, *ib.* iii. 113. Philosophers themselves critics of

I N D E X.

- a double kind, i. 208, &c. Philosopher ancient schools dissolved, iii. 66. Philosophers and bear-garden, 7, 8, &c.
- Philosophy*, modern, i. 104, 105, 106. iii. 255. Ancient, i. 14. 104, 105. Home-spun, 36. 312. Mastership in life in manners, iii. 132. Its state and liberty in the ancient world, i. 14. Philosophical speculations innocent, 81. See *Doctrine*, *Hypothesis*. Philosophy, where confined now-a-days, i. 287. ii. 151. Its study incumbent on every man, i. 277, &c. ii. 363, &c. Philosophy speculative and practical, i. 251, &c. Vain, or solid, 256, &c. Guide to virtue in all religions, 85, 86. Balance against superstition, 14. Philosophy judge of religion, 256. of herself, and of every thing besides, 257. Majesty of philosophy, 258. Philosophy appealed to by all, 246. Standard or measure of trust, friendship, or merit, in men, *ib.* Genuine and false fruits, 247. Unhappy mixture or conjunction of philosophy with religion, iii. 51, 52. 63. Monstrous issue and product of this union, 66, 67, &c. Dry philosophy, 158. Vocal philosophy, i. 248. Ideal philosophy. See *Idea*. Lineage of philosophy and poetry. See *Lineage*. Philosophy of the words, ii. 354.
- Physician* iii. 150. Physicians in the body-politic, i. 11.
- Physiologists*. See *Metaphysicians*.
- Piece*, (work, treatise), legitimate, illegitimate, i. 289. iii. 1. 2.
- Pilate*, Pontius, iii. 200.
- Planets*. See *Moon*. Planetary system, ii. 13. 307. &c.
- Plate*, embossed with satyrs, fawns, &c. proper to accompany the figure of Pleasure, iii. 322.
- Plato*, i. 51. iii. 64. 204. 231. Cited, i. 45.
- Platonists*, latter sort, i. 14.
- Plays*, theatrical, how frequented, i. 229. See *Comedy*, *Theatre*, *Tragedy*. Plays, vulgar. See *Foot-ball*, *Hot-cockles*.
- Pleasing*, sensations i. 105, &c.
- Pleasure*, whether our good, i. 265. ii. 187, 188. iii. 166, 167, &c. All pleasure not to be reckoned as good, ii. 189, 190. Enjoyments of reason not really compre-

I N D E X.

hended in the notion of pleasure, 191, 192. Pleasure no rule of good, i. 266. 292. Pleasures of the mind greater than those of the body, ii. 81, 82. Sensual pleasure, who the properest judge of it, 83, 84. Sensual pleasures dependent on social and natural affection, 103, 104, 105. Distasteful, inconstant, and insupportable without it, 106, 107. Unnatural pleasure in general, its effects, 137, 138. Pleasure, luxury, 122, 123. See *Luxury*. Understanding in pleasure, i. 120. Rule and order in pleasure, *ib.* Men of pleasure, forced to acknowledge virtue, *ib.* See *Poets*. Pleasure, solicits Hercules in opposition to Virtue, iii. 291. Is first heard, 293. Her figure to be drawn silent, 308. Her posture and ornament, 308, 309.

Pliny cited, i. 124. iii. 132.

Plum, cant-word among rich knaves, i. III.

Plutarch, i. 287. Cited, i. 34. 45. iii. 103, &c. 231.

Pneumatophobia, iii. 53.

Poem heroic, epic, See *Homer*, i. 307, &c. iii. 215, &c. Not to be modelled on holy writ, i. 307, &c.

Poet, character of a poet and poetry from Strabo, i. 180. Poet, second maker, 179. Poet, herald of fame, 194. Ill poets worse than ill painters, 195. Poets preferable to most philosophers, i. 104. iii. 245, 255. More instructive than historians, i. 297. Morality of poets, i. 117. iii. 255, 256. Poets acknowledge virtue, i. 117, 118. Strongest party on virtue's side, 273. Poets, enthusiasts, i. 1, &c. iii. 54, 55. 191, 192. Friends to revelation, i. 1—5. French poets, 189. Modern poets or poetical writers affected, and false in their draughts or imitations, i. 175. iii. 239, &c. Conceited, combined, iii. 228, &c. Injudicious, i. 179. Impotent *ib.* English poets, of a preceding age, iii. 229, 230. Of the present 230, &c. Audience forms the poet, i. 228. Poet, how far of necessity a philosopher, and true to virtue and morals, i. 238, 239. iii. 232, 233. Divine or orthodox poets, i. 4. 307, 308. iii. 98. 191—197, &c. Orthodox mock-poets, iii. 198, 199. Poets fanatics, i. 42. Poets in-

I N D E X.

- inspired, i. 4. 42. iii. 54, 55. 189, 190, &c. 196, 197.
 Poet. See *Author*.
Poetess, English, ii. 194.
Poetical enthusiasm, i. 16. Poetical genius, 139. Poetical
 imitation, 166, 167, &c. Poetical truth. See *Truth*.
 Poetic science, 122 — 128.
Poetry. See *Muses*. Lineage of poetry and philosophy.
 See *Lineage*. Sacred wit and poetry, iii. 97. Indifferent
 poetry, detestable, 233, 234. Art of poetry, an English
 poem, 232. Poetry epic or dramatic, incompatible with
 orthodox divinity, i. 305, 306, 307.
Point, jingle or pun, i. 288.
Points of wit, iii. 4. 215, 216, 217.
Point of honor, ii. 160. See *Duel*, *Gallantry*.
Poison to reason, i. 77.
Policy, British and Dutch, Turkish and French, i. 66.
Politeness owing to liberty, i. 53. 60. 81. See *Liberty*.
 Flux and reflux of politeness, i. 234.
Politicians, i. 163.
Politics, part of morals, ii. 151.
Polytheist, definition, ii. 6.
Pope Clement XI. iii. 199. See *Gregorius*, *Leon*.
Popery. See *Church*, *Mass*, *Rome*, *Priest*.
Post-way of writers. See *Correctness*, *Writers*.
Power, balance of, i. 80.
Praise of the Deity, i. 35, &c. Qualifications for such
 praise, *ib*. Value of praise or glory from the ignorant, *ib*.
 Value of forced praise or applause, *ib*. True praise how
 learned, *ib*.
Preaching, i. 57, 58, 59. 115. 143. iii. 82. 247, 248.
 Elegant and gross, iii. 93, 94. Fashionable and unfash-
 ionable, *ib*. Solemn, melancholy, i. 115. Various-
 ly humored, alternate, high and low, iii. 108. See *Decla-*
mation, *Pulpit*.
Preconception, ii. 254, 255. 342. See *Anticipation*.
Prefaces, dedications, &c. i. 173. 200. 262. iii. 22.
 Preface become a word to signify excuse, i. 283.
Prelate, i. 3. See *Bishop*.

Presensation.

I N D E X.

- Presensation.* See *Preconception*.
- Press*, printing-press, i. 263. See *Printer*.
- Priests*, consecrated by the magistrate, i. 311. iii. 279.
 Their faction, sedition, and engagement of mankind in
 their quarrels, iii. 43. 49, 50. 66. 70, 71, 72. 280, 281.
 Their love of blood, i. 23. Propagation and increase of
 the priesthood, manner and consequence, iii. 36—42, &c.
 Model of the Egyptian and Asiatic priesthoods, and
 difference from the European, or that of Greece, or Rome,
 36—53. See *Hierarchy*.
- Prince.* See *Absolute*. Story of an heroic prince, i. 152. &c.
 Princes use the plural style, whence, 181, &c. Prince-authors,
 184.
- Princely.* See *Royal*.
- Principle*, one universally active, ii. 302, 303.
- Printer*, iii. 14. See *Amanuensis*, *Bookseller*.
- Printing*, free, i. 263.
- Prodicus*, ii. 209.
- Prometheus*, poetical solution of the phænomenon of ill,
 ii. 158. 165. Poet a Prometheus, i. 179.
- Proof.* See *Criterion*, *Test*, *Trial*.
- Prophecy* catching, i. 37, 38. The evil as well as the
 good spirit, i. 38. iii. 96. Prophecy or prophet-errant,
 processional, saltant, iii. 96, 97. Naked prophecy, *ib.*
- Prophet*, the name allowed to Heathens, iii. 197. Prophets.
 passive organs, i. 23. Modern prophets, 38, 39, &c.
 Compared with ancient, *ib.*
- Property*, dominion founded in, iii. 41.
- Proportion* and symmetry founded in nature, not in opinion
 or fancy, i. 303. See *Architecture*, *Symmetry*.
- Protestant* authors, iii. 15, 16. Protestant liberty, 194.
 265. 273 — 277.
- Public*, i. 30. See *Constitution*. Public assemblies. See
Assemblies.
- Pulpit*, i. 25, 26. iii. 211. 220. 238. See *Preaching*.
- Punishments and rewards*, of what use in the state, i. 107,
 108. ii. 50, 51. In families, 51. In religion, 52.
- Puns.* See *Point*, *University*.

I N D E X.

Pupil. See *Pedant*, *Royal*, *Tutor*.
Puppets, in dialogue, iii. 242. See *Dialogue*
Puppet-show, i. 23.
Pyrrho, *Pyrrhonist*, ii. 294. iii. 161. 176. See *Sceptic*.
Pyrrhus, i. 280.
Pythagoras, iii. 63. 105. 168.
Pythagorean sect, i. 14.
Pythian god, i. 107. *Prophetess*. See *Sibyl*.

Q.

Q *Queen Elizabeth*, iii. 125.
Quibble. See *Point*, *Pun*.
Quietists, iii. 31. 77.

R.

R *Railery*, sober use of it, i. 110. Defensive railery, 50, 51. Opposition to banter, i. 52. iii. 186. Gross fort and refined, i. 52, 53. iii. 186, 187. See *Ridicule*.
Socratic railery, i. 168. 171. Railery affected by grave doctors, i. 53. iii. 241. Grim railery, *ib.* See *Burlesque*.
Spirit of railery, why prevalent in certain conversations, i. 80, 81. Why carried into the extreme, 60. Nothing proof against railery, but what is honest and just, 61, 62.
Rake a better character than that of certain grave and thoughtful gentlemen, iii. 250.
Reader, courteous, uncourteous, i. 261, 262.
Reading, wrong choice and manner, i. 294, 295, &c. Multiplicity of reading, *ib.* Task reading, *ib.* Surfeiting, 295. Polite reading and converse, chief qualifications in a character, 312. Gothic and barbarous reading, 296, &c.
Realist in morality, ii. 221.
Reason, its nourishment, health, i. 57, 58, &c. Its antidote, poison, 77. Reason, correctrix of the fancies, &c. 277, &c. Intendant, mistress, housekeeper, *ib.* Reason quitted, for what reason, when, how, iii. 246, 247, &c. Reason confined, what effect, i. 58, 59, 60.

I N D E X.

- Reasoning*, habit of, alone can make a reasoner, i. 58, 59, 60.
- Records*, recorders, compilers, registers in sacred matters, i. 310. iii. 191—198, &c. Ruled by law, *ib.*
- Rehearsal*, comedy, i. 224. iii. 229. 233.
- Religion*, virtue, how allied, founded, derived, maintained
See *Treatise*, 4. *viz.* The inquiry, first of vol. 2. Religion, a public leading, or national church, i. 13. Religion by law established, i. 311. iii. 59. See *Law*. Differences in religion, i. 66. See *Models*, *Modes*. Religious antipathy, i. 14. ii. 79. iii. 33. 50. 66. 212. Religious passion, iii. 29. Different aspects of religion, according to the views or aspects of divinity, 32. Power of fancy or imagination in religion, 56. Religion considered as a passion, ii. 72. Its influence, 39. Religion, ancient Grecian, iii. 103, 104, 105. Roman, Ægyptian, Syrian, 34, 35. Where first it grew unfociable, ii. 320, 321. Religion cruel enemy to virtue, by what means, 211. Religion liberal, illiberal, 225. Knavish religion, i. 107, 108. 114. iii. 103, &c. True foundation of religion, ii. 222, 223. Religion betrayed, 230. Overlaid, i. 82. Exhilaration of religion, iii. 79. 102. Different faces or representations of religion, with what design, 108, 109. Uniformity in religion. See *Uniformity*.
- Relish*, false, fatal to painting and the other arts, iii. 326.
- Resignation*, devout, false, ii. 47.
- Resolution*. See *Will*.
- Retirement*, agreeable, necessary, ii. 183.
- Revelation* judged by morals, i. 256. What previous and antecedent, i. 32. ii. 166. See *Authority*.
- Revolution*, the late happy one, i. 187. iii. 126. Revolution in the world and nature, ii. 13. 14. 177. 304, 314, &c. In ourselves, i. 245. ii. 194, 195. See *Self*.
- Rewards* and punishments of what use in the state, ii. 50. In families, 51. In religion, 52, 53. 225. Future rewards and punishments, wrong enforcement, i. 82. ii. 54, 55. Virtue for reward, not worth rewarding, i. 82. Reward most deserved, when unsought 85. No goodness or virtue in nature, if no motive besides reward 82.

I N D E X

- A knave not the less such, when reward and punishment alone make him honest in outward behaviour 107, 108. 149. Consciousness, only reward of friendship 85. See *Disinterestedness*, *Mercenariness*.
- Rhetoricians*, iii. 117.
- Rhetoric*. See *Declamation*, *Preaching*. In what part of a discourse its greatest energy should be employed, iii. 293, 294. Rhythmus, false and true, i. 187, iii. 218.
- Ridicule*, its rule, measure, test, i. 8, 9. See *Test*. Appeal to ridicule, 50. Affectation of it by pedants, 53. See *Banter*. Ridicule ridiculous, when half-way, lame, or leaning to one side, 67. Injudicious and imposing, when far strained, and beyond its size, 67. 68. 69. Nonsensical, when raised from contraries, 111. Nothing ridiculous but what is deformed, 110. Virtue not capable of being ridiculed, *ib*.
- Right* and wrong, ii. 25, 26. In nature, not from opinion, will, or law, 27. See *Opinion*, *Virtue*.
- Rites* or rituals by law established, i. 311.
- Rites*, ceremonies, habits, processions, pomp, their use and effect in religion, iii. 76, 77, 78.
- Roger*, Sir Roger, iii. 229.
- Roman* eloquence corrupted, iii. 18, 19. Monarchy. See *Monarchy*. Empire, rise and fall, i. 190, 191, 192. Emperors, iii. 34. 66. 75, 76. 200. See *Cæsars*. Worthies, i. 232. Romans old, raised from barbarity by Greece 192. 233, 234, 235. Their gradual refinement 216. 236. Growth of Heathen religion under the Romans, iii. 34.
- Romance*. See *Novel*.
- Rome* old, i. 190. iii. 193. Rome modern, i. 291. iii. 76. 194. See or court of Rome, iii. 199.
- Royal* preceptor, i. 185. See *Prince*. Royal pupils, 89. 183.
- Rule*. See *Law*. Rule of dispatch, i. 230.
- Rustics*, i. 164.

I N D E X.

S.

- S***acrifice* human, ii. 27. Familiar to the inhabitants of Palestine, iii. 102, 103. See *Abraham*, *Jephtha*
- Sacrifice* of forms, natures. See *Subordination*
- Sadducee*, iii. 64.
- Saint*, on what terms, iii. 105, 106. Female saints, 31.
- Saint-protectrices*, i. 236.
- Saint-errantry*, i. 16.
- Salvation*. See *Saving*
- Saracen's head*, i. 311.
- Satires*, Roman, their origin, i. 223. See *Atellan*, *Fescennin*.
- Satire*, English, 229. Spirit of satire, iii. 90.
- Satiric* and comic genius, style, i. 223, &c.
- Satirists*, true to virtue, i. 121. iii. 20. See *Poet*.
- Savage*. See *Goth*. *Savages*, i. 76.
- Savageness*, inroad whence, i. 81. See *Barbarians*.
- Saving*, of souls, i. 15. of complexions, 71.
- Saul*, i. 38. iii. 96.
- Scandal*, i. 215.
- Scene*, of the story of Hercules, to be laid in the country, iii. 314. To have nothing in it to call the eye off from the subject, 314, 315.
- Sceptical* conversation, i. 56, 57. 65, 66, &c.
- Scepticism*, support to reason, i. 56, 57. 65, 66, &c. See *Reason*. *Scepticism*, fashionable sort, ii. 169, 170. Defence of scepticism, iii. 59 — 65. Partial scepticism cause of vice and folly, i. 59, 60. See *Thinking*. *Scepticism*, remedy against the dogmatical spirit, 80. *Sceptical* wit, apology 81. *Scepticism* of a reverend divine, iii. 56, 57.
- Sceptics*, the advantages of their philosophy, ii. 169, 170. *Sceptic* personated, iii. 244. Modern sceptics dogmatized, ii. 190, 191. Real sceptic *ib.* & 194. Christian sceptic, iii. 60. See *Academy*, *Pyrrho*.
- Scholar* and gentleman, i. 286, &c. *Scholar*, ill read, 294. True scholar, or man well read, reads few authors, 295.

I N D E X.

Scholastic, i. 55. See *Style*. Scholastic brood, iii. 67. Scholastic weapons, 245.

School, inferior schools of arts and exercises teach truth and nature better than some higher, i. 286, 287, 288.

Sciences in general, i. 250. Mock-science, 247. Science of articulation, 250. Science. See *Art*.

Scripture, judgment of, i. 126, 127. Criticism, iii. 59, 60, 61. Scripture sacred and profane, 191 — 196. Sacred history, characters, scripture, subject to human criticism, philosophy, and rules of art, i. 127. ii. 222, 223. iii. 190 — 197. Scripture interpolated, suppressed, controverted, mangled, iii. 263, 264, &c. 273, 274, &c. See *Fathers of the church*. Variety of readings, controverted passages, books, copies, catalogues, 268, &c. Scripture fragile, volatile, 193.

Scythian. See *Anacharsis*, *Goth*.

Sea to drink, iii. 172, 173.

Secular. See *Arm*.

Sedition. See *Faction*.

Self, a man when himself, when not himself, i. 279. See *Identity*, *Revolution*. What makes a man himself, ii. 207, 208. Self-love. See *Love*. True self-love depends on knowledge of self, i. 102, 176, &c. Self-knowledge, i. 147, 148. iii. 155, 242, &c.

Selfishness, i. 98, 99, 100, &c. ii. 16, 242. Destructive of self-enjoyment, i. 273. iii. 249, 250. Improved by certain philosophers, i. 106, &c. Folly of the endeavour, ii. 255.

Self-inspection, i. 169. Acknowledgment of a better self, 242. Self-reverence, 149, 150, 151. Self-abasement, i. 285. iii. 103 — 108. See *Interest*, *Sycophants*.

Seneca, his character, genius, style, iii. 18, 19, 20.

Sensations. See *Pain*, *Pleasure*.

Sense impaired, ii. 24. Sense in morals, life, i. 113. iii. 185, 186. See *Nose*, *Taste*. Common sense, various signification, i. 64, 65, &c. Common sense, honest sense, i. 114. iii. 168, &c. Sense, equivocal, in painting, to be avoided in the story of Hercules, iii. 309.

I N D E X.

Sensus communis interpreted, i. 87, 88.

Sermon, law of, ii. 233. See *Preaching*.

Sexes. See *Love*, *Women*. Fair sex seduced by tales, impostures, i. 299, 300, 301. Inclined to monstrous loves, according to our ancient poet, 299. See *Ladies*, *Superstition*. Won by appearance of submission, and tendernefs, iii. 95. Exposition of the modesty of the sex in barbarous nations, i. 235. Better conduct of the more polite, *ib.* Prerogatives of the fair sex, ii. 159. Writings, ii. 160. iii. 210, 211, Taste and humor, ii. 223. iii. 137, 212.

Sextus Empiricus cited, i. 73.

Shepherds. See *Arcadia*.

Sibyl, i. 39. iii. 192. Sibylline scripture, iii. 187. 192, 193.

Sight, single, simple; τὸ εὐσύννοτον, i. 123.

Silence, to be distinctly characterised in the figure of Hercules, during the contention, iii. 301.

Simplicity. See *Style*.

Sinner against good-breeding, i. 144. Against grammar, *ib.*

Sins, i. 143. iii. 146.

Slavery, court-slavery, i. 120, 121. ii. 97. 98. iii. 141 — 146. 173. Slavery of vice, iii. 254, &c. 258, &c. Slavish principles and spirit, 124. 141. 208. 254 — 260.

Smithfield, i. 23.

Social animals, iii. 183. Social enjoyment. See *Enjoyment*.

Social affection. See *Affection*.

Society. See *Government*, *Tribe*. Early state and progress of society, i. 93. Natural growth of a society, or national community, 94, 95. Principle of society, natural, 93, 94, 95, &c. Proved from sedition, war, 96, 97. from the greatest opposers of this principle, 76, 77, 78. from its force in ill, as well as in good passions, 12. Society in nature, not from art or compact, 93. See *Nature*. Religious orders or societies, 97.

Socrates, i. 25. 219. iii. 178. 201. See *Railery*, *Chartæ*

I N D E X.

- Socraticæ, i. 166, &c. 177. Socratics, their characters, i. 219, 220, &c.
- Soil, climate, region, iii. 121, &c. Patriots of the soil, 125.
- Solemnity: Folly and amusements become solemn, i. 67.
See *Gravity*, *Imposture*.
- Soliloquy, see treatise of, viz. vol. i. p. 131.
- Solitude, &c. i. 151. ii. 183, 184.
- Solomon, British, i. 185.
- Solon, iii. 204.
- Sophocles, i. 211.
- Sophists once honorable, and of highest dignity, i. 208.
Sophists language-masters, iii. 117. First teachers of philosophy, 113. Sophistry, i. 61. See *Imposture*.
- Sot, sottishness, i. 266, 267.
- Soul, two, in man, i. 159.
- Sounds, articulate, i. 248, 249.
- Space, vacuum, i. 259. Space, plenitude, substance, mode, matter, immateriality. See *Metaphysics*.
- Species, interest of, ii, 9, 10. A whole species subservient to some other, 11, 12. Species of fair, i. 120, 121.
See *Beauty*, *Decorum*, *Fair*. Moral species, or appearances, overbearing all other, ii. 83. iii. 27, 28.
- Spectres, i. 50. iii. 247.
- Spencer, de legibus Heb. iii. 46, &c.
- Spider, ii. 12.
- Spirits, judgment of others, i. 46. Of our own, *ib.* Fear of spirits, in an odd sense. See *Pneumatophobia*. Animal spirits confined, i. 59.
- Spleen, i. 15. Objected to critics and satirists, iii. 90, 91.
- Stage of the world, ii. 151. Stage, English, i. 234. iii. 211, 212. 239, 240. See *Drama*. Stage allowed to instruct as well as the pulpit, i. 310. iii. 211.
- Standard of manners, breeding, gentility, iii. 148, &c.
- Standard of wit, English, i. 229. iii. 224 — 230. &c.
- Standard of moral rectitude, i. 90. 256. 303. iii. 251.
- Statuary, Lysippus, i. 196. Statuary and statuaries. See *Painters*, Statuary, with other arts and letters, destroyed

I N D E X.

- by ancient bishops of Rome and Greece, iii. 197, 198, &c.
- Statute* against criticism, iii. 224. 230, 231. Statute of mort-main and repeal among the ancients, 37. 41. 64. See *Hierarchy*. Statutes. See *Laws*.
- Stories*, old wives, i. 3. Told up and down, 30.
- Storks*, iii. 66.
- Strabo* cited, i. 180. 217. iii. 127.
- Styles* and manners of writing, the several kinds, i. 208, 209, 210, &c. 221, 222. Didactive, preceptive style, i. 19. iii. 236. Scholastic, pedantic, i. 221, &c. iii. 118. Metaphoric, i. 208, 209. iii. 117. 216, 217. 280. Methodic, i. 221, 222. Simple, *ib.* & iii. 17, 18. 117. &c. Sublime, i. 221, 222, &c. 238. iii. 154. See *Bombast*, *Comic*, *Farce*, *Sublime*, *Tragic*. Heavenly style in painting, iii. 190. See *Painter*, *Painting*. Style of our blessed Saviour, 101, 102. English style in prose and verse, 218, 219, 220. 228, 229, &c. Gouty joints, darning-work, &c. iii. 219. Discord, dissonance, *ib.* See *Monosyllables*.
- Subjects*, multiplication of them in a piece perplexes the ordinance of a work, iii. 320.
- Sublime*, iii. 116. Sublime in speaking, i. 5. 288. False and true, 209, &c. See *Bombast*. Sublime of characters, 289. of actions, iii. 28. Sublime in things. See *Admiration*, *Beauty*.
- Subordination* necessary in nature, ii. 176 — 179. What required to make it perfect, iii. 320.
- Succession* church-succession, i. 309. iii. 280. Succession of wit and humor, i. 218, &c. See *Lineage*.
- Superstition*, ii. 137. See *Ægypt* *Enthusiasm*, *Hierarchy*, *Magi*, *Miracle*, *Priest*, *Tales*. Difference between superstition and enthusiasm, iii. 32. Anti-superstitious passion or counter-enthusiasm, i. 74, 75, &c. iii. 54. 55. Superstition, fear, i. 254. iii. 54. Superstition the most enslaving and worst of vices, iii. 252. Female superstition, i. 299, 300. iii. 39. See *Ladies*. Picture or character of superstition, iii. 103 — 108. Superstition destructive of

I N D E X.

- moral rectitude, ii. 36 — 41. The superstitious are willing Atheists, iii. 103, 104, 105. Unable to believe as they desire, *ib.* Quantity of superstition answers to the number of religious dealers, iii. 38.
- Supineness*, proper for the figure of Pleasure, iii. 309.
- Surgeons*, spiritual, iii. 79. 88.
- Surgery* in politics and religion, i. 12, 13. iii. 88. Inward surgery, i. 136.
- Sweden*. See *Denmark*.
- Sycophants* in religion, i. 29. iii. 103—108. See *Beggars*, *Flattery*.
- Symbol*. See *Creed*, *Test*, *Watch-word*.
- Symmetry*, i. 303. iii. 218. Real, iii. 139. 148. See *Beauty*, *Decorum*.
- Synods*, i. 303, &c.
- Syria*, its religion, iii. 34. 35. See *Ægypt*, *Jews*, *Palestine*.
- System*, a fool by method and system, i. 251. See *Hypothesis*. Systems imposed by authority, i. 81. System of the world, ii. 238. Particular systems, and their single parts, united in one system, 13, &c. 236, 237.

T

- T** *Ablature*, specifically distinguished, iii. 289, 290. The design of it should be immediately apparent, 315.
- Tacitus* cited, iii. 45. 209.
- Tail*, works or pieces without head or tail. See *Works*.
- Tale*, its use, upon occasion, ii. 166. Tales, love of, and monstrous stories, its affinity with the passion of superstition, i. 298, 299. Tremendous tale-tellers *ib.*
- Talkers*, i. 144.
- Tartar*. See *Goth*. Tartar-notion, i. 69.
- Taste*, explanation of a right one in manners, morals, government, iii. 136 — 140, &c. In wit and ingenuity, how raised and improved, i. 207. 215. A taste in morals, life, i. 304. iii. 146, 147, &c. See *Nose*, *Sense*. Moral taste or sense, how acquired, iii. 332. Taste in inward beauty

I N D E X.

- and characters founded in nature, i. 289. iii. 251, 252.
 True taste or judgment in life, how gained, i. 291. Lies
 in our own power, iii. 155. Virtuoso taste, i. 116. Ruin
 of taste from multiplicity of reading, 294, 295, &c.
 Taste barbarised, 296. Reformation of taste, great work,
 304. Good taste in the polite world, iii. 128, 129.
Taylor, Bishop, cited, i. 84. iii. 33. 270—272, &c.
Temper, the truly divine, i. 30. Best or worst in man,
 ii. 79. What makes a good temper, 94, 95. The fittest
 temper for judgment, 9. 27, 28.
Temperance, how valuable, ii. 204, 205, 206. Set in
 opposition to avarice and ambition, 207, 208.
Terence, i. 288. iii. 154. 217.
Terra incognita, i. 296. iii. 174.
Test, religious tests, problems, &c. i. 49, 50. See *Creed*,
Symbol. Test of ridicule, 7. 24, 25. 50. See *Criterion*.
 Test of gravity, 61, 62.
Testimony, human, i. 38. 127, 128. ii. 275. Divine,
 ii. 276, 277.
Theatre. See *Stage-play*.
Theism, how it tends to promote virtue, ii. 56, 57. Com-
 pared in that respect with Atheism, 57, 58. Theism, to
 what opposed, 172. Faith of Theism, 297.
Theist, the belief of a perfect one, ii. 5. Theists, nominal,
 real, 222, 223.
Theogony, *Theology*, Heathen and Christian, i. 308, 309,
 &c. See *Divinity*.
Theology, i. 308.
Thinking: Freethinking, iii. 246, &c. Freethinkers, *ib*.
 Halfthinkers, a sorry species, 248. Dishonesty, a half-
 thought, 245, &c. Under-thinking, or short-thinking,
 its nature, cause, and consequences, 249, 250, &c.
 See *Scepticism*.
Thorns, grapes not from, i. 247.
Thought, whether able to produce matter, ii. 173.
Thucydides, iii. 204.
Tiberius, i. 89.
Tillotson, Abp, cited, iii. 272—276.

I N D E X.

- Time*, points of, the judgment of Hercules capable of being divided into three, iii. 292. The proper circumstances of each, 292, 293. Objections against a fourth, 293. A future time may be expressed by enigmatical devices, 294.
- Tire-men*, i. 70.
- Title* of a work last determined, iii. 22.
- Titles*, i. 176.
- Toilette*, a general's, iii. 154.
- Toleration*. See *Liberty*, *Persecution*. When and on what account opposed, iii. 91, 92. When admired and recommended, *ib.* See *Charity*.
- Top*, child's top, i. 162. Works without top or bottom. See *Works*.
- Tragedy*, genius of, i. 188, 189. See *Euripides*. Prior to comedy, 210, 211, &c. iii. 117. Tragedy, modern; love and honor, i. 237, 238. See *Play*, *Theatre*. English tragedy, iii. 51, 52. Moral and virtue of tragedy, i. 272, 273. iii. 256.
- Tragi-comedy*, iii. 6.
- Tragic* aspect of certain divines, i. 53, 54. 61.
- Trajan*, i. 197.
- Traveller*, or travel-writer in form, i. 297. History of certain travelling-gentlemen, iii. 82, &c.
- Treachery*, negative vice, ii. 138.
- Treatise*. See *Piece*.
- Tribe*, formation of a clan or tribe, i. 94. of federate tribes, mixed colonies, &c. *ib.* & 204, &c.
- Trustee*. See *Guardian*.
- Truth* bears all lights, i. 7. 25, 26. 50. Ridicule, a light or criterion to truth, 50. Truth injured by over-much discovery, 51. Face of truth suffers by masks, 71. Truth. See *Beauty*, powerful, 2. Principal even in fable and fiction, *ib.* Poetic truth, i. 123. &c. 168. 169. 289. 304. iii. 148, &c. 217, 218. 232. Plastic or graphical truth, i. 126. iii. 150. Historical, critical, moral, philosophical, and religious truth, *ib.* & 150. &c. See *History*, *Revelation*. Magna, et prævalebit, i. 128. Truth of work, 225, 226. &c. Truth of actions, *ib.* Verum atque decens, iii. 135. Strength of perception no

I N D E X.

- sure ground of truth, 57. Truth, historical, to give way to poetic or probable, in painting, 211, 212, 213. Truth, poetic, presupposes prognostication, 294.
Trial. See *Criterion*, *Proof*, *Test*.
Turks, i. 21. Turkish policy destructive of letters, i. 196. iii. 194, 195.
Turn. See *Vicissitude*.
Tutor. See *Pedagogue*. Tutor and pupil, i. 183. The age not to be tutored, 49.
Tyranny, i. 90. Worshipped, 189. See *Absolute*, *Arbitrary*, *Force*.
Tyros in philosophy, iii. 30.

U.

- U***ndermining* or sapping method in wit and philosophy, iii. 111.
Understanding and eyes fitted to so much light, and no more, i. 51. Plot of mankind against their own understanding, iii. 84, 85, &c.
Uniformity in religion, hopeful project, i. 14, 15. How practicable, iii. 75, 76. 85, 86. 88. 263, 264.
Unity in the universe, ii. 210, 211.
Universe, ii. 174, 175. iii. 186, 187.
University-wit, i. 53. See *Pedant*. *University-learning*, 247, 248. 257. 287, 288, 289. *University-chair*, ii. 212, &c. iii. 238. Modern universities not very fortunate in the education of youth, i. 287, 288, 289.
Urbanity, i. 59.

V.

- V***anity*, i. 255.
Varro, iii. 193.
Venus: The Venus, venustum, or grace in things, i. 119. 289, 290. See *Decorum*. Every one a Venus, 119.
Vice, artifice of, i. 150. Vice in opinion, ii. 26. Causes of vice, 30. Most essential part of vice, 78, 79. See *Slavery*.
Vicissitude, law of discourse and conversation, i. 58.
View. See *Sight*.

I N D E X

Virgil, i. 39. ii. 183, 184. 284. iii. 192.

Virtue, honesty, and justice in nature, not from will or law, i. 92. 303, 304. Nothing to do with fashion or vogue, *ib.* & 24. Independent of opinion, and above the world, 227. Virtue the truth and symmetry of manners. See *Harmony*, *Music*, *Proportion*, *Symmetry*. Beauty of virtue, i. 119, 120. Virtue, fashion and name only in the sense of some fashionable moralists, 67. 77, 78. 105, &c. 303. Less a sufferer by being concealed than betrayed, 81, 82. Overlaid by its nurses, *ib.* Underpropped, *ib.* Forfeited, ii. 24. Trial of virtue, 27, 28. Degrees of Virtue, 29, 30. Causes of virtue, 32. Virtue degraded and defaced, 209. See *Religion*. Virtue made mercenary, i. 82. Heroic virtue, 85. Virtue and morals demonstrated. See *Vol.* 2. treatise 4. and vol. 3. p. 161, 162, &c. Virtue incapable of being ridiculed, i. 110. See *Jest*, *Raillery*, *Ridicule*. Virtue, her figure in the piece, iii. 303, 304. To be drawn standing, 302. How habited, *ib.* Her proper attitude, 304. Her palace not to be inserted, 314.

Virtuosi, iii. 130, 151. ii. 150. 326. Mock virtuoso or pedant of the kind, i. 294. iii. 130, 131. Virtuosi and philosophers compared, iii. 130, 131.

Virtuoso-lovers, i. 117, 118, 159. ii. 150. 326. Virtuoso-passion, iii. 154. Virtuoso-taste. See *Taste*.

Virtuosoship, a step towards virtue, i. 286. iii. 133. Science of virtuoso, and that of virtue, almost the same, i. 291.

Visionaries. See *Fanatics*.

Vitruvius, iii. 149.

Voluntier in faith, i. 3. in morals, 168.

Vossius, *If. de viribus rhythm*, iii. 218.

W

WAR, passion of heroic spirits, why, i. 95. England seat of war, whence feared, iii. 123, 124.

Watchmaker, i. 253.

Watch-word in divinity, iii. 50.

Whole, a whole and parts, i. 123, 179. ii. 235. iii. 215. The whole, a system complete, ii. 236. iii. 289, 290.

I N D E X.

- Will*, freedom of, i. 160. Resolution and will a nose of wax, 159. Top or foot-ball, 162. Will insured, ascertained, *ib.* Readiness to obey the first motion of will, is impotence and slavery, ii. 190. Will and power no rule of good or just, i. 90, 91. 106. See *Arbitrary*. Will, (testament), power and practice of the priesthood in making people's wills, iii. 66. 75.
- Wisdom* in permitting folly, i. 10, 11. *Wisdom*, as well as charity, begins at home, 163.
- Wise* men of Greece, i. 75.
- Wit*, mere or sheer wit, iii. 2. Mannerly wit can hurt no honest cause, i. 81. Orthodox wit, iii. 241, 242. Lay wit, 241. Bottom of wit enlarged, 3. Lineage of wit. See *Lineage*. Separate provinces of wit and wisdom, 5. Generation and succession of our national and modern wit, 223, &c. Freedom of wit, a cure to false wit, i. 15. 53. Liberty of wit, 57. See *Freedom*, *Liberty*. Liberty of wit and trade parallel, 57. False wit, how proved, 61, 62. Men frightened, not laughed out of their wits, 81. Wit and humor. See *Treatise*, 2. viz. vol. 1. p. 47, &c. & iii. 81, &c.
- Wits* or poets, offspring of, iii. 227. Wits by patent *ib.* Stratagem of affected wits, iii. 248.
- Witches*, i. 127, 128.
- Wolf*, silly comparison of man and wolves, i. 73, 74. 78. 100, 101. ii. 225.
- Women*. See *Lady*, *Sex*. Women spectators, judges of combats, duels, amphitheatrical spectacles, masculine games, i. 235, 236. ii. 160. Judges of the state, and poetical performance, i. 234, 235. &c. Flattery of their taste by poets, i. 234. 237, 238. iii. 215, 216. Silly women won by preachers, i. 300. Forsake courteous knights for black inchanters, *ib.* Follow the hero of a black tribe, *ib.* Women who live by prostitution, ii. 105.
- Wonder*, wonderment, i. 124, 125, 126. &c. ii. 270, &c. See *Admiration*.
- Work*. See *Piece*. Truth of work, i. 225, &c.
- Works* without head or tail, beginning or end, i. 126, 127. iii. 7. 20. What contributes to the perfection of a work, ii. 153. *Workman*. See *Artisan*.

INDEX

World, iii. 27. See *Universe*.
Worship, vitious, ii. 26, 27.
Worth and baseness acknowledged, ii. 348, &c.
Wrestler, i. 167.
Writer. See *Author*. Ancient writer de mundo, iii. 218.
 Just writer, an able traveller or horseman, iii. 21. Modern
 writers, their foundation, polity, state, mystery, 2. 3. 4.
 5. 6, &c. 224, 225. &c. See-saw of modern writers 21.
 Post-way, *ib*.
Writings. See *Essay*, *Memoir*, *Miscellany*.
Writing, fashionable model of, iii. 22. See *Correctness*,
Critic, *Incorrectness*, *Penmen*.
Wrong, right and wrong, what, ii. 24, 25, 26. See *Right*,
Virtue

X

Xenocrates, i. 218.
Xenophon, i. 287. iii. 205. His commentaries, i. 194.
 His genius, character, style, i. 220. iii. 205.

Z

Zeal and knavery, i. 113, 114, 115. ii. 270. iii. 103.
 Imprudent zeal, ii. 54. Zeal, compound of superstition
 and enthusiasm, iii. 31, 32. Offensive and defensive 68.
 71, &c. See *Bigotry*, *Persecution*. Amorous zeal, 31.
Zealots bear no raillery, i. 49. Pretend to rally others 50.
 Characters of modern zealots, iii. 180, 181.
Zealot-writers, their grimace, i. 53, 54. Picture *ib*. Affecta-
 tion of pleasantry and humor *ib*. & iii. 241. character
 of a zealot-author, i. 54, 55. Anti-zealots i. 77. iii. 53, 54.
Zealous charity for the conversion of our neighbours, how
 far suspicious, iii. 88, 89. 92, 93.

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